MILITARY  MISCELLANIES, 


BY 


JAMES  B.   FRY, 

RETIRED  ASSISTANT  ADJUTANT-GENERAL,  RANK  OF  COLONEL, 
BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL,  U.  S.  A. 


11  It  fiufficcth  not  to  the  strength  o/  the  armes  to  have  flesh,  blood 
and  bonex,  tin-less  then  have  also  siti.cwes,  to  stretch  out  and  pull  in 
for  the  defence  of  the  hody;  so  it  sufflceth  not  in  an  army  to  have 
VICTUALS,  for  the  maintenance  of  it;  ARMOUR  and  WEAPONS  for  the 
defence  of  it;  unless  it  have  MONEY  also,  the  SINEWES  OP  WARRE." 


"  Wherefore,  seeing  that  money  is  such  a  real  advantage  in  the 
warres,  we  may  conclude,  that  whosoever  prepareth  forwarre  must 
first  be  provided  of  MONEY,  the  Sinewes  thereof.""— (Ward's  "An- 
imadversions of  Warre."  London,  1639.) 


BREISTTANO'S. 

1889. 


'-  'opyright  liy 

JAMES  B/FRY. 


PRESS  OP 

A.  G.  SHERWOOD  <fe  CO. 
NEW  YORK. 


'    / 


PEEFACE. 

THERE  is  nothing  new  in  this  compilation.  My 
purpose  is  to  put  some  facts,  opinions  and  comments 
into  book-form  for  the  convenience  of  such  military 
students  as  may  find  occasion  to  refer  to  them. 


MI81666 


<  <  73  U T  the  fact  is  that  here  as  elsewhere,  poetry  has  reached 
the  truth  while  science  and  common  sense  have  missed  it. 
It  has  distinguished,  as  in  spite  of  all  mercenary  and  feeble 
sophistry,  men  ever  will  distinguish,  war  from  mere  bloodshed. 
It  has  discerned  the  higher  feelings  which  lie  beneath  its  re- 
volting features.  Carnage  is  terrible.  The  conversion  of  pro- 
ducers into  destroyers  is  a  calamity.  Death,  and  insults  to 
women  worse  than  death,  and  human  features  obliterated  beneath 
the  hoof  of  the  war-horse,  and  reeking  hospitals,  and  ruined 
commerce,  and  violated  homes,  and  broken  hearts — they  are  all 
awful.  But  there  is  something  worse  than  death.  Cowardice 
is  worse.  And  the  decay  of  enthusiasm  and  manliness  is  icorse. 
And  it  is  worse  than  death,  aye,  worse  than  a  hundred  thou- 
sand deaths,  when  a  people  has  gravitated  down  into  the  creed 
that  the  '  wealth  of  nations '  consists  not  in  generous  hearts  — 
\fire  in  each  breast  and  freedom  on  each  broiv' — in  national 
virtues  and  primitive  simplicity,  and  heroic  endurance,  and 
preference  of  duty  to  life — not  in  men,  but  in  silk  and  cotton, 
and  something  that  they  call  '  Capital. '  Peace  is  blessed.  Peace 
arising  out  of  charity  But  peace  springing  out  of  the  calcu- 
lations of  selfishness  is  not  blessed.  If  the  price  to  be  paid 
for  peace  is  this,  that  wealth  accumulate  and  men  decay,  better 
far  that  every  street  in  every  town  of  our  once  noble  country 
should  run  blood."— Lecture  of  Rev.  F.  W.  Robertson,  Febru- 
ary, 1852,  before  Mechanics'  Institution,  Brighton,  England. 


CONTENTS. 


PAET  I. 

PAGE. 

I.     NOTES  ON  THEOEETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  MILITARY 

MATTERS: 9 

1.  CONGRESS.  2.  THE  PRESIDENT.  3.  OFFICE.  4. 
COMMISSION.  5.  GRADE.  6.  RANK.  7.  TITLE.  8.  PRO- 
MOTION. 9.  TRANSFER.  10.  AUTHORITY.  11.  BREVET. 
12.  RETIREMENT.  13.  REDUCING  PAY.  14.  RENTING  QUAR- 
TERS. 15.  CHANGING  STATION.  16.  FORAGE  FOR  OFFI- 
CERS' HORSES.  17.  A  SURVIVORSHIP  ANNUITY  SOCIETY. 
18.  DUTIES  OF  AN  ADJUTANT-GENERAL.  19.  ARMY  REGU- 
LATIONS. 
II.  THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY, 64 

III.  JUSTICE  IN  THE  ARMY, 147 

IV.  LAW  IN  THE  ARMY, 152 

V.     OBEDIENCE  IN  THE  ARMY, 161 

VI.  JUSTICE  FOR  THE  ARMY, 177 

VII.  THE  HONOR  OF  THE  ARMY, 180 

VIII.  A  MILITARY  COURT  OF  APPEALS,  182 
IX.  AN  ELASTIC  REGULAR  ARMY, 196 

X.     ADMISSION  TO   THE   MILITARY  ACADEMY,         .         .         204 
XL     THE  MILITIA,  '257 


CONTENTS, 

PART  II. 

PAGE. 

I.     ABRAHAM  LINCOLN, 277 

II.     AN  ACQUAINTANCE  WITH  GRANT,       ....  292 

III.  GRANT  AND  MATTHEW  ARNOLD, 311 

IV.  HALLECK  AND  GRANT.     MISUNDERSTANDINGS,      .  326 
V.     NICOLA Y'S  "OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION,"     .         .         .  349 

VI.     THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN,       .         .         .         .  '  357 

VII.     SMITH'S    "CONFEDERATE    WAR    PAPERS"    (BATTLE 

OF  SEVEN  PINES), 401 

VIII.     DODGE'S  "CAMPAIGN  OF  CHANCELLORS VILLE,"     .  427 

IX.     DOUBLED  AY'S  "  CHANCELLORSVILLE   AND   GETTYS- 
BURG,"      434 

X.     DE  TROBRIAND'S    "FOUR   YEARS    WITH    THE  ARMY 

OF  THE    POTOMAC," 443 

XI.     PITTINGER'S  "  CAPTURING  A  LOCOMOTIVE,"        .         .  455 

XII.     KEYES'S  "FIFTY  YEARS'  OBSERVATION  OF  MEN  AND 

EVENTS," ...  462 

XIII.  KILLED    BY   A     BROTHER     SOLDIER     (NELSON    AND 

DAVIS), .486 

XIV.  CUSTER'S  DEFEAT  BY  SITTING  BULL,          ...  506 
XV.     FARRAR'S  "  MILITARY  MANNERS  AND  CUSTOMS,"      .  512 

APPENDIX.  521 


AETICLE  I. 


Notes  on  Theoretical   and    Practical 
Military  Matters. 


I. — CONGRESS. 

THE  Constitution  gives  Congress  power  to  provide 
for  the  common  defence  and  general  "  welfare  of  the 
United  States,"  "  to  declare  war,"  "  to  raise  and  sup- 
port armies,"  "  and  to  make  rules  for  the  government 
and  regulation  of  the  land  and  naval  forces." 

The  responsibility  for  the  common  defence  resting 
on  Congress,  all  the  power  essential  to  meet  it  is  vested 
in  Congress,  which  possesses  supreme  control  of  the 
land  and  naval  forces.  "  There  can  be  no  limitation 
of  that  authority,  which  is  to  provide  for  the  defence 
and  protection  of  the  community  in  any  matter  essen- 
tial to  its  efficacy ;  that  is,  in  any  matter  essential  to 
the  formation,  direction  and  support  of  the  national 
forces."  * 

Congress,  by  virtue  of  its  constitutional  powers, 
may  make  laws  governing  appointments  and  promo- 
tions in  the  Army ;  and  without  trenching  on  the  rights 
of  the  appointing  power,  may  prescribe  how  original 
or  other  vacancies  shall  be  filled.  These  appointments 
are  "  otherwise  provided  for "  in  the  clauses  of  the 
Constitution  which  empower  Congress  to  raise  armies 

*  Federalist,  No.  XXIII.     Hamilton. 


10 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


and  make  rules  for  their  government  and  regulation.* 
[See  appendix  A.] 

II. THE    PRESIDENT. 

The  Constitution  provides  that  "  the  President  shall 
be  Commander-in-chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy  of  the 
United  States  and  of  the  militia  of  the  several  States 
when  called  into  the  actual  service  of  the  United 
States." 

"  No  Act  of  Congress,  no  act  even  of  the  President 
himself,  can  by  constitutional  possibility  authorize  or 
create  any  military  officer  not  subordinate  to  the 
President."  (7  "  Opinions,"  465.) 

The  President  is  the  first  General  and  the  first 
Admiral  of  the  United  States,  but  he  exercises  his 
command  in  conformity  to  such  rules  for  the  govern- 
ment and  regulation  of  the  land  and  naval  forces  as 
Congress,  the  supreme  authority,  may  prescribe. 

As  Chief  Magistrate  "  he  shall  nominate  and,  by 
and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,f  shall 

*  For  exercise  of  power  over  appointments  by  early  Congresses  see 
note  t,  page  7. 

t  Commissioned  officers  have  not  in  all  cases  been  confirmed  by  the 
Senate  under  the  present  Constitution.  The  President  was  empowered 
"alone  to  appoint"  those  of  the  "levies,"  March  3,  1791,  and  he 
' '  alone  ' '  was  authorized  to  officer  the  Cavalry  provided  for  by  the  Act  of 
1792.  In  other  instances  he  has  been  required  only  to  submit  the  names 
of  field  and  higher  officers  to  the  Senate.  By  the  Act  of  July  6,  1812, 
the  President  was  authorized  alone  to  confer  brevet  rank  on  officers, 
while  the  Act  of  April  16,  1818,  requires  that  "  no  brevet  commission 
shall  hereafter  be  conferred  but  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  Senate."  Thus,  as  early  as  1791,  Congress  appears  to  have  acted 
on  the  understanding  that  it  could  except  army  appointments  from  the 
operation  of  the  general  constitutional  provision  concerning  appoint- 
ments ;  in  other  words,  that  army  appointments  belonged  among  those 
"  otherwise  provided  for  "  by  the  Constitution  itself. 


THEORETIC A.L  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES. 

appoint  Ambassadors,  other  public  Ministers  and  Con- 
suls, Judges  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  all  other  officers 
of  the  United  States  whose  appointments  are  not  herein 
otherwise  provided  for,  and  which  *  shall  be  estab- 
lished by  law.  But  the  Congress  may  by  law  vest 
the  appointment  of  such  inferior  officers  f  as  they  think 
proper  in  the  President  alone,  in  the  courts  of  law,  or 
in  the  heads  of  departments." 

in. — OFFICE. 

Office  is  a  public  station  or  employment  established 
by  law.J  In  its  broadest  sense  it  implies  public  du- 
ties and  powers  and  personal  rights  and  privileges. 

An  officer  is  one  who  is  invested  with  an  office. 

*  The  meaning  of  this  evidently  is  whose  offices  "  shall  be  established 
toy  law." 

t  A  decision  was  rendered  by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court 
in  the  case  of  the  United  States  against  Douglas  Smith.  Douglas 
Smith  was  a  clerk  in  the  office  of  the  Collector  of  Customs  at  New  York, 
and  in  1886  he  was  indicted  under  section  5,490  of  the  Revised  Statutes 
for  embezzlement  of  public  moneys.  The  Court  below  was  divided  in 
opinion  as  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  indictment,  and  certified  to  this 
court  the  following  questions : 

"  First— Is  a  clerk  in  the  office  of  the  Collector  of  Customs  for  the 
city  of  New  York,  appointed  by  the  Collector  with  the  approbation  of 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  by  virtue  of  section  2,634  of  the  Revised 
Statutes,  a  person  charged  by  any  act  of  Congress  with  the  safe 
keeping  of  public  moneys  ? 

"  Second— Was  the  defendant  appointed  by  the  head  of  a  depart- 
ment within  the  meaning  of  the  constitutional  provisions '  upon  the 
subject  of  the  appointing  power?  " 

This  Court,  in  an  opinion  by  Mr.  Justice  Field,  answers  both  of 
these  questions  in  the  negative  and  holds  that  section  3,639  of  the 
Revised  Statutes  concerning  the  safe  keeping  of  public  moneys  does  not 
apply  to  Collectors'  clerks,  and  that  such  clerks  are  not  appointed  by 
the  head  of  any  department  within  the  meaning  of  any  constitutional 
provision. 

See   Bouvier's  Law  Diet.,  p.  255;  Wharton's  Law  Lexicon,    p. 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

The  Constitution  requires  that  the  President  "  shall 
commission  all  the  officers  of  the  United  States." 

Offices  in  the  Army  are  grouped  in  grades.* 

Names  are  given  to  the  grades  and  offices  in  the 
different  corps  of  the  Army.  For  example,  the  name 
of  a  grade  in  one  corps  is  Assistant  Surgeon-General. 
That  is  also  the  name  of  the  office  constituting  that 
grade.  The  law  provides  that  the  incumbent  of  that 
office  shall  have  the  rank  of  Colonel. 

The  names  of  grades  in  some  other  corps  are  Colonel, 
Lieutenant-Colonel,  Major, f  etc.,  and  the  names  of  offices 
in  those  grades  are  Colonel  of  Cavalry,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  of  Artillery,  Major  of  Infantry,  etc.  In  these 
cases  rank  is  expressed  in  the  term  used  by  the  law 
for  defining  the  office.  The  result  would  be  the  same, 
if  the  law  in  the  one  case  had  called  the  grades  by 
other  names — Chief  of  Cavalry,  Assistant  Chief  of 

537;  Blackstone's  Commentaries:  U.  S.  Supreme  Court,  6  Wallace, 
393  (42  New  York  Superior  Court,  481)  ;  Webster  and  other  lexicog- 
raphers ;  Tlie  Nation  of  Aug.  10,  1882. 

In  a  decision  rendered  March,  1884,  concerning  the  case  of  an 
officer  of  the  Army  on  the  retired  list,  Judge  Lawrence,  First  Comp- 
troller of  the  Treasury,  says :  "  An  office  cannot  exist  unless  it  be  es- 
tablished or  recognized  by  the  Constitution  or  by  Act  of  Congress. "  "  A 
retired  Army  officer  is  an  officer  in  the  public  service." 

*  See  Grades. 

t  The  following  definitions  are  in  Bailey's  English  Dictionary 
(1747) : 

Colonel.     The  Chief  Commander  of  a  regiment  of  horse  or  foot. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  (of  Horse  or  Foot).  An  officer  who  is  next  in 
post  to  the  Colonel,  and  commands  in  his  absence. 

Major  of  a  Regiment  is  the  next  in  office  to  a  Lieut. -Colonel,  etc. 

Captain.  A  head  officer  of  a  Troop  of  Horse,  or  a  Company  of 
Foot,  or  of  a  Ship  of  War. 

Lieutenant  (of  Horse  or  Foot)  is  next  to  the  Captain,  and  com- 
mands in  his  absence. 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.  13 

Artillery,  etc.,  for  example — and  then  had  provided 
that  the  incumbent  of  the  office  of  Chief  of  Cavalry 
and  of  the  office  of  Assistant  Chief  of  Artillery  should 
have,  respectively,  the  rank  of  Colonel  and  Lieutenant- 
Colonel.  In  other  words,  the  mere  fact  that  rank  in 
some  cases  is  expressed  in  the  designation  of  office  does 
not  make  it  differ  from  rank  specifically  provided  for 
an  incumbent  of  office.  The  same  principle  governs. 
Office  in  both  cases  is  the  source  of  authority  in  the 
corps  ;  rank  is  a  legal  incident  of  office,  a  degree  of  dig- 
nity, which  fixes  an  order  of  precedence  to  be  observed 
in  the  exercise  of  authority  beyond  the  corps. 

iv. — COMMISSION. 

"  The  commission,"  said  General  Macomb,  "is  the  in- 
strument of  authority."  It  is  an  official  document  of 
two  distinct  parts.  The  first  part  is  evidence  or  patent 
of  office  with  rights  and  privileges.  It  fixes  both  the 
grade  and  rank  of  the  officer.  The  language  of  the 
President  is  :  "  By  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of 

the  Senate  I  do  appoint  him (naming  office,  grade 

and  corps)  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  to  rank 
as  such  from  the day  of ." 

The  second  part  confers  the  authority  of  the  office 
and  imposes  its  duties  and  obligations.  It  -charges 
the  appointee  "  carefully  and  diligently  to  discharge 
the  duties  of by  doing  and  performing  all  man- 
ner of  things  thereunto  belonging."  It  directs  "  all 
officers  and  soldiers  under  his  command  to  be  obedient 
to  his  orders,"  and  requires  him  to  "  observe  and  fol- 
low such  orders  and  directions  as  he  may  receive  from 
the  superior  officers  set  over  him."  Commissions  do 


14  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

not  entitle  their  holders  to  authority  beyond  the  body 
to  which  the  holders  belong. 

v. — GRADES. 

Grades  are  subdivisions  in  the  military  hierarchy,, 
as  the  grade  of  General,  the  grade  of  Colonel,  the 
grade  of  Surgeon,  the  grade  of  Paymaster,  etc.,  etc. 
Though  "  grade "  and  "  rank  "  are  often  used  as  sy- 
nonymous terms,  the  former  is  more  properly  appli- 
cable to  positions  than  to  persons.  The  question,  for 
example,  What  grade  does  he  occupy  ?  and  the  an- 
swer, the  grade  of  Colonel,  or  Paymaster,  etc.,  as  the 
case  may  be,  illustrate  the  proper  use  of  the  term. 
Its  correct  meaning  appears  in  the  124th  Article  of 
War,  which  says  "officers  of  the  militia  .  . 
shall  take  rank  next  after  all  officers  of  the  like  grade 
in  said  regular,"  etc. 

The  precedence  of  grades  in  a  corps  has  long  been 
established  by  the  "  custom  of  war,"  and  is  usually  ex- 
pressed in  the  order  of  their  arrangement  in  the  law 
creating  the  corps.  General  Scott  said  in  an  official 
letter  in  1846  :  "  There  is  not  a  syllable  in  any  Act  of 
Parliament  or  of  Congress ;  not  a  syllable  in  the 
British  Articles  of  War  and  General  Regulations,  or 
in  our  Articles  of  War  (Act  April  10,  1806),  which 
says  in  terms  that  an  officer  of  any  grade  whatever 
may  command  an  officer  of  any  other  grade  whatever. 
Every  question  between  grades  and  dates  of  the  same 
grade  is  settled  both  in  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  by  the  '  custom  of  war  in  like  cases.' '  When 
a  new  grade  is  created  in  an  established  corps,  the  Act 
creating  it,  to  prevent  confusion,  should  fix  its  position. 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.        15 

If  that  be  not  done,  its  position  must  be  determined 
by  the  best  evidence  available,  the  rank  attached  for 
the  incumbent  being  entitled  to  weight  in  deciding 
the  question. 

The  grade  which  an  officer  is  to  occupy  is  desig- 
nated in  his  commission. 

Every  grade  may — many  do — contain  a  number  of 
offices.  A  corps  may  contain  many  offices  and  but 
few  grades. 

VI. — RANK. 

Rank  is  a  degree  of  dignity.  In  our  Government 
it  is  created  by  law,  and  is  based  upon  office.  Con- 
gress may  at  any  time  change  or  abolish  it,  under  the 
constitutional  power  to  make  rules  for  the  government 
and  regulation  of  the  land  and  naval  forces. 

The  term  rank  applies  to  persons,  and  implies  a 
range  of  precedence  or  subordination  among  officers. 

An  officer's  rank  (as  well  as  the  grade  he  is  to  oc- 
cupy and  the  office  he  is  to  hold)  is  designated  in  his 
commission. 

As  authority  proceeds  from  office,  and  as  rank  in 
our  country  is  conferred  only  on  officers,  it  follows,  as 
Washington  said,  that  "  Military  rank  and  eligibility 
to  command  are  ideas  which  cannot  be  separated." 
Nevertheless,  if  all  rank  were'  abolished,  the  authority 
of  office  would  remain. 

When  a  law  in  terms  confers  rank  on  an  incumbent 
of  office,  as  in  case  of  the  Act  of  June  16,  1880,  which 
conferred  on  the  "  Chief  Signal  Officer "  "  the  rank 
and  pay  of  Brigadier-General,"  a  new  appointment 
is  not  necessary  to  entitle  the  officer  who  may  hold  the 


16 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


office,  when  the  Act  is  passed,  to  the  rank  conferred  by 
the  law. 

VII. TITLE. 

Title  is  an  appellation  of  dignity.  The  term  is 
applicable  to  persons  rather  than  to  positions,  dignity 
being  a  quality  which  attaches  not  to  office  itself,  but 
to  the  incumbent  by  virtue  of  his  occupation  of  office. 

If  the  word  name  were  used  instead  of  title,  when 
speaking  of  office,  grade  and  rank,  it  might  prevent 
some  of  the  confusion  which  is  created  by  such  ex- 
pressions as  the  title  of  his  grade,  the  title  of  his  office, 
the  title  of  his  rank. 

vni. — PROMOTION. 

Promotion  in  the  Army  is  advancement  to  an  office 
in  a  higher  grade. 

Every  promotion  is  an  appointment  to  office  and  is 
made  subject  to  rules  established  by  Congress  for  the 
government  and  regulation  of  the  Army. 

The  rank  provided  by  law  for  incumbents  of  offices 
in  the  Army,  as  a  rule  corresponds  in  importance  with 
the  order  of  precedence  of  the  offices.  Hence  promo- 
tion usually  produces  higher  rank.  But  this  is  not  al- 
ways the  case,  as  the  same  rank  may  be  provided  by 
law  for  the  incumbents  of  different  grades  in  a  corps, 
one  grade  having  precedence  of  the  other.  That  was 
the  case  with  the  grades  and  offices  of  Paymaster-Gen- 
eral and  Assistant  Paymasters-General  from  1872  to 
1876,  all  the  incumbents  having  the  rank  of  Colonel. 
Although  the  incumbents  had  the  same  rank  their 
offices  were  not  the  same,  and  advancement  from  the 
grade  of  Assistant  Paymaster-General,  with  the  rank 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.         1  7 

of  Colonel,  to  the  grade  of  Pay  master- General,  with 
the  rank  of  Colonel,  was  promotion. 

When  the  law  creates  a  military  corps  and  names 
the  grades  composing  it  in  the  order  of  their  prece- 
dence, as  established  by  the  custom  of  war,  and  gives 
a  relative  position  to  such  new  grades  as  it  may  cre- 
ate, the  arrangement  in  the  law  is  the  order  of  prece- 
dence of  the  grades  for  the  exercise  of  authority  with- 
in the  corps,  and  for  guidance  in  making  promotions, 
let  the  rank  provided  for  incumbents  be  what  it  may. 

Promotion  is  governed  by  law.  The  present  code 
of  Army  Regulations  of  1881  says: 

"All  vacancies  in  established  regiments  and  corps, 
to  the  rank  of  Colonel,  shall  be  filled  by  promotion 
according  to  seniority,  except  in  case  of  disability  or 
other  incompetency." 

A  regiment  or  corps  is  not  "  established "  in  the 
meaning  of  the  laws  governing  promotion  until  every 
office  in  it  has  been  filled  once,  no  matter  whether  the 
offices  are  all  created  at  the  same  time  or  some  at  one 
and  some  at  another  time.  Until  filled  once  every  of- 
fice affords  what  is  called  an  original  vacancy,  to  which 
the  rule  of  promotion  by  seniority  does  not  apply,  and 
which,  unless  otherwise  provided  by  law,  may  be  filled 
by  selection. 

IX. TRANSFERS. 

After  a  man  has  been  duly  appointed  to  an  office  in 
a  regiment  or  corps  of  the  Army,  his  transfer  to  another 
regiment  or  corps  involves  vacation  of  one  office  and 
installation  in  another.  That  is  to  say,  it  involves  ap- 
pointment to  office.  This,  like  any  other  appointment, 
the  appointee  has  the  right  to  accept  or  decline.  It  is 


18 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


in  deference  to  these  facts  that  Army  Regulations — 
made  or  adopted  by  Congress — forbid  "  the  transfer  of 
officers  from  one  regiment  or  corps  to  another,"  except 
"  on  the  mutual  application  of  the  parties  desiring  ike 
change"  This  exceptional  process,  by  which  officers 
are  enabled  practically  to  couple  withdrawal  from  one 
office  with  appointment  to  another,  called  transfer,  is 
provided  by  the  Regulations  to  accommodate  the  of- 
ficers, as  shown  by  the  fact  that  it  is  dependent  on 
"the  mutual  application  of  the  parties  desiring  the 
change " ;  and  their  mutual  application  is  evidently 
regarded  as  a  precedent  acceptance  of  the  new  office. 
No  right  exists  to  transfer  an  officer  against  his  will 
from  the  regiment  or  corps  in  which  he  has  been  duly 
appointed  to  another,  not  even  on  the  ground  that  it 
may  promote  the  welfare  of  the  Service.  In  fact  an 
officer  could  not  be  considered  as  holding  an  office  to 

o 

which  he  might  be  transferred  if  he  declined  the  office 
— that  is,  if  he  declined  the  transfer — nor  could  he 
be  considered  as  vacating  the  office  to  which  he  had 
been  duly  appointed,  for  arbitrary  transfer  is  not  a 
legal  process  for  ejecting  an  incumbent  from  office.* 

X. AUTHOEITY. 

Authority  in  the  military  service  is  derived  from 
office.  A  commission  to  office,  however,  does  not  en- 
title the  holder  to  authority  beyond  the  corps  to  which 
he  belongs.  The  authority  of  officers  oft  he  Army  is 
extended  beyond  their  corps  by  law  and  by  custom  of 
war.  The  rule  established  by  law  for  precedence  in 
the  exercise  of  such  extended  authority  is  found  in  the 

*  This,  however,  is  not  intended  to  imply  a  limitation  to  the  power 
of  Congress  in  disbanding,  reducing  or  reorganizing  the  Army. 


THEOEETIOAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.  19 

122d  Article  of  War,  which  says:  "If  upon  marches, 
guards,  or  in  quarters,  different  corps  of  the  Army  hap- 
pen to  join  or  do  duty  together,  the  officer  highest  in 
rank  of  the  line  of  the  Army,  marine  corps  or  militia 
by  commission  there  on  duty  or  in  quarters,  shall  com- 
mand the  whole  and  give  orders  for  what  is  needful 
to  the  Service,  unless  otherwise  specially  directed  by 
the  President,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  case." 

This  law  does  not  set  up  rank  in  lieu  of  office  or  in 
addition  to  office  as  a  source  of  authority.  It  merely 
extends  the  authority  of  office  and  prescribes  the  order 
among  office  holders,  in  which,  under  certain  circum- 
stances, the  authority  of  office  shall  be  exercised  ;  to 
wit,  in  the  order  of  rank.  To  exercise  authority  in 
such  cases,  office  holders  must  be  in  "  the  line  of  the 
army,  marine  corps,  or  militia  by  commission  there 
on  duty."  The  Articles  of  War  (25  and  26)  prior  to 
1806,  out  of  which  the  62d  of  that  year  and  the  122d 
of  the  present  day  grew,  did  not  mention  rank.  They 
required  the  "  eldest  officer,"  which  meant  senior  or  su- 
perior officer,  to  command.  The  object  of  the  old  ar- 
ticles on  this  point  was,  however,  the  same  as  of  the 
new.  It  was  to  prescribe  how  the  authority  of  office, 
which  by  the  commission  operates  only  within  the 
corps,  should  be  extended  over  different  corps  of  the 
Army  in  certain  contingencies  not  otherwise  provided 
for;  to  wit,  when  they  "happen  to  join  or  do  duty  to- 
gether  "  "  upon  marches,  guards,  or  in  quarters." 

XI. BKEVET. 

Is  the  brevet  the  instrument  of  office  in  the  Army  at 
large,  or  is  it  merely  the  instrument  of  abstract  rank 
conferred  upon  civilian  or  soldier  ? 


.20 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


"  The  word  brevet  in  French  signifies,  when  applied 
to  offices  in  the  army  or  navy,  Commission.  Brevet 
was  taken  by  the  English  from  the  French  with  this 
meaning.  As  used  in  the  United  States  Army,  brevet 
was  borrowed  with  our  Articles  of  War  from  England, 
and  in  the  British  service  it  means  a  commission  in 
the  army  at  large."  (EL  L.  Scott's  Mil'y  Diet.) 

Brevets  were  introduced  into  the  British  service 
(1692)  not  to  confer  rank  upon  officers  then  in  the 
army,  but  for  the  purpose  of  appointing  civilians  to 
•offices  in  the  army  at  large. 

They  appeared  in  our  first  Articles  of  War,  which 
went  into  operation  June  20,  1775,  and,  as  in  the  case 
of  the  mother  country,  the  first  use  made  of  them  was 
to  appoint  civilians  to  office  in  the  army  at  large. 

There  can  be  no  dispute  that  in  the  British  army 
the  brevet  is  conclusive  evidence  of  office.  It  is  the 
only  commission  to  general  offices  held  in  that  army 
by  officers  above  the  corps  grade  of  Colonel.  If  it  did 
not  commission  them  to  office  they  would  not  be  officers 
of  the  army.  They  not  only  hold  offices  by  brevet,  but, 
as  Clode  tells  us,  in  his  "  Forces  of  the  Crown,"  and 
as  Regulations  show,  they  have  " promotion  by  brevet 
.  .  .  conferred  strictly  according  to  seniority."  We 
have  no  rank  among  civilians.  Our  Government  does 
not  confer  rank  independent  of  office. 

With  no  other  commission  than  the  brevet,  persons 
in  our  Service  have  in  many  cases  exercised  command, 
received  and  disbursed  public  funds,  administered  law 
as  members  of  general  courts-martial,  and  performed 
all  other  duties  belonging  to  officers  of  the  Army,  and 
drawn  the  pay  and  allowances  of  the  grades  which 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.        21 

they  held  by  brevet  alone.  If  their  brevets  were  not 
commissions  to  office,  these  persons  were  not  officers  of 
the  Army.  If  brevets  were  evidence  of  office  formerly, 
they  are  so  at  the  present  time,  for  the  legal  restric- 
tions which  have  been  imposed  from  time  to  time  on 
brevets  have  not  changed  their  nature.  But  the  terms 
of  the  Statutes,  and  the  many  questions  which  have 
arisen  affecting  public  and  private  interests,  leave  it 
still  in  dispute,  whether  the  brevet  is  evidence  of  office 
in  the  Army  at  large  or  merely  evidence  of  abstract 
rank  independent  of  office,  or  attached  by  law  to  some 
office  in  a  particular  corps.  The  law  now  permits 
brevets  to  be  given  only  to  officers  oft  he  Army,  and 
the  terms  of  the  Act  of  1812  support  the  view  that 
brevets  are  evidence  of  rank,  not  office.  But  rank  and 
office  have  been  so  often  confounded  in  the  Statutes 
and  elsewhere,  that  the  mere  use  of  the  former  term 
is  not  conclusive. 

A  brevet  is  indisputably  "  a  commission  in  the  Army 
at  large."  What  does  "  commission  "  mean  here  ?  Is 
the  person  commissioned  to  rank  or  to  office  ?  Hardly 
to  rank,  for  "  rank  is  a  degree  of  dignity."  Like  a  vote 
of  thanks  or  a  medal,  rank  can  be  conferred  by  an  act  of 
Congress  without  the  aid  of  the  appointing  power.  In 
our  service  it  is  not  a  "station  or  employment,"  nor  is 
it  in  itself  a  source  of  authority.  It  is  dependent  on 
office,  and  may  be  attached  to  or  withdrawn  from  the 
incumbent  of  office  or  modified  at  pleasure  by  Con- 
gress. It  does  not  appear  to  be  rank  that  men  are 
commissioned  to  by  the  brevet.  On  the  contrary,  the 
brevet  is  evidence  of  station  and  employment,  and  is 
a  source  of  authority.  It  is  not  conferred  or  changed 


22 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


by  Congress.  It  is  bestowed  through  the  full  exercise 
of  the  appointing  power.  During  the  Revolution  Con- 
gress, while  it  possessed  appointing  power,  used  the 
brevet  as  a  means  of  increasing  without  limit  the  num- 
ber of  commissioned  officers  in  the  military  Service. 
There  were  but  two  brevets  between  the  adoption 
of  the  Constitution  and  1812.  They  were  bestowed 
upon  Harmar  and  de  Poiery,  and  were  conferred 
through  the  operation  of  the  regular  appointing  power 
— Washington,  the  President,  nominated  and  the 
Senate  confirmed. 

An  Act  was  approved  June  6,  1812,  authorizing  the 
President  to  confer  brevet  rank,  but,  probably  to  pre- 
vent him  from  increasing  the  number  of  officers,  as  had 
been  done  during  the  Revolution,  the  law  permitted 
him  to  confer  brevets  only  upon  "  officers  of  the  Army." 
On  the  16th  April,  1818,  an  Act  was  approved  saying : 
"No  brevet  commission  shall  hereafter  be  conferred 
but  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate." 
This  Act,  which  is  still  in  force,  was  preceded  by 
a  protracted  discussion  in  Congress  and  full  confer- 
ence between  committees  of  the  Senate  and  House. 
It  requires  that  brevets  shall  be  conferred  by  the  exer- 
cise of  the  full  appointing  power.  The  Constitution 
requires  the  President  to  "  commission  all  the  officers 
of  the  United  States,"  and  it  does  not  require  him  to 
commission  any  one  else.  He  commissions  all  persons 
on  whom  brevets  are  conferred;  and  furthermore, 
he  requires  them  to  subscribe  and  file  with  accep- 
tance of  the  commission  the  oath  of  office,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  oath  the  officer  may  have  filed  with  the 
acceptance  of  his  office  in  a  particular  corps.  This 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.        23 

throughout  is  the  process  of  appointment  to  office  in 
the  Army. 

An  "  office  is  a  public  station  or  employment  estab- 
lished by  law"  The  brevet  clearly  is  evidence  of 
public  station  or  employment,  but  is  that  public  sta- 
tion or  employment  established  by  law  ?  The  answer 
is,  yes;  the  Acts  of  July  6,  1812,  and  April  16,  1818, 
authorizing  and  providing  for  conferring  brevets,  cre- 
ated the  public  stations  or  offices  necessary  for  the  ful- 
filment of  the  law.  In  opinion  dated  Dec.  11,  1822, 
Attorney-General  Wirt  said  :  "  Laws  on  military  sub- 
jects seldom  fall  within  the  sphere  of  a  lawyer's  prac- 
tice or  consideration,  and  he  is  consequently  without 
that  key  of  experience  in  the  subject-matter  which  is 
so  essential  to  their  just  construction.  The  origin  and 
nature  of  brevet  rank,  for  example,  the  cases  in  which 
it  is  conferred  and  the  effects  which  it  produces,  are 
purely  questions  of  military  experience,  with  regard  to 
which  we  have  no  written  laws,  and  all  suggestions  in 
regard  to  that  rank  must  be  of  necessity  beyond  the 
province  of  the  mere  jurist." 

The  character  of  the  brevet  was  established  in  Great 
Britain,  by  the  custom  of  war,  long  before  we  separated 
from  the  mother  country.  It  was  an  instrument  of 
office  in  the  army  at  large.  Without  reservation,  ex- 
planation or  qualification,  we  adopted  and  used  it 'as 
an  instrument  of  office  during  the  Revolution.  In  1812 
we  re-established  the  brevet,  by  law,  the  sole  legal 
condition  imposed  being  that  it  should  be  given  only 
to  officers  of  the  Army,  and  thus  while  the  number 
of  offices  in  the  Army  at  large  was  increased  indefi- 
nitely, the  number  of  officers  was  not  increased. 


24  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

In  support  of  the  opinion  that  brevets  are  commis- 
sions to  office  and  not  merely  certificates  of  rank,  the 
following  may  be  noted : 

In  1855  it  was  proposed  to  reward  General  Scott 
with  the  brevet  of  Lieutenant-General  for  distinguished 
services  in  the  Mexican  War.  If  the  brevet  meant 
nothing  but  abstract  rank  it  could  have  been  conferred 
by  Act  of  Congress.  But  it  was  not  conferred  in  that 
way.  On  the  contrary,  the  Act  of  February  15,  1855, 
first  "revived"  the  grade*  of  Lieutenant-General  in  the 
Army,  and  General  Scott  was  then  duly  appointed  to 
it  by  brevet. 

The  U.  S.  Supreme  Court  (14  Wallace,  550),  in  de- 
ciding a  claim  for  pay  by  a  brevet  officer,  recognized 
the  brevet  as  evidence  of  office,  saying :  "  There  is  a 
difference  of  military  position  between  an  officer  by 
brevet  and  an  officer  by  regular  commission." 

Generals  Macomb  and  Scott  regarded  the  brevet  as 
a  commission  in  the  Army  at  large. 

Reverdy  Johnson,  discussing  General  Scott's  brevet 
of  Lieutenant-General,  said,  "  It  was  not  only  as  an 
honor,  but  as  a  compensation  that  the  office  was  con- 
ferred upon  him." 

The  Assistant  Attorney-General,  acting  for  the 
Government  in  the  case  of  General  H.  J.  Hunt,  before 
the  Court  of  Claims,  says,  speaking  of  brevets :  "  The 
military  offices  here  mentioned,  like  all  other  offices  of 
the  Army  of  the  United  States,  are  creatures  of  the 
laws  of  Congress"  "To  discover  the  nature  and  attri- 
butes of  these  offices"  etc. 

*  Attorney-General  Wirt  in  1812  gave  the  opinion  that  the  brevet 
of  Major  in  the  Marine  corps  could  not  be  conferred  because  there  was 
no  such  grade  as  Major  in  that  corps. 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.  25 

The  Army  and  Navy  Journal  published,  "  as  a  con- 
tribution to  the  mooted  question  of  brevet  rank,"  a 
letter  dated  November  11,  1880,  from  Colonel  John  P. 
Nicholson,  recorder-in-chief  of  the  Military  Order 
of  the  Loyal  Legion  of  the  United  States,  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  War,  and  the  Secretary's  response  transmitting 
answers  by  the  Adjutant-General  to  six  questions 
submitted  by  Col.  Nicholson. 

Colonel  Nicholson's  first  two  inquiries  were 
whether  brevets  conferred  during  the  Rebellion 
by  Governors  of  States  on  commissioned  officers 
and  enlisted  men  "are  recognized  as  conferring 
brevet  rank  in  the  United  States  Volunteers,  and 
whether  such  appointees  are  recognized  by  the  War 
Department  as  entitled  to  be  designated  as  officers 
by  brevet  in  the  United  States  Volunteers."  To 
these  questions  the  Adjutant-General  answered  in  the 
negative.  The  United  States  recognized  only  the 
commissions  it  conferred  and  those  it  adopted  by 
"  muster-in."  No  one  was  mustered  into  United 
States  Service  during  the  Rebellion  under  a  brevet 
from  a  State. 

But  the  United  States  conferred  brevets  on  volun- 
teers in  its  service  during  the  Rebellion ;  and  Colonel 
Nicholson's  third  inquiry  is :  "  Are  these  appointees 
considered  as  still  in  the  Volunteer  Service  of  the  Uni- 
ted States  and  liable  to  active  duty  when  called  upon 
by  the  President,  the  duties  and  privileges  of  their 
respective  offices  being  suspended  in  the  meantime  ? " 
(See  "Fry  on  Brevets,"  p.  10.)  To  this  inquiry  the 
Adjutant-General  replied  :  "The  Volunteer  officers  bre- 
vetted  by  the  President  during  and  after  the  war  are 


26  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

not  considered  as  still  in  the  Volunteer  Service  of 
the  United  States."  The  Adjutant-General  added, 
"these  brevets  were  based  on  the  actual  rank  the 
officers  held  in  the  U.  S.  Volunteer  Service.  The  rec- 
ognized rule  is  that  a  brevet  appointment  falls  and 
ceases  to  be  effective  with  the  commission  on  which 
it  is  based."  While  it  is  true  that  in  order  to  be 
brevetted  it  is  necessary  to  be  a  commissioned  officer 
in  the  military  service,  there  is  nothing  in  law,  reg- 
ulations, or  competent  decisions  requiring  that  a  bre- 
vet be  "  based  on  .the  actual  rank  "  held,  nor  that 
it  shall  fall  and  cease  to  be  effective  on  account  of 
vacation  of  the  particular  grade  held  when  it  is  con- 
ferred. The  Act  of  July  12,  1812,  though  not  the 
origin  of  brevets  is  practically  the  foundation  of  the 
system  in  our  Service.  When  it  was  passed  there  was 
not  a  brevet  officer  in  our  Army.  The  second  War  of 
Independence  had  begun,  and  as  Attorney-General 
Wirt  said,  "  The  Act  was  passed  flagrante  bello,  and 
was  manifestly  intended  as  a  stimulus  to  enterprise  in 
a  struggle  which  it  was  foreseen  would  require  all  our 
strength."  The  terms  of  so  much  of  that  Act  as  is 
involved  in  this  issue  are,  "the  President  is  hereby 
authorized  to  confer  brevet  rank  on  such  officers  of  the 
Army  as  shall  distinguish  themselves  by  gallant  actions 
or  meritorious  conduct,"  etc.  There  is  nothing  in  this 
Act  nor  has  there  ever  been  anything  in  law  or  regula- 
tions requiring  brevets  to  be  "based  on  the  actual 
rank"  held,  and  to  fall  and  "cease  to  be  effective"  when 
that  rank  is  vacated.  All  that  the  law  requires  on  this 
point  is  that  the  person  on  whom  a  brevet  is  conferred 
shall  be  a  commissioned  officer  of  the  military  service 


THEOKETICAL  AND  PKACTICAL  NOTES.         27 

and  shall  have  distinguished  himself  by  gallant  actions 
or  meritorious  conduct.  No  sequence  is  necessary  be- 
tween the  "  actual "  or  corps  grade  and  the  brevet,  nor 
between  the  brevets  themselves.  When  the  circum- 
stances permit  the  bestowal  of  brevets  the  appointing 
power  has  the  same  constitutional  and  legal  rights  to 
bestow  one  brevet  as  another. 

The  foregoing  remarks  apply  to  brevets  conferred 
upon  officers  of  Volunteers  under  the  Act  of  March  3, 
1863,  which,  embodying  the  principles  of  the  act  of 
1812,  authorized  the  President,  with  the  advice  of  the 
Senate,  "  to  confer  brevet  rank  on  such  commissioned 
officers  of  Volunteers  and  other  forces  in  the  Service 
of  the  United  States,  as  have  been  or  may  hereafter  be 
distinguished  by  gallant  actions  or  meritorious  con- 
duct." The  theory  that  brevets  under  the  Act  of  1812, 
and  the  acts  which  grew  out  of  it,  are  based  on  "  actual 
rank,"  and  fall  with  change  of  grade,  is  one  of  the  most 
extraordinary  delusions  that  ever  had  a  firm  grip  on  a 
government  bureau.  It  first  appeared  in  unsound  ar- 
guments put  forth  long  ago  by  Adjutant-General  Roger 
Jones  for  the  purpose  of  bolstering  a  claim  he  made  to 
hold  two  offices,  one  in  the  Adjutant-General's  Depart- 
ment and  one  in  the  Artillery,  at  the  same  time.  More 
than  once  destroyed  when  fairly  brought  to  the  test, 
this  theory  nevertheless  rises  phoenix-like  from  its  ashes, 
and  is  re-embraced  by  the  Adjutant-General's  Depart- 
ment, on  the  ground  apparently  that  its  own  rulings 
form  precedents,  and  that  the  adverse  decisions  by 
higher  authority  are  merely  exceptional  cases.  This 
remarkable  fatuity  is  probably  due  to  bureaucratic 
pride,  and  to  misconception  concerning  Attorney-Gen- 


28 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


eral  Wirt's  opinions.    Adjutant-General  Cooper,  speak- 
ing of  the  rulings  of  his  department  on  this  subject, 
said  "  the  principle  of  these  decisions  will  be  found 
in  the  opinion  of  the   Attorney-General,   Mr.    Wirt, 
August,  1821."    That  opinion  does  not  contain  the  prin- 
ciple attributed  to  it.     The  question  before  Mr.  Wirt 
arose  in  the  Marine  Corps,  in  which  there  was  at  that 
time  no  grade  of  Major.    A  Captain  of  marines  became 
entitled  to  a  brevet.     The  question  was  whether  he 
should    be  given  the    brevet  of   Major,    whether   he 
should  have  no  brevet  at  all,  or  whether  he  should  be 
brevetted  Lieutenant-Colonel.     The  Attorney-General 
held  that  the  brevet  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  could  be 
conferred,  but  that  the  brevet  of  Major,  the  grade  of 
Major  having  no  existence  in  the  corps,  could  not  be 
conferred.     In  endeavoring  to  emphasize  his  views  on 
this  point,  the  Attorney-General  used  language  which 
has  been  employed,  conscientiously  no  doubt,  by  the 
Adjutant-General's  Department  in  antagonism  to  the 
purpose  and  meaning  of  the  opinion.     Mr.  Wirt  said, 
after   this   marine   case   had   been   forced    upon  him 
ad  nauseam,  "  It  seems  to  me  a  palpable  solecism  in 
military  language  to  talk  of  the  existence  of  a  brevet 
rank  after  the  lineal  rank  by  commission  (of  which  the 
brevet   is  merely  the  shadow)    has  been  destroyed." 
The  figure  of  speech  in  the  Attorney-General's  brackets 
has  been  taken  literally,  and  with  the  rest  of  the  sen- 
tence forms  the  foundation  of  the  theory  that  brevets 
must  be  consecutive,  each  based  on  the  grade  next  be- 
low, and  that  as  soon  as  the  particular  lineal  grade  on 
which  the  first  brevet  is  based,  is  vacated,  the  brevets 
must  all  fall,  though  the  grade  be  not  destroyed,  but  on 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.         29 

the  contrary,  both  the  grade  and  the  officer  remain  part 
of  the  legal  military  establishment.  There  is  no  law, 
nor  is  there  an  opinion  from  an  Attorney-General  to 
sustain  this  theory.  What  Mr.  Wirt  decided  was  that 
an  officer  cannot  be  bre vetted  to  a  grade  which  "  has 
been  destroyed,"  which  has  no  legal  existence.  This 
cannot  be  contested.  Congress  recognized  the  point 
when  it  was  proposed  to  reward  General  Scott  for 
services  in  the  Mexican  war.  At  that  time  no  higher 
grade  than  the  one  held  by  Major-General  Scott  existed 
in  our  military  establishment.  Congress  first  "  revived 
the  grade  of  Lieutenant-General  in  the  Army  of  the 
United  States,"  and  then  the  President  and  Senate  con- 
ferred on  Major-General  Scott  the  brevet  of  Lieu- 
tenant-General. 

Col.  Nicholson's  fourth  inquiry  was :  "  In  cases 
where  brevet  commissions  were  granted  by  the  Presi- 
dent in  the  usual  manner  to  enlisted  men  in  the  Volun- 
teer Service  (see  "  Fry  on  Brevets,"  p,  236),  are  such 
appointees  recognized  by  the  War  Department  as 
officers  ?  "  To  this  the  Adjutant-General  replied  : 
"  Brevet  commissions  were  issued  to  enlisted  men  in 
the  Volunteers  through  error  only.  There  were  but 
very  few  cases  like  that  referred  to  in  the  case  of  Pri- 
vate Stowe.  The  person  so  brevetted,  however,  would 
probably  be  entitled  to  all  the  privileges  which  the 
law  attaches  to  brevet  rank  thus  conferred."  The 
Adjutant-General  says  there  were  "  but  very  few  cases  " 
like  Private  Stowe's.  No  case  like  it  has  ever  ap- 
peared. It  was  a  plain  violation  of  law.  Colonel 
Nicholson  asked — no  doubt  to  remove  uncertainty 
in  the  Loyal  Legion — whether  such  appointees  "  are 


30  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

recognized  by  the  War  Department  as  officers."  He 
is  told  that  persons  "  so  bre vetted  " — that  is,  privates 
brevetted  in  the  usual  manner,  but  in  violation 
of  the  law  which  in  conferring  brevets  restricts  the 
President  and  Senate  to  commissioned  officers — 
"would  probably  be  entitled  to  all  the  privileges 
which  the  law  attaches  to  brevet  rank  thus  conferred." 
That  is  to  say,  persons  brevetted  in  violation  of  law 
would  probably  be  entitled  to  all  the  privileges  which 
the  law  attaches  to  brevets  conferred  in  violation 
of  law.  Col.  Nicholson  evidently  tried  to  find  out 
what  in  the  opinion  of  the  War  Department  those 
privileges  are,  but  he  failed. 

The  proposed  appropriation  of  a  hundred  millions  in 
a  single  year,  for  the  disabled  of  the  last  war,  and  the 
favor  shown  in  all  spheres  and  pursuits,  to  those  who 
were  conspicuous  in  that  contest,  prove  that  our  people 
appreciate  important  military  services.  Yet  we  have 
not  been  able  to  devise  any  satisfactory  system  of  re- 
wards in  the  Regular  Army  as  a  lt  stimulus  to  enter- 
prise." Promotion  by  merit  would  not  do.  Influence  is 
the  curse  of  the  service.  It  blocks  the  way  to  military 
punishments  and  is  a  standing  menace  to  any  system 
of  rewards  we  could  adopt.  It  is  well  for  the  Army 
that  the  law  requires  promotions  to,  and  includ- 
ing, the  grade  of  Colonel  to  be  made  by  seniority. 
Whether  it  would  not  be  best  in  time  of  peace  to 
carry  the  law  of  seniority  still  higher,  especially  now 
that  we  have  compulsory  retirement  for  age,  is  a  ques- 
tion worthy  of  careful  consideration. 

After  more  than  a  hundred  years'  experience  we  have 
found  no  substitute  for  the  brevet,  but  have  deprived 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.         3  I 

that  reward  of  nearly  all  the  value  it  once  possessed. 
If  we  are  to  have  any  stimulus  to  enterprise,  the  ques- 
tion to  consider  is  whether  we  ought  to  venture  on 
something  new,  or  whether  we  should  try  to  perfect  or 
improve  the  brevet  system  and  rely  upon  it.  The  diffi- 
culties in  devising  a  system  that  will  not  do  more  harm 
than  good,  and  the  risks  in  administering  any  system 
are  so  great  as  to  render  experiments  in  a  new  field 
dangerous.  The  brevet  has  the  merit  of  being  con- 
ferred by  the  President  and  Senate  of  the  United 
States,  and  in  its  complimentary  character  it  is  akin  to 
the  "  thanks  of  Congress."  The  truth  is,  though  it  be 
not  openly  confessed,  that,  abused,  abridged,  emascu- 
lated as  the  brevet  has  been,  the  Army  loves  it  still. 
It  has  its  faults,  but  the  worst  of  them  might  be 
removed.  The  indiscriminate  distribution  of  brevets 
after  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  no  doubt  contributed  to 
producing  legislation  which  not  only  restrains  the 
appointing  power  in  conferring  this  reward,  but  de- 
prives the  reward  of  advantages  it  formerly  possessed. 
If  the  brevet  is  to  be  retained  as  a  stimulus  to  enter- 
prise— we  have  no  other — the  proper  course  would  be 
to  increase  its  value  and  at  the  same  time  restrict  its 
bestowal  to  cases  of  clearly  defined  and  well  estab- 
lished gallant  actions. 

One  step  towards  increasing  the  value  of  the  brevet 
would  be  to  let  it  carry  a  specified  pay  independent  of 
all  contingencies  of  command.  That  of  itself  ought  to 
impose  caution  in  its  bestowal.  With  that  provision, 
with  the  right  to  command  as  at  present,  when  assigned 
by  the  President,  and  with  suitable  insignia  on  the 
regular  uniform,  the  brevet  would  probably  be  the 


°^  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

best  form  of  reward  and  stimulus  to  enterprise  that 
can  be  devised  for  our  Service.* 

XII. RETIREMENT. 

Ordinary  or  partial  retirement  is  not  vacation  of 
office.  It  is  only  withdrawal  from  "active  service  and 
command,  and  from  the  line  of  promotion?  This 
point,  after  able  discussion,  was  decided  by  the  Court 
of  Claims  in  the  case  of  General  T.  J.  Wood,  retired, 
vs.  the  United  States.  The  Court  said,  "  Congress  can- 
not appoint  him  to  a  new  and  different  office,"  "  but 
Congress  may  transfer  him  to  the  retired  list,  and  may 
change  his  rank  and  pay  at  any  time  without  coming 
in  conflict  with  the  Constitution. "  "  He  still  retains, 
on  the  retired  list,  the  office  of  Colonel  of  Cavalry.'1''  The 
Supreme  Court  in  the  case  of  the  United  States  vs. 
Tyler  (105  U.  S.,  244)  decided  that  a  retired  Army 
officer  is  an  officer  in  the  military  Service. 

The  law  does  not  design  to  deprive  the  retired 
officer  of  office.  On  the  contrary,  it  says,  "  He  shall 
continue  to  be  borne  on  the  Army  Register "  as  a 
retired  officer  of  the  grade  which  he  may  occupy  at  the 
time  of  retirement;  and  the  Revised  Statutes  say :  "The 
Army  of  the  United  States  shall  consist  of  one  Gen- 
eral .  .  .  the  officers  of  the  Army  on  the  retired 
list  .  .  .  and  the  Professors  and  Corps  of  Cadets 
of  the  United  States  Military  Academy."  While  the 
law  provides  for  the  retired  officer's  withdrawal  from 
active  service  and  command,  and  from  the  line  of 

*The  acts  of  July  12,  1862,  and  March  3,  1863,  authorize  the 
President  to  bestow  "  medals  of  honor  on  such  officers,  non-commis- 
sioned officers  and  privates  as  have  most  distinguished  or  may  hereafter 
most  distinguish  themselves  in  action." 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES. 

proinotion,  it  leaves  him  in  possession  of  his  office, 
his  grade,  rank  and  uniform  and  part  of  the  pay  of 
his  active  grade,  and  it  specifies  duties  which,  under 
the  authority  of  his  office,  he  may  legally  perform  if 
assigned. 

The  law  not  only  says  that  the  officer  when  retired 
shall  be  withdrawn  from  the  line  of  promotion,  but  it 
requires  that  the  next  officer  shall  be  promoted.  It  is 
the  purpose  and  effect  of  the  law  that  the  offices  nec- 
essary in  the  various  grades  to  accomplish  the  retire- 
ments required  by  the  law  shall  exist  (with  the  re- 
strictions governing  in  retirement)  as  long  as  occupied 
in  addition  to  the  legal  complement  of  offices  for  active 
service  in  the  different  corps.  Although  the  law  re- 
stricts the  functions  and  incidents  of  his  office,  the 
partially  retired  officer  belongs  no  less  to  his  corps 
and  no  more  to  the  Army  at  large  after  retirement 
than  he  did  before. 

XIII. REDUCING    PAY. 

The  Army  officer's  contract  is  for  life.  He  gives  up 
all  other  occupations  and  places  his  talents  and  time 
at  the  disposal  of  his  employer.  The  Government 
exacts  at  will  the  fruits  of  his  industry  in  peace,  and 
the  exposure  of  his  life  in  war  and  pestilence ;  and 
totally  independent  of  the  officer's  comfort  or  wishes, 
claims  of  him,  at  its  discretion,  services,  involving  not 
only  great  personal  but  heavy  pecuniary  sacrifices. 
The  pay  of  the  officer  should  rest  upon  the  require- 
ments of  his  life-long  contract,  and  not  upon  the  ser- 
vices— always  designated  by  the  Government — which 
he  may  be  rendering  at  any  particular  moment.  The 
Captain  in  his  quarters  in  garrison,  or  on  leave  of  ab- 


34  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

sence  among  his  friends,  is  overpaid,  no  more,  not  a 
thousandth  part  so  much,  in  fact,  as  he  is  underpaid 
when  he  is  leading  his  company  in  the  forefront  of 
battle,  or  nursing  his  men  in  pestilential  hospitals. 
His  compensation  is  but  an  average — and  a  low  one 
— on  his  permanent  contract.  While  he  must  hold 
himself  ever  in  readiness  for  exposure,  and  sacrifice 
even  of  life  itself,  he  receives  no  increase  for  his  more 
dangerous  and  valuable  services.  Should  he  not  be 
spared  a  reduction  for  his  less  conspicuous  though 
arduous  labors  ? 

The  officer  of  the  Army  knows  that  the  Government 
has  a  right  to  reduce  his  pay,  but  he  asks,  in  consider- 
ation of  the  nature  of  his  contract,  and  the  character 
and  magnitude  of  the  services  and  sacrifices  required 
of  him,  that  this  right  be  not  enforced  unless  general 
economy  makes  it  necessary  to  reduce  all  salaries. 
Then  the  Army  officer,  without  making  any  special 
plea,  will,  as  Generals  Sherman,  Hancock  and  others 
have  said,  bear  cheerfully  the  same  percentage  of  reduc- 
tion that  the  nation  may  find  it  necessary  to  apply  to 
all  paid  from  its  treasury. 

In  an  article  on  the  Army  of  the  United  States, 
published  in  the  North  American  Review,  May- June, 
1878,  the  Honorable  James  A.  Garfield,  M.  C.,  says : 

"  During  the  last  Congress,  the  House  refused  to 
reduce  the  pay  of  its  own  officers,  and  thus  expressed 
its  judgment  of  the  proper  relation  between  service 
and  compensation.  Remembering  how  light  are  the 
duties  of  most  of  the  officers  of  the  House  during  the 
recess  of  Congress,  and  comparing  the  qualities  and 
training  required  for  their  work  (mostly  clerical)  with 


THEOKETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.  35 

the  training  and  service  required  of  regimental  and 
field  officers,  the  following  table  will  be  found  instruc- 
tive : 

PRESENT   PAY   OF   CERTAIN   OFFICERS  OF  THE   HOUSE. 

Clerk  of  the  House, $4,500 

Sergeant-at-Arms, •  4,000 

Doorkeeper, 2,500 

Nine  Assistant  Clerks,  each, 2,500 

Clerk  of  Document  Room, 2,000 

Distributing  Clerk, 1,800 

Messenger, • .         .  1,440 

Upholsterer  and  Locksmith,  each,         ....  1,400 

PROPOSED   PAY   OF  ARMY   OFFICERS. 

Colonel, .  $3,500 

Lieutenant-Colonel, .3,000 

Major, 2,600 

Captain  (mounted), 1,800 

Captain  (not  mounted), 1,600 

First  Lieutenant  (mounted), 1,500 

First  Lieutenant  (not  mounted),        .         .         .  1,400 

Second  Lieutenant  (not  mounted),       ....  1,300 

"  Should  this  bill  become  a  law  it  would  be  better, 
so  far  as  pay  is  concerned,  to  be  a  doorkeeper  in  the 
House  of  Representatives  than  a  senior  Captain  of 
Infantry ;  better  to  be  the  locksmith  of  the  House, 
than  a  Second  Lieutenant  of  the  line." 

The  pay  of  the  Army  officer  is  barely  sufficient  for 
his  proper  support.  To  reduce  it  would  tend  -to 
destroy  the  democratic  character  of  the  Service,  by 
driving  the  poor  officers  to  other  pursuits,  and  leaving 
our  military  profession  for  the  aristocracy  of  wealth 
alone.  Whatever  the  size  or  formation  of  the  Army 
may  be,  it  should  be  efficient.  In  the  interest  of  effi- 
ciency as  well  as  of  the  integrity  and  honor  of  the 
Service,  the  officer  should — unless  overruling  public 


36  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

necessity  intervenes — have  security  of  place  and  pay 
so  long  as  he  is  worthy. 

The  subject  of  pay  is  forcibly  and  quaintly  presented 
in  Ward's  "  Animadversions  of  Warre,"  1639.  The 
author  says : 

"  It  is  likewise  money  and  pay  that  keeps  the  army 
in  good  order,  and  makes  it  strictly  to  observe  disci- 
pline, the  preserver  of  all :  Pay  is  the  poore  souldiers 
aqua-vita,  which  makes  him  comfortably  undergoe  the 
hardest  command;  but  want  of  it  is  such  an  aqua- 
fortis, as  eats  through  the  iron  doores  of  discipline,  and 
causeth  whole  armies  to  rush  into  disorders." 

XIV. RENTING    QUARTERS. 

The  inquiry  concerning  Army  pay,  which  culminated 
in  the  Act  of  July  15,  1870,  was  the  most  exhaustive 
one  on  that  subject  that  has  ever  figured  in  the  history 
of  our  service.  The  purpose  of  the  resulting  legisla- 
tion was,  first,  to  dispense,  as  far  as  possible,  with 
allowances,  and  have  a  fixed  and  definite  sum  of  money 
as  the  officer's  compensation ;  and,  second,  to  provide 
that,  with  a  few  unimportant  exceptions,  officers  of  the 
same  grade  should  receive  exactly  the  same  compensa- 
tion, no  matter  what  branch  of  the  Service  they  might 
belong  to,  where  they  might  be  stationed,  or  what 
duty  they  might  perform.  Line  and  Staff,  Artillery, 
Cavalry,  and  Infantry,  were,  in  this  respect,  all  placed 
on  identically  the  same  footing.  Probably  there  are  no 
Army  officers  in  any  service  who  have  fewer  allowances 
than  ours  receive  under  the  present  system ;  and  there 
are  no  officials  under  our  Government  whose  compensa- 
tion is  set  forth  more  fully  and  plainly  than  that  of  our 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.         37 

Army  officers.  Under  the  Act  of  1870,  and  the  general 
Regulations  of  the  Army,  then  and  still  in  force,  the 
Government,  when  not  requiring  its  officers  to  be  in  the 
field,  provides  for  them  when  on  duty  quarters  appro- 
priate to  their  respective  grades.  A  large  majority  of 
the  officers  are  posted  habitually  at  points  where  the 
Government  owns  quarters  suitable  for  them  ;  and  the 
equality  contemplated  by  the  law  is  thus  preserved 
among  all  of  these.  But  there  is  a  small  minority  who 
must,  without  any  choice  or  discretion  on  their  parts, 
be  posted  from  time  to  time  at  places  where  the  Govern- 
ment neither  owns  quarters,  nor  is  disposed  to  purchase 
or  erect  them.  To  preserve  the  equality  heretofore 
adverted  to,  the  act  of  1870  permits  quarters  to  be 
hired  for  these  officers,  according  to  their  grades. 
That  is  to  say,  the  number  of  rooms  authorized  for  an 
officer's  grade  may  be  hired  for  him,  when  the  Govern- 
ment requires  him  to  live  where  it  has  no  rooms  of  its 
own  to  give  him  ;  and  in  like  manner,  it  supplies  him, 
by  purchase,  with  the  fuel  authorized  and  necessary  for 
these  rooms.  It  is  not  possible,  under  existing  circum- 
stances, by  any  other  plan  or  process,  to  secure, 
throughout  the  Service,  the  equality  of  compensation 
which  is  fair  and  just,  and  which  the  Act  of  July  15, 
1870,  sought  to,  and  in  principle  does,  establish.  In 
illustration  it  may  be  mentioned  that  the  post  of  Fort 
Columbus,  Governor's  Island,  is  within  the  City  of 
New  York.  The  officers  on  duty  there  are  supplied 
by  the  Government  with  ample  and  excellent  quarters. 
There  are,  however,  a  number  of  other  officers  on  duty 
in  New  York  City  for  whom  the  Government  has  no 
quarters.  Equality  between  these  two  classes  can  be 


38 


MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 


maintained  only  by  the  Government  hiring  for  the  latter 
the  equivalent  of  what  it  actually  lends  to  the  former. 
Neither  the  renting  of  quarters  nor  providing 
them  in  kind  is  restricted  to  any  particular  grade  or 
class  of  officers.  Every  officer  is  liable  at  any  time  to 
find  himself  quartered  under  either  branch  of  this  just 
principle. 

XV. CHANGE  OF  STATION. 

Changes  of  position  in  the  military  Service  are  fre- 
quent and  sudden.  To  enlisted  men  they  are  not  a 
great  hardship.  The  Government  supplies  them  with 
quarters,  furniture,  camp  and  garrison  equipage,  cloth- 
ing, rations,  and  transportation  for  their  effects.  It 
is  very  different  with  the  officer.  All  he  gets  for 
change  of  position  is  mileage,  by  the  shortest  mail 
route,  and  allowance  for  a  few  hundred  pounds  of 
baggage  in  case  of  regular  change  of  station.  All  the 
expenses  over  mileage  that  an  officer  incurs,  whether 
on  his  own  account  or  that  of  moving  his  wife,  children) 
servants  and  furniture,  come  out  of  his  own  pocket. 
Furthermore,  it  frequently  happens  that  the  change  of 
an  officer  living  in  rented  quarters,  makes  him  a  loser 
to  the  extent  of  the  unexpired  term  of  his  lease.  A 
case  or  two  of  actual  experience  may  be  mentioned  in 
illustration  of  the  magnitude  of  this  hardship.  A  care- 
ful officer  says:  "I  had  ten  thousand  dollars  in  U.  S. 
bonds,  the  amount  of  two  bequests.  My  station  has 
been  so  often  changed,  and  at  such  expense,  that,  of 
the  ten  thousand,  I  have  precisely  four  hundred  left, 
which  I  have  invested  for  my  children."  Since  he 
wrote  the  foregoing,  his  station  has  been  changed  two 
or  three  times. 


THEOKETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.        39 

Another  officer  who  was  ordered  from  the  Atlantic 
to  the  Pacific  coast,  shipped,  around  Cape  Horn,  as 
much  of  his  furniture  as  was  necessary  for  the  comfort 
of  his  family.  This,  though  the  most  economical 
course,  was  expensive.  He  was  soon  ordered  back 
to  the  Atlantic  coast.  Before  starting,  being  com- 
pelled to  close  up  promptly,  he  disposed  of  all  his 
furniture  at  a  forced  sale  for  the  sum  of  $65,  and 
had  to  re-furnish  when  he  reached  his  new  station. 
These  changes,  frequent,  necessary  and  sudden,  are 
not  confined  to  a  limited  period,  but  go  on  during 
the  whole  of  the  officer's  life.  To  provide  for  them 
requires  while  the  officer  is  stationary,  economy  that 
none  can  appreciate  except  those  who  are  compelled 
to  practise  it.  Change  of  station  is  a  heavy  and  in- 
evitable assessment  on  the  officer's  pay. 

But  there  are  other  requirements.  This  is  a  free 
country  in  which  the  social  status  of  most  men  is 
regulated  by  themselves.  But  by  the  law  of  the 
land,  officers  of  the  Army  are  required  to  live 
as  gentlemen,  and  must,  by  the  Articles  of  War, 
be  dismissed  from  the  Service  for  conduct  unbecom- 
ing a  gentleman.  That  they  may  in  all  respects 
be  worthy  of  the  nation,  heavy  expenses  resulting 
from  rules  of  life,  public  and  private,  which  they 
cannot  disregard,  if  they  would,  are  forced  upon  them. 
In  the  matter  of  dress  even,  they  are  controlled. 
Their  uniform  and  equipment,  prescribed  by  the  Gov- 
ernment, is  enormously  expensive  in  the  first  instance, 
and  must  be  frequently  renewed,  as  poverty  is  not  ac- 
cepted as  an  excuse  for  shabbiness  on  duty.  With  the 
bare  sufficiency  of  their  pay  and  allowances  to  meet 


40  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

the  demands  upon  them,  failure  to  pay  a  debt,  large 
or  small,  is  treated  as  an  offence  against  the  honor  of 
the  Service. 

These  are  considerations  which  should  be  fully 
weighed  in  estimating  the  compensation  of  Army  officers 
as  an  independent  question,  as  well  as  in  comparing 
it  with  the  pay  of  officers  in  the  civil  service. 

XVI. FORAGE  FOR  OFFICERS'  HORSES. 

Experience  in  the- organization  of  armies  has  resulted 
in  a  few  general  rules  about  which  there  is  at  this  day 
no  dispute.  One  principle,  growing  out  of  the  fact 
that  the  horse  is  essential  in  the  Service,  is  to  make  a 
general  division  of  the  forces  into  mounted  and  not 
mounted.  The  division  is  a  necessary  one,  and  our 
laws  contemplate  that  the  distinct  purposes  of  the 
two  parts  shall  be  held  in  view  notwithstanding 
occasional  interruptions.  Thus  the  excess  of  pay 
provided  for  a  mounted  officer  over  one  not  mounted, 
attaches  permanently  to  the  office,  and  is  not  dis- 
turbed by  the  fact  that  the  mounted  officer  may 
be  called  upon  to  do,  for  a  time,  duty  not  mounted. 
Nothing  which  is  calculated  to  promote  the  mounted 
officer's  main  object — mounted  duty — can  properly  be 
neglected  or  withheld. 

Experience  has  also  shown  that  efficiency  and  econ- 
omy are  promoted  by  requiring  the  commissioned  of- 
ficer in  the  mounted  service  to  provide  his  horse  and 
equipments,  while  the  Government  supplies  horses  and 
equipments  for  the  use  of  enlisted  men. 

The  line  between  what  the  Government  should  fur- 
nish and  what  the  officer  himself  should  furnish  to 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.  41 

ensure  the  efficiency  which  depends  on  fitness  between 
the  officer  and  his  horse  and  equipments,  has  long  been 
clearly  and  distinctly  drawn  in  our  Service.  The  latter 
produces  the  horse  caparisoned,  as  he  presents  himself 
in  uniform,  and  the  former  feeds  and  shoes  the  horse. 
The  Government  and  the  officer  are  under  an  equally 
binding  obligation — the  latter  to  keep  and  ride  the 
horse,  and  the  former  to  feed  and  shoe  him.  It  is  a 
serious  defect  in  our  Army  that  there  are  cases  where 
officers  on  sedentary  service,  remaining  for  a  long  time 
undisturbed,  omit  the  horsemanship  which  is  an  im- 
portant element  in  their  fitness  and  readiness  for  all  of 
their  duties.  But  these  are  exceptions,  and  even  in 
them  the  officers  do  not  necessarily  and  invariably 
remain  stationary.  As  a  rule  in  the  matter  of  sta- 
tions, duties  and  expenses  in  our  Army,  the  only 
certainty  is — uncertainty. 

The  term  "  field  service  "  has  been  proposed  as  in- 
dicating the  period  during  which  an  officer  should  have 
his  horse  and  forage.  No  rule  basing  the  allowance 
of  forage  on  the  contingency  of  field  service  could  be 
made  to  work  advantageously.  Doubts  and  disputes 
damaging  to  the  Service,  with  immense  expense  to  the 
officer,  and  no  saving  to  the  Government,  would  cer- 
tainly arise  under  it.  Field  and  garrison  duty  in 
our  Army  are  not  confined  to  particular  periods  or 
places.  Either  may  occur  in  the  East  or  the  West, 
and  may  continue  for  a  longer  or  shorter  time.  Field 
service  might  be  construed  as  beginning  to-day,  when 
the  officer,  under  the  proposed  plan,  would  have  to 
buy  his  horse,  and,  ending  to-morrow,  when,  for  the 
lack  of  feed,  etc.,  he  would  have  to  sell  him. 


42  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

The  present  law  on  the  subject  seems  to  be  ample 
and  appropriate.  It  is  that  "forage  may  be  furnished 
in  kind  to  officers  by  the  Quartermaster's  Department, 
according  to  law  and  regulations."  (Act  of  July  15, 
1870.) 

The  forage  authorized  by  this  Act  is  not  an  emolu- 
ment for  officers,  directly  or  constructively.  It  is  for 
the  purpose  of  keeping  them  at  all  times,  ready  to 
mount, well  qualified  for  the  Government  Service.  That 
purpose  should  not  be  abandoned.  Horsemanship  is 
deemed  so  important  in  the  German  Army  that  staff 
officers  must  be  confirmed  in  it  before  promotion,  and 
it  might  well  form  part  of  the  examination  which 
our  officers  should  undergo  before  passing  to  higher 
grades.  If,  in  our  Service,  it  is  in  some  cases  neg- 
lected, correction  may  be  applied  by  orders  or  regu- 
lations under  the  law  as  it  now  stands. 

XVII. AN  ARMY  MUTUAL  SURVIVORSHIP  ANNUITY  SOCIETY. 

It  is  plain  that  the  Government  cannot  provide  ade- 
quately for  the  support  of  all  the  widows  and  orphans 
of  its  public  servants.  The  existing  pension  laws — as 
liberal  doubtless  as  the  Nation  can  afford — come  far 
short  of  the  actual  necessities  of  the  case.  Hence  we 
witness  the  humiliating  spectacle  of  the  widows  of 
the  higher  and  more  distinguished,  as  well  as  the  lower 
and  more  obscure  officers,  begging  Congress  to  give 
them  pensions  so  increased,  by  special  enactment,  as  to 
reach  the  sum  of  perhaps  fifty  or  seventy-five  dollars 
a  month.  They  act  from  necessity  in  asking,  and 
Congress  acts  from  necessity  in  refusing  or  restricting. 
Every  day's  experience  furnishes  new  proof  that  the 


THEOBETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.        43 

safest  if  not  the  only  way  to  provide  adequately  for 
the  protection  of  the  widows  and  orphans  of  officers  of 
the  Army,  is  by  an  organization  for  that  purpose  among 
the  officers  themselves.  How  to  effect  it  is  the  ques- 
tion. Life  Insurance  is  attended  with  the  objection 
that  at  best  it  produces  not  a  certain  income,  but  only 
a  specific  sum  of  money,  and  this  comes  to  the  widow 
and  orphan  at  the  death  of  the  protector  and  adviser, 
and  consequently  it  is  very  likely  to  be  lost  or  reduced 
by  injudicious  investment,  or  to  be  so  trenched  upon 
for  current  expenses  that  it  becomes  too  small  to  pro- 
duce an  income  for  support.  Furthermore,  with  all 
private  corporations,  whether  for  Life  insurance  or 
annuity  purposes,  the  officer  must  pay  a  percentage 
large  enough  to  cover  his  share  of  the  heavy  expenses, 
and  perhaps  contribute  to  profits,  and  still  he  feels 
that  there  is  some  risk  of  his  not  getting  what  he  is 
paying  for.  When  we  consider  the  number  of  these 
companies  open  to  him  and  the  peculiar  difficulties  the 
officer  is  under  in  deciding  which  is  good  and  which  is 
not,  it  is  plain  to  see  that  his  fears  on  this  score  are 
well  founded.  Then,  too,  whatever  company  he  selects, 
he  is  in  the  hands  of  strangers  and  knows  that  his 
widow  will  be  so  likewise  in  making  her  claims  or  col- 
lections after  he  is  dead. 

It  is  not  the  purpose  of  an  annuity  society  to  provide 
life  insurance,  nor  to  supersede  or  interfere  with  any 
Army  life  insurance  scheme.  Its  sole  object  is  to  enable 
an  officer,  by  small  deductions  from  his  pay,  to  secure, 
from  the  date  of  his  death,  an  income  for  his  wife, 
child,  or  other  designated  person,  in  case  that  person 
outlives  him.  The  aggregate  of  the  deductions  from 


44 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


the  pay  of  the  officer  is  the  price  agreed  upon  for  a 
specified  guarantee y  that  is,  for  a  guarantee  to  the  ef- 
fect that  in  case  the  officer  dies  before  his  nominee, 
the  latter  shall  receive  a  stipulated  income  for  life.  As 
long  as  the  guarantee  is  held,  the  price  of  it,  as  agreed 
upon,  must  be  paid,  and  that  price  must  belong,  solely 
and  without  reversionary  claim  of  any  sort,  to  the  fund 
from  which  the  annuities  are  to  be  paid.  This  renders 
it  practicable  to  reduce  the  price  of  the  guarantee  to 
the  minimum,  and  at  the  same  time  keep  the  fund 
adequate  to  the  demands  upon  it. 

Concerning  the  benefits  to  be  received  by  the  Gov- 
ernment from  this  scheme,  it  may  be  said  that  the  de- 
ductions made  monthly  from  the  pay  of  officers  will 
continually  go  to  increase  the  cash  on  hand  in  the 
Treasury,  and  in  the  great  majority  of  cases  long  be- 
fore any  annuity  matures ;  only  so  much  being  drawn 
out  from  time  to  time  as  may  be  found  necessary  to 
pay  the  annuities  falling  due.  The  Government  will 
have  the  use  of  and  interest  on  all  the  remaining 
balances,  and  its  benefits  therefrom  will  increase  rap- 
idly as  time  goes  on.  While  this  scheme  does  not  pro- 
pose any  interference  with  the  pension  laws,  it  will 
tend  to  prevent  the  increase  of  the  regular  pension  list, 
and  remove  the  necessity  for  appropriations  for  special 
pensions.  The  extent  of  this  advantage  to  the  Govern- 
ment will  of  course  depend  on  the  success  of  the  pro- 
posed plan.  The  advantages  offered  to  those  who  may 
purchase  annuities  are : 

1st. — Absolute  certainty  that  the  conditions  under 
which  they  purchase  annuities  will  be  fully  and  ex- 
actly complied  with. 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.  45 

2(1. — That  each  member,  without  regard  to  rank, 
can  secure  for  his  nominee  just  as  much  monthly  in- 
come, to  commence  at  his  death,  as  he  chooses  to  pay 
for  during  his  life. 

3d. — That  the  proportional  price  he  pays  for  this 
income  is  exactly  fair  as  determined  by  the  considera- 
tion of  all  the  elements,  which  the  science  of  insurance 
has  shown  to  pertain  to  the  subject,  mathematically 
considered ;  and  that  the  actual  price  is  lower  than  is 
charged  for  the  same  thing  by  private  annuity  com- 
panies. 

4th. — That  this  income  is  independent  of  risk  and 
expense  in  collection,  and  will  be  paid  monthly  by  the 
pay  department  of  the  Army ;  a  method  of  payment 
which  is  not  only  safe  and  convenient  but  is  the  one  most 
likely  to  be  agreeable  to  the  officer's  widow  or  orphan. 

5th. — That  this  Society  will  be  open  to  officers  on 
the  same  terms  under  all  contingencies  of  service, 
whereas  in  time  of  war  or  other  special  danger,  the 
increased  charge  for  increased  risk  makes  it  next  to 
impossible  for  officers  of  the  Army  to  procure  life  in- 
surance or  survivorship  annuities  in  private  corpora- 
tions. 

XVIII. DUTIES  OF  AN  ADJUTANT-GENERAL. 

Office  in  our  Army  renders  the  incumbent  eligible 
to  command,  but  as  a  rule  command  is  assumed  by  vir- 
tue of  assignment  to  duty. 

The  order  making  an  original  assignment  should 
specify  clearly  what  is  embraced  in  the  command  ;  and 
commanders  succeeding  the  first  one,  exercise  authority 
to  the  same  extent  their  predecessors  did,  unless  other- 
wise ordered. 


46 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


Although  violations  may  be  tolerated  in  practice,  it 
is,  nevertheless,  the  theory  of  our  military  system  that 
the  commanding  officer  is  solely  responsible  for  his  en- 
tire command — staff  as  well  as  line — and  his  authority 
is  as  full  and  complete  over  the  one  as  over  the  other. 

In  obedience  to  the  full  measure  of  responsibility 
placed  directly  upon  him,  a  Commanding  General  in 
our  Service  performs  the  various  duties  of  his  office  in 
person,  as  far  as  possible. 

In  time  of  peace,  when  the  operations,  although 
multifarious,  are  not  of  great  magnitude,  and  when 
economy  in  public  expenditures  is  dwelt  upon  as  of 
special  importance,  commanding  generals  give  their 
personal  attention  to  many  matters  of  detail  which,  in 
time  of  war,  with  large  armies  and  grand  operations, 
they  must  entrust  mainly,  if  not  entirely,  to  adjutants- 
general  or  chiefs  of  staff. 

Our  military  laws  provide  no  such  office  as  Chief  of 
Staff.  It  has  appeared  but  twice  in  our  legal  organiza- 
tion, namely,  in  the  Act  of  March  3,  1865,  which  was 
repealed  and  the  office  abolished  by  the  Act  of  April 
3,  1869,  and  in  the  Act  of  March  3,  1813,  which  has 
never  been  repealed  in  express  terms,  but  which  was 
virtually  repealed  by  the  Acts  of  1815,  and  1821,  fixing 
the  peace  establishment.  The  necessities  of  the  Ser- 
vice, however,  produce  the  office  in  fact,  although  it 
does  not  exist  in  form,  and  legislative  sanction  is  not 
required  for  the  assignment  of  an  officer  to  duty  as 
Chief  of  Staff. 

As  a  general  rule  the  duties  of  this  office  fall  upon 
the  Adjutant-General  of  the  command. 

That  officer,  whether  in  peace  or  war,  is  de  facto 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.        47 

Chief  of  Staff,  unless  some  other  officer  is  specially  as- 
signed to  that  duty.  But  the  office  is  essentially  dif- 
ferent in  our  Service  from  what  it  is  in  foreign  services. 
In  the  latter,  the  Chief  of  Staff,  as  such,  has  control 
over,  and  is  accountable  for  the  staff  of  the  command, 
which  creates  a  divided  responsibility  at  the  head  of 
the  Army,  while  with  us  an  Adjutant-General  (or  Chief 
of  Staff)  is  not  a  power  in  himself.  He  is,  in  fact,  the 
organ,  and  acts  only  in  the  name  of  the  General  with 
whom  he  is  serving,  the  latter  alone  being  accountable 
for  the  staff  as  well  as  line.  The  office  of  Adjutant- 
General  is  absolutely  indispensable  in  all  large  com- 
mands. Its  duties,  speaking  broadly,  are  all  of  those 
duties  of  the  Commanding  General  himself,  which,  un- 
der a  judicious  division  of  labor,  he  does  not  perform 
in  person. 

This  division  of  labor  is  not  made  by  the  law,  and 
is  but  vaguely  indicated  by  regulations.  In  fact  it 
cannot  be  governed  by  inflexible  rules,  but  must  vary 
from  time  to  time ;  custom,  the  directions  and  wishes 
of  the  commander,  and  the  necessities  of  the  Service  as 
they  arise  from  day  to  day,  alone  can  regulate  it. 

No  General  Order,  and  no  important  Special  Order, 
should  be  promulgated  by  an  Adjutant-General  until 
it  has  been  read  and  approved  by  the  commander  in 
whose  name  it  is  made. 

Any  order,  written  or  verbal,  not  palpably  illegal, 
that  an  Adjutant- General  promulgates  in  the  name  of 
the  General  Commanding  is  binding  on  all  within  the 
sphere  of  the  General's  command. 

Practically  speaking,  so  far  as  the  command  is  con- 
cerned, whatever  the  Commanding  General  may  do 


48 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


himself,  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  command  may  do 
in  his  name,  being  responsible  only  to  his  commander. 
The  latter  in  turn  is  responsible  to  his  superiors  for 
the  Adjutant-General  as  well  as  for  the  rest  of  the 
command.  It  is,  therefore,  a  matter  of  the  greatest 
moment  that  Adjutants-General,  who  are  the  only  of- 
ficers in  the  Army  invested  with  such  large  discretion, 
should  be  persons  of  good  character  and  good  habits, 
as  well  as  men  of  judgment,  learning,  and  experience. 

The  following  extracts  from  the  U.  S.  Army  Regu- 
lations of  1821,  compiled  by  General  Scott,  and  ap- 
proved by  Congress,  though  not  reproduced  in  the  ex- 
isting code,  are  nevertheless  of  interest : 

"  4.  The  duties  of  a  Chief  of  Staff,  including  always 
his  assistants,  whatever  may  be  the  corps  to  which  he 
is  attached,  fall  under  the  heads  sedentary  and  active." 

"  5.  Sedentary  duties,  or  the  business  of  the  bureau, 
as  publishing  orders  in  writing,  making  up  written  in- 
structions and  the  transmission  of  them ;  reception  of 
reports  and  returns ;  disposing  of  them ;  forming  ta- 
bles, showing  the  state  and  position  of  the  corps,  or 
its  several  parts ;  regulating  details  of  service ;  corre- 
sponding with  the  corps,  detachments,  or  individual 
officers  serving  under  the  orders  of  the  same  com- 
mander; corresponding  with  the  administrative  or  dis- 
bursing departments  relative  to  the  wants  of  the 
troops,  and,  finally,  the  methodical  arrangement  and 
care  of  the  records  and  papers  of  his  office.7' 

"  8.  Active  duties.  These  consist  principally  in 
establishing  camps ;  visiting  guards  and  posts  ;  muster- 
ing and  inspecting  troops ;  inspecting  guards  and  de- 
tachments ;  forming  parades  and  lines  of  battle ;  the 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.  49 

conduct  or  control  of  deserters  and  prisoners  (from  the 
enemy);  making  reconnoisances,  and,  in  general,  dis- 
charging such  other  exterior  duties  (exterior  to  the 
bureau)  as  may  be  specially  assigned." 

"  7.  This  article  regards  more  particularly  the  staff 
of  an  army  in  the  field,  but  will  equally  apply,  in 
many  particulars,  to  the  staff  of  a  geographical  mili- 
tary department,  or  to  that  of  a  post  in  time  of  peace 


or  war." 


The  foregoing  extracts,  however,  as  well  as  the  spe- 
cification of  duties  for  a  Chief  of  Staff  given  by  Jomini 
and  other  foreign  military  writers,  are  to  us  merely 
suggestions  of  the  kind  of  service  an  Adjutant-General 
may  have  to  perform,  and  are  not  to  be  regarded  as 
setting  forth  the  duties  of  his  office. 

An  Adjutant-General  should  so  arrange  the  public 
business  as  to  enable  the  commander  to  give  timely 
attention  to  official  subjects  in  the  order  of  their  im- 
portance. With  a  view  to  this,  it  is  proper  that  cor- 
respondence concerning  a  command,  between  its  com- 
mander and  any  one  not  superior  to  him  in  the  mili- 
tary service,  as  well  as  all  official  correspondence  be- 
tween a  commander  and  those  under  his  command, 
should  be  conducted  by,  and  all  official  communications 
in  the  ascending  line  of  this  correspondence  should  -be 
addressed  to,  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  command. 
This  secures  prompt  dispatch  of  public  business,  and 
enables  the  Adjutant-General  to  obtain  and  submit 
with  those  communications  which  require  the  special 
direction  of  the  commander,  all  the  information  neces- 
sary to  a  full  understanding  of  the  subjects  presented. 
The  Adjutant-General  should  also,  if  practicable,  pro- 


50  MILITAEY  MISCELLANIES. 

cure  for  transmittal  with  those  communications  which 
his  Commanding  General  has  not  the  power  to  decide 
upon,  such  information  as  will  enable  higher  authority 
to  dispose  of  the  subjects  presented  without  further 
reference  ;  but  no  subject  which  a  commander  is  com- 
petent to  dispose  of  should  be  forwarded  for  the  action 
of  higher  power,  except  by  way  of  appeal.  In  com- 
municating information  based  upon  reports  in  detail 
from  inferiors,  the  commander's  own  report  should 
embody  all  that  may  be  of  interest  to  higher  authority. 

Orders  and  instructions  must  be  perfectly  under- 
stood in  order  to  be  promptly  and  fully  executed. 
They  should,  therefore,  be  so  plainly  expressed  as  to 
be  readily  comprehended  by  the  subordinate,  who  may 
know  nothing  of  the  matter  in  hand  but  what  he  learns 
from  the  orders  or  instructions  received. 

All  orders,  and  all  important  decisions  and  opinions, 
which  are  general  in  their  bearing,  should,  when  pro- 
mulgated from  an  Adjutant-General's  office,  appear  in 
the  form  of  "General"  or  "Special  Orders,"  in  regu- 
larly numbered  series,  and  not  as  "Circulars."  The 
latter  form,  if  adopted  at  all,  should  be  used  only  for 
conveying  information  which  is  unimportant,  and  fugi- 
tive in  its  nature. 

Orders  should  be  couched  in  brief  and  positive 
terms. 

Instructions,  if  not  given  verbally,  usually  take  the 
form  of  letters,  and  should  be  as  elaborate  and  explana- 
tory as  the  subject  and  occasion  may  require. 

It  is  especially  the  duty  of  an  Adjutant-General, 
before  promulgating  orders,  carefully  to  consider  what 
their  effect  will  be  upon  or  under  existing  orders  and 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.        51 

regulations,  and  to  ascertain  that  their  execution  is 
practicable,  and  that  they  are  such  as  will  accomplish 
the  object  with  the  greatest  advantage  to  the  Service, 
and  with  the  least  fatigue  and  inconvenience  to  the  troops. 

An  Adjutant-General  should  have  his  arrangements 
made  in  advance  for  the  distribution  of  orders  with 
the  least  possible  delay  and  with  the  greatest  pos- 
sible certainty.  The  interval  between  the  time  an 
order  is  given  by  a  commander  and  received  by  a 
subordinate,  is  not  always  fully  appreciated.  The 
Adjutant-General  should  see  that  this  interval  is  made 
as  short  as  possible.  To  that  end  he  should  keep  him- 
self informed  of  the  position  of  the  different  parts  of  the 
command,  and  the  routes  by  which  to  reach  them,  and 
should  see  that  orders  and  instructions  are  punctu- 
ally delivered  and  executed,  as  well  as  promptly  sent. 
During  campaigns,  important  orders  and  instructions 
should,  if  possible,  be  conveyed  by,  and  delivered  to, 
commissioned  officers. 

There  is  no  office  in  which  subordination  and  true 
military  character  are  more  essential  than  in  that  of  an 
Adjutant-General. 

While  he  is  not,  like  an  Aid-de-camp,  dependent  on 
the  commander  for  his  office,  he  is  fully  in  the  com- 
mander's confidence.  Entrusted  with  great  power  and 
discretion — under  no  other  bonds  than  his  personal  and 
official  integrity  and  loyalty,  he  is  under  peculiar  obli- 
gations to  his  commander  and  to  the  Service  for  faith- 
ful and  efficient  performance  of  duty.  He  should  fur- 
nish his  Commanding  General  with  information  which 
will  contribute  to  the  formation  of  just  and  correct 
conclusions  and  opinions  on  all  military  matters  con- 


52  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

cerning  the  command.  He  is  bound  by  honor  as  well 
as  by  duty  to  lay  official  business  before  the  Com- 
manding General  in  a  full,  fair  and  impartial  light, 
and  studiously  to  avoid  those  devices,  in  the  so-called 
"  art  of  putting  things,"  which  are  calculated  to  pro- 
duce wrong  impressions  and  imperfect  or  partial  rul- 
ings. While  he  should  never  assume  the  character  of 
an  advocate,  he  should — as  the  independence  of  his 
position  enables  him  to  do — on  all  proper  occasions 
give  his  own  views  and  advice,  frankly  and  fearlessly? 
but  not  persistently,  remembering  that  the  business  in 
hand,  and  the  responsibility  therefor,  belong  not  to 
him  but  to  the  Commanding  General. 

XIX. ARMY   REGULATIONS. 

In  1779  (March  29)  the  Continental  Congress 
adopted  certain  "  Regulations,"  to  "  be  observed  by  all 
the  troops  of  the  United  States."  These  had  been 
prepared  by  Baron  Steuben,  and  were  published  in  the 
same  year  as  "  Regulations  for  the  order  and  discipline 
of  the  troops  of  the  United  States."  They  were,  for 
the  greater  part,  a  system  of  tactics  and  rules  for  the 
camp  and  on  the  march,  but  contained  "Instructions," 
for  the  different  regimental  officers  and  enlisted  men. 
Other  editions  of  these  "  Regulations,"  were  published 
in  1802,  1807,  and  1809. 

Many  of  the  regulations  in  force  at  the  beginning  of 
the  year  1810,  which  had  been  issued  at  different 
times  since  1797,  in  the  form  of  General  and  Executive 
Orders,  are  given  in  Duane's  Military  Dictionary. 

On  the  increase  of  the  Army  in  1798,  in  contempla- 
tion of  war  with  a  foreign  power,  President  Adams 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.        53 

issued  manuscript  regulations,  supplementary  to  Baron 
Steuben's,  containing  many  rules  prescribing  duties  of 
the  different  grades  of  officers  and  enlisted  men  in  ser- 
vice, and  particularly  as  to  the  administration  in  a 
garrisoned  post  or  barracks. 

A  number  of  regulations,  in  the  form  of  General 
Orders,  were  also  issued  by  the  War  Department  on 
the  increase  of  the  Army  in  1812.  Some  of  these  are 
to  be  found  in  the  appendix  to  "Maltby  on  Courts- 
Martial." 

In  1808  the  Articles  of  War,  the  principal  Existing 
Regulations  and  Laws  of  the  United  States  relating  to 
the  Military  Establishment  in  force  on  the  12th  day 
of  April,  1808,  were  published — apparently  by  author- 
ity— by  Dinmore  and  Cooper,  Washington,  the  "  Reg- 
ulations "  covering  but  sixteen  pages.  In  1812  a  vol- 
ume, similar  to  that  of  1808,  was  published  by  R.  C. 
Weightman,  Washington, — also  apparently  by  author- 
ity. That  part  of  it  which  is  devoted  to  the  "  Rules 
and  Regulations  of  the  War  Department "  is  contained 
in  twenty-seven  pages. 

In  1813  the  General  Regulations  affecting  the 
Army  of  the  United  States,  were  for  the  first  time  col- 
lected and  issued  by  the  War  Department  in  book 
form  as  a  complete  system. 

By  the  Act  of  March  3  of  that  year,  it  was  made 
the  duty  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  prepare  General 
Regulations  "which  Regulations,  when  approved  by 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  shall  be  respected 
and  obeyed,  until  altered  and  revoked  by  the  same 
authority." 

The  Regulations  thus  issued  were  laid  before  Con- 


MILITABY  MISCELLANIES. 

gress  at  its  next  session,  as  required  by  the  Act,  and 
are  reprinted  in  the  "  American  State  Papers  on  Mili- 
tary Affairs,"  Vol.  I. 

Editions  of  the  Regulations  were  issued  in  Novem- 
ber, 1814,  and  in  1815.  The  latter  was  published  at 
Albany,  by  "  Webster  and  Skinners,"  and  was  not  an 
authorized  edition. 

By  Act  of  April  24,  1816,  the  Regulations  in  force 
before  the  reduction  of  the  Army,*  were  recognized  as 
far  as  found  applicable  to  the  Service,  and  subject  to 
alterations  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  with  the  approba- 
tion of  the  President. 

This  Act  did  not  refer  to  any  particular  edition  of 
General  Regulations,  but  to  all  the  general  rules,  etc., 
existing  at  the  time  of  the  reduction. 

An  edition  of  the  Regulations  was  authoritatively 
issued  in  September  of  that  year. 

There  was  an  edition  published  in  January,  1820— 
by  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  from  the  Adjutant 
and   Inspector-General's  Office — which  was  a  reprint 
of  that  of  1816,   with  the  War  Department    orders 
which  had  been  issued  in  the  meantime. 

These  Regulations  of  January,  1820,  were  wholly 
distinct  from  those  issued  the  following  year  in  the 
manner  to  be  stated. 

On  the  22d  December,  1819,  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives had  resolved  that  "  the  Secretary  of  War  be 
instructed  to  cause  to  be  prepared  and  laid  before  this 
House,  at  the  next  session  of  Congress,  a  system  of 
martial  law,  and  a  system  of  field  service  and  police, 

*The  Act  fixing   the   military   peace    establishment  was  approved 
March  3,  1815 — the  actual  reduction  took  place  in  June. 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.  55 

for  the  government  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States." 
On  the  22d  December,  1820,  the  Secretary  of  War 
(Calhoun)  accordingly  submitted  a  system  of  "martial 
law,"  prepared  by  Judge- Advocate  Major  Storrow 
(which  was  never  adopted),  and  a  system  of  field  ser- 
vice and  police,  which  had  been  prepared  by  General 
Scott,  and  submitted  to  the  War  Department  in  Sep- 
tember, 1818. 

December  26,  1820,  the  speaker  laid  them  before 
the  House.  The  document  was  in  manuscript  and  was 
ordered  to  be  printed,  and  a  copy  laid  upon  the  desk 
of  each  member.  (It  is  reprinted  in  the  3d  vol.  of  the 
State  Papers  on  Military  Affairs.)  When  the  book 
was  printed  several  copies  were  sent  to  General  Scott, 
who  made  certain  corrections,  and  on  the  20th  Febru- 
ary, 1821,  returned  a  corrected  copy  (of  which  he  re- 
tained a  duplicate)  to  the  War  Department  for  the 
committee  of  the  House.  It  was  received  by  the 
chairman  of  the  Committee  on  the  %Sd  February,  1821. 

February  27,  1821,  the  chairman  of  the  Military 
Committee  of  the  House,  reported  the  Senate  Bill,  "  to 
reduce  and  fix  the  military  peace  establishment,"  with 
certain  amendments,  among  which  was  the  addition  of 
a  section  approving  and  adopting  "  the  system  of  Gen- 
eral Regulations  for  the  Army,  compiled  by  Major- 
General  Scott."  The  bill,  including  this  (the  14th) 
section  became  law  March  2,  1821.  Early  in  that 
month  General  Scott  received  directions  to  put  the 
book  to  press  for  the  use  of  the  Army,  and  (having 
received  a  letter  from  the  chairman  of  the  Military 
Committee  of  the  House,  informing  him  that  the  cor- 
rected copy  had  been  received,  and  section  14  added 


56  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

to  the  Army  Bill  by  way  of  amendment)  he  caused 
the  book  to  be  reprinted  from  his  retained  duplicate 
corrected  copy. 

The  Regulations  were  then,  July,  1821,  issued  by  the 
War  Department,  witli  the  corrections  as  "  formally 
approved  by  Congress." 

This  gave  rise  to  the  question,  was  the  corrected 
copy  the  one  approved  by  Congress?  In  1822  a  com- 
mittee of  the  House  was  appointed  to  investigate  the 
circumstances  attending  its  publication.  General  Alex- 
ander Smyth,  the  chairman  of  the  Military  Committee, 
stated  that  when  he  proposed  section  14,  of  the  Act  of 
1821,  to  the  committee  as  an  amendment,  he  had  refer- 
ence to  the  corrected  Regulations  which  he  had  then 
received,  that  he  did  not  recollect  exhibiting  them  to 
the  committee,  but  thought  he  had,  and  believed  that 
when  he  reported  the  amendments  to  the  House,  he 
had  the  corrected  copy  and  deposited  it  with  the  clerk 
with  the  intent  that  from  that  copy  the  system  should 
be  published.  These  recollections  were  not,  however, 
sustained  by  the  other  members  of  the  committee  nor 
by  the  clerk  of  the  House.  None  of  them  apparently 
had  ever  seen  the  corrected  copy  before  the  passage  of 
the  law,  but  the  clerk  of  the  House  thought  he  had 
seen  it  subsequently,  when  General  Smyth,  made  a 
return  to  him  of  various  papers  which  had  been 
before  the  committee,  and  he  refused  to  receive  it, 
not  considering  himself  the  proper  repository.  Search 
had  been  made  in  his  office,  but  it  could  not  be 
found. 

The  select  Committee  reported  that  it  was  an  act 
of  omission,  and  not  of  design,  on  the  part  of  the  chair- 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.        57 

man  of  the  Military  Committee  in  not  submitting  the 
corrected  copy  to  the  Committee. 

The  Committee  reported,  May  6,  1822,  and  Con- 
gress immediately  passed  an  Act — which  was  approved 
May  7 — repealing  the  14th  section  of  the  Act  of  1821. 

Gaines  was  accused  by  Scott  of  being  instrumental 
in  raising  the  opposition  to  these  regulations. 

The  Regulations  which  were  published  to  the  Army 
in  July,  1821,  by  President  Monroe,  as  approved  by 
Congress,  never,  therefore,  in  that  form,  had  such  ap- 
proval, whereas  the  Regulations  which  were  laid  be- 
fore Congress  in  1820,  but  were  never  published  to  the 
Army,  had. 

The  next  issue  of  Regulations  was  that  of  March  1, 
1825, — revised  by  General  Scott. 

In  1835,  new  Regulations,  revised  by  Major-General 
Macomb,  were  published.  Some  amendments  were 
made  to  these  in  an  order  from  the  War  Department, 
dated  December  31,  1836,  in  which  it  was  declared 
that  the  General  Order  prefixed  to  the  Regulations  of 
1835,  had  never  been  promulgated  or  in  force,  and 
directing  the  page  containing  it  to  be  cancelled,  and 
the  Order  of  December  31,  1836,  to  be  inserted  in  its 
place. 

Another  edition  of  the  Regulations  was  issued  Jan- 
uary 25, 1841,  and  u  Re  vised  Regulations,"  May  1, 1847. 

The  next  editions  published  to  the  Army  were 
those  of  January  1,  1857,  August  10,  1861,  and  of 
1863  (the  latter  being  simply  a  republication  of  the 
Regulations  of  1861,  with  an  appendix  "  containing 
the  changes  and  laws  affecting  Army  Regulations  and 
Articles  of  War,  to  June  25,  1863  "). 


58  MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 

By  an  Act,  approved  July  28,  1866,  Congress  di- 
rected the  Secretary  of  War  "  to  have  prepared,  and 
to  report  to  Congress  at  its  next  session,  a  code  of 
Regulations  for  the  government  of  the  Army,  and  of 
the  Militia  in  actual  service,  which  shall  embrace  all 
necessary  orders  and  forms  of  a  general  character,  for 
the  performance  of  all  duties  incumbent  on  officers  and 
men  in  the  military  service,  including  rules  for  the 
government  of  Courts-Martial.  The  existing  Regula- 
tions to  remain  in  force  until  Congress  shall  have  acted 
on  said  report." 

No  code  of  Regulations  having  been  submitted,  Con- 
gress, by  Act  of  July  15,  1870,  enacted  as  follows : 

"  The  Secretary  of  War  shall  prepare  a  system  of 
General  Regulations  for  the  administration  of  the  af- 
fairs of  the  Army,  which,  when  approved  by  Congress, 
shall  be  in  force  and  obeyed  until  altered  or  revoked 
by  the  same  authority,  and  said  Regulations  shall  be 
reported  to  Congress  at  its  next  session ;  Provided. 
That  said  Regulations  shall  not  be  inconsistent  with 
the  laws  of  the  United  States." 

A  board,  with  Inspector-General  Marcy  at  its  head, 
was  accordingly,  in  1871,  appointed  to  prepare  such  a 
system,  and  the  Regulations  proposed  by  it  were  sub- 
mitted to  the  House,  February  17,  1873,  referred  to 
the  committee  on  Military  Affairs,  and  ordered  to  be 
printed.  There  was  not  time  for  the  42d  Congress  to 
act  on  them. 

The  Military  Committee  of  the  43d  Congress  having 
had  them  under  consideration,  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  regulations  should  be  flexible,  which  would  not 
be  the  case  if  adopted  by  Congress.  The  Committee, 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.  59 

therefore,  recommended  a  bill  which  was  passed,  and 
approved,  March  1,  1875,  repealing  the  above  quoted 
section  of  the  Act  of  July  15,  1870,  and  authorizing 
the  President  "  to  make  and  publish  Kegulations  for 
the  government  of  the  Army  in  accordance  with  exist- 
ing laws," — but  the  authority  thus  re-committed  to  the 
President,  was  not  acted  on. 

In  1876,  however,  by  a  Joint  Resolution  of  August 
15,  Congress  " requested"  the  President  "to  postpone 
all  action  in  connection  with  the  publication  of  said 
Regulations  until  after  the  report "  of  the  Commission 
on  the  reform  and  reorganization  of  the  Army,  created 
by  Act  of  July  24,  1876,  was  "  received  and  acted 
upon  by  Congress  at  its  next  session."  Upon  the 
"  report "  here  indicated  no  final  action  was  ever  taken, 
and  the  said  Commission  was,  after  March  4,  1879, 
discontinued.  Thereupon  an  Act  was  approved  June 
23  of  that  year,  section  2  of  which  provided  as  follows: 

"That  the  Secretary  of  War  is  authorized  and  directed 
to  cause  all  the  Regulations  of  the  Army  and  general 
orders  now  in  force  to  be  codified  and  published  to 
the  Army,  and  to  defray  the  expenses  thereof  out  of 
the  contingent  fund  of  the  Army." 

The  work  of  codification  was  confided  to  the  Adju- 
tant-General of  the  Army,  and  the  Secretary  of  War, 
upon  an  opinion  of  the  Judge- Advocate  General,  di- 
rected that  it  should  include  all  orders  published  since 
the  date  of  the  Act  authorizing  the  codification.  It 
includes,  therefore,  General  Orders,  No.  20,  of  Febru- 
ary 15,  1881.  The  codification,  thus  prepared,  was 
approved  by  the  Secretary  of  War  (Alex.  Ramsey) 
and  published  for  the  instruction  and  government  of 


60  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

the  Army  on  February  17,  1881.     It  is  known  as  the 
United  States  Army  Regulations,  1881. 

A  Board  of  Officers,  of  which  Brigadier-General 
Stephen  V.  Benet,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  was  president, 
was  (by  par.  1,  Special  Orders,  No.  298,  Headquarters 
of  the  Army,  A.  Gr.  O.,  December  28,  1886)  appointed 
to  meet  at  the  War  Department  on  the  3d  day  of  Jan- 
uary, 1887,  "for  the  purpose  of  revising  and  condens- 
ing the  Regulations  of  the  Army  and  preparing  a  new 
edition  of  the  same."  This  edition  was  officially  ap- 
proved and  promulgated  as  follows : 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

February  9,  1889. 

The  President  of  the  United  States  directs  that  the 
following  Regulations  for  the  Army  be  published  for 
the  government  of  all  concerned,  and  that  they  be 
strictly  observed.  Nothing  contrary  to  the  tenor  of 
these  Regulations  will  be  enjoined  in  any  part  of  the 
forces  of  the  United  States  by  any  commander  what- 
soever. 

WM.  C.  ENDICOTT, 

Secretary  of  War. 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  foregoing : 

1. — That  the  Regulations  of  1813,  although  required 
to  be  laid  before  Congress,  were  alterable  and  revok- 
able  by  the  President. 

2. — That  the  Regulations  existing  at  the  time  of  the 
reduction  of  the  Army  in  1815,  were  recognized  by 
the  Act  of  April  24,  1816,  subject  to  alterations  by  the 
Secretary  of  War,  with  the  approbation  of  the  Presi- 
dent. 

3. — That  only  so  much  of  the  Regulations  of  1821, 


THEORETICAL  AND  PRACTICAL  NOTES.  1 

as  was  contained  in  the  original  manuscript  submitted 
to  the  House  in  1820,  and  ordered  to  be  printed,  was 
approved  and  adopted  by  Congress. 

4. — And  that,  therefore,  with  this  exception,  the 
Regulations  of  1863,  have  been  the  only  system  of  reg- 
ulations adopted  by  Congress  in  such  way  as  to  make 
it  appear  unalterable  by  the  President. 


ARTICLE  II. 

The  Command  of  the  Army.* 

George  Washington  was  appointed  General  and 
Comniander-in-Chief  by  Congress  June  15,  1775,  but 
(with  the  exception  of  the  six  months,  commencing 
December  27,  1776,  during  which  it  endowed  Wash- 
ington with  dictatorial  powers)  Congress  commanded 
the  Army — directly  a  part  of  the  time,  and  through 
the  Board  of,  and  Secretary  at  War,  the  remainder. 

General  Washington  resigned  his  commission  as 
General  and  Commander-in-Chief  on  the  23d  of  De- 
cember, 1783;  Major-General  Henry  Knox,  then  on 
duty  at  West  Point,  became  the  senior  officer  of  the 
small  force  remaining  in  service,  but  he  was  not  placed 
in  command.  On  the  2d  of  June,  1784,  Congress 
directed  all  the  troops  in  service  to  be  mustered  out, 
except  25  privates  to  guard  the  stores  at  Fort  Pitt 
and  55  to  guard  the  stores  at  West  Point,  with  a 
proportionate  number  of  officers — no  officer,  however, 
above  the  rank  of  Captain.  Under  this  resolution 
Major-General  Knox  was  disbanded,  and  the  Captain 
(John  Doughty)  in  command  of  the  small  artillery 
force  at  West  Point  retained  in  service  became  the 
senior  officer  of  the  Army,  and  Congress  allowed  him 
the  pay  and  emoluments  of  a  Major  of  Artillery  by 
Resolution  of  November  11,  1784.  The  peace  estab- 
lishment, fixed  by  Resolution  of  June  3,  1784,  pro- 

*  Field  Glass,  for  May,  1879. 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  63 

vided  for  700  men,  to  be  formed  into  one  regiment  of 
eight  companies  of  infantry  and  two  of  artillery,  "  for 
securing  and  protecting  the  northwestern  frontiers  of 
the  United  States,"  etc.  Josiah  Harmar,  of  Penn- 
sylvania, was  appointed  Lieutenant-Colonel  Command- 
ant of  these  troops,  and  thus  became  the  senior  officer 
in  service.  But  that  he  did  not  command  the  Army  is 
evident  from  the  fact  that  the  resolution  which  pro- 
vided the  troops,  authorized  the  Secretary  at  War  to 
direct  "their  destination  and  operations,  subject  to 
the  order  of  Congress."  On  the  27th  of  January,  1785, 
Congress  passed  an  ordinance  for  "  ascertaining  the 
powers  and  duties  of  the  Secretary  at  War."  This 
ordinance,  amongst  other  things,  declared  it  to  be  the 
duty  of  the  Secretary  at  War  "  to  direct  the  arrange- 
ment, destination  and  operation  of  such  troops  as  are, 
or  may  be,  in  service,  subject  to  the  orders  of.  Con- 
gress." This  was  reiterated  in  Resolution  of  April 
12,  1785,  further  defining  the  peace  establishment. 
On  the  31st  of  July,  1787,  Congress  conferred  upon 
Lieut. -Col.  Josiah  Harmar  a  brevet  commission  of 
Brigadier-General,  and  allowed  him  the  emoluments, 
but  not  the  pay,  of  said  commission,  to  continue,  how- 
ever, only  during  his  command  on  the  frontier.  Matters 
remained  thus  until  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution 
in  1789.  Section  II.,  Article  2,  of  that  instrument 
says  "  the  President  shall  be  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  Army  and  Navy  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the 
Militia  of  the  several  States  when  called  into  the 
actual  Service  of  the  United  States."  The  Conti- 
nental Congress  had  exercised  control  of  the  Ar- 
my. Several  members  of  that  Congress  assisted  in 


64  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

framing  the  Constitution.  They  created  the  Supreme 
Civil  Magistrate,  who  was  to  be  "  Commander-in- 
chief,"  and  transferred  to  him,  the  President,  and 
not  to  the  senior  officer  within  the  Army,  the  power 
to  command  the  Army  which  Congress  had  exercised. 
But  they  provided  in  the  Constitution  for  a  division 
of  power,  by  giving  to  the  President  the  command, 
and  by  reserving  to  Congress  the  right  to  make  ap- 
propriations for  the  support  of  the  Army  and  rules 
for  its  government  and  regulation.  On  the  7th  of  Au- 
gust, 1789,  Congress  created  the  Department  of  War, 
and  on  the  29th  of  September,  1789,  it  passed  an  Act  to 
recognize  and  adapt  to  the  Constitution  the  military 
establishment  previously  created.  President  Wash- 
ington on  the  29th  of  September,  1789,  nominated, 
among  others,  Lieut.-Col.  Josiah  Harmar,  Brigadier- 
General  by  brevet,  and  he  was  confirmed  and  com- 
missioned, and  was  retained  under  the  Constitution  in 
the  position  he  had  held  prior  to  its  adoption.  He 
continued  as  the  senior  officer  of  the  Army,  but  exer- 
cised no  command  except  of  the  troops  on  active 
service  with  him  on  the  northwestern  frontier.  On 
the  4th  of  March,  1791,  Governor  Arthur  St.  Clair  of 
the  Northwestern  Territory  was,  under  the  Act  of 
March  3,  1791,  appointed  Major- General,  superseding 
Harmar  as  senior  officer  and  as  commander  on  the 
frontier,  but  with  no  larger  powers  as  Command er-in 
Chief  than  Harmar  had  possessed.  On  the  5th  of 
March,  1792,  St.  Clair  resigned  and  Anthony  Wayne 
(formerly  Brigadier- General,  Continental  Army)  was 
on  the  same  day  appointed  Major-General  and  placed 
as  "  General-in-Chief "  over  the  army  on  the  frontier. 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  65 

He  died  December  15,  1796,  and  was  succeeded  same 
day  by  one  of  his  Brigadier-Generals — James  Wilkin- 
son— who  continued  until  July  3,  1798.  At  this  time 
war  with  France  was  anticipated.  Washington  had 
served  two  terms  as  President,  and  had  retired  to 
private  life,  being  succeeded  in  the  Presidency  by 
John  Adams. 

The  Act  of  May  28,  1798,  authorizing  a  "  provis- 
ional "  Army,  empowered  the  President,  whenever  he 
should  deem  it  expedient,  to  appoint,  by  and  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  a  "  Commander  of 
the  Army  who  being  commissioned  as  Lieutenant- 
General,  might  be  authorized  to  command  the  armies 
of  the  United  States."  The  Act  provided  that  the 
"  Commander  of  the  Army,"  as  well  as  others  appointed 
under  it,  might  be  discharged  whenever  the  President 
thought  the  public  safety  would  justify  it.  Wash- 
ington was  nominated  by  the  President  on  the  2d  and 
confirmed  by  the  Senate  on  the  3d  July,  1798,  "  to  be 
Lieutenant-General  and  Commander -in- Chief  <A  all  the 
armies  raised  or  to  be  raised  in  the  United  States." 
Our  Republic  was  at  that  time  in  its  infancy  and  was 
threatened  with  a  war  of  invasion  by  a  powerful  and 
aggressive  enemy.  The  independence  which  had  been 
won  by  the  sword,  but  which  was  hardly  yet  fully  in 
possession  of  the  civil  powers,  was  in  such  danger  that 
the  sword  seemed  indispensable  to  preserve  it.  Under 
these  circumstances,  the  "  Father  of  his  Country  "  was 
called  from  his  retirement  to  see  that  the  freedom  he 
had  fought  for  was  not  toppled  over  before  it  had 
become  really  enthroned.  It  is  not  strange  that  under 
these  circumstances  Washington  was  endowed  with  the 


66 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


large  powers  as  Commander-in- Chief  (though  of  ques- 
tionable constitutionality)  which  he  had  exercised 
during  the  Revolution.  But  even  under  the  pressure 
of  these  trying  times,  and  in  the  presence  of  the 
"  Father  of  his  Country,"  the  President  (Mr.  Adams) 
was  watchful  of  the  constitutional  duties  and  prerog- 
atives of  his  high  office. 

On  the  3d  March,  1799,  an  Act  was  passed  "That 
a  Commander  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States  shall 
be  appointed  and  commissioned  by  the  style  of  '  Gen- 
eral of  the  Armies  of  the  United  States,'  and  the 
present  office  and  title  of  Lieutenant-General  shall 
thereafter  be  abolished."  The  purpose  was  to  confer 
the  new  office  and  title  on  Washington.  But  in  the 
view  of  Mr.  Adams,  while  the  title  of  Lieutenant- 
General  had  relation  to  the  higher  office  of  the  Presi- 
dent as  the  General  in  fact,  and  did  not  fully  ignore 
the  Chief  Magistrate  as  the  constitutional  and  actual 
head  of  the  Army,  the  title  and  office  of  General  of 
the  "  Armies  of  the  United  States  "  "  touched,"  if  it 
did  not  "  encroach  upon,  the  constitutional  functions 
of  the  President."  The  office  of  "  General,"  created  by 
the  Act  of  March  3,  1798,  was  not  filled,  and  Wash- 
ington died  in  office  as  Lieutenant-Genera}.  Then 
Hamilton  became  the  senior  officer  of  the  Army,  and 
as  Inspector-General  had  some  general  supervision, 
but  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  he  was  put  in  com- 
mand of  the  Army.  Indeed,  there  is  evidence  to  show 
that  he  was  never  endowed  with  the  command,  but 
that  the  Secretary  of  War  directly  exercised  it ;  for 
on  the  18th  of  December,  1799,  Secretary  of  War 
McHenry  wrote  to  Hamilton,  saying:  "  I  intend  that 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  67 

the  recruiting  service  shall  be  wholly  confided  to 
you,"  and  on  the  5th  of  January,  1800,  Hamilton  wrote 
to  Mr.  King,  saying  :  "Who  is  to  be  Cominander-in- 
Chief  \  not  the  next  in  command.  It  will  probably 
be  deferred."  Hamilton  and  the  other  officers  ap- 
pointed for  the  "  Provisional  Army,"  raised  during  the 
trouble  between  the  United  States  and  France,  were 
disbanded  on  the  15th  of  June,  1800.  James  Wil- 
kinson, Brigadier-General  of  the  regular  Army,  thus 
again  became  the  senior  officer,  and  continued  as  such 
until  January  27,  1812.  On  the  27th  of  January,  1812, 
war  with  Great  Britain  having  broken  out,  Henry 
Dearborn,  who  had  been  a  Colonel  in  the  Revolution- 
ary Army,  and  Secretary  of  War  from  1801  to  1809, 
was  appointed  Major-General.  Dearborn,  as  rep- 
resenting the  President,  exercised  command  while  he 
was  Secretary  of  W7ar,  but  did  not  assume  it  now  that 
he  became  the  senior  General.  In  1808  he  reported, 
in  relation  to  a  proposed  increase  of  the  Army,  "In  the 
event  of  war  it  will,  I  presume,  be  considered  neces- 
sary to  arrange  our  military  force  into  separate  de- 
partments, and  to  have  a  commander  to  each  depart- 
ment, and  of  course  to  have  no  such  officer  as  Corn- 
mander-in-Chief . " 

In  1809,  he,  as  Secretary  of  War,  reported  that  "the 
business  of  the  Department  had  increased  beyond  the 
capacity  of  what  any  one  man  could  perform,"  and  the 
increase  of  the  Army  in  1812  made  it  necessary  to  pro- 
vide relief.  Delegation  of  the  duties  of  command 
was  not  resorted  to — probable  not  thought  of.  The 
first  remedy  suggested  was  the  creation  of  two  Assist- 
ant-Secretaries of  War ;  but  for  this  plan,  that  of  estab- 


68 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


lisliing  additional  regular  military  bureaux  was  sub- 
stituted and,  accordingly,  the  Quartermaster-General's 
Department,  the  Purchasing  Department  and  the  Ord- 
nance   Department   were    authorized    by  law.      The 
Adjutant-General's,  Inspector-General's,  Medical  and 
Pay  Departments  had  already  been  established.     The 
Secretary  of  War  himself,  in  the  autumn  of  1813,  by 
direction  of  President  Madison,  took  the  field  and  in 
person  directed   the  operations  of  the  Army  on  the 
Northern  frontier.     Dearborn  was  disbanded  June  15, 
1815,  under  the  Act  of  March  3  of  that  year  fixing  the 
military  peace  establishment.     That  Act  provided  for 
two  Major-Generals,   and  under  it  Jacob  Brown  and 
Andrew  Jackson  were  retained.     Brown  thus  became 
the  senior  General  Officer  of  the  Army  on  the  15th  of 
June,  1815;  but  the  President  assigned  him  to  the  com- 
mand of  the  Division  of  the  North,  and  Jackson  to  the 
Division  of  the  South,  and  exercised  direct  command 
himself  through  his  Secretary  of  War.    This  condition 
of  affairs  continued  until  the  reorganization  under  the 
Act  of  March   2,  1821.     That  Act  provided  for  one 
Major-General  only.    The  President  divided  the  United 
States  into  two  departments, — Eastern  and  Western, 
—assigned  Brigadier-General  Scott  to  the  former,  and 
Brigadier-General  Gaines  to  the  latter,  and  directed 
Major- General  Brown  to  establish  his  Head-quarters  in 
the  District  of  Columbia.     This  left  Brown  virtually 
without  a  command,  and  simply  as  adviser  of  the  Sec- 
retary of  War  and  President.     His  duties  as  senior 
General  seem  to  have  been  specifically  defined  to  him 
by  the  War  Department — though  there  is  no  record  of 
them — for  in  his  General  Order  of  June  1,  1821,  he 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  AKMY.  69 

said  :  "  On  assuming  the  new  duties  prescribed  to  him 
by  the  Department  of  War,  the  Major- General  con- 
siders," etc.  That  it  was  not  intended  he  should  com- 
mand the  Army  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  no  orders 
or  instructions  to  that  effect  were  made  known  to  the 
Army,  nor  did  he  make  any  such  claim.  Brown  died 
on  the  24th  of  February,  1828,  and  was  succeeded  by 
Alexander  Macornb,  who  was  appointed  "  Major-Gen- 
eral." The  following  order  was  issued  from  the  Ad- 
jutant-General's office,  by  direction  of  the  President, 
on  the  28th  of  May,  1828:  "He  [Maconib]  is  directed 
to  assume  the  command  of  the  Army,  and  to  take  the 
station  which  was  occupied  by  Major-General  Brown 
at  the  time  of  his  decease,  at  the  seat  of  Government." 
Macomb  assumed  command  on  the  29th  of  May, 
1828,  in  the  following  terms:  "Major-General  Alex- 
ander Macomb,  by  virtue  of  his  appointment  and  the 
orders  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  assumes 
command  of  the  Army."  At  the  time  of  Macomb's 
appointment  Scott  was  a  Brigadier- General,  and  a 
Major-General  by  brevet  dating  July  25,  1814.  He 
had  expected  to  succeed  Brown,  and  had  for  a  long 
time  urged  upon  the  Government  that  he  was  entitled 
to  rank  as  Major-General  from  the  date  of  his  brevet  as 
such.  If  this  had  been  so  he  would  have  been  senior 
to  Macomb,  even  after  the  latter  had  been  appointed 
vice  Brown  to  the  only  Major-Gen eralcy  in  the  Army. 
The  President's  order  assigning  Macomb  to  the  com- 
mand of  the  Army  was  probable  designed  to  override 
Scott's  pretensions,  and  not  to  make  a  change  in  the 
principle  and  practice  under  which  the  President  him- 
self actually  commanded  through  the  Secretary  of 


70  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

War.     Scott,    however,    as  is  well   known,  contested 
Macomb's  right  to  command  him. 

Macomb  died  June  25,  1841,  and  was  succeeded  by 
Scott.  The  President  on  the  5th  of  July,  1841,  issued 
a  similar  order  to  that  issued  when  Macomb  was  ap- 
pointed Major-General,  and  Scott  issued  his  order  July 
5,  1841,  assuming  command.  Thus  this  form  of  an- 
nouncing the  senior  General  came  into  practice.  Scott 
(as  shown  by  many  facts,  especially  his  failure  to  pro- 
vide any  authority  or  command  for  a  General-in-Chief 
in  the  Regulations  of  1821  and  1825,  prepared  by  him, 
and  by  his  correspondence  with  Secretaries  of  War 
Marcy  and  Davis)  was  fully  aware  of  the  President's 
constitutional  obligation  to  command  the  Army.  He 
said,  "  The  Acts  of  Congress  in  force  do  not  create  the 
office  of  Commander-in-Chief,"  or  "  Commander  of  the 
Army.  The  existing  laws  do  not  even  require  that 
the  senior  General  be  called  to  Washington  to  act  as 
Commander  of  the  Army  under  the  President."  On 
the  15th  of  February,  1855,  a  joint  resolution  was 
passed  reviving  the  grade  of  Lieutenant- General,  in 
order  that  it  might  be  conferred  upon  Scott,  by  brevet, 
as  an  acknowledgment  of  his  services  in  the  Mexican 
War.  There  was  nothing  in  the  resolution  entitling  the 
incumbent  to  the  command  of  the  Army  as  there  was 
in  the  case  of  General  Washington.  General  Scott,  in 
his  new  grade  of  Brevet  Lieutenant-General,  continued 
in  office  until  November  1,  1861,  when,  the  Rebellion 
being  fully  under  way,  he  retired,  and  was  succeeded 
by  Major-General  George  B.  McClellan,  then  the  senior 
officer  in  the  Army.  On  the  1st  of  June,  1862,  McClel- 
lan, still  the  senior,  and  after  having  for  seven 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  AKMY.  71 

months  exercised  all  the  authority  over  the  entire 
army  that  a  General-in-Chief  can  possess,  was  re- 
duced to  the  command  of  the  Department  of  Virginia, 
and  took  the  field  at  the  head  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac;  Major-General  Henry  W.  Halleck,  junior 
to  McClellan,  as  well  as  to  Fremont,  Dix,  Banks, 
Butler,  and  Hunter,  being  called  to  Washington  by 
the  President  and  assigned  to  duty  as  General-in- 
Chief  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States.  General 
Halleck's  own  opinions  and  views  as  to  his  powers 
under  this  assignment  are  referred  to  hereafter. 

On  the  29th  of  February,  1864,  an  Act  was  passed 
directing  "  that  the  grade  of  Lieutenant-General  be, 
and  the  same  is  hereby  revived  in  the  Army  of  the 
United  States ;  and  the  President  is  hereby  authorized, 
whenever  he  shall  deem  it  expedient,  to  appoint,  by 
and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  a 
Lieutenant- General,  to  be  selected  from  among  those  of- 
ficers in  the  military  service  of  the  United  States,  not 
below  tlie  grade  of  Major -General,  most  distinguished 
for  courage,  skill  and  ability,  who,  being  commissioned 
as  a  Lieutenant-  General,  may  be  authorized  under  the 
direction  and  during  the  pleasure  of  the  President,  to 
command  the  Armies  of  the  United  States.  Under  this 
Act,  Major-General  U.  S.  Grant  was  commissioned 
Lieutenant-General  March  2,  1864.  But  it  was  not 
until  the  12th  of  March,  1864,  when  Halleck  at  his 
own  request  was  relieved  from  duty  as  General-in- 
Chief,  that  Grant  was  assigned  to  command  the  Armies 
of  the  United  States.  On  the  same  day  Halleck  was 
assigned  to  duty  in  Washington  as  Chief  of  Staff  of 
the  Army ;  and  he  continued  until  the  close  of  the 


72 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


war  to  perform,  under  that  title,  the  same  duties  that 
he  had  theretofore  performed  under  the  designation  of 
"General-in-Chief." 

On  the  25th  of  July,  1866,  an  Act  was  passed  re- 
viving the  grade  of  "  General."  Under  it  Lieutenant- 
General  Grant  was  appointed  "  General "  July  25, 
1866.  The  grade  was  revived  in  special  recognition  of 
Grant's  eminent  services ;  but  that  it  gave  him  no  ad- 
ditional powers  is  evident  from  the  terms  of  the  Act, 
which  are  identical  in  that  particular  with  those  of  the 
Act  reviving  the  grade  of  Lieutenant-General.  On  the 
2d  of  March,  1867,  an  Act  was  passed  that  athe  Gen- 
eral of  the  Army  shall  not  be  removed,  suspended,  or 
relieved  from  command,  or  assigned  to  duty  elsewhere 
than  at  said  head-quarters  (Washington),  except  at  his 
own  request,  without  the  previous  approval  of  the 
Senate."  This  Act  further  required  that  "  all  orders 
and  instructions  relating  to  military  operations  issued 
by  the  President  or  Secretary  of  War  shall  be  issued 
through  the  General  of  the  Army,  and  in  case  of  his 
inability,  through  the  next  in  rank ;  and  any  orders  or 
instructions  relating  to  military  operations  issued  con- 
trary to  the  requirements  of  this  section  shall  be  null 
and  void."  Penalties  were  prescribed  for  any  viola- 
tion of  these  requirements. 

It  is  historical  that  the  President  at  this  time  was  in 
great  disfavor,  and  was  not  long  afterwards  tried  by  a 
High  Court  of  Impeachment;  and,  although  the  im- 
peachment failed,  he  was  practically  deposed  as  Coni- 
mander-in-Chief  by  the  Act  just  referred  to,  which  he 
had  signed  only  under  compulsion  and  protest.  In 
messages  to  Congress  he  called  attention  to,  and  pro- 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  73 

tested  against,  this  Act  as  depriving  the  President  of 
his  constitutional  rights.  As  it  is  not  probable  that 
any  one  will  ever  cite  this  legislation  in  support  of  the 
right  of  the  President  to  delegate  his  powers  as  Com- 
rnander-in-Chief,  or  the  right  of  Congress  constitution- 
ally to  deprive  him  of  them,  it  need  not  be  discussed 
in  this  connection.  It  was  repealed  by  the  Act  of  July 
15,  1870,  which  abolished  the  offices  of  General  and 
Lieutenant-General  as  soon  as  vacated  by  the  officers 
then  holding  them. 

On  the  4th  of  March,  1869,  Grant  became  President 
of  the  United  States,  and  Lieutenant-General  W.  T. 
Sherman  was,  on  that  date,  appointed  General.  On 
the  5th  of  March,  1869,  the  President  directed  General 
Sherman  to  assume  command  of  the  Army,  which  he 
did  by  an  order  dated  March  8,  1869;  but  by  an  order 
dated  March  26,  1869,  the  President  practically  re- 
sumed command  himself,  and  has  exercised  it  ever  since. 

On  the  15th  of  July,  1870,  an  Act  was  passed  di- 
recting that  "  the  offices  of  General  and  Lieutenant- 
General  of  the  Army  shall  continue  until  a  vacancy 
shall  occur  in  the  same,  and  no  longer ;  and  when  such 
vacancy  shall  occur  in  either  of  said  offices,  immedi- 
ately thereupon  all  laws  and  parts  of  laws  creating 
said  office  shall  become  inoperative,  and  shall,  by  vir- 
tue of  this  Act,  from  thenceforward  be  held  to  be  re- 
pealed." The  revival  of  the  grades  of  Brevet  Lieutenant- 
General  in  1865,  and  of  Lieutenant-General  and  General 
in  1864  and  1866,  was  not  intended  to  make  a  change 
in  the  regular  military  system  of  the  United  States,  but 
was  designed  to  afford  rewards  for  the  distinguished 
services  of  particular  individuals.  The  intention  is 


74 


MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 


the  same  in  all,  but  is  most  clearly  set  forth  in  the  case 
of  General  Scott,  the  Joint  Resolution  reading : 

"  That  the  grade  of  Lieutenant-General  be,  and  the 
same  is  hereby,  revived  in  the  Army  of  the  United 
States,  in  order  that  when,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Presi- 
dent and  Senate,  it  shall  be  deemed  proper  to  acknowl- 
edge eminent  services  of  a  Major-General  of  the  Army 
in  the  late  war  with  Mexico,  in  the  mode  already  pro- 
vided for  in  subordinate  grades  the  grade  of  Lieu- 
tenant-General may  be  specially  conferred  by  brevet, 
and  by  brevet  only,  to  take  rank  from  the  date  of  such 
service  or  services.  Provided,  however,  that,  when  the 
said  grade  of  Lieutenant-General  by  brevet  shall  have 
once  been  filled,  and  have  become  vacant,  this  Joint 
Resolution  shall  thereafter  expire  and  be  of  no  effect." 


It  cannot  be  disputed  that,  if  it  is  the  meaning  and 
intention  of  the  Constitution  that  the  President  shall 
actually  command  the  Army,  the  intention  must  be 
carried  out.  To  ascertain  the  intention,  "the  safest 
rule  of  interpretation  will  be  found  to  be  to  look  into 
the  nature  and  object  of  the  particular  powers,  duties, 
and  rights,  with  all  the  lights  and  aids  of  contempo- 
rary history,  and  to  give  to  the  words  of  each  just 
such  operation  and  force  consistent  with  their  legiti- 
mate meaning  as  may  fairly  secure  and  attain  the  ends 
proposed."  (XVI.  Pet.  610-616.  Wheat.  418  ) 

u  The  intention  of  the  instrument  must  prevail;  this 
intention  must  be  collected  from  its  words ;  and  its 
words  are  to  be  understood  in  that  sense  in  which 
they  are  generally  used  by  those  for  whom  the  instru- 
ment is  made."  (XII.  Wheaton,  832.  Ch.  J.  Marshall.) 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  75 

"  The  first  and  fundamental  rule  in  relation  to  the 
interpretation  of  all  instruments  applies  to  the  Consti- 
tution ;  that  is,  to  construe  them  according  to  the  sense 
of  the  terms  and  the  intention  of  the  parties.  .  .  , 
This,  for  the  reason  that  the  Constitution,  which  was 
founded  by  the  people  for  themselves  and  their  pos- 
terity, and  for  objects  of  the  most  momentous  nature ; 
for  the  perpetual  Union;  for  the  establishment  of  jus- 
tice ;  for  the  general  welfare,  and  for  the  perpetuation 
of  the  blessings  of  liberty,  requires  that  every  inter- 
pretation of  its  powers  should  have  a  constant  refer- 
ence to  these  objects.  .  .  .  Where  technical  words 
are  used,  the  technical  meaning  is  to  be  applied  to 
them,  unless  it  is  repelled  by  the  context."  (Potter's 
"  Dwarris  on  Statutes,"  chap,  xix.,  pp.  655,  662,  676, 
677, — quoting  Story). 

Admitting  that  the  foregoing  authorities  establish 
the  fact  that  the  intention  when  ascertained  must  be 
carried  out,  it  is  necessary  to  look  into  the  question  as 
to  what  was  intended  by  that  part  of  the  Constitution 
which  says  the  President  "SHALL  BE  Cornmander-in- 
Chief  of  the  Army,"  etc.  This  intention  "must  be 
collected  from  its  words  ;  and  its  words  are  to  be 
understood  in  that  sense  in  which  they  are  generally 
used  by  those  for  whom  the  instrument  is  made." 
When  the  Constitution  was  prepared  we  had  just 
emerged  from  an  eight  years'  war  for  freedom.  The 
people  were  familiar  with  military  operations,  duties 
and  titles.  Washington  was  the  leader  in  the  long 
struggle  by  virtue  of  the  commission  of  General  and 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army  of  the  United  Col- 
onies conferred  upon  him  by  the  delegates — all  of 


76 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


them  being  named.  These  delegates  undoubtedly 
meant  by  the  term  "  Commander-in-Chief,"  that  the 
person  holding  that  office  should  actually  command, 
and  so  Washington  understood  their  wishes.  There 
is  no  reasonable  doubt  that  the  words  "Commander- 
in-Chief,"  as  introduced  into  the  Constitution,  under 
which  Washington  became  the  first  President,  were 
meant  in  the  same  sense  as  that  in  which  they  had 
been  understood  in  his  commission  as  "  General."  By 
the  term  Commander-in-Chief,  the  "  Fathers  "  meant 
that  the  President  must  be  the  General  of  the  Army 
and  the  Admiral  of  the  Navy,  and  no  navy  officer 
makes  any  claim  to  the  command  of  the  Navy.  The 
design  was  to  confer  upon  the  President  the  power, 
and  impose  upon  him  the  obligation,  to  command  ;  and 
it  was  not  intended,  in  making  him  Commander-in- 
Chief,  to  endow  him  with  nominal  functions  or  with 
power  which  he  might,  in  his  discretion,  delegate 
to  some  one  else.  He,  however,  became  Commander, 
as  the  civil  chief  magistrate,  instead  of  as  the  senior 
General,  and  his  title  was  changed.  Instead  of  being 
"  General  and  Commander-in-Chief,"  he  became  "  Presi- 
dent and  Commander-in-Chief,"  and  though  not  triable 
by  court-martial,  as  a  soldier,  he  was  made  amenable 
to  a  special  tribunal  of  a  similar  nature,  namely  the 
High  Court  of  Impeachment.  That  there  should  be 
no  semblance  even  of  military  domination,  not  only 
was  the  actual  command  lodged  irrevocably  and  un- 
alterably with  the  elective  civil  chief  magistrate,  but 
the  Constitution  provided  that  uno  appropriation 
of  money "  for  the  support  of  armies  "  shall  be 
for  a  longer  term  than  two  years."  Never  in  the 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  AEMY.  77 

formation  of  a  free  government  were  there  wiser 
provisions.  They  could  not  have  been  set  forth  in 
plainer  or  more  positive  terms.  The  President  cannot 
divest  himself  of  the  duties  of  Commander-in-Chief 
(O'Brien's  "Military  Law,"  p.  30),  nor  can  Congress  take 
them  from  him ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  Congress  only 
can  raise  and  support  the  forces  over  which  this  com- 
mand is  to  be  exercised.  The  military  is  thus  raised, 
commanded,  and  supported  under  the  immediate  con- 
trol of  two  of  the  civil  powers,  and  is  helpless  in  the 
the  hands  of  either  against  the  other.  Kent,  in  his 
"  Commentaries,"  says  :  "  It  was  difficult  to  constitute 
the  office  [of  President]  in  such  a  manner  as  to  render 
it  equally  safe  and  useful,  by  combining  in  the  struc- 
ture of  its  powers  a  due  proportion  of  energy  and 
responsibility.  The  first  is  necessary  to  maintain  a 
firm  administration  of  the  law ;  the  second  is  equally 
requisite  to  preserve  inviolate  the  liberties  of  the 
people.  The  authors  of  the  Constitution  appear 
to  have  surveyed  the  two  objects  with  profound 
discernment,  and  to  have  organized  the  executive 
department  with  consummate  skill."  That  the  in- 
tention was  that  the  President  should  actually  com- 
mand seems  to  be  clear  from  the  foregoing  point  of 
view.  But  it  may  be  inferred  also  from  the  facts 
concerning  the  State  Constitutions  adopted  prior  to 
and  soon  after  the  formation  of  the  Union.  It  is  fair 
to  assume  that  the  principles  in  military  affairs  by 
which  the  various  State  Executives  were  governed, 
were  of  the  same  nature  as  those  introduced  into  the 
National  Constitution,  and  that  where  the  term  "  Com- 
mander-in-Chief "  was  used  by  the  delegates  who 


78 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


framed  the  Constitution  of  the  Union,  it  was  intended 
to  convey  substantially  the  same  meaning  that  it  did 
when  used  in  the  State  constitutions.  In  this  con- 
nection we  find  the  following : 

New  Hampshire.  —  Constitution  formed  in  1784, 
amended  in  1792.  .  .  .  "The  President  of  this 
State  for  the  time  being  shall  be  Commander-m-Chief 
of  the  Army  and  Navy,  and  all  the  military  forces  of 
this  State  by  sea  and  by  land  .  .  .  and  lead  and 
conduct  them  .  .  .  and,  in  fine,  the  Governor  is 
hereby  entrusted  with  all  other  powers  incident  to  the 
office  of  Captain-General  and  Commander-in-Chief  and 
Admiral." 

Massachusetts. — Constitution  agreed  upon  1779- 
1780.  "The  Governor  of  the  Commonwealth  for 
the  time  being  shall  be  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Army  and  Navy,  and  of  all  the  military  forces  of  the 
State  by  sea  and  land  .  .  .  and  lead  and  conduct 
them,  and  with  them  to  encounter,  repel,  resist,  expelr 
and  pursue  by  force  of  arms,  as  well  by  sea  as  by 
land,  within  or  without  the  limits  of  this  Common- 
wealth ;  .  .  .  and  that  the  Governor  be  entrusted 
with  all  these  and  other  powers,  incident  to  the  offices 
of  Captain-General  and  Coininander-in-Chief  and 
Admiral." 

Connecticut. — Under  the  Royal  Charter  of  1662,  as 
adopted  by  the  people  in  1776  and  modified  from 
time  to  time  till  1818,  when  the  present  Constitution 
was  adopted,  "the  Governor  was  Captain-General  of 
the  Militia  and  the  Deputy-Governor  was  Lieuten- 
ant-General.  Under  the  present  Constitution,  the  Gov- 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  79 

ernor  is  Captain-General  of  the  Militia  of  the  State, 
except  when  called  into  the  Service  of  the  United 
States." 

NeiuYorJc. — Constitution  established  by  the  Con- 
vention, 1777.  "That  the  Governor  shall  continue  in 
office  three  years,  and  shall,  by  virtue  of  his  office,  be 
General  and  Commander-in-Chief  of  all  the  Militia,  and 
Admiral  of  the  Navy  of  this  State." 

New  Jersey.— Constitution,  1776.  .  .  .  "That 
the  Governor,  or,  in  his  absence,  the  Vice-President  of 
the  Council,  shall  have  the  Supreme  Executive  Power, 
be  Chancellor  of  the  Colony,  and  act  as  Captain-Gen- 
eral and  Commander-in-Chief  of  all  the  Militia  and 
other  military  force  in  this  Colony." 

Pennsylvania. — Constitution  of  1776.  "The  Presi- 
dent shall  be  Commander  in- Chief  of  the  forces  of  the 
State,  but  shall  not  command  in  person,  except  advised 
thereto  by  the  Council,  and  then  only  so  long  as  they 
shall  approve  thereof."  Constitution  1790.  .  .  . 
"  He  shall  be  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army  and 
Navy  of  this  Commonwealth,  and  of  the  Militia,  ex- 
cept when  they  shall  be  called  into  actual  Service  of 
the  United  States."  .  .  . 

Delaware.— Constitution  of  1 776.  "  The  President, 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Privy  Council,  may 
embody  the  Militia  and  act  as  Captain-General  and 
Commander-in-Chief  of  them  and  [of]  the  other  mili- 
tary forces  of  this  State,  under  the  laws  of  the  same." 

Maryland.— Constitution  of  1776.  .  .  .  "That 
the  Governor,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

Council,  may  embody  the  Militia,  and,  when  embodied, 
shall  alone  have  the  direction  of  all  the  regular  land 
and  sea  forces  under  the  laws  of  this  State ;  but  he 
shall  not  command  in  person  unless  advised  thereto 
by  the  Council,  and  then  only  so  long  as  they  shall 
approve  thereof."  .  .  . 

Virginia. — Constitution  of  1776.  "The  Governor 
may  embody  the  Militia  with  the  advice  of  the  Privy 
Council,  and  when  embodied,  shall  alone  have  the  di- 
rection of  the  Militia,  under  the  laws  of  the  country." 

North  Carolina.  —  Constitution  of  1776.  .  .  . 
"  The  Governor,  for  the  time  being,  shall  be  Captain- 
General  and  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Militia ;  and 
in  the  recess  of  the  General  Assembly  shall  have 
power,  by  and  with  the  advice  of  the  Council  of  State, 
to  embody  the  Militia  for  the  public  safety."  .  .  . 

South  Carolina. — Constitution  of  1790.  .  .  . 
"The  Governor  shall  be  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Army  and  Navy  of  this  State,  and  of  the  Militia,  ex- 
cept when  they  shall  be  called  into  the  actual  Service 
of  the  United  States."  In  the  Constitution  of  1778 
the  Governor  is  uniformly  styled  "  Governor  and  Com- 
mander-in-Chief. " 

Vermont. — Constitution  of  1786.  "The  Governor 
shall  be  Captain-General  and  Command er-in  Chief  of 
the  forces  of  this  State ;  but  shall  not  command  in 
person  except  advised  thereto  by  the  Council,  and  then 
only  so  long  as  they  shall  approve  thereof ;  and  the 
Lieutenant-Governor  shall,  by  virtue  of  his  office,  be 
Lieutenant-General  of  all  the  forces  of  the  State." 

In  relation  to  the  reservation  in  the  constitutions  of 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  81 

Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  and  Vermont,  that  the  Gov- 
ernor shall  not  command  personally  in  the  field  with- 
out the  concurrence  of  the  legislature,  it  may  be  stated 
that  in  Hamilton's  first  draft  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  it  was  expressly  set  forth  that  the  Presi- 
dent shall  not  take  the  actual  command,  in  the  field, 
of  our  Army  without  the  consent  of  the  Senate  and 
Assembly,  but  this  was  not  agreed  to.  The  presump- 
tion seems  to  have  been  that,  unless  restrained  by  ex- 
press limitation,  the  Commander-in-Chief  might  feel 
bound  to  take  the  field  to  the  prejudice  of  his  other 
duties.  But,  as  stated,  this,  in  the  President's  case, 
was  finally  left  to  his  discretion.  So  far  were  the 
framers  of  the  Constitution  from  intending  that  the 
President  should  be  able  to  delegate  his  powers  as 
Commander,  that  some  of  them  doubted  whether  they 
had  succeeded  in  exempting  him  from  the  necessity  of 
exercising  immediate  personal  command. 

In  the  light  of  the  foregoing  circumstances  it  is  not 
strange  that  Hamilton  in  the  Federalist  spoke  of  the 
President  as  "the  first  General  and  Admiral,"  and 
in  his  later  writings  of  the  Governors  as  the  first  Gen- 
erals in  their  several  States.  It,  therefore,  seems  plain 
that  using  the  words  "  Commander-in-Chief "  in  the 
sense  in  which  they  were  understood  by  the  framers 
of  the  Constitution,  as  well  as  by  those  to  whom  the 
instrument  applied,  that  it  was  the  intention  that  the 
President  should  be  the  actual  Commander.  That  in- 
tention would  not  be  carried  out  if  the  President  di- 
vested himself  of  his  power  and  responsibility  as  Com- 
mander by  delegating  them  to  a  "  chosen  General." 

One  of  Grotius'  maxims  of  interpretation  is  that  per- 


82 


MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 


mission  includes  "a  liberty,   but  a  command  carries 
along  with  it  necessity  of  acting" 

Attorney-General  Wirt  said  :  "  It  could  never  have 
been  the  intention  of  the  Constitution  in  assigning  this 
general  power  to  the  President  to  take  care  that  the 
laws  be  executed,  that  he  should  in  person  execute 
them  himself;"  but,  he  adds,  if  the  law^s  "require  a 
particular  officer  by  name  to  perform  a  duty,  not  only 
is  that  OFFICER  bound  to  perform  it,  but  NO  OTHEK  officer 
can  perform  it  without  a  violation  of  tlie  laiv" 

Under  these  authorities,  and  others  which  might  be 
cited,  a  public  officer  to  whom  a  duty  is  specifically 
and  distinctly  assigned  by  the  Constitution,  or  by  the 
law,  cannot  be  said  to  perform  that  duty  if  he  delegates 
the  performance  of  it  to  some  one  else.  Nor  could 
such  delegation  of  military  command  be  admissible  un- 
der a  construction  giving  a  technical  meaning  to  the 
term  "  Commander-in-Chief."  No  officer  of  the  Army 
from  the  highest  General  down  to  the  lowest  subaltern 
can  delegate  his  authority.  Orders  have  force  only 
because  of  the  authority  whence  they  emanate.  The 
channel  through  which  they  flow  serves  as  proof  of 
their  source. 

A  commanding  officer  may — usually  must — exercise 
authority  through  subordinate  commanders,  and  may 
give  his  orders  and  express  his  will  through  chosen  offi- 
cers but  that  is  not  delegating}^  command, which  means 
endowing  another  with  the  general  power,  and  entrust- 
ing its  execution  to  his  discretion.  The  term  "  Corn- 
man  der-in- Chief  "  is  never  used  in  the  military  service 
to  express  any  right  to  delegate  command  on  the  one 
hand,  or  to  acquire  it  by  delegation  on  the  other.  On 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  AKMY.  83 

the  contrary,  its  meaning  indicates  the  exercise,  not 
the  abandonment,  of  command.  Again,  there  is  an- 
other light  in  which  the  subject  may  be  viewed.  The 
man  who  is  elected  President  by  the  people  is,  by  the 
Constitution,  appointed  to  the  office  of  "  Commander- 
in- Chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy  of  the  United  States, 
and  of  the  Militia  of  the  several  States  when  called 
into  the  Service  of  the  United  States,"  and  in  terms 
no  more  specific  the  Vice-President  is  by  the  same  in- 
strument appointed  President  of  the  Senate.  These 
are  the  only  two  appointments  made  by  the  Constitu- 
tion. The  obligation  actually  to  perform  the  duties 
of  his  office  seems  to  rest  alike  on  each  of  the  incum- 
bents ;  one  has  no  more  right  to  delegate  the  powers 
of  his  specific  office  than  the  other.  Recognizing  the 
fact  that  the  Vice-President  might  be  absent  from  his 
place  as  President  of  the  Senate,  the  Constitution,  in- 
stead of  permitting  him  to  delegate  his  powers,  provides 
in  distinct  terms  how  his  duties  shall  be  performed ; 
but  it  does  not  admit  that  the  President  can  by  any 
possibility  do  otherwise  than  continue  in  the  actual 
performance  of  the  duties  of  his  specific  office  as  Com- 
mander-in- Chief.  There  is  significance  in  still  another 
view  of  the  terms  used.  While  there  are  several 
things  which  the  Constitution  says  the  President 
"  shall  do"  Commander-in-Chief  is  the  only  thing  which 
it  says  he  " shall  be"  To  divest  himself,  by  general 
delegation,  of  the  actual  duties  of  this  office  would 
seem  to  be  a  graver  departure  from  the  purpose  of  the 
Constitution  than  it  would  be  to  delegate  one  of  his 
specific  constitutional  duties,  the  appointing  power  for 
example.  In  fact,  the  construction  which  would  give 


MILITAEY  MISCELLANIES. 

him  the  right  to  delegate  the  duties  of  his  office  as 
Commander-in-Chief,  would  carry  with  it  the  right  to 
-delegate  any  or  all  of  his  constitutional  duties,  thus 
violating  the  intention  as  stated  by  Jefferson,  where 
he  says,  "  the  theory  of  our  Government  is,  that  what 
belongs  to  the  executive  power  is  to  be  exercised  by 
the  uncontrolled  will  of  the  President."  (Jefferson's 
Works,  vol.  v.,  p.  569.) 

In  the  way  of  illustration,  it  may  be  said  that  if 
the  Constitution  had  provided  for  a  second  Vice- Pres- 
ident, and  had  made  it  his  only  duty  to  be  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, using  the  identical  terms  which  now 
confer  that  office  on  the  President,  there  is  hardly  a 
doubt  that  he  would  have  been  in  fact,  as  well  as  in 
name,  the  actual  Commander.  The  obligation  of  act- 
ual command  resting  on  the  President  is  quite  as 
strong  as  it  would  have  been  on  a  Vice-President  in 
the  case  assumed,  and  it  is  not  in  the  least  impaired  by 
the  fact  that  the  Constitution  assigns  other  duties  to 
the  President  besides  those  of  Commander-in-Chief. 

It  cannot  be  denied,  however,  that  the  right  of  the 
President  to  delegate  his  powers,  to  some  extent  at 
least,  as  Commander-in-Chief,  has  been  affirmed  by 
some  good  authorities.  Attorney-General  Butler  said 
(April  6,  1835):  "The  President  need  not  assume  per- 
sonal command  of  the  militia.  He  may  place  them 
under  the  command  of  any  officer  to  whom,  in  his  ab- 
sence, lie  may  delegate  his  constitutional  powers.  It 
may  be  indispensable  that  officers  of  the  Army  be  re- 
quired to  serve  in  the  militia ;  as,  for  example,  when 
vacant  offices  are  not  immediately  filled  by  the  State, 
or  when  the  militia  officers  are  absent  or  disabled.  It 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  AEMY.  85 

must  be  remembered,  however,  that  this  power  must 
be  exercised  in  accordance  with  the  reserved  rights- 
of  the  States  to  officer  their  quotas."  (II.  "  Opinions," 
711.) 

But  in  relation  to  this  opinion,  it  must  be  borne  in 
mind  that  when  militia  troops  were  called  for  by  the 
President  in  1812,  some  of  the  States — refusing  to  fur- 
nish them — took  the  ground  that  the  President  must 
command  the  militia  in  person,  or  through  militia  of- 
ficers. The  point  was  submitted  by  the  Governor  of 
Massachusetts  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  that  State. 
Justices  Parsons,  Sewall,  and  Parker  of  the  Court  de- 
cided that  "  Congress  may  provide  laws  for  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  militia  when  in  actual  service;  but  to 
extend  this  power  to  the  placing  them  under  the  com- 
mand of  an  officer  not  of  the  militia  "  (Gen'l  Dearborn 
was  referred  to),  "  except  the  President,  would  render 
nugatory  the  provision  that  the  militia  are  to  have  of- 
ficers appointed  by  the  States ; "  and  the  Court  went 
on  to  say  that  it  could  not  determine  who  should  com- 
mand "  in  the  absence  of  the  President"  No  overruling 
decision  has  been  rendered  on  this  point.  And  the 
fact  may  be  recalled  that  President  Washington,  in 
1794,  took  the  field  in  actual  command  of  the  militia 
of  Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey,  and  Virginia,  and  when 
he  relinquished  immediate  command  he  turned  it  over 
to  the  Governor  of  the  last  named  State. 

In  his  "War  Powers  of  the  President,"  Whiting 
says :  "  It  is  necessary  to  the  proper  conduct  of  war 
that  many,  if  not  most,  of  the  powers  of  the  President 
as  Commander  should  be  delegated  to  his  Secretaries, 
and  Generals,  and  that  many  of  their  powers  should 


86  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

be  exercised  by  officers  under  them ;  and  although  it 
not  seldom  happens  that  subalterns  abuse  the  power 
of  arrest  and  detention,  yet  the  inconvenience  resulting 
from  this  fact  is  one  of  the  inevitable  misfortunes  of 


war." 


It  will  be  observed  that  no  right  of  general  delega- 
tion of  power  is  here  asserted.  It  is  claimed  that 
"  many  if  not  most "  of  the  powers  of  the  President  as 
Commander  may  be  delegated ;  and  this  is  urged  in 
the  face  of  admitted  abuses  of  the  delegation  ;  nor  was 
this  alleged  to  be  a  constitutional  power  of  the  Presi- 
dent. It  was  claimed  only  as  one  of  his  war  powers 
under  the  Constitution  and  the  delegation  of  authority 
under  discussion  by  Mr.  Whiting  was,  more  especially, 
that  to  make  arrests  during  a  time  when  it  was  feared 
treason  was  lurking  in  all  quarters.  Furthermore,  his 
work  was  prepared  with  a  view  to  giving  to  the  Presi- 
dent the  largest  latitude  that  construction  would  ad- 
mit of,  so  as  to  enable  the  Executive  to  deal  in  the 
most  summary  manner  with  the  difficult  questions  then 
new,  arising  out  of  a  great  civil  war. 

The  delegation  of  specific  duties  to  subordinate  of- 
ficers from  time  to  time,  as  contemplated  by  Butler 
and  Whiting,  while  the  general  duties  of  Commander- 
in-Chief  are  reserved,  is  one  thing.  The  assignment 
of  a  subordinate  as  the  "  Commanding  General "  or 
"  General-in-Chief "  —being  equivalent  to  an  assign- 
ment as  the  Commander -in- Chief — is  another  and 
a  very  different  thing.  The  first  is  a  special  delega- 
tion of  power  within  the  Army,  manifesting  instead  of 
derogating  the  supreme  command  over  it.  While  the 
latter,  the  general  delegation  of  the  full  measure  of 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  87 

the  President's  powers,  involves  an  abdication  of  these 
powers. 

The  claim  in  favor  of  delegation  of  the  President's 
powers  as  Commander  is  very  clearly  stated  by  Major- 
General  Schofield.    He  says :  "  The  Secretary  of  War  is 
the  immediate  head  of  the  military  establishment — the 
impersonation  of  the  authority  of  the  constitutional 
Commander-in-Chief.    The  President  is  not  only  above, 
but  beyond  the  Army,  rarely  in  contact  with  it,  and 
never  heard  from  except  through   the    Secretary  of 
War.    The  latter  is  regarded  by  all  as  the  real  head — 
the  Chief:''     But  he  goes  on  to  say:  "The  President" 
(meaning,  of  course,  the  Secretary  of  War  also)  "does 
not  command  in  person  ;   he  delegates  his  military  com- 
mand to  a  General  Officer  who  has  been  educated,  ap- 
pointed, commissioned,  and  assigned  by  him  for  that 
purpose.     The  President's  military  staff  thus  becomes 
the  staff  of  his  representative — the  Commanding  Gen- 
eral of  the  Army ; "  and  he  adds,  "  the  orders  of  his 
chosen  General-in-Chief  are  as  mucli  his  own  orders  as 
if  lie  gave  them  in  person"   (Army  and  Navy  Journal 
of  January  4,  1879 — letter  to  Gen'l  W.  T.  Sherman, 
December  25,  1878.)     If  this  complete  delegation  of 
military  power  could   be  made,  it  might  give  rise  to 
the  very  danger  which  it  was  evidently  the  purpose  of 
the  Constitution  to  guard  against,  viz.:  the  domination 
of  the  civil  by  the  military  power.     A  military  chief- 
tain, endowed  either  by  law  or  delegation  with  the 
President's   power  as   Commander-in-Chief,   with   the 
President's  military  staff  converted  into  his  staff,  and 
with   his   orders  acknowledged  to  be  "  as  much  the 
President's  orders  as  if  he  gave  them  himself,"  would 


88 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


seem  to  be  the  functionary  whose  existence  the  Con- 
stitution most  pointedly  intended  to  prevent. 

But,  besides  the  peril  to  the  nation,  there  would  be 
danger  to  the  Army,  if  the  President  could  delegate 
his  powers  as  Commander-in-Chief.  The  right  to  del- 
egate these  powers  over  the  Army,  and  the  right  to 
assign  an  officer  to  duty  within  the  Army  according  to 
his  own  commission,  have  no  connection.  They  are 
entirely  distinct  from  each  other.  If  the  President 
had  the  right  to  delegate  his  powers  as  Commander-in 
Chief,  he  could  not,  in  the  exercise  of  it,  be  limited  to 
a  "  chosen  General "  any  more  than  to  a  chosen  Cap- 
tain, civilian,  or  any  one  else.  It  will  appear  without 
argument,  that  in  this  view  of  the  subject  the  power 
to  delegate  might  be  very  injurious  to  the  Army  itself. 

The  aspect  of  the  question  of  putting  a  chosen  Gen- 
eral in  actual  command  of  the  Army  depends  very 
much  on  the  direction  from  which  it  is  viewed.  Look- 
ing from  the  strictly  military  point  of  view,  it  seems 
clear  that  a  chosen  General,  educated,  and  appointed 
and  assigned  to  the  duty,  should  command  ;  and  the 
same  conclusion  would  follow  by  reasoning  from  anal- 
ogy, as  we  see  that  subordinate  officers  throughout  the 
Service  actually  command  according  to  their  respective 
grades  and  assignments — Colonels  commanding  regi- 
ments ;  Brigadier-Generals,  brigades  and  departments ; 
and  Major-Generals,  divisions  ;  the  analogy  being  that 
the  senior  General  in  the  Army  should  command  the 
whole.  There  is,  as  already  intimated,  an  essential 
distinction  between  command  within  the  Army,  and 
command  over  it.  The  analogy  holds  only  for  the 
former.  The  latter  is  the  failing  point  in  the  system. 


THE  COMMAND  OP  THE  ARMY.  89 

Having  reached  it,  the  subject  must  be  looked  at  from 
the  constitutional  point  of  view,  which,  involving  as  it 
does  the  question  of  civil  liberty,  is  by  far  the  most 
important  one.  George  Ticknor  Curtis  says,  in  his 
work  on  the  "  Origin,  Formation,  and  Adoption  of  the 
Constitution,"  "  The  reason  on  which  it  was  rested  by 
the  grand  committee,  and  on  which  the  plan  of  a  Coun- 
cil of  State  was  rejected,  was  that  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  unlike  the  executive  in  mixed  govern- 
ments of  the  monarchical  form,  was  to  be  personally 
responsible  for  his  official  conduct,  and  that  the  Con- 
stitution should  do  nothing  to  dimmish  that  responsi- 
bility, even  in  appearance.  If  it  had  not  been  intended 
to  make  the  President  liable  to  impeachment,  a  Cab- 
inet might  have  been  useful,  and  would  certainly  have 
been  necessary  if  there  was  to  be  any  responsibility 
anywhere  for  executive  acts.  But  a  large  majority  of 
the  States  preferred  to  interpose  no  shield  between  the 
President  and  a  public  accusation.  He  might  derive 
any  assistance  from  the  great  officers  of  the  executive 
departments  which  Congress  might  see  fit  to  establish, 
that  he  could  obtain  from  their  opinions  or  advice ; 
but  the  powers  which  the  Constitution  was  to  confer  on 
him  must  be  exercised  by  himself,  and  every  official  act 
must  be  performed  as  his  own." 

Our  political  policy  requires  that  the  control  of  the 
Army  shall  be  actually  and  without  qualification  or 
limitation  subject  to  the  civil  power— legislative  and 
executive.  Anything  short  of  this  would  violate  the 
fundamental  ideas  of  Anglican  civil  liberty,  wrought 
out  by  centuries  of  English  history,  and  finally  adapted 
to  our  system,  and  which  were  intended  to  be  perpet- 


90  MILITAEY  MISCELLANIES. 

uated  by  our  Constitution.  All  the  sacrifice  of  mili- 
tary unity  and  efficiency,  if  there  be  any,  which  these 
principles  require,  was  no  doubt  duly  estimated  by  the 
framers  of  the  Constitution,  and  is  fully  compensated 
by  the  greater  security  to  our  Eepublican  institutions 
and  to  the  freedom  of  the  people.  But  it  is  a  self- 
evident  fact  that  it  would  be  difficult,  if  not  impracti- 
cable, for  the  President  to  attend  in  person  to  all  the 
duties  of  the  Army,  and  the  question  arises,  Has  a 
proper  and  sufficient  remedy  been  provided  to  meet 
this  difficulty  ?  That  question  is  settled  by  the  Acts 
of  Congress  creating  the  great  Departments  and  their 
Bureaux,  and  by  several  decisions  and  opinions  con- 
cerning them.  It  is  enough  to  quote  one  decision  of 
the  U.  8.  Supreme  Court,  perhaps  the  most  compre- 
hensive of  all  the  rulings  on  the  subject.  It  is  as  fol- 
lows : 

The  Secretary  of  War  "  is  the  regular  constitutional 
organ  of  the  President  for  the  administration  of  the 
military  establishment  of  the  nation ;  and  rules  and 
orders  publicly  promulgated  through  him  must  be  re- 
ceived as  the  acts  of  the  Executive,  and  as  such  be 
binding  upon  all  within  the  sphere  of  his  legal  and 
constitutional  authority." 

This  decision  embraces  more  than  is  disclosed  by  a 
mere  cursory  examination.  It  in  fact  settles  the  whole 
question  as  to  the  command  of  the  Army.  The  Pres- 
ident is  the  Constitutional  Commander-in-Chief.  The 
decision  shows : 

First. — That  he  must  administer  the  military  estab- 
lishment ;  that  is  to  say,  he  must  direct  the  execution 
and  application  of  the  laws  on  the  subject. 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  91 

Second. — For  this  purpose  the  Secretary  of  War,  and 
no  one  else,  is  his  regular  constitutional  organ. 

Third. — That  administering  the  military  establish- 
ment involves  not  only  the  execution  and  application 
of  laws,  but  the  promulgation  of  "rules  and  orders." 

Fourth.  —That  all  such  "  rules  and  orders  " — that  is 
to  say,  the  acts  of  the  President  as  expressed  by  rules 
and  orders  for  the  military  establishment,  when  pub- 
licly  promulgated  through  the  Secretary  of  War — must 
be  received  as  the  act  of  the  Executive  and  must  be 
binding.  The  effect  of  an  attempt  to  promulgate  them 
through  some  one  else — the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
for  example — may  at  present  be  left  for  conjecture. 

The  President  must  actually  administer  the  military 
establishment,  and  the  decision  shows  that  there  is  one, 
and  it  shows  but  one,  constitutional  way  in  which  he 
may  be  relieved  of  the  labor  of  continuous  personal 
command  ;  that  is,  by  having  that  command  exercised 
by  the  Secretary  of  War ;  not  by  virtue  of  delegated 
power,  nor  in  fact  by  any  power  of  his  own,  but  be- 
cause his  rules  and  orders,  and  his  only,  mast  be  re- 
ceived as  the  acU  of  the  President. 

Remembering  that  the  rules  and  orders  in  question 
are  all  which  are  required  for  the  execution  and  ap- 
plication of  the  laws  to  the  military  Service  (that  is 
for  administering  the  military  establishment),  the  con- 
clusion is  unavoidable  that  the  person  who  must  make 
them,  must  command  the  Army ;  and  thus  the  decision 
of  the  Supreme  Court  confirms  the  practice  which, 
though  once  or  twice  a  little  disturbed,  has  been  in 
actual  operation  since  the  foundation  of  the  Govern- 
ment, or,  to  quote  Secretary  of  War  Davis,  "  the  ex- 


92  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

elusive  control  of  the  military  establishment  has  never 
been  surrendered  to  the  senior  General  of  the  Army, 
as  the  unvarying  practice  of  the  War  Department  ex- 
hibits.'7 The  reason  for  this  is  well  stated  by  Attor- 
ney-General Bates,  in  language  as  follows : 

"  The  President  is  a  department  of  the  Government, 
and,  although  the  only  department  which  consists  of  a 
single  man,  he  is  charged  with  a  greater  range  and 
variety  of  powers  and  duties  than  any  other  depart- 
ment. He  is  a  civil  magistrate  and  a  military  cliief  j 
and  in  this  regard  we  see  a  striking  proof  of  the  gen- 
erality of  the  sentiment  prevailing  in  this  country  at 
the  time  of  the  formation  of  our  Government,  to  the 
effect  that  the  military  ought  to  be  held  in  strict  sub- 
ordination to  the  civil  power.  For  the  Constitution, 
while  it  grants  to  Congress  the  unrestricted  power  to 
declare  war,  to  raise  and  support  armies,  and  to  pro- 
vide and  maintain  a  navy,  at  the  same  time  guards 
carefully  against  the  abuse  of  that  power  by  with- 
holding from  Congress,  and  from  the  Army  itself,  the 
authority  to  appoint  the  Chief  Commander  of  a  force  so 
potent  for  good  or  for  evil  to  the  State.  The  Consti- 
tution provides  that  the  President  shall  be  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy  of  the  United  States, 
and  of  the  Militia  of  the  several  States  when  called 
into  the  actual  Service  of  the  United  States.  And 
why  is  this?  Surely  not  because  the  President  is  sup- 
posed to  be,  or  commorily  is,  in  fact,  a  military  man,  a 
man  skilled  in  the  art  of  war,  and  qualified  to  marshal 
a  host  in  the  field  of  battle.  No  !  it  is  quite  a  different 
reason :  it  is  that  whatever  skilful  soldier  may  lead 
our  armies  to  victory  against  a  foreign  foe,  or  may 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  93 

quell  a  domestic  insurrection ;  however  high  he  may 
raise  his  professional  renown,  and  whatever  martial 
glory  he  may  win,  still  he  is  subject  to  the  orders  of 
the  civil  magistrate,  and  he  and  his  army  are  always 
subordinate  to  the  civil  power." 

And  Attorney- General  Gushing  says :  "  No  Act  of 
Congress,  no  act  even  of  the  President  himself,  can,  by 
constitutional  possibility,  authorize  or  create  any  mili- 
tary officer  not  subordinate  to  the  President." 

The  President  is  the  Commander  of  the  Army.  The 
Secretary  of  War  is  his  constitutional  organ ;  and  to 
assert  that  two  persons  command  the  same  force  at 
the  same  time  involves  a  contradiction  amounting  to 
absurdity.  There  can  be  but  one  Commander.  All 
others  must  be  commanded.  Saying  that  a  chosen 
General  commands  the  whole  Army  under  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  is  admitting — what  is  the  fact — that  he 
does  not  command  it.  The  late  Major- General  Hal- 
leek,  who  was  an  educated  soldier,  an  accomplished 
scholar,  and  a  profound  lawyer,  fully  comprehended 
this.  While  "  General-in-Chief  "  he  wrote  as  follows  : 
— "The  great  difficulty  in  the  office  of  ' General-in- 
Chief  '  is  that  it  is  not  understood  by  the  country. 
The  responsibility  and  odium  thrown  upon  it  do  not 
belong  to  it.  I  am  simply  a  'military  adviser  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  and  the  President,  and  must  obey 
and  carry  out  wliat  they  decide  upon,  whether  I  concur 
in  their  decisions  or  not.  .  .  .  It  is  my  duty  to 
strengthen  the  hands  of  the  President  as  Gommander-in- 
Ghief,  not  to  weaken  them  by  factious  opposition.  I 
have,  therefore,  cordially  co-operated  with  him  in  any 
plan  decided  upon,  although  I  have  never  hesitated  to 


94  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

differ  in  opinion.  I  must  leave  it  to  history  to  vindi- 
cate or  condemn  my  own  opinions  or  plans.  They 
will  be  found  at  some  future  time  on  record."  (Let- 
ter from  H.  W.  Halleck,  Headquarters  Army,  Wash- 
ington, February  16,  1864,  to  Major-General  "W.  T. 
Sherman.) 

But  the  wishes  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  as  well  as 
his  rights,  must  be  taken  into  account.  Under  the 
Constitution  and  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court,, 
he  possesses  the  power,  and  whoever  he  may  be,  he 
prefers  exercising  it  in  fact,  to  assigning  it  to  some  one 
else.  He  is  necessarily  a  man  of  distinction  and 
ability,  usually  a  public  leader  of  prominence,  able  and 
active,  with  more  or  less  ambition,  member  of  a  con- 
stitutional cabinet  in  which  every  one  of  his  colleagues,, 
including  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  actually  and 
directly  commands  and  conducts  the  business  of  hi& 
department.  How  can  it  be  expected  that  this  one 
cabinet  officer  would,  if  he  could,  abdicate  his  office, 
and  assign  his  duties  to  one  of  his  subordinates  and 
become  a  mere  figure-head  in  the  Government ! 

The  conclusions  are  : 

1st.  The  President  is  required  by  the  Constitution 
actually  to  command  the  Army,  and  Congress  has  no 
right  to  divest  him  of  that  duty,  in  whole  or  part. 

2d.  He  cannot  delegate  the  command  if  he  would,, 
and  he  probably  would  not  if  he  could. 

THE    COMMAND    OF    THE    ARMY. CONTINUED.* 

For  many  years  the  subject  of  the  Command  of  the 
Army  has  been  a  theme  of  discussion  in  the  Army,  and 

*  From  Field  Glass  for  July,  1879.     By  Brevet-Colonel  William  M. 
Wherry,  Captain  6th  Infantry. 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  95 

by  "  would-be  reformers  "  out  of  the  Army.  Of  late 
the  discussion  has  been  brought  into  special  promi- 
nence by  the  advocates  of  the  pernicious  doctrine  that 
the  Army  can  be  maintained  as  an  effective  and  reli- 
able executive  instrument  without  a  military  head,  to 
which  all  its  parts  shall  be  subordinate,  but  must  be 
governed  and  controlled  by  a  hydra  headed  body, 
composed  of  the  chiefs  of  bureaus  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment, each  one  of  whom  is  striving  to  secure  predom- 
inance and  power  in  his  department  at  the  expense  of 
all  other  branches  of  the  Service — a  system  which, 
while  claiming  the  independence  of  the  staff  depart- 
ments from  all  military  control,  threatens  not  to  stop 
until  the  line,  including  Generals  of  Command,  is 
subordinate  to  the  staff  bureaus.  Hence,  the  subject 
is  at  this  time  one  of  unusual  interest  to  the  Army  and 
to  all  those  who  desire  to  see  our  military  establish- 
ment, necessarily  a  small  one,  maintained  on  correct 
principles  and  kept  up  to  the  highest  state  of  effi- 
ciency. 

By  the  Constitution,  Article  II,  Section  2,  "The 
President  shall  be  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army 
and  Navy  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the  Militia  of 
the  several  States  when  called  into  the  actual  Service 
of  the  United  States."  The  vast  majority  of  the  func- 
tions of  the  President,  as  Chief  Executive,  whether 
civil  or  military,  must  be  performed  by  his  subordi- 
nates, acting  under  his  general  directions  and  according 
to  regulations  approved  by  him.  It  is  utterly  impos- 
sible for  him  to  perform  them  in  person.  To  whom 
may  he  delegate  such  authority  ?  To  such  officers  as 
Congress  has  authorized  for  that  purpose. 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

The  Constitution  leaves  this  matter  entirely  to 
Congress.  It  does  not  even  provide  in  terms  for  the 
heads  of  the  great  Executive  departments  of  the  Gov- 
ernment. It  simply  recognizes  the  fact  that  such  high 
functionaries  must  be  provided  by  Congress,  in  the 
clause  of  the  section  above  cited,  which  only  author- 
izes the  President  to  call  for  their  opinions  in  writing. 
In  accordance  therewith,  Congress  created  the  Depart- 
ment of  War,  and  "a  principal  officer  therein,  to  be 
called  the  Secretary  for  the  Department  of  War." 
The  Act  of  Congress  creating  the  Department  of  War 
and  a  Secretary  thereof,  in  express  terms,  confines  his 
authority  to  the  performance  of  such  "  duties  as  shall 
from  time  to  time  be  enjoined  on  or  intrusted  to  him 
by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  agreeable  to  the 
Constitution,"  and  the  same  is  to  be  said  of  every 
officer  in  the  military  establishment,  from  the  General 
to  the  lowest  lance-corporal.  Each  and  every  one  of 
them  acts  upon  those  below  him  in  grade  or  rank  by 
authority  of  the  President.  No  law  prescribes,  except 
in  a  few  particulars,  the  functions  of  any  officer,  but 
each  is  to  do  "  as  shall  from  time  to  time  be  enjoined 
on,  or  intrusted  to  him  by  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  agreeable  to  the  Constitution,"  and  the  laws. 

The  Constitution  does  not  make  the  Secretary  of 
War,  for  example,  "  the  regular  constitutional  organ  of 
the  President  for  the  administration  of  the  military 
establishment  of  the  nation."  The  Constitution  says 
nothing  of  the  kind,  nor  anything  on  that  subject.  It 
does  not  even  name  the  Secretary  of  War,  nor  refer  to 
him  in  any  way,  except  in  the  general  terms  referred 
to  above,  viz.:  "  he  (the  President)  may  require  the 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  97 

opinion  in  writing  of  the  principal  officer  in  each,  of 
the  Executive  departments,  upon  any  subject  relating 
to  the  duties  of  their  respective  offices."  Hence,  the 
Secretary  of  War  is  "  the  regular  constitutional  organ 
of  the  President,"  etc.,  simply  because  Congress  has 
authorized  his  appointment  to  discharge  such  duties 
respecting  military  affairs  and  in  such  manner  as  the 
President  may  direct.  He  is,  as  the  Supreme  Court 
has  decided,  aa  civil  officer,  and  all  his  duties  are  civil 
duties."  He  is  not  a  military  officer,  and  cannot  take 
the  field  in  command  of  troops,  as  the  President  may 
do.  Hence,  he  cannot  possibly  perform  in  person  all 
the  functions  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  nor  can  all 
those  functions  be  performed  by  the  President  through 
him.  The  Secretary  is  only  the  Chief  of  the  civil 
administration  of  the  War  Department,  and  the  me- 
dium of  communication  of  the  President  with  the 
Army.  It  is  for  this  last  reason  only  that  the  acts  of 
the  Secretary  must  be  assumed,  as  said  by  the  Supreme 
Court,  to  be  the  acts  of  the  President. 

The  military  functions  of  the  President  must  be 
performed  either  in  person  or  through  military  officers. 
It  is  beyond  dispute,  he  cannot  perform  them  in 
person.  He  may  delegate  those  military  functions  to 
such  officers  as  the  laws  may  designate  for  that  pur- 
pose, and  to  no  others. 

And  all  such  officers  must  perform  their  duties  as 
the  President  may  direct,  within  the  limits  of  the  law. 
They  all  represent  the  Commander-in-Chief,  to  do 
within  their  respective  spheres  such  things  and  in  such 
manner  as  he  has  ordered  in  his  regulations,  in  his 
tactics,  or  in  his  "  orders,"  published  from  time  to  time. 


98  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

The  President  cannot  in  person  perform  all  bis  civil 
functions,  he  must  delegate  them  to  subordinate  offi- 
cers. For  the  same  reasons  he  cannot  personally 
perform  all  his  military  functions,  nor  can  he  delegate 
them  to  the  Secretary  of  War.  And  in  addition  to 
the  cogent  and  insuperable  reasons  why,  from  the 
limitation  of  human  power,  the  President  cannot  him- 
self perform  all  his  civil  functions,  comes  in  the 
weighty  one  in  reference  to  military  functions,  of  their 
peculiar  character.  The  President  is  a  civil  officer  and 
so,  too,  the  Secretary  of  War.  All  military  duties 
are  in  the  highest  sense  technical.  They  require  for 
their  efficient  performance  men  specially  educated  for 
them.  The  President  needs  the  services  of  a  Chief- 
General  as  much  as  he  does  of  a  Chief-Engineer,  or  a 
Chief-Quartermaster,  or  a  Chief -Surgeon. 

The  entire  Army  needs  a  military  commander  quite 
as  much  as,  and  more  than,  does  a  division,  brigade,  or 
regiment.  The  case  of  the  Navy  is  by  no  means  a 
parallel  one.  The  different  squadrons  of  the  Navy 
act  in  different  parts  of  the  world,  and  have  no  con- 
nection with  each  other.  Each  Admiral  is  the  Corn- 
mander-in-Chief  of  an  entirely  separate  squadron  or 
fleet.  But  the  operations  of  all  the  armies  of  the 
United  States  must,  in  general,  be  in  military  harmony 
with  each  other.  Hence,  they  must  be  under  one 
military  head. 

The  recognition  of  this  simple  military  principle  has 
been  so  strongly  forced  upon  the  country  through  the 
disasters  resulting  from  ignoring  it,  that  it  seems 
amazing  that  any  military  men  can  have  failed  to  learn 
the  lesson. 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  AEMY.  99 

Both  this  necessity  and  the  exact  constitutional 
principle  governing  action  under  it  have  been  recog- 
nized by  Congress  in  sundry  acts,  and  were  empha- 
sized in  the  Act  to  revive  the  grade  of  Lieutenant- 
General,  who  "  may  be  authorized,  under  the  direction 
and  during  the  pleasure  of  the  President,  to  command 
the  Armies  of  the  United  States,"  when  General  Grant 
was  assigned  to  that  command.  It  is  well  known 
that  General  Grant  declined  to  accept  the  commission 
unless  his  command  should  include  the  staff  of  the 
Army  as  well  as  the  line,  and  that  he  did  command 
both, — that  is,  the  entire  Army. 

In  the  words  "  under  the  direction  of  the  President," 
the  constitutional  prerogative  of  the  "  Command  er-in- 
Chief"  is  fully  preserved.  The  constitutionality  of 
that  law  cannot  for  a  moment  be  questioned.  The 
President's  right  to  assign  the  Lieutenant-General,  or 
not  to  assign  him,  or  to  limit  his  command  in  his 
discretion,  was  fully  reserved.  And  so  long  as 
the  President  continued  to  exercise  the  "  direction " 
contemplated  by  the  law,  it  cannot  be  said  that 
he  "  abdicated  "  his  functions  as  Commander-in- 
Chief. 

It  is  a  great  mistake  to  suppose  the  functions  of  a 
General-in-Chief,  even  with  the  highest  authority  ever 
given  to  that  officer  in  this  country,  are  identical  with 
those  of  the  "  Commander-in-Chief."  So  long  as  the 
General  acts  u  under  the  direction "  and  "  during  the 
pleasure  "  of  another,  he  falls  very  far  short  of  the  chief 
command.  He  can  do  nothing,  except  as  he  may  be 
directed  or  permitted  by  his  superior.  Even  the  man- 
ner in  which  he  is  to  do  the  things  directed  or  per- 


100 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


mitted  is  largely  controlled  by  the  "regulations"  es- 
tablished by  the  Commander-in-Chief. 

The  military  theory  is  perfectly  simple  and  plain. 
A  "  General-in-Chief  "  is  a  military  expert,  versed  in 
all  branches  of  the  science  of  war,  appointed  by  the 
President,  under  authority  of  the  law,  to  do,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  rules  taught  by  the  science  of  war,  with 
which  he  is  familiar,  those  things  which  the  "  Com- 
mander-in-Chief "  may  direct  or  authorize  to  be  done, 
but  which  he  himself  does  not  know  how  to  do,  or 
which  his  other  duties  do  not  leave  him  the  time  to  do 
in  person. 

It  is  a  mere  abuse  of  terms  to  call  a  General-in- 
Chief,  so  assigned,  "  Commander-in-Chief  "  in  the  sense 
of  the  Constitution.  This  is  doubtless  one  of  the 
cases  where  confusion  arises  from  the  use  of  the  same 
word  in  different  senses,  owing  to  the  poverty  of  lan- 
guage. But  certainly  no  thoughtful  person  ought  to 
make  the  mistake  of  supposing  a  General  assigned  to 
command  the  Army,  under  the  direction  of  the  Presi- 
dent, to  be  thereby  substituted  for  the  President  as 
41  Commander-in-Chief  in  derogation  of  his  constitu- 
tional prerogative."  Such  an  error  could  only  result 
from  the  most  thoughtless  construction  of  words,  the 
mere  misinterpretation  of  a  name. 

The  General-in-Chief  no  more  displaces  the  Presi- 
dent than  does  the  Secretary  of  War.  They  both  act 
under  the  President's  direction  and  control,  and  in 
strict  subordination  to  his  supreme  authority  as  Chief  - 
Executive  and  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army. 

Yet  we  hear  it  asserted  that  the  President  cannot 
delegate  his  powers  as  Commander-in-Chief  to  any- 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  AKMY.,  101 

body.  He  must,  under  the  Constitution,  exercise  those 
powers  in  person.  But  this  being  a  physical  and  moral 
impossibility,  the  Supreme  Court  has  come  to  the  re- 
lief of  the  overburdened  President  by  deciding  that 
the  orders  of  the  Secretary  of  War  must  be  received 
as  those  of  the  President.  Thus  we  are  to  be  satisfied 
with  the  fiction  that  the  President  actually  commands 
in  person,  when  we  all  know  he  does  not,  and  generally 
cannot  for  want  of  military  knowledge,  and  that  be- 
cause his  orders  come  through  another  civilian  who  does 
not  and  actually  cannot  command!  But  if  the  Presi- 
dent attempts  to  make  known  his  will  to  the  Army 
through  a  General  who  knows  how  to  express  that 
will  in  military  form  and  direct  all  the  details  of  its 
execution,  we  are  told :  "  No ;  that  will  not  do ;  that 
would  be  a  violation  of  the  Constitution ;  that  would 
be  to  abdicate  his  authority  as  Commander-in-Chief ! n 
He  may  give  his  military  orders  to  one  who  cannot 
execute  them,  and  that  is  all  right ;  but  if  he  give  his 
orders  to  one  who  can  execute  them,  that  is  all  wrong ! 
He  must,  of  course,  have  a  General  of  some  education 
and  experience  in  command  of  each  division  and  brig- 
ade, but  the  command  of  "  all  the  armies  "  is  such  a 
simple  non-military  business,  it  is  so  easy  to  direct  the 
operations  of  a  million  of  men  formed  into  half-a-dozen 
or  more  armies,  with  all  their  staff  included,  any  able- 
bodied  civilian  can  do  that !  That  does  not  require 
any  military  education.  The  Constitution  can  not 
possibly  have  intended  to  give  the  President  power  to 
make  a  soldier  do  that  business  for  him.  He  can  do 
that  himself.  Or,  if  he  prefers,  he  can  select  some 
other  civilian,  make  him  Secretary  of  War,  and  let 


102  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

him  do  it !  For  we  are  told  "  there  is  one,  and  but 
one,  constitutional  way  in  which  he  may  be  relieved 
of  the  labor  of  continuous  personal  command ;  that  is 
by  having  that  command  exercised  by  the  Secretary  of 
War ;  not  by  virtue  of  delegated  power,  nor  in  fact 
by  any  power  of  his  own  j  but  because  his  rules  and 
orders,  and  liis  only,  must  be  received  as  the  acts  of  the 
President"  Not  because  the  Secretary  has  any  con- 
stitutional authority;  nor  because  the  President  can 
give  him  any ;  but  because  the  Supreme  Court  has 
decided  that  the  Secretary's  acts  must  be  received  as 
those  of  the  President ! 

The  law  is  precisely  the  reverse  of  this.  The  Presi- 
dent cannot  delegate  his  military  command  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  War.  There  is  not  a  word  in  the  Constitu- 
tion, nor  in  any  Act  of  Congress  to  give  him  any  such 
authority.  The  President  must  exercise  his  powers  in 
person,  or  else  through  such  officers  as  may  be  ap- 
pointed for  that  purpose,  and  under  authority  of  law. 
Congress  has  authorized  the  appointment  of  certain 
general  officers,  for  the  exercise,  under  the  President's 
direction,  of  appropriate  military  commands.  He  may 
assign  them,  or  not,  as  he  pleases — he  may  do  in  that 
regard  what  the  law  has  authorized,  and  no  more ;  but 
the  law  cannot  compel  him  to  do  what  would  be  in 
derogation  of  his  constitutional  power,  viz.:  to  make 
such  assignments  contrary  to  his  judgment.  He  must 
retain  the  substance  of  supreme  command  by  retaining 
control  of  all  his  subordinates  and  requiring  them  to 
act  according  to  his  directions.  So  long  as  he  does 
this  there  is  no  limit  in  the  Constitution  to  the  organ- 
ization of  the  Army  and  the  distribution  of  commands 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  103 

which    Congress    may   authorize    and   the    President 
adopt. 

It  is  simply  absurd  to  say  that  Congress  can  not 
authorize  the  President  to  assign  a  General  to  com- 
mand "  all  the  armies,"  or  the  entire  Army,  under  his 
direction.  That  would  be  to  deny  to  the  President 
and  Congress  the  power  to  do  the  very  thing  which 
all  military  authors  agree  is  the  first  great  essential  to 
success  in  war ;  that  is,  to  select  a  competent  General 
to  direct  all  the  military  forces  to  be  employed. 

Is  it  possible  the  Constitution  requires  the  President 
to  actually  do  himself  in  person,  although  he  may 
know  he  is  not  competent  to  do  it,  this  most  moment- 
ous of  all  executive  duties  ? 

While  Congress  may  expend  millions  to  educate 
subordinate  officers,  they  are  positively  prohibited  by 
the  Constitution  from  employing  an  educated  soldier 
as  General-in-Chief,  unless  the  people  elect  him  Presi- 
dent! In  other  words,  the  people  are  driven  to  the 
necessity  of  either  electing  a  military  chieftain  to  the 
Presidency,  or  else  of  trusting  the  command  of  the 
Army  to  a  civilian !  Can  any  thing  be  more  mon- 
strous ?  What  a  set  of  imbeciles  the  "  Fathers  "  must 
have  been ! 

But  they  never  dreamed  of  such  a  thing  Nor  did 
they  practise  it.  In  the  struggle  for  independence 
they  saw  the  folly  of  such  a  theory,  and  subsequently 
they  provided  against  it,  and  even  conferred  the  re- 
sponsibility upon  Washington  in  1798. 

Every  military  writer  in  all  time  has  seen  the  ne- 
cessity for  and  urged  the  importance  of  due  subordina- 
tion in  all  branches  of  an  army  to  a  supreme  head, 


104  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

and  all  officers  of  experience  in  our  Service  can  recall 
disasters  and  confusion  resulting  from  the  clashing  and 
distracting  exercise  of  independent  authority  by  the 
chiefs  of  staff  bureaus  in  Washington. 

Perhaps  the  clearest  exposition  of  the  subject,  and 
its  bearing  upon  the  present,  is  contained  in  Major- 
General  Schofield's  letter  of  October  13,  1876,  to  the 
Secretary  of  War,  on  the  subject  of  "  Army  Reorgan- 
ization," from  which  the  following  extracts  are  taken: 

"  The  President  of  the  United  States,  the  constitu- 
tional Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  is 
generally  a  civilian.  As  compared  with  the  chief  ex- 
ecutive officers  of  most  other  nations,  he  is  pre-emi- 
nently a  civil  magistrate.  It  is  as  such  civil  head  of 
the  nation,  and  not  as  a  military  chieftain,  that  he  is 
given  the  supreme  command  of  the  Army.  His  Sec- 
retary of  War  is  also  a  civilian,  Congress  having  even 
gone  so  far  as  to  prohibit  the  appointment  of  an  army 
officer  to  that  station.  Thus  the  perfect  subordination 
of  the  military  to  the  civil  power  is  secured,  military 
command  and  administration  are  made  to  conform 
strictly  to  the  civil  interpretation  of  the  laws  and  to 
the  civil  policy  of  the  Government. 

"  But  the  President  is  not  practically,  and  in  gen- 
eral can  not  possibly  be,  because  his  other  duties  pre- 
vent, the  actual  '(military)'  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Army." 

He  must  delegate  his  military  functions  to  some 
subordinate,  acting  under  his  general  directions.  Now 
the  simple  questions  is,  shall  this  subordinate  be  a 
General  or  a  civilian  ?  In  a  country  where  the  mon- 
arch is  an  educated  soldier  and  his  War  Minister  one 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  AKMY.  105 

of  his  trusted  lieutenants,  such  a  question  does  not  exist. 
In  ours  it  can  not  be  ignored,  but  must  be  fairly  met. 
In  such  other  country  the  War  Minister  may  well  be, 
under  the  sovereign,  the  actual  commander  of  the 
army.  In  ours  the  plainest  military  principles  forbid. 
The  President's  military  representative  must  be  a 
"  General-in-Chief,"  not  a  civilian  Secretary  of  War. 

"  The  Secretary  of  War  is  the  President's  represen- 
tative, as  civil  executive,  for  one  department  of  the 
Government,  to  direct  and  control  military  affairs  and 
conduct  army  administration  in  the  President's  stead  ; 
but  not  to  command  the  Army,  except  in  the  general 
sense  in  which  the  President  himself  commands  it. 
The  Secretary  for  his  department,  stands  in  the  Presi- 
dent's place,  and  does  in  detail  what  the  President 
does  in  gross :  directs  and  controls,  not  commands. 

"  It  is  true,  as  has  been  said,  that  no  officer  has  any 
right  to  command  by  virtue  of  his  commission  alone. 
He  can  only  command  such  forces  as  the  President 
may  assign  to  him.  The  President's  power  in  this  re- 
gard can  not  properly  be  limited  by  law. 

"  He  may  do  or  leave  undone  a  thousand  things 
which  he  ought  not.  The  question  is  not  what  he  has 
the  power  to  do,  but  what  he  ought  to  do.  His  plain 
duty  as  dictated  by  the  simplest  military  principles, 
is  to  assign  some  General  to  the  command  as  l  General- 
in-Chief.'  If  he  has  not  the  necessary  confidence  in 
the  senior  officer,  he  may  relieve  him  from  duty  and 
assign  the  next  in  rank,  and  so  on  until  he  finds  one 
whom  he  thinks  qualified  for  the  command.  He  has 
no  right  to  leave  the  Army  to  the  command  of  a 
civilian,  a  person  to  whose  appointment  for  any  suck 


106  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

command  the  Senate  has  not  consented,  nor  the  law 
provided.  The  other  alternative  of  leaving  the  Army 
practically  without  any  Cornrnander-in-Chief,  as  has 
been  done,  is  no  better.  The  several  division  or 
department  commanders  and  the  chiefs  of  the  several 
staff  corps,  departments,  and  bureaux,  then  conduct 
their  affairs  in  their  own  several  ways,  with  just 
enough  interference  from  the  Secretary  of  War  to 
destroy  what  little  adhesion  to  common  military  prin- 
ciples might  otherwise  have  existed. 

"  Unity  in  the  command  of  an  army  is  the  one  con- 
dition indispensable.  Other  things  imperfect  may  be 
tolerated,  but  divided  authority  is  inevitably  disas- 
trous. Of  this  truth  our  own  recent  history  gives  but 
too  abundant  proof,  and  the  history  of  other  countries 
may  be  searched  in  vain  for  contradictory  evidence. 
It  is  capable  of  demonstration  to  the  satisfaction  of 
any  average  military  mind,  that  our  late  war  might 
have  been  brought  to  a  successful  conclusion  in  two 
years  instead  of  four,  and  at  half  the  cost  in  men  and 
money,  if  any  one  soldier  of  fair  ability  had  been  given 
the  absolute  control  of  military  operations  and  of  the 
necessary  military  resources  of  the  country. 

"  It  was  only  after  three  years  of  imperfect  suc- 
cesses, failures,  and  disasters,  that  a  practical  recog- 
nition of  this  essential  principle  of  unity  was  forced 
upon  the  Government.  Another  time  we  may  not  be 
given  three  years  in  which  to  learn  the  fundamental 
principles  of  the  Art  of  War  and  another  year  to 
profit  by  the  lesson. 

"  A  vicious  system,  long  followed  in  Peace,  cannot 
be  suddenly  changed  upon  the  commencement  of  War. 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  AEMY.  107 

Habit,  prejudice,  and  ignorance  will  either  sustain 
the  old  or  make  the  new  system  inefficient,  until 
disaster,  irretrievable,  as  in  the  case  of  France,  or 
enormously  expensive,  as  in  our  own,  awakens  the 
government  to  its  delusion. 

"  No  military  system  is  worthy  the  name  unless  it 
conforms  in  Peace  in  all  its  essential  features  to  the 
requirements  of  War.  The  Army  must  have,  in  Peace 
as  well  as  in  War,  a  military  head,  or  l  General-in- 
Chief,'  who  shall  have,  not  only  in  name,  but  in  fact, 
the  actual  command  of  the  Army,  and  not  of  a  part 
only,  but  of  the  entire  Army. 

"  Whatever,  may  be  true  on  other  points,  unity  of 
command  under  one  military  head  is  the  first  great  and 
indispensable  necessity." 

"  Any  portion  of  the  Army  may  be  detached  from 
purely  military  duties,  in  the  discretion  of  the  Presi- 
dent or  of  Congress,  and  employed  on  civil  works, 
under  the  immediate  direction  of  the  heads  of  the  ex- 
ecutive departments  to  which  they  belong.  Or  army 
officers  may,  in  addition  to  their  ordinary  military  du- 
ties, be  entrusted  with  others  of  a  civil  nature,  in  respect 
to  which  they  will  be  free  from  military  control.  In 
like  manner,  strict  subordination  to  their  military 
commander  in  all  matters  which  appertain  to  the  com- 
mand, is  entirely  compatible  with  direct  responsibility 
to  their  administrative  chiefs  and  the  Secretary  of 
War,  in  matters  of  administration  and  accountability." 

•5f  -J5-  #  »  #  # 

"  The  military  theory  is  that  of  dual  responsibility 
of  the  staff  ;  similar  to  that  of  ministerial  responsibil- 
ity." 


108  MILITAEY  MISCELLANIES. 

"  As  the  minister  is  responsible  to  the  Chief  Exe- 
cutive for  faithful  execution  of  his  orders,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  the  people  or  to  the  legislature  for  strict 
obedience  to  the  laws,  and  wise  and  honest  counsel 
to  his  chief,  so  the  staff  officer  is  responsible  to  his 
commander  for  the  faithful  execution  of  his  orders,  and 
to  the  War  Department  for  strict  conformity  to  the 
laws  and  regulations. 

"  No  man  is  so  learned,  wise,  and  dispassionate  as 
not  to  need  information,  counsel,  and  restraint  under 
some  circumstances.  Military  commanders  are  not 
less  liable  than  other  men  to  such  imperfection.  No 
commander  can  be  familiar  with  all  the  details  of  the 
laws  and  regulations  for  his  government,  or  with  the 
state  of  the  appropriations  for  each  of  the  numerous 
details  embraced  in  the  several  branches  of  the  Service. 
No  one  can  know  the  necessities  of  the  numerous  de- 
tails of  a  large  command,  except  as  reported  to  him 
by  his  subordinates.  No  one  whose  sole  absorbing 
aim  is,  and  must  be,  the  accomplishment  of  his  mili- 
tary ends,  should  be  left  the  sole  responsible  judge  of 
the  lawfulness  of  the  means  he  may  think  most  appro- 
priate to  those  ends.  The  necessities  of  war  make  the 
Army  commander  the  sole  judge  in  the  last  resort. 
But  wise  governments  surround  him  with  a  body  of 
intelligent,  reliable,  and  responsible  staff  officers, 
whose  duty  it  is  to  assist  him,  to  advise  him,  and  to 
guard  him  against  any  unwitting  disregard  of  the 

law." 

#  •&  «  *  •*  * 

"  If  this  principle  be  correct,  it  necessarily  follows 
that  the  staff  officers  must  have  direct  communication 


THE  COMMAND  OP  THE  AEMY.  109 

with  their  administrative  chiefs,  and  through  them 
with  the  War  Department,  in  respect  to  all  matters  in- 
volving such  responsibility  and  their  accountability  to 
the  Treasury.  They  must  not  be  required  nor  per- 
mitted to  depend  in  such  matters  solely  upon  their 
commanders. " 


It  may  be  said,  in  conclusion,  that  the  real  issue  in 
this  country  is  not  whether  the  Army  shall  be  com- 
manded by  the  President  in  person,  or  through  a 
General-in-Chief,  but  whether  or  not  it  shall  be  com- 
manded by  the  Chiefs  of  Bureaus.  Practically,  the 
functions  of  the  General-in-Chief,  as  advocated  by 
those  who  argue  in  favor  of  such  an  assignment,  are 
coincident  with  those  of  the  Chief  of  Staff,  or  Chef 
$Etat- Major  of  European  armies,  He  is  the  senior 
in  control  to  furnish  the  plans  and  elaborate  the  de- 
tails of  campaigns  and  the  military  administration 
incident  thereto — and  to  do  so  effectually,  he  must  have 
control  of  all  the  parts — that  is,  of  the  entire  Army, 
staff,  as  well  as  line. 

Owing  to  the  poverty  of  language,  as  mentioned 
heretofore,  confusion  arises  in  the  employment  of 
terms,  and  we  are  inclined  to  regard  the  chief  of 
staff,  as  spoken  of  in  the  Prussian  army,  for  instance, 
as  the  head  of  the  staff  corps  only — when  in  reality 
he  is  the  principal  officer  in  command  under  their 
sovereign— the  military  head  of  the  organized  force, 
and,  as  such,  ranks  as  chief  of  the  generals  or  mar- 
shals who  command. 


HO  MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 

THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY. CONTINUED.* 

An  article  by  Colonel  Wherry,  Aid-de-Camp  to  Gen- 
eral Scliofield,  appeared  in  your  last  issue  on  "The 
Command  of  the  Army,"  the  subject  which  I  treated 
in  the  Field  Glass  of  May  last.  The  author  of  that 
article  looks  only  from  the  military  standpoint,  and 
argues  the  question  as  to  what  ought  to  be.  I  took  a 
general  view  and  tried  to  ascertain  what  is,  and  why 
it  is.  Hence,  though  writing  under  the  same  title,  we 
are  not  discussing  the  same  subject.  But  as  it  is  quite 
evident  that  Colonel  Wherry  designs  his  article  to 
pass  as  a  refutation  of  some  of  the  views  in  mine,  I 
beg,  in  consideration  of  the  importance  of  the  topic, 
the  favor  of  your  columns  for  a  brief  rejoinder. 

Colonel  Wherry  contends  for  a  distinction  between 
the  terms  "  General-in-Chief "  and  "  Commander -in- 
Chief,"  and  says  that  this  is  "  one  of  the  cases  where 
confusion  arises  from  the  use  of  the  same  word  in  dif- 
ferent senses,  owing  to  the  poverty  of  language."  The 
military  designation  of  the  President  is  evidence  of  the 
marvellous  perspicuity  which  characterizes  the  Consti- 
tution. He  is  called  "  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Army  and  Navy  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the  Mili- 
tia of  the  several  States,  when  called  into  the  actual 
Service  of  the  United  States,"  which  means,  and  which 
is  equivalent  to  saying,  that  he  is  practically  the  Chief 
General  of  the  Army,  and  the  Chief  Admiral  of  the 
Navy.  But  the  subject  rises  above  a  mere  discussion 
of  terms.  While  admitting  that  the  President  is  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Colonel  Wherry,  in  the  first  part  of 
his  article,  insists  that  he  may  "  delegate  "  his  "  mill- 

*  To  the  Editor  of  the  Field  Glass.     By  General  James  B.  Fry. 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  AKMY.  Ill 

tary  functions."  There  need  be  no  refinement  of  terms 
or  misunderstanding  here.  The  usual  meaning  of  the 
word  "  delegate  "  is  to  endow  another  with  general 
power  and  entrust  its  execution  to  his  discretion.  Gen- 
eral Schofield  forestalls  all  doubt  as  to  the  words  hav- 
ing any  other  meaning  in  connection  with  this  subject, 
when,  in  speaking  of  the  President,  he  says,  "he  del- 
egates Jiis  military  command  to  a  general  officer,  who 
has  been  educated,  appointed,  commissioned,  and  as- 
signed by  him  for  that  purpose.  The  President's  mili- 
tary staff  thus  becomes  the  staff  of  his  military  repre- 
sentative " — "  the  orders  of  his  chosen  General-in-Chief 
are  as  much  his  own  orders  as  if  he  gave  them  in  per- 
son." This  is  delegation  of  authority  pure  and  simple. 
It  does  not  in  the  least  resemble  the  assignment  to  duty 
of  a  subordinate  by  his  military  superior.  It  clearly 
means  that  the  military  duties  and  responsibilities  im- 
posed on  the  President  by  the  Constitution,  and  the 
military  staff  created  by  law  to  aid  him  in  the  per- 
formance of  them,  shall  be  transferred  to  a  chosen 
General.  His  orders — orders  conceived,  not  by  the 
President,  but  by  the  General,  resolved  upon  in  his 
discretion,  promulgated  as  his  will — are  as  much  the 
President's  orders  as  if  he  gave  them  himself.  With 
this  issue  plainly  joined,  we  should  not  suffer  from  the 
"  poverty  of  language."  But  in  the  latter  part  of  his 
article,  Colonel  Wherry  treats  "  delegation  of  author- 
ity" and  "assignment  to  duty"  as  synonymous  ex- 
pressions. He  says  "  it  is  the  President's  plain  duty, 
as  dictated  by  the  simplest  military  principles,  to  as- 
sign some  General  to  the  command  as  General-in-Chief." 
"  No  officer,"  he  says,  "  has  any  right  to  command  by 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

virtue  of  his  commission  alone."  "  He  can  only  com- 
mand such  forces  as  the  President  may  assign  to  him. 
The  President's  power  in  this  regard  cannot  properly 
be  limited  by  law.  The  question  is  not  what  he  has 
the  pouter  to  do,  but  what  lie  ought  to  do"  It  will 
strike  "  the  average  military  mind,"  to  which  Colonel 
Wherry  appeals,  that,  for  practical  purposes,  it  would 
be  well  to  settle  what  the  President  has  the  power  to 
do,  before  deciding  what  he  ought  to  do.  But  the  real 
question  is  not,  what  ought  he  to  do  ?  nor  is  it  simply, 
what  has  he  the  power  to  do  ?  It  is,  what,  by  the  Con- 
stitution, is  lie  obliged  to  do  ?  Must  he  actually  com- 
mand the  Army,  or  may  he  delegate  the  command  to  a 
"  chosen  General  "  ? — using  the  word  "  delegate  "  as 
General  Schofield  and  Colonel  Wherry  use  it.  There 
is  no  question  as  to  the  President's  power  to  assign 
all  of  his  subordinates  in  the  Army  to  duty  according 
to  their  respective  commissions.  What  disposition 
must  he  make  of  himself  ?  The  language  of  the  Con- 
stitution is,  the  President  "shall  be  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy  of  the  United  States," 
etc.  I  claim  to  have  shown  in  my  article  in  the  Field 
Glass  of  May,  1879,  that  the  Constitution  means  that 
the  President  must  be  the  actual  commander,  that  he 
cannot  "  delegate  "  the  command  to  any  one,  that  the 
framers  of  the  Constitution  meant  to  do  just  what 
they  did,  and,  in  adopting  the  clause  referred  to,  they 
understood  its  bearing  upon  the  military  Service  in 
particular  as  well  as  upon  the  Government  in  general, 
and  that,  as  shown  by  experience,  it  is  practicable  for 
the  President  to  exercise  the  command  in  a  way,  pro- 
vided by  law>  which  the  Supreme  Court  has  pro- 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  113 

nouuced  constitutional.  These  points  are  not  really 
contested  in  Colonel  Wherry's  article,  but  he  tells  us 
that  the  President  ought  to  delegate  his  military  func- 
tions to  some  General.  His  reasons  for  this  are,  briefly, 
as  gleaned  from  his  article,  that  the  staff  departments 
are  ambitious  of  predominance  and  power,  that  unity 
in  military  command  is  essential,  that  military  educa- 
tion is  of  great  value,  that  the  President  may  be  ig- 
norant of  the  military  duty  which  the  Constitution 
imposes  on  him,  and  he  adds,  in  the  way  of  illustra- 
tration,  that  the  War  of  Rebellion  might  have  been 
ended  in  two  years  instead  of  four,  "if  any  one  soldier 
of  fair  military  ability  had  been  given  the  absolute 
control  of  military  operations,  and  the  necessary  mili- 
tary resources  of  the  country"  (Let  us  ask,  in  paren- 
thesis, how  it  could  be  possible,  under  our  system,  to 
give  any  soldier  the  absolute  power  here  mentioned  ? 
What  would  "the  Fathers"  have  thought  of  such  a 
suggestion  ?)  The  inapplicability  of  these  arguments 
to  the  question  of  the  President's  power  to  delegate 
his  military  functions  need  not  be  pointed  out  in 
detail.  In  using  them,  Colonel  Wherry  no  doubt  had 
in  mind  their  bearing  on  what  he  calls  "  the  military 
theory."  He  says  :  "  the  military  theory  is  perfectly 
simple  and  plain.  A  General-in-Chief  is  a  military 
expert,  versed  in  all  branches  of  the  science  of  war, 
appointed  by  the  President,  under  authority  of  the 
law,  to  do,  in  accordance  with  the  rules  taught  by 
the  science  of  war  with  which  he  is  familiar,  those 
things  which  the  Commander-in-Chief  may  direct  or 
authorize  to  be  done,  but  which  he  himself  does  not 
know  how  to  do,  or  which  his  other  duties  do  not 


114 


MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 


leave  him  time  to  do  in  person.'7  Any  one  may  ad- 
vance and  advocate  a  theory.  Tn  relation  to  this  one 
it  is  only  necessary  to  say,  at  present,  that  it  does  not 
embrace  the  question  at  issue,  to  wit,  the  "delegation" 
of  the  President's  "military  functions,"  nor  does  it  ap- 
pear to  be  sound  in  the  light  of  a  definition  of  the 
term  "  General-in-Chief."  The  presumption  that  the 
President  is  ignorant  of  his  duties  as  Commander-in- 
Chief  is  put  forth  in  this  "theory"  as  also  in  another 
part  of  Colonel  Wherry's  article,  where,  quoting  from 
General  Schofield,  he  says  of  one*  "President,"  as 
compared  with  the  chief  "  executive  officers  of  most 
other  nations  he  is  pre-eminently  a  civil  magistrate." 
What  chief  executive  can  show  better  title  to  being 
pre-eminently  a  military  magistrate  ?  If  direct  ap- 
pointment by  the  Constitution  of  his  country  to  the 
supreme  command  of  all  of  its  land  and  naval  forces 
can  make  a  head  magistrate  a  "military  chief,"  cer- 
tainly ours  is  one,  and  he  has  been  so  defined  by  an 
Attorney-General.  Without  depreciating  the  advan- 
tages of  military  education  and  talents,  it  may  be  said 
that  no  presumption  that  the  President  is  ignorant  of 
his  duties  can  invalidate  the  force  of  his  high  com- 
mission, nor  can  his  chieftainship  be  impaired  by  the 
opinion  his  subordinates  may  have  of  his  military 
ability  or  attainments.  It  is  gratifying  to  find  that, 
notwithstanding  Colonel  Wherry  argues  that  the 
President  should  "delegate  "  his  "military  functions  " 
to  some  General  who  should  "command,"  he  arrives 
at  the  conclusion  that  the  chosen  General  can,  after 
all,  be  nothing  more  than  the  President's  Chief -of - 

*  Misprint.     Should  be  our.     See  p.  133. 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  115 

Staff,  which  is  admitting  that  the  President  must 
command.  He  says,  "practically  the  functions  of  the 
General-in-Chief,  as  advocated  by  those  who  argue  in 
favor  of  such  an  assignment,  are  coincident  with  those 
of  the  Chief-ofStaff,  or?  Chef  cTMat- Major '  of  Euro- 
pean armies."  That  is  the  conclusion  at  which  Hal- 
leek  arrived  when  he  was  so-called  General-in-Chief. 

In  my  article  of  May  last  I  said:  "To  assert  that  two 
persons  command  the  same  force  at  the  same  time,  in- 
volves a  contradiction  amounting  to  absurdity.  There 
can  be  but  one  commander :  all  others  must  be  com- 
manded. Saying  that  a  chosen  General  commands 
the  whole  Army  under  the  Secretary  of  War  is  admit- 
ting, what  is  the  fact,  that  he  does  not  command  it. 
The  late  Major-General  Halleck,  who  was  an  educated 
soldier,  an  accomplished  scholar,  and  a  profound  law- 
yer, fully  comprehended  this.  While  General-in-Chief 
he  wrote  as  follows :  'The  great  difficulty  in  the  office 
of  General-in-Chief  is,  that  it  is  not  understood  by  the 
country.  The  responsibility  and  odium  thrown  upon 
it  do  not  belong  to  it.  I  am  simply  a  military  adviser 
of  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  President,  and  must 
obey  and  carry  out  what  they  decide  upon,  whether  I 
concur  in  their  decisions  or  not.  .  .  .  It  is  my 
duty  to  strengthen  the  hands  of  the  President -as 
Commander-in-Chief,  not  to  weaken  them  by  factious 
opposition.  I  have,  therefore,  cordially  co-operated 
with  him  in  any  plan  decided  upon,  although  I  have 
never  hesitated  to  differ  in  opinion.  I  must  leave  it 
to  history  to  vindicate  my  opinions  or  plans.  They 
will  be  found  at  some  future  time  on  record.'  (Letter 
from  H.  W.  Halleck,  Headquarters  of  the  Army, 


116 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


Washington,  Feb.    16,  1864,  to   Major-General   W.  T. 
Sherman.)  " 

In  conclusion,  if,  as  the  Constitution  says,  the  Presi- 
dent is  Commander-in- Chief ;  if,  as  I  claim  to  have 
shown,  he  cannot,  as  such,  delegate  his  authority  and 
responsibility ;  if  he  has  a  legal  staff  through  whom 
to  exercise  the  command  of  the  Army,  as  is  admitted 
by  General  Schofield's  statement,  that  "  the  President's 
staff"  thus  becomes  the  staff  of  his  chosen  General, 
and  if,  as  experience  has  shown  it  to  be,  it  is  practi- 
cable for  him  to  exercise  the  command  in  the  only 
way  that  the  Supreme  Court  has  pronounced  constitu- 
tional, how  can  he  be  expected  to  delegate  the  actual 
command  of  the  Army  to  a  chosen  General  ?  and  who 
are  the  "  would-be  "  reformers  of  whom  Colonel  Wher- 
ry speaks  ?  Are  they  the  men  who  advocate  an  en- 
forcement of  the  existing  system,  or  those  who  urge  a 
departure  from  it  ?  * 

THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY. CONTINUED. f 

When  I  wrote  my  article  on  "  The  Command  of  the 
Army,"  which  appeared  in  your  number  for  July,  I 
purposely  omitted  General  Fry's  or  any  other  person's 
name,  to  avoid  personal  controversy  and  the  asperity 
which  usually  belongs  to  such  personal  mention. 

In  your  number  for  August  appears  a  letter  from 
General  Fry,  Assistant  Adjutant- General,  which  de- 
mands an  answer  from  me,  and  I  desire  to  reply  on 
the  broad  ground  upon  which  only  such  an  important 
subject  should  be  discussed. 

*  This  letter  was  dated  Saratoga,  July  7,  1879. 

t  From  Field  Glass  for  September,  1879.      By  Brevet-Colonel  Will- 
iam M.  Wherry,  Captain  6th  Infantry. 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  117 

General  Fry's  answer  has  the  great  merit  of  reduc- 
ing the  subject  of  contention  within  very  narrow 
limits,  and  of  clearly  stating  the  only  question  upon 
which  there  can  be  any  difference  of  opinion  so  far  as 
it  is  a  constitutional  or  legal  question. 

The  position  assumed  by  General  Fry,  in  his  article 
in  your  May  number,  is  restated  by  him  in  the  August 
number,  in  the  following  emphatic  language:  "To  as- 
sert that  two  persons  command  the  same  force  at  the 
same  time  involves  a  contradiction  amounting  to  ab- 
surdity. There  can  be  but  one  commander :  all  others 
must  be  commanded.  Saying  that  a  chosen  General 
commands  the  whole  Army  under  the  Secretary  of 
War  is  admitting  what  is  the  fact,  that  he  does  not 
command  it."  Is  it  meant  that  to  command  and  be 
commanded  at  the  same  time  is  an  impossibility,  "  a 
contradiction  amounting  to  an  absurdity  "  ?  Of  course 
not.  That  is  the  condition  in  which  all  comman- 
ders, save  the  President,  from  highest  to  lowest,  find 
themselves  at  all  times.  Each  commands  a  certain 
force,  which  force,  with  its  immediate  commander,  is 
also  commanded  by  a  superior,  and  so  on  up  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  the  President.  The  relations 
between  superior  and  subordinate  are  essentially  the 
same  throughout. 

The  law  and  regulations  and  the  custom  of  Service 
define  to  some  extent  the  proper  scope  of  functions  to 
be  performed  by  each  of  the  several  grades  of  com- 
manders. But  there  yet  remains  a  wide  range  within 
which  any  commander  may,  in  his  discretion,  exercise 
control  of  the  details  of  military  operations  or  leave 
those  details  to  his  subordinates.  The  range  within 


118 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


which  such  discretion  may  be  exercised  is,  of  course, 
greatest  with  the  Comrnander-in-Chief.  Who  will 
undertake  to  say  exactly  what  functions  of  the  chief 
command  he  must  exercise  and  what  he  may  trust  to 
his  subordinates  ?  It  hardly  need  be  stated  that  the 
President  may,  in  his  discretion,  control  all  the  details 
of  military  affairs  so  far  as  it  is  physically  possible  for 
him  to  do  so.  But  must  he  do  this  ?  Must  he  in  fact 
exercise  any  of  the  functions  of  generalship  ?  May  he 
not,  on  the  contrary,  limit  himself  to  simply  determin- 
ing the  use  that  shall  be  made  of  the  Army,  under  the 
law,  that  is,  the  object  for  which  it  shall  be  employed, 
and  leave  to  his  General-in-Chief  the  entire  conduct  of 
the  campaign  ? 

Again,  because  it  has  been  decided  by  the  Supreme 
Court  that  rules  and  orders  publicly  promulgated 
through  him  (the  Secretary  of  War),  must  be  received 
as  the  acts  of  the  Executive,  does  it  follow  that  the 
President  cannot  send  his  orders  to  the  Army  through 
any  other  channel  ?  Are  all  laws  held  to  be  uncon- 
stitutional until  the  Supreme  Court  approves  them  ? 
Is  the  law  authorizing  the  assignment  of  the  General 
of  the  Army  to  command  all  the  armies  unconstitu- 
tional ?  And  did  not  General  Grant  so  command  ? 
And  was  not  the  President  at  the  same  time,  in  fact 
as  well  as  in  name,  Commander-in-Chief  ?  Could  not 
General  Grant  command  the  Army,  and  the  President, 
by  commanding  him,  also  command  the  Army  at  the 
same  time  ?  What  is  meant  by  the  proposition,  "  There 
can  be  but  one  commander :  all  others  must  be  com- 
manded "  ?  It  must  mean  that  there  cannot  be  at  the 
same  time  two  independent  commanders,  for  which  it  is 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  119 

believed  no  one  has  ever  contended.  But  certainly 
there  may  be,  at  the  same  time,  any  number  of  com- 
manders, each  dependent  upon  and  subordinate  to  the 
next  superior,  and  each  acting  under  such  orders  and 
instructions  as  he  may  receive  from  higher  authority, 
but  exercising  supreme  command  within  the  sphere  of 
duties  left  to  his  discretion. 

Thus,  to  take  an  extreme  case  for  illustration,  there 
may  be  a  post  garrisoned  by  a  single  company,  but 
with  a  post  commander,  superior  to  the  Captain  of  the 
company.  In  that  case,  the  post  commander  would 
exercise  command  over  that  one  company  as  much  or 
as  little  as  he  sees  fit,  within  the  limits  of  the  law  and 
regulations.  Just  so  the  Commander-in-Chief  may  as- 
sign the  General  to  command  the  entire  Army,  and  yet 
himself  exercise  the  command  so  far  as  he  sees  fit 
under  his  constitutional  and  legal  obligation. 

So  also,  if  Congress  sees  fit,  all  the  staff  departments 
may  be  united  under  one  head,  or  Chief-of-Staff.  Cer- 
tainly no  one  will  contend  that  there  may  not  be  one 
instead  of  several  Chief s-of -Staff,  and  that  the  Presi- 
dent or  Secretary  of  War  may  not  command  the  staff 
through  that  one,  instead  of  as  now,  through  the  sev- 
eral heads  of  bureaus.  And  why,  so  far  as  any  consti- 
tutional question  is  involved,  may  not  this  Chief-of- 
Staff  and  the  General-in-Chief  be  one  and  the  same 
person  ? 

Is  there  anything  in  the  letter  or  spirit  of  the  Con- 
stitution which  makes  it  necessary  for  the  President 
and  Secretary  of  War  to  give  their  orders  directly  to 
ten  or  twelve  heads  of  departments,  and  to  three,  four, 
or  any  other  number  of  military  commanders  ?  May 


120 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


this  not  all  be  done  through  one  chief  instead  of 
through  several,  if  Congress  so  desires?  Would  the 
President  be  any  the  less  Commander-in-Chief  because 
he  exercised  his  functions,  as  such,  through  one  subor- 
dinate than  through  many  ?  The  error  into  which 
General  Fry  has  fallen  seems  to  proceed  entirely  from 
the  fallacy  that  a  man  cannot  command  and  be  com- 
manded at  the  same  time, — a  fallacy  which  is  exposed 
by  the  universal  fact  to  the  contrary. 

It  is  believed  that  the  constitutional  question  in- 
volved in  this  subject  is  purely  imaginary,  and  that 
there  is  nothing  in  the  letter  or  spirit  of  the  Constitu- 
tion to  prevent  the  organization,  command,  and  admin- 
istration of  the  United  States  Army  in  accordance 
with  the  strict  military  principles  which  have  been 
deduced  from  the  experience  of  the  military  nations  of 
Europe.  Army  officers  are  at  liberty  to  discuss  this 
subject  upon  the  broad  basis  of  principle,  that  is, 
of  "the  military  theory,"  and  to  consider  how  this 
military  principle  or  theory  may  be  best  applied  to 
our  country  and  Government,  and  this  not  for  the 
present,  but  for  all  time,  not  under  some  one  Presi- 
dent,* as  General  Fry  supposes,  but  under  the  Presi- 
dent at  any  time,  who,  as  everybody  knows,  is  chosen 
as  a  statesman,  and  not  as  a  military  chieftain.  When 
General  Schofield  wrote  on  this  subject  the  then  Presi- 

*The  text  of  General  Fry's  letter  of  July  7,  as  published  in  the 
Field  Glass  for  August,  contains  the  following:  "In  another  part  of 
Colonel  Wherry's  article,  where  quoting  from  General  Schofield,  he 
says  of  one  '  President '  as  compared  with  the  chief  '  executive  officers 
of  most  other  nations,  he  is  pre-eminently  a  civil  magistrate. ' '  But  in 
the  copy  in  a  number  of  the  Field  Glass  sent  to  me  by  General  Fry 
since  the  above  was  written,  he  has  corrected  in  ink  the  "  one  "  to  read 
"  our,"  hence  the  above  remarks  and  this  note.  W. 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  121 

dent  was  our  most  eminent  soldier,  yet  General  Fry 
quotes  as  if  he  understood  General  Schofield  to  refer 
to  that  "  one  President." 

So  far  as  General  Fry's  claim  that  the  President  of 
the  United  States  "  is  pre-eminently  a  military  magis- 
trate "  is  concerned,  it  may  not  be  inapplicable  to  quote 
the  following  from  a  speech  made  by  the  Hon.  Mr. 
Edmunds,  of  Vermont,  in  the  United  States  Senate, 
May  9,  L879  :  "The  President  of  the  United  States, 
by  the  Constitution,  commands  it  (the  Army),  not 
because  he  is  a  military  tyrant,  or  has  any  military  or 
divine  right  to  command  it,  but  because  he,  the  chief 
civil  magistrate  of  the  Union,  and  not  the  military 
magistrate  of  the  Union,  is  selected  by  the  Constitu- 
tion to  command  it. 

"  The  Army  is  not  intrusted  to  the  command  of  a 
military  officer.  It  is  intrusted  to  him  (the  President) 
by  your  Constitution,  and  beyond  your  rightful  power 
to  take  away ;  I  say  '  rightful  power,'  I  do  not  know 
what  will  happen.  It  is  intrusted,  beyond  your  right- 
ful power  to  take  away,  to  him  as  a  civil  officer  to 
command  it.  It  is  not,  therefore,  when  it  is  exerted 
under  his  authority  the  power  of  the  sword  per  se,  but 
it  is  the  power  of  the  civil  law." 

This  indicates  what  is  the  President's  constitutional 
duty  in  reference  to  the  Army,  namely,  to  control  and 
direct  the  uses  to  which  it  may  be  put,  and  not  to 
command  it  in  a  military  sense.  It  is  for  that  reason, 
the  subordination  of  the  military  to  the  civil,  that  the 
command  (that  is,  the  use  and  direction  of  it,  not  the 
military  control  or  generalship  of  its  various  parts)  is. 
given  to  the  civil  magistrate. 


122 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


It  must  be  admitted  Senator  Edmunds  is  a  constitu- 
tional lawyer,  and  acquainted  with  what  "  the  framers 
of  the  Constitution  meant  to  do."  And  his  language 
is  very  nearly  identical  with  that  of  General  Schofield, 
in  his  letter  quoted  in  my  article,  which  General  Fry 
regards  as  presumptuous. 

General  Fry  begs  the  whole  question  when  he  ad- 
mits the  President's  command  of  the  Army  is  or  has 
been  exercised  by  the  Secretary  of  War.  If  by  a  Sec- 
retary of  War,  why  not  by  a  General  ?  If  he  cannot 
delegate  his  authority  to  a  General  appointed  in  accord- 
ance with  law,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  Senate,  how  can  he  permit  the  Secretary,  who  is 
"  a  civil  officer,  and  whose  duties  are  civil  duties,"  and 
"  who  cannot  take  the  field,"  who  "  is  not  a  part  of  the 
Army,"  to  exercise  his  military  functions  as  Comman- 
der-in-Chief  ?  General  Fry  claimed,  in  his  first  paper, 
that  "  there  is  one  constitutional  way  in  which  he  (the 
President)  may  be  relieved  of  the  labor  of  continuous 
personal  command,  that  is,  by  having  that  command  ex- 
ercised ~by  the  Secretary  of  War;  not  by  virtue  of  dele- 
gated power,  nor,  in  fact  by  any  power  of  his  own,  but 
because  his  rules  and  orders,  and  his  only,  must  be 
received  as  the  acts  of  the  President,"  because  the  Su- 
preme Court  had  decided  that  the  President's  "  rules 
and  orders,  publicly  promulged  through  him  (the 
Secretary  of  War)  must  be  received  as  the  acts  of  the 
Executive." 

And  in  his  letter,  in  your  August  number,  he  so  refers 
again  to  that  decision,  and  claims  that  experience  shows 
"it  is  practicable  for  the  President  to  exercise  the 
command  in  a  way  (namely,  by  the  Secretary  of  War) 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  AEMY.  123 

that  the  Supreme  Court  has  pronounced  constitu- 
tional." Now,  that  decision  was  not  based  upon  a 
question  of  command  at  all,  and  was  not  intended  to 
apply  to  military  functions. 

The  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  (15  Peters,  291), 
in  which  the  Secretary  of  War  is  pronounced  "the 
regular  constitutional  organ  of  the  President  for  the 
administration,  of  the  military  establishment  of  the 
nation,"  and  which  is  so  often  quoted  and  relied  upon 
as  manifesting  the  right  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to 
execute  the  military  functions  of  command  of  the 
President,  because  of  the  subsequent  language  of  the 
decision,  "  and  rules  and  orders  publicly  promulged 
through  him,  must  be  received  as  the  acts  of  the  Ex- 
ecutive, and  as  such  be  binding  upon  all  within  the 
sphere  of  his  legal  and  constitutional  authority,"  was 
given  upon  a  case  purely  administrative  and  minis- 
terial, a  case  of  settlement  of  money  accountability 
and  claim  for  compensation  for  disbursements.  And 
the  decision  was  upon  the  right  or  power  of  the  Presi- 
dent, either  in  his  own  name  or  acting  "through,"  his 
secretary,  to  "  modify,  or  repeal,  or  create  anew  "  an 
existing  regulation,  and  denied  the  right  of  a  subordi- 
nate officer  to  insist  upon  a  prior  regulation  as  govern- 
ing when  the  order  for  its  repeal  or  modification  "  was 
adopted  by  the  proper  authority  "  —that  is,  the  Presi- 
dent— «  and  by  the  same  authority  promulged  to  every 
officer  through  the  regular  official  organ." 

Now,  beside  the  fact  that  the  decision  relates  to 
administrative  duties,  and  not  military  command,  it  is 
noticeable  that  the  language  used  by  the  Supreme 
Court  throughout  treats  of  the  acts  as  being  those  of 


124  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

the  President,  and  only  promulgated  "  through  "  his 
constitutional  organ,  not  the  acts  of  a  delegate,  deputy, 
or  alter  ego. 

In  a  preceding  decision  (13  Peters,  513)  the  same 
court  had,  in  reference  to  another  purely  administra- 
tive act  of  the  Secretary's,  used  the  following  lan- 
guage: "Now,  although  the  immediate  agent  in  requir- 
ing this  reservation  was  the  Secretary  of  War,  yet  we 
feel  justified  in  presuming  that  it  was  done  by  the  ap- 
probation and  direction  of  the  President.  The  Presi- 
dent speaks  and  acts  through  the  heads  of  the  several 
departments  in  relation  to  subjects  which  appertain  to 
their  respective  duties.  Both  military  posts  and  In- 
dian affairs,  including  agencies,  belong  to  the  War  De- 
partment. Hence  we  consider  the  act  of  the  War  De- 
partment in  requiring  the  reservation  to  be  made,  as 
being  in  legal  contemplation  the  act  of  the  President, 
and,  consequently,  that  the  reservation  thus  made  wras, 
in  legal  effect,  a  reservation  made  by  order  of  the 
President,  within  the  terms  of  the  Act  of  Congress." 
Now,  the  Supreme  Court  having  decided  that  "  he  (the 
Secretary  of  War)  is  a  civil  officer,  and  all  his  duties 
are  civil  duties,"  how  would  it  have  been  had  the 
act  of  the  Secretary  been  a  military  instead  of  a 
civil  administrative  act  ?  The  whole  decision  hinges 
upon  the  fact  that  the  act  was  one  appertaining  to  the 
duties  of  the  department,  among  which  is  not  the  mili- 
tary command  of  the  armies  of  the  United  States. 

It  is  believed  far  safer  for  the  President  to  "  dele- 
gate "  his  military  command  to  a  General-in-Chief  than 
to  have  it  exercised  by  the  Secretary  of  War  not  by  any 
constitutional  authority,  "  nor  by  delegated  power,  nor  in 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  125 

fact  by  any  power  of  his  own"  but  relying  upon  a  de- 
cision of  the  Supreme  Court  which  does  not  relate  to 
such  functions.  And  it  certainly  would  be  more  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  teachings  of  the  best  military  author- 
ities. 

That  the  President  has  the  power  to  delegate  such 
authority,  and  to  assign  the  General-in-Chief  cannot  be 
denied,  for  it  is  clearly  and  distinctly  set  forth  in  sun- 
dry acts  of  Congress,  and  most  recently  in  the  act  re- 
viving the  grade  of  General  of  the  Army  of  the  United 
States,  which  reads  as  follows : 

"  That  the  grade  of  '  General  of  the  Army  of  the 
United  States '  be  and  the  same  is  hereby  revived ; 
and  that  the  President  is  hereby  authorized,  whenever 
he  shall  deem  it  expedient,  to  appoint,  by  and  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  a  General  of  the 
Army  of  the  United  States,  to  be  selected  from  among 
those  officers  in  the  military  Service  of  the  United 
States  most  distinguished  for  courage,  skill,  and  ability, 
who  being  commissioned  as  General,  may  be  author- 
ized, under  the  direction  and  during  the  pleasure  of 
the  President,  to  command  the  armies  of  the  United 
States."  (Sec.  1,  July  25,  1868,  Chap.  232.) 

So  there  is  no  question  as  to  the  power  of  the  Presi- 
dent in  the  case,  but  there  seems  to  be  one  as  to  what 
he  ought  to  do.  And  since  the  constitutionality  of 
that  Act  of  Congress  has  never  been  questioned,  offi- 
cers of  the  Army  have  a  right  to  accept  it  in  the  dis- 
cussion of  this  subject  rather  than  a  decision  of  the 
Supreme  Court,  which  does  not  apply  to  the  question. 

General  Fry  takes  issue  with  me  upon  the  use  of  the 
word  "  delegate  "  or  delegation,  and  claims  that  "  it 


126 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


does  not  in  the  least  resemble  the  assignment  to  duty 
of  a  subordinate  by  his  military  superior."  The  issue 
as  made  by  him  is  accepted,  and  his  difficulty  in  this 
will  be  found  to  be  as  fictitious  and  fallacious  as  the 
trouble  he  has  in  reference  to  commanding  and  being 
commanded  at  the  same  time. 

The  powers  conferred  upon  the  President  as  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  of  the  Army  embrace  every  possible 
detail  of  command  respecting  the  duties  of  every  indi- 
vidual in  the  Army.  He  may  exercise  direct  authority 
in  any  and  every  one  of  this  vast  number  of  details,  or 
he  may,  as  he  does  in  his  discretion,  confide  the  vast 
majority  of  these  to  his  subordinates,  both  commanders 
and  staff  officers.  He  does  this  habitually  in  his  as- 
signments of  officers  to  command,  and  in  his  regula- 
tions and  orders  prescribing  what  such  commanders 
may  and  what  they  shall  do.  It  is  not  worth  the 
while  to  contend  over  the  meaning  of  a  word,  but  if 
this  is  not  a  delegation  of  the  authority  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief,  then  what  is  it  ? 

The  President  reserves  to  himself  the  right  at  any 
time  to  alter  his  regulations,  change  his  commanders, 
or  in  terf ere  directly  in  any  detail  of  command  ;  in 
other  words,  to  resume  at  any  moment  the  power  dele- 
gated to  his  subordinates,  or  to  control  the  manner  of 
their  exercise.  It  is  thus,  in  addition  to  what  uses 
authorized  by  law  shall  be  niade  of  the  Army,  that  the 
President  continually  discharges  the  duty  imposed 
upon  him  as  Commander-in-Chief.  The  vast  majority 
of  these  duties  are  actually  performed  by  his  subordi- 
nates, whether  they  may  be  called  "  delegates  "  or  not. 
And  if  the  President  may  confer  these  powers  upon 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  127 

twenty  different  officers,  may  he  not  confer  them,  or  a 
certain  portion  of  them,  npon  one,  the  power  so  con- 
ferred upon  one  to  be  exercised  over  the  entire  Army, 
instead  of  over  only  a  part  of  it  ?  If  not,  how  large  or 
how  small  are  the  parts  of  the  Army  over  which  the 
President  may  assign  commanders  ? 

Again :  where  do  the  several  commanders  derive 
the  authority  which  they  habitually  exercise  ?  None 
of  that  authority  is  conferred  by  the  Constitution,  and 
very  little  (such  as  that  relating  to  courts-martial,  etc.) 
by  act  of  Congress.  It  is  a  portion  of  the  President's 
authority  as  Commander-in-Chief  which  he  confers 
upon  his  subordinates,  but  which  he  may  still  resume 
and  exercise  in  person  at  any  moment  if  he  sees  fit  to 
do  so.  Is  not  this  a  delegation  of  authority  ?  Wherein 
consists  the  supposed  difference  between  an  assign- 
ment to  command  under  certain  regulations  and  in- 
structions and  a  delegation  of  military  authority? 
Unquestionably,  then,  the  President  may  assign  one 
officer  to  command  all  the  armies  and  all  parts  of  the 
armies  of  the  United  States  under  his  direction  and 
during  his  pleasure,  but  he  must  assign  an  officer  of 
the  Army  appointed  and  commissioned  according  to 
law,  or  he  may  assign  any  number  of  such  officers  so 
appointed  and  commissioned  to  command  parts  of  the 
Army  ;  but  he  cannot  assign  such  duties  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  War,  and  in  such  assignments  he  delegates  to 
the  officers  so  assigned  his  functions,  or  so  much  of 
them  as  may  be  necessary  to  carry  out  his  will. 

The  duties  of  officers,  such  as  relate  to  courts-mar- 
tial  and  certain  duties  of  some  of  the  staff  departments, 
defined  by  special  acts  of  Congress,  are  to  be  per- 


128  MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 

formed  by  authority  of  law  ;  all  other  duties  are  per- 
formed by  authority  delegated  by  the  President.  And 
there  is  nothing  in  the  law  preventing  the  President 
from  requiring  those  specific  duties  confided  by  law  to 
special  officers  from  being  performed  under  the  super- 
vision of  a  General-in-Chief,  whom  the  law  has  author- 
ized him  to  assign,  so  long  as  he  does  not  take  the 
performance  of  such  duties  from  the  officers  designated 
in  the  laws.* 

THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY. CONTINUED. f 

Colonel  Wherry  desires  more  information  than  your 
columns  or  my  circumstances  will  justify  me  in  giving 
him  in  this  letter.  In  his  last  communication  on  "  The 
Command  of  the  Army,"  he  asks  some  twenty-five 
questions !  I  find  no  new  arguments  to  answer.  I 
thank  him  for  his  quotation  from  Senator  Edmunds, 
which  clearly  sustains  my  conclusion  that  the  President 
must  command  the  Army.  In  my  first  article,  I  said 
the  "  actual  command  "  was  "  lodged  irrevocably  and 
unalterably  with  the  elective  civil  magistrate."  and  that 
is  substantially  the  ground  taken  by  Senator  Edmunds, 
as  Colonel  Wherry  quotes  him.  But  the  fact  that  the 
highest  civil  functions  and  also  the  highest  military 
functions  are  lodged  in  the  President  does  not  impair 
his  supremacy  in  both.  To  deny  the  President  hi*  real 
military  power  with  a  view  to  leaving  that  power  to 
be  exercised,  .through  delegation  or  otherwise,  by  "  a 
chosen  General,"  would  destroy  the  force  of  Senator 
Edmunds'  argument  as  well  as  defeat  the  purpose  of 

*  Dated,  West  Point,  N.  Y.,  August  4,  1879. 

f  General  Fry  in  Field  Glass ;  dated,  Governor's  Island,  September 
9,  1879. 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  1  29 

the  Constitution.  The  fact  that  the  President  is  en- 
dowed with  supreme  military  power  for  the  very 
reason  that  he  is  chief  civil  magistrate  does  not  weaken 
the  point  here  made. 

Colonel  Wherry  is  catching  at  straws.     Because  I 
asserted  the  broad  proposition  that  two  persons  cannot 
command  the  same  force  at  the  same  time,  saying, 
"  there  can  be  but  one  commander :  all  others  must  be 
commanded,"   he   attributes   to   me   the  "  fallacy  " 
foolery,  it  might  be  called — of  holding  that  "  a  man 
cannot   command    and    be    commanded    at   the    same 
time  "  ;  and  then  he  demolishes  that  "fallacy  "  ;  telling 
us  that  "  there  may  be  a  post  garrisoned  by  a  single 
company,  but  with  a  post  commander  superior  to  the 
Captain  of  the  company,"  who  "  would  exercise  com- 
mand over  that  one  company  as  much  or  as  little  as  he 
saw  fit,"  etc.     I  despair  of  enabling  Colonel  Wherry 
to  grasp  my  meaning ;  and  it  would  not  be  allowing 
fair  play  to  the  discernment  of  your  readers  if  I  com- 
mented for  their  benefit  on  such  points  as  the  one  I 
have  just  quoted,  or  upon  the  Colonel's  view  that  the 
general  principle  plainly  enunciated  by  the  Supreme 
Court — that  rules   and   orders  publicly  promulgated 
through  the  Secretary  of  War  must  be  received  as  the 
acts  of  the  President,  and  as  such  be  binding  upon- all 
within  the  sphere  of  his  legal  and  constitutional  au- 
thority— must  be  restricted  to  so-called  administrative 
and  ministerial  matters,  because  the  decision  embrac- 
ing the   principle   was  given  upon   a  case   of  money 
accountability.     That  nothing  more  on  the  main  ques- 
tion is  necessary  from  me  is  very  clear.     There  is  an 
old  story  to  the  effect  that  during  the  Flood  a  certain 


130  MILITAEY  MISCELLANIES. 

man  made  many  fruitless  attempts  to  get  into  the  Ark, 
and,  when  finally  repulsed,  he  waded  away  with  the 
water  up  to  his  chin,  remarking,  "  It  makes  no  differ- 
ence, there  ain't  going  to  be  much  of  a  shower,  no 
how."  Fortunately  he  was  so  constituted  that  he 
could  take  a  cheerful  view  of  a  difficult  situation. 
Colonel  Wherry  seems  able  to  take  a  like  comforting 
view  of  the  weighty  subject  under  discussion.  After 
having  for  several  months  wrestled  unsuccessfully  with 
a  trouble  which,  like  the  waters  in  the  Deluge,  grew 
deeper  and  deeper,  he  at  last  turns  away,  remarking, 
u  it  is  believed  that  the  constitutional  question  involved 
in  this  subject  is  purely  imaginary."  Under  this  as- 
sumption he  abandons  it,  and  proceeds  to  discuss 
numerous  other  points,  leaving  the  important  matter 
to  the  fate  of  Ginx'  baby.  I  repeat  that  the  points  I 
maintain  are  the  broad  ones  distinctly  stated  in  my 
first  article,  namely,  that  the  President  is  required  by 
the  Constitution  to  command  the  Army  (not  nominally, 
nor  yet  with  "fuss  and  feathers,"  but  actually)',  that 
Congress  has  no  right  to  divest  him  of  that  duty,  and  that 
he  cannot  delegate  the  command  to  "  a  chosen  General," 
or  any  one  else,  but  that  the  Secretary  of  War  is  his 
"  regular  constitutional  organ  for  the  administration  of 
the  MILITARY  establishment  of  the  nation,"  and  may  be 
used  in  that  capacity  to  any  extent  the  President  deems 
best.  The  points  which  I  especially  contest  are  em- 
braced in  General  Schofield's  assertion  that  "The 
President  does  not  command  in  person ;  he  delegates 
his  military  command  to  a  General  officer  who  has 
been  educated,  appointed,  commissioned  and  assigned 
by  him  for  that  purpose.  The  President's  military 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  AEMY.  131 

staff  thus  becomes  the  staff  of  his  representative — the 
Commanding  General  of  the  Army;  .  .  .  the 
orders  of  his  chosen  General-in-Chief  are  as  much  his 
own  orders  as  if  he  gave  them  in  person."  I  will  not 
be  a  party  to  smothering  these  points  in  details  and 
side  issues,  nor  to  clouding  them  with  sophistries  ;  nor 
will  I  be  drawn  away  from  them  through  the  allure- 
ments of  European  systems,  or  native  modern  military 
theories.  As  matters  now  stand,  I  am  quite  willing 
to  submit  the  case  without  further  argument. 

Colonel  Wherry  again  presents  the  proposition  of 
having  the  "General-in-Chief"  made  " Chief -of-Staff " 
of  the  Army.  I  have  not  discussed  that  proposition 
directly.  But  so  far  as  my  argument  on  the  President's 
constitutional  obligation  to  command  the  Army  bears 
upon  the  question  of  the  appointment  or  assignment 
of  a  Chief -of-Staff,  it  supports  the  view  that  the  "  Gen- 
eral-in-Chief "  can  be  nothing  more  than  Chief-of-Staff. 
Certainly  a  Chief-of-Staff  can  be  authorized  by  law. 
Possibly  the  President  can  make  one  by  assignment 
without  further  legislation.  I  know  of  nothing  im- 
pairing his  power  to  do  so,  unless  it  be  the  fact  that 
the  office  of  Chief-of-Staff  to  the  Lieutenant-General, 
created  by  the  Act  of  March  3,  1 865,  transferred  to  the 
General  by  the  Act  of  July  25,  1866,  and  filled  until 
March  12,  1869,  was  formally  abolished  by  the  Act  of 
April  3,  1869.  But  to  convert  the  "  General-in-Chief  r 
into  Chief-of-Staff  would  not  be  much  more  than  a 
change  of  name.  Whether  it  would  grease  the  wheels 
or  not  is  a  question  ;  it  would  not  materially  alter  the 
machine.  The  feature  in  our  military  system,  which 
Colonel  Wherry  and  many  other  good  officers  are 


132 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


trying  in  fact  to  remove,  is  not  due  to  the  organization 
or  behavior  of  the  Army,  line  or  staff,  nor  to  military 
grades  or  titles.  It  arises  from  the  existence  of  the 
Secretary  of  War.  Their  scheme  involves  the  neces- 
sity of  "  wiping  out  "  the  Secretary.  His  office — au- 
thorized in  general  terms  by  the  Constitution — has 
been  formally  created  by  law.  Various  acts  of  Con- 
gress have  imposed  upon  him  specific  duties  in  the 
military  Service.  Decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
and  the  inherent  and  imperative  demands  resulting 
from  the  relations  between  the  Secretary  of  War  and 
the  President,  have,  for  all  purposes  affecting  the 
Army,  fastened  these  two  functionaries  so  closely  and 
firmly  together,  that  no  officer  of  the  Army  can,  with 
any  practical  advantage  to  himself  or  the  Service,  be 
wedged  in  between  them.  It  was  not  accomplished 
when  Grant,  as  General,  was  backed  by  all  the  law  on 
the  point  now  in  force,  and  was  covered  with  military 
glory.  No  one  acquainted  with  the  war  times  need 
be  reminded  of  the  actual  command  of  the  Army  exer- 
cised by  President  Lincoln  through  his  Secretary  of 
War,  Mr.  Stanton,  during  the  Rebellion.  Nor,  when 
Grant  had  stepped  from  the  head  of  the  army-list  into 
the  White  House  did  he  permit  his  successor  as  Gen- 
eral, to  come  between  him  and  his  Secretary  of  War. 
To  abolish  the  Secretary  of  War  would  unquestionably 
be  very  difficult,  but  the  task  of  establishing  between 
him  and  the  President  a  General  with  independent  and 
conclusive  powers  for  any  military  purpose,  either  ad- 
ministrative or  executive,  is  more  than  difficult — it  is 
hopeless. 

Colonel  Wherry's  letter  contains  a  few  things  which 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  133 

it  is  proper  for  me  to  notice  in  the  way  of  correction 
and  u  cleaning  up,"  although  they  are  immaterial  to 
the  question  under  consideration.  He  says,  if  I  under- 
stand him,  that  a  letter  from  General  Schofield,  which 
he  quoted,  is  regarded  by  me  as  "  presumptuous."  So 
far  as  I  know,  the  assertion  is  wholly  groundless.  I 
regard  and  have  treated  General  Schofield  as  one  of 
the  highest  military  authorities. 

Again,  in  my  letter  which  appeared  in  the  Field 
Glass  of  August,  I  am,  through  a  misprint,  made  to 
say  "  one  "  President — making  the  expression  special, 
instead  of  "  our  "  President — making  it  general.  I  had 
no  opportunity  to  correct  the  proof,  and  did  not  see  the 
letter  in  print  until  the  paper,  regularly  issued,  reached 
nie  in  Montreal  about  the  4th  of  August.  Then  I 
detected  and  corrected  the  error.*  To  the  reader  who 
examines  carefully  enough  to  become  a  reviewer,  the 
context,  it  seems  to  me,  ought  to  have  disclosed  the 
fact  that  the  printer  was  at  fault.  But  I  did  not  leave 
Colonel  Wherry  to  make  the  discovery.  I  sent  to  him 
by  letter-mail  a  corrected  copy  as  early  as  the  5th  of 
August.  Notwithstanding  all  of  this,  he,  in  the  Sep- 
tember number  of  your  paper,  makes  the  erroneous 
reading  the  basis  of  sharp  comment  as  if  it  had  been 
correct,  and  then  adds  a  foot-note  confessing  that-he 
received  from  me  a  correction  of  the  misprint.  His 
excuse  for  retaining  his  comments  seems  to  be  that  his 
article  was  written  before  he  received  notice  of  the 
error.  He  revised  the  printer's  proof  of  his  article,  and 
that,  too,  after  he  received  the  correction.  There  was 

*  The  error  here  mentioned  was  a  misprint,  and  there  is  conclusive 
evidence  that  General  Fry  corrected  it  as  stated.— [Ed.  Field  Glass. 


134  MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 

unnecessary  labor,  due  perhaps  to  an  author's  excus- 
able love  of  offspring,  in  retaining  and  trying  to 
explain  sharp  comments  founded  upon  error,  instead 
of  preventing  their  appearance  by  simply  striking 
them  out. 

Finally,  Colonel  Wherry  says  that  when  he  wrote 
his  article  on  "  The  Command  of  the  Army,"  which 
appeared  in  your  number  for  July,  he  purposely 
omitted  "  General  Fry's  or  any  oilier  person's  name,  to 
avoid  personal  controversy,  and  the  asperity  which 
usually  belongs  to  such  personal  mention."  I  do  not 
perceive  the  necessity  for  this  statement,  but  finding  it, 
I  may  remind  the  Colonel  that,  in  the  article  to  which 
he  refers,  he  quoted  from  two  officers — General  Scho- 
field  and  myself — and  that  he  cited  General  Schofield 
by  name.  I  hope  no  "  personal  controversy  "  will  arise 
between  them  on  this  account.  Colonel  Wherry's 
omission  applied  to  me.  I  appreciate  his  motives  as 
he  explains  them,  but  it  is  a  new  notion  that,  in  mak- 
ing quotations,  a  writer  may,  to  avoid  personal  contro- 
versy, neglect  to  credit  the  author  from  whom  he 
quotes — especially  if,  as  in  this  instance,  he  quotes 
from  the  published  writings  of  two  persons,  one  of 
whose  names  is  given.  Colonel  Wherry  overestimates 
my  sensitiveness.  In  quoting  me  he  can  mention  my 
name  with  entire  safety.  As  he  has  introduced  the 
subject,  I  may  suggest  that,  as  a  rule,  in  making  quo- 
tations, personal  controversy  is  more  likely  to  be 
avoided  by  giving  authorities  than  by  omitting 
them. 

With  respect  and  kind  feelings  for  those  who  differ 
from  me — especially  for  General  Schofield  and  Colonel 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  135 

Wherry — I   quit  this   subject,  leaving  the  Colonel  a 
lady's  privilege — the  last  word. 

THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY. CONTINUED.* 

General  Fry,  in  his  last  article  (of  September  9,  in 
your  October  number),  graciously  gives  me  the  last 
word.  I  am  not  disposed  to  comment  on  the  tone  of 
his  article,  much  less  to  retort  in  kind. 

It  is  sufficient  that  he  now  states  the  case  so  as  to 
leave  no  ground  for  discussion.  Certainly,  it  cannot 
be  contended  that  the  President  may  lawfully  be  de- 
prived of  the  actual  command  of  the  Army ;  or  that 
the  office  of  the  Secretary  of  War  may  be,  or  ought  to 
be,  abolished  ("  wiped  out  ")  ;  or  a  General-in-Chief 
interposed  between  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
War.  If  this  is  the  proposition  with  which  General 
Fry  started,  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  why  he  thought 
it  necessary  to  prove  it. 

A  very  different  proposition,  viz.:  that  a  Command- 
ing General,  General-in-Chief,  or  Chief  of  Staff  under 
both  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  sub- 
ject to  their  direction,  might  be  placed  over  the  entire 
Army,  line  and  staff,  has  been  maintained  on  the  one 
hand  and  denied  on  the  other.  But,  it  now  seems, 
General  Fry  takes  no  part  in  this  contention.  Hence, 
I  cheerfully  end  the  discussion,  with  assurances '  of 
respect  and  kind  feelings  for  General  Fry,  and  regrets 
that  I  failed  to  see  at  the  start  that  his  labored  argu- 
ment was  designed  only  to  prove  the  simple  and  self- 
evident  propositions  with  which  he  closes  the  discus- 
sion. 

*  Colonel  Wherry  (West  Point,  N.  Y.,  October  2),  in  Field  Glass  for 
November,  1879. 


136  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

THE    COMMAND    OF    THE    ARMY. CONTINUED.* 

Your  letter  of  the  2d  inst.  reached  me  some  days 
ago.  You  adhere  positively,  yet  kindly  I  am  sure,  to 
your  assertion  that  the  "  fact  of  history  is  diametrically 
the  reverse  "  of  a  certain  statement  in  my  pamphlet 
on  the  command  of  the  Army.  But  you  tell  me  to 
"strike  out  the  word  diametrically"  if  I  wish.  In 
my  understanding  of  language,  the  reverse  of  a  fact  is 
the  same  as  diametrically  the  reverse  of  it.  I  do  not 
avail  myself  of  your  concession  for  the  reason  that  it 
does  not  change  the  meaning  of  your  remark  nor  re- 
duce the  force  of  your  contradiction.  The  statement 
in  my  pamphlet  is,  "  the  fact  may  be  recalled  that 
President  Washington  in  1794  took  the  field  in  actual 
command  of  the  militia  of  Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey 
and  Virginia ;  and  when  he  relinquished  immediate 
command,  he  turned  it  over  to  the  Governor  of  the 
last-named  State."  In  your  letter  of  October  26, 
you  say  of  this,  1st,  "It  is  pivotal  to  the  question  " 
discussed  in  my  pamphlet,  and,  2d,  that  it  is  "a  serious 
error  of  history — that  it  is  diametrically  the  reverse  " 
of  the  "fact  of  history."  I  do  not  regard  the  incident 
as  "pivotal"  or  very  important  to  the  question.  It 
was  mentioned,  as  shown  by  the  terms  used,  merely 
as  an  example  which  had  arisen  by  chance  under  a 
rule  which,  I  thought,  firmly  established  by  the  argu- 
ment of  the  pamphlet.  As  I  look  at  it,  the  force  of 
the  argument  would  not  be  impaired  much,  if  at  all, 
by  striking  out  the  occurrence.  But  unimportant  as 
the  statement  appears  to  me  in  its  connection  in  the 

*  Letter  from  General  Fry  (New  York,  November  23,  1882),  to  Gen- 
eral H.  C.  Wayne,  published  in  Journal  Military  Service  Institution. 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARM Y.  137 

pamphlet,  your  flat  and  elaborate  contradiction,  de- 
mands my  reasons  for  making  it.  You  say,  "  now  the 
fact  of  history  is  diametrically  the  reverse  of  this  state- 
ment. President  Washington  did  not  command  in 
person  the  militia  above  mentioned  on  the  occasion 
referred  to,  nor  any  other  militia,  nor  any  other  troops 
at  any  time  during  the  two  terms  of  his  presidency ;" 
and  you  add  in  relation  to  the  militia  force  called  into 
the  Service  of  the  United  States  to  suppress  the 
whiskey  insurrection,  "  Governor  Lee  of  Virginia  was 
appointed  to  the  command  of  this  force."  In  both  of 
your  letters  (October  26  and  November  2)  you 
insist  that  the  reader  shall  "  interpret  technical  lan- 
guage according  to  its  meaning  and  application  as  de- 
termined by  our  Constitution,  military  law  and  Army 
Kegulations  ";  and  add  that  "to  inspect  troops  in  no 
manner  implies  command  of  them  in  person  or  ac- 
tively." You  speak  as  if  the  Constitution,  military 
laws  and  Army  Regulations  laid  down  or  "deter- 
mined "  an  exact  method  for  interpreting  technical 
language.  If  that  were  so  we  should  not  be  engaged 
in  discussion.  But  there  is  no  accepted  glossary  to 
the  instrument  you  name.  In  the  case  we  have  in  hand 
you  say  Washington  did  not  command  "  in  person." 
To  be  exact  in  technical  terms,  I  may  remind  you  that 
my  pamphlet  does  not  say  he  commanded  in  person. 
It  says  he  took  the  field  in  "  actual  command,"  and 
speaks  of  his  "  immediate  command,"  We  may  be 
differing  a  little  about  the  technical  meaning  of 
"  actual,"  "  immediate  "  and  personal  command,  but  I 
think  by  explanation  we  may  understand  each  other. 
As  to  the  facts  of  history  in  the  case  in  point,  I  ob- 


138  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

serve  that  you  cite  no  authority  but  Sparks.  You 
admit  that  President  Washington  went  in  person  to 
the  army  but  you  hold  that  his  only  purpose  was  u  to 
inspect."  In  relation  to  his  exercise  of  command  you 
say,  "  Sparks  settles  that  question  by  telling  us  that 
Washington  had  the  intention  at  one  time  of  taking 
personal  command  of  the  militia  if  necessary,  but  that 
he  did  not  do  so,  but  after  inspecting  them  returned  to 
Philadelphia  to  be  present  at  the  meeting  of  Con- 
gress." Here,  on  November  2,  you  accept  Sparks 
as  settling  the  question,  but  in  your  letter  of  October 
26,  being  at  that  time  unwilling  to  admit  that  Wash- 
ington ever  had  even  the  intention  of  taking  command, 
you  discredit  this  same  authority  by  saying,  "  but  Mr. 
Sparks  gives  no  authority  in  confirmation  of  his  inten- 
tion, and  as  it  is  well  known,  a  mere  statement  of 
intention  unsupported  by  corroborative  testimony  has 
no  positive  weight."  I  may  remark  here  that  for  the 
purpose  of  the  argument  in  my  pamphlet,  Washing- 
ton's intention  to  take  command  is  quite  sufficient 
even  if  he  did  not  carry  out  the  intention.  Mr.  Sparks 
could  have  been  discredited  to  more  advantage  on  some 
of  his  other  statements  concerning  the  whiskey  insur- 
rection, than  upon  what  he  says  of  Washington's  in 
tention  to  take  command.  For  example,  he  says  that 
the  "  Secretary  of  War  "  accompanied  the  President  to 
the  place  of  rendezvous  and  that  the  "  Secretary  of 
War  went  on  with  the  army  to  Pittsburgh  These  are 
mistakes.  The  Secretary  of  War,  Knox,  did  not  ac- 
company the  President,  did  not  go  to  the  places  of 
rendezvous  at  all,  nor  did  he  go  on  with  the  army  to 
Pittsburg.  Sparks1  failure  to  state  in  the  text  of  his 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  139 

Life  of  Washington  that  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
Hamilton,  accompanied  the  President  to  the  rendezvous 
and  went  on  with  the  army  is  a  grave  omission,  especial- 
ly in  view  of  the  active  part  taken  by  Hamilton  in  ike 
military 'as  well  as  in  the  civil  business  of  the  expedition. 

To  return  to  the  main  point.  You,  adopting  Sparks, 
say,  as  I  understand  you,  Washington  went  merely 
"  to  inspect "  troops  which  were  already  organized  and 
under  the  command  of  Governor  Lee  of  Virginia.  I 
think  you  are  wrong.  Washington  himself  says  in 
his  message  to  Congress,  November  20  :  "I  ordered 
the  militia  to  march,  after  once  more  admonishing  the 
insurgents."  "  If  the  state  of  things  had  afforded 
reasons  for  the  continuance  of  my  presence  with  the 
army  it  would  not  have  been  withheld."  "  But  every 
appearance  assuring  such  an  issue  as  will  redound  to 
the  reputation  and  strength  of  the  United  States,  I 
have  judged  it  most  proper  to  resume  my  duties  at  the 
seat  of  Government,  leaving  the  chief  command  with 
the  Governor  of  Virginia." 

On  the  8th  of  October  (1794),  Washington  wrote 
from  Carlisle  to  General  Daniel  Morgan  saying,  "  im- 
perious circumstances  alone  can  justify  my  absence 
from  the  seat  of  Government  while  Congress  is  in  ses- 
sion, but  if  these,  from  the  disposition  of  the  people  in 
the  refractory  counties,  and  the  state  of  the  informa- 
tion I  expect  to  receive  at  the  advanced  posts,  should 
appear  to  exist,  the  less  must  yield  to  the  greater  duties 
of  my  office,  and  I  shall  cross  the  mountains  with  the 
troops  ;  if  not,  I  shall  place  the  combined  force  under 
the  orders  of  Governor  Lee  of  Virginia  and  repair  to 
the  seat  of  Government." 


140  MILITABY  MISCELLANIES. 

On  the  9th  of  October,  being  still  at  Carlisle,  he 
wrote  to  Knox,  Secretary  of  War,  at  Philadelphia, 
"  it  would  have  given  rne  pleasure  to  have  you  with 
with  nie,"  but  "  it  is  now  too  late  as  we  shall  be  in  the 
act  of  crossing  the  mountains,  or  I  shall  be  on  my 
return  to  Philadelphia,  according  to  circumstances  and 
the  information  T  shall  receive  at  the  head  of  the  line, 
before  you  could  arrive."  "  To-morrow,  if  I  can  get 
the  troops  in  motion  at  this  place,  I  shall  set  out  for 
Williamsport,  thence  to  Bedford,  where  about  the 
18th  or  20th,  my  ultimate  measures  will  be  determined 


on." 


On  the  16th  of  October,  he  wrote  from  Cumber- 
land, to  Randolph,  Secretary  of  State,  "I  do  not  ex- 
pect to  be  here  more  than  two  days,  thence  to  Bedford, 
whence,  as  soon  as  matters  are  arranged  and  a  plan 
settled,  I  shall  shape  my  course  for  Philadelphia,  but 
not  because  the  impertinence  of  Mr.  Bache  or  his  cor- 
respondent has  undertaken  to  pronounce  that  I  cannot 
constitutionally  command  the  Army  'while  Congress  is 


in  session" 


On  the  20th  of  October,  Washington  having  arrived 
at  Bedford,  decided  on  the  u  ultimate  measures  "  men- 
tioned in  his  letter  of  the  8th  to  Morgan.  He  directed 
Hamilton  to  address  a  formal  and  lengthy  letter  of 
instructions  to  Governor  Lee  which  opens  by  saying : 
"  I  have  it  in  special  instruction  from  the  President  of 
the  United  States  now  at  this  place,  to  convey  to  you 
on  his  behalf  the  following  instructions  for  the  general 
direction  of  your  conduct  in  the  command  of  the 
militia  army  with  which  you  are  charged."  It  is 
in  this  letter  that  the  rank  of  the  Governors  is  an- 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  141 

nounced  ;  Hamilton  saying,  "  it  has  been  settled  that 
the  Governor  of  Pennsylvania  will  be  second,  the 
Governor  of  New  Jersey  third  in  command."  On  the 
same  day,  October  26,  Washington  addressed  a  let- 
ter to  Governor  Lee  in  which  he  says,  "  could  my  fur- 
ther presence  with  them "  (the  troops)  "  have  been 
necessary  or  compatible  with  my  civil  duties,  at  a 
period  when  an  approaching  session  of  Congress  par- 
ticularly calls  me  to  return  to  the  seat  of  Government, 
it  would  not  have  been  withheld.  In  leaving  them, 
I  have  less  to  regret  as  I  know  I  commit  them  to  able 
and  faithful  direction." 

The  foregoing  extracts  afford  conclusive  proof,  as  it 
seems  to  me,  that  wheu  President  Washington,  in 
September,  1794,  left  the  seat  of  Government  for  Car- 
lisle, Williamsport  and  Bedford,  it  was  not  merely  "  to 
inspect "  a  militia  force  which  was,  as  you  claim,  at  that 
time  organized  and  commanded  by  Governor  Lee  of 
Virginia.  If  a  doubt  could  remain  on  this  point  it 
probably  would  be  removed  by  what  Washington 
himself  says  of  his  purpose.  In  the  message  sent  to 
Congress  after  his  return  he  says  he  "  visited  the  places 
of  general  rendezvous  to  obtain  more  exact  informa- 
tion, and  to  direct  a  plan  for  ulterior  movements." 
What  was  embraced  in  directing  a  plan  ?  What  in 
fact  did  he  do  ?  I  have  said  in  substance  that  he  went 
in  his  capacity  of  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  militia 
he  had  called  into  the  Service  of  the  United  States,  and 
that  he  exercised  the  actual  command  of  that  militia 
until  he  turned  it  over  to  Governor  Lee  of  Virginia. 
In  support  of  this  I  cite  the  foregoing  extracts  and 
will  add  a  few  comments.  If  he  was  not  exercising 


142 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


command  there  would  be  no  meaning  in  the  indigna- 
tion with  which  he  spurns  Mr.  Bache's  assertion  that  he 
could  not  constitutionally  command  the  Army  while 
Congress  was  in  session,  and  in  his  giving  reasons  for 
his  return  to  the  seat  of  Government,  which  were— 
not  that  he  was  not  commanding — but,  that  matters 
were  arranged  and  a  plan  directed  so  that  it  was  un- 
necessary for  him  to  remain  with  the  army.  In  fact, 
Mr.  Bache's  question  about  Washington's  right  to 
command  could  hardly  have  arisen  if  the  right  had  not 
been  exercised. 

In  his  message  to  Congress,  Nov.  20,  Washington 
says,  "  f  ordered  the  militia  to  march,"  "./put  in  mo- 
tion 15,000  men;"  and  he  distinctly  states  that  it  was 
"  as  Commander-in-  Chief  of  the  militia  when  called 
into  the  Service  of  the  United  States,"  that  he  pro- 
ceeded to  join  the  troops.  The  Constitution  appoints 
the  President  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army  and 
Navy  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  militia  when 
called  into  the  Service  of  the  United  States.  He  is- 
always  on  duty  in  that  capacity.  No  assignment  or 
formal  announcement  is  necessary  to  the  exercise  by 
him  of  any  command  he  may  deem  proper. 

As  soon  as  he  arrived  at  Carlisle,  he  went  directly 
and  actively  to  work  to  improve  the  discipline  of  the 
troops  there.  They  were  disorderly,  and  it  was  feared 
they  would  burn  the  town.  "  To  what  heights  these 
heats  might  have  gone  if  the  President  had  not  arrived 
so  seasonably  it  is  impossible  to  tell."  "  Though  there 
were  officers  possessed  of  virtue  and  experience  before 
he  arrived,  yet  their  authority  was  not  sufficient  to 
preserve  order,"  etc.  "  After  a  short  conversation  he 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  143 

informed  us  he  was  just  going  out  about  some  business 
relating  to  the  army,  and  that  after  breakfast  he  was 
going  to  see  a  division  of  the  army  march,  but  would 
converse  with  us  at  10  o'clock  that  morning."  Thus  he 
was  attending  in  person  to  army  business  both  before 
and  after  breakfast.  "  He  assured  us  that  he  would 
provide  by  dispersing  the  disorderly  corps  among  bet- 
ter troops,  or  otherwise,  that  they  should  be  kept  in 
strict  subordination."  "Having  rode  out  a  few  miles 
to  see  some  relations,  the  President  was  gone  out  to 
the  army  before  we  returned."  "General  Smith,  who 
commanded  the  Maryland  brigade,  complied  strictly 
with  the  President's  orders  in  discharging  such  of  the 
men  as  were  disorderly."  "  The  President  was  hap- 
pily successful  in  reducing  the  licentious  part  of  the 
army  to  subordination,"  *  etc.,  etc.  This  certainly  in- 
dicates the  exercise  of  "  actual  "  and  "  immediate  " 
command.  The  President  confirms  it  by  his  letter  of 
October  9,  already  cited,  in  which  he  says,  "  If  /can 
get  the  troops  in  motion  at  this  place,  I  shall  set  out 
for  Williamsport,  thence  to  Bedford."  That  he  was  at 
this  time  actually  executing  the  duties  of  his  military 
office  is  further  shown  by  his  letter  of  October  8  to 
Morgan,  his  letter  of  October  20  to  Lee,  and  his 
message  of  November  20  to  Congress.  In  the"  first 
he  says,  "if  imperious  circumstances  require  it,  the 
less  must  yield  to  the  greater  duties  of  my  office,  and 
I  shall  march  across  the  mountains  with  the  troops." 
In  the  second  he  distinctly  contrasts  the  military  du- 
ties he  was  then  performing  with  the  "  civil  duties  " 
he  proposed  to  resume  by  returning  to  the  seat  of  Gov- 

*  Findley's  History  of  the  Whiskey  Insurrection. 


144  MILITAEY  MISCELLANIES. 

ernment.  In  the  third,  after  giving  reasons  for  his 
return  from  the  army,  he  says  :  "  I  have  judged  it 
most  proper  to  resume  my  duties  at  the  seat  of  Govern- 
ment, leaving  the  chief  command  with  the  Governor  of 
Virginia."  Clearly  from  this,  he  had  for  a  time  laid 
aside  his  civil  duties  at  the  seat  of  Government,  for  the 
purpose  of  attending  in  person  to  military  duties  at  the 
seat  of  war.  And  furthermore  it  appears  plain  enough 
from  this  that  the  Governor  of  Virginia  did  not  have 
the  chief  command  of  the  militia  army  until  the  Presi- 
dent left  it  to  him  by  quitting  the  field.  It  is  true  that 
Washington  is  reported  to  have  said  at  Carlisle  that  he 
did  not  "command  the  army  in  person,  but  had  ap- 
pointed Governor  Lee  Commander-in-Chief."  The  date 
on  which  he  appointed  Lee  to  command  in  person,  or 
left  him  in  chief  command,  is  not  material  in  this  dis- 
cussion. It  would  seem  however  that  he  had  not  ap- 
pointed Lee  as  late  as  October  8,  for  he  said  in  his 
letter  of  that  date  to  Morgan,  if  not  required  to  cross 
the  mountains,  "  I  shall "  —(that  is  at  some  future  time) 
— "  place  the  combined  force  under  the  orders  of  Gov- 
ernor Lee  of  Virginia."  It  seems  clear  that  up  to  that 
date  the  President  was  exercising  the  command  him- 
self. 

The  Governors  bore  the  same  relation  to  their  respec- 
tive forces  that  the  President  bore  to  the  whole  force. 
He  and  they  exercised  command  on  exactly  the  same 
principles.  For  the  purpose  of  actual  military  com- 
mand he  fixed  their  relative  military  rank  as  already 
shown.  In  our  discussion,  the  historical  fact  of  the 
President's  part  in  the  whiskey  insurrection  is  impor- 
tant only  as  bearing  on  the  principle  of  command 


THE  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY.  145 

which  controls  alike  the  President  and  the  Governors. 
Admitting,  that  at  some  date  not  known,  the  Presi- 
dent appointed  Lee  to  command  in  person,  it  would 
still  be  true  that  up  to  the  date  of  his  departure,  the 
President  actually  exercised  the  chief  command  him- 
self. In  his  letter  of  October  20  to  Lee  he  says  of 
the  troops :  "  In  leaving  them  I  have  less  to  regret  as 
I  know  I  commit  them  to  able  and  faithful  direction." 
You  will  observe  the  force  of  the  present  tense  of  the 
verb  commit.  It  seems  to  me  that  it  was  then  and 
there  that  the  immediate  command  was  relinquished 
by  the  President  and  turned  over  to  the  Governor  of 
Virginia,  just  as  stated  in  my  pamphlet,  and  that  you 
are  in  error  in  characterizing  my  statement  as  "  dia- 
metrically the  reverse  of  the  fact  of  history." 

Allow  me  also  to  say,  in  all  kindness,  that  the 
"  brief  history  "  of  the  whiskey  insurrection,  given  in 
your  letter  of  October  26,  is  defective  in  making  no 
allusion  to  the  documents  I  have  cited  ;  for  without 
considering  them,  Washington's  part,  especially  in  the 
military  operations,  cannot  be  fully  understood. 

A  few  words  as  to  a  general  proposition  in  your 
letter  and  I  shall  close. 

You  say  "it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  Chief 
Magistrate  of  the  nation  shall  be  qualified  to  command 
in  person,  an  army  in  the  field,  or  direct  the  ma- 
noeuvres of  a  naval  squadron.  Nor  is  it  to  be  sup- 
posed that  he  could  abstract  himself  from  his  other 
duties,  civil  and  military,  to  command  in  person  on 
land  or  sea,  were  he  competent  to  do  so.  Either  sup- 
position is  an  impossibility,  and  therefore  both  are  in- 
admissible." 


146  MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 

On  the  basis  of  these  assumptions,  after  we  have 
had  more  than  a  hundred  years  of  experience,  you 
would  transplant  from  the  British  military  system  to 
ours,  certain  features  and  titles  which  the  founders  of 
our  Government  understood  and  rejected.  That  Wash- 
ington did  not  entertain  the  views  you  express  con- 
cerning the  military  functions  of  the  President,  is 
proved  by  the  foregoing  extracts. 

It  seems  to  me  there  is  no  more  unstable  founda- 
tion for  a  military  system  than  the  assumption  that 
the  actual  head  of  it  is  incompetent,  and  if  com- 
petent would  necessarily  be  unable  to  perform 
his  duties ;  and  so  I  judge  the  framers  of  our  Con- 
stitution thought,  for  it  is  recorded,  that  "  objec- 
tions were  made  to  that  part  of  this  article  by  which 
the  President  is  appointed  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Army  and  Navy  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the 
militia  of  the  several  States ;  and  it  was  wished  to  be 
so  far  restrained  that  he  should  not  command  in  per- 
son, but  this  could  not  be  obtained"' 

Looking  from  my  point  of  view,  the  only  supposi- 
tion admissible  is,  that  the  President  is  qualified  for 
all  the  duties  imposed  upon  him  by  the  Constitution. 
The/act  is  the  Constitution  and  laws  afford  him  ample 
facilities  for  the  efficient  performance  of  them. 

*  Luther  Martin's  Letter  to  Maryland  House  of  Representatives.     El- 
liott's Debate  on  Federal  Constitution. 


ARTICLE   III. 

Justice  in  the  Army.* 

Justice  is  absolutely  essential  to  discipline  in  our 
Army.  Inasmuch  as  the  military  is  a  more  arbitrary 
and  despotic  system  than  the  civil,  so  is  even-handed 
justice  the  more  necessary  in  it.  Mercy  (which  is  one 
form  of  favoritism)  should  not  be  confounded  with 
kindness.  It  implies  wrong  known  both  to  the  offender 
and  the  judge.  Justice  and  mercy  are  totally  incom- 
patible. There  can  be  no  such  compound  as  justice 
seasoned  with  mercy.  The  least  particle  of  the  latter 
destroys  the  former.  In  the  Army,  if  not  elsewhere, 
it  is  justice,  not  mercy,  that  "  is  twice  blessed  " ;  it 
"  blesses  him  that  gives,  and  him  that  receives  " ;  and 
as  justice  conveys  double  blessings,  so  does  mercy 
bring  double  evils.  The  records  of  our  Army  sustain 
the  assertion  that  remissions  and  mitigations  of  de- 
served penalties  smooth  the  way  to  repetitions  of 
offences  and  lead  offenders  deeper  and  deeper  into 
trouble. 

But  the  more  common  form  of  favoritism  in  Army 
management  does  not  come  under  the  head  of  mercy. 
Many  Army  scandals  if  not  attributable  to,  have  been 
promoted  by,  the  purer  form  of  this  evil.  It  is  a 
truism  that  some  men  cannot  stand  prosperity.  In 
the  Army  where  regularity  and  strict  routine  are  the 
rule,  sudden  elevation  is  dangerous,  especially  when 

*  Army  and  Navy  Journal,  September  22,  1883. 

147 


148  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

it  does  not  come  from  established  merit.  Take  for 
example  the  case  of  —  —.A  cadet,  he  was  pro- 
moted in  1871  to  the  grade  of  2d  Lieutenant.  After 
less  than  two  years'  service  in  that  grade  he  resigned ; 
and  without  distinction  in  the  Army  or  out  of  it  he 
was  in  1876  appointed  paymaster  with  the  rank,  pay, 
and  emoluments  of  Jfcyor,  while  his  classmates  who 
had  served  faithfully  during  the  time  he  was  out  of 
the  Army,  were  still  Lieutenants.  He  could  not  stand 
the  sudden  and  unearned  elevation.  To  him  the  pay 
and  emoluments  of  Major  seemed  so  large  compared 
with  those  of  his  former  and  proper  grade,  2d  Lieu- 
tenant, that  he  probably  thought  they  would  sustain 
any  indulgence,  even  a  big  game  of  draw-poker.  When 
his  pay  failed  he  resorted  to  the  public  purse  to  meet 
the  demands  of  habits  he  never  would  have  formed  if 
he  had  remained  a  Lieutenant  until  he  grew  gradually 
to  higher  grades.  This  is  no  apology  for  his  crimes. 
It  is  merely  one  of  the  causes  of  them. 

Colonel  —  -'s  case  is  also  in  point.  He,  a  young 
Major  of  cavalry,  received  by  a  mere  stroke  of  the 
pen  the  rank,  pay  and  emoluments  of  Colonel,  was 
transferred  from  the  active  service  and  wholesome  in- 
fluence of  his  regiment  to  Washington  City,  where  he 
had  little  or  nothing  to  do.  He,  too,  became  dizzy 
and  was  not  able  to  resist  the  temptations  of  his  new 
and  exalted  sphere. 

Colonel furnishes  another  example  of  influ- 
ence, or  favoritism.  He  had  shown  ability  and  gal- 
lantry as  a  soldier,  and  had  military  recommendations 
for  promotion  to  the  grade  of  Major  in  the  Adjutant- 
Department.  But  the  contest  between  him 


JUSTICE  IN  THE  AEMY.  149 

and  other  officers  for  that  position  was  decided  in  his 
favor  by  political  influence.  The  lesson  he  learned 
from  concentrating  and  applying  that  influence  to 
secure  his  promotion,  he  subsequently  turned  to  such 
account  that  the  military  powers  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment were  not  able  even  to  change  his  station.  He 
would  not  leave  Washington,  the  source  of  favors. 
There,  as  he  is  said  to  have  expressed  it  in  a  gambler's 
figure  of  speech,  he  had  a  seat  near  the  dealer,  and 
that  was  an  advantage  in  the  game  which  he  was  not 
going  to  surrender.  Nor  did  he  surrender  it.  He 
held  Washington  as  his  station  from  the  time  he  en- 
tered the  Adjutant-General's  Department  by  promo- 
tion until  he  left  it  by  voluntary  retirement ;  and  that 
was  still  his  residence  when  he  appeared  in  the  scan- 
dals which  bear  his  name. 

The  cure  for  these  ills  is  not  in  the  hands  of  the 
Army.  But  united  action  on  the  part  of  officers  may 
promote  remedial  measures.  There  is  nothing  in 
which  the  Army  is  more  deeply  concerned  than  in  the 
laws  and  regulations  governing  appointments  and 
promotions  and  their  enforcement.  While  appoint- 
ments to  so-called  original  vacancies  are  by  unre- 
strained selection,  the  law  provides  that  selections  for 
appointment  to  the  lowest  grades  in  several  of  the 
staff  departments  shall  be  made  from  the  Army.  The 
rule  of  promotion  is  that  seniority  shall  govern,  but 
there  are  exceptions  to  the  rule,  and  under  these  selec- 
tion has  precedence.  There  is  a  growing  tendency  to 
restrict  the  operation  of  the  rule  and  increase  the  ex- 
ceptions. This  works  badly  for  the  Army.  Certainly 
it  is  objectionable  in  a  military  system  to  have  medi- 


150  MILITAEY  MISCELLANIES. 

ocrity,  especially  as  it  grows  old,  sit  witli  all  the 
weight  of  the  law  ou  active  and  aspiring  energy  and 
ability.  Promotion  based  on  merit  might  be  of  ad- 
vantage to  the  Army,  provided  relative  merit  could 
be  accurately  determined  and  promotion  made  to  con- 
form rigidly  and  impartially  to  it.  But  that  is  impos- 
sible in  our  Service,  though  in  times  of  great  and  im- 
mediate danger  appointments  and  promotions  may  to 
a  limited  extent  be  made  safely  by  selection.  With 
us,  speaking  broadly,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  promo- 
tion by  merit.  All  promotion  that  is  not  by  seniority 
is  now,  and  will  continue  to  be,  by  favoritism.  The 
Army's  views  upon  these  systems,  if  clearly  expressed, 
would  no  doubt  have  some  weight.  It  is  not  easy  to 
secure  the  attention  to  this  subject  which  it  deserves. 
Comparatively  few  of  our  people  are  willing  to  con- 
cern themselves  during  the  long  years  of  peace  with 
preparations  for  war.  Only  part  of  those  who  admit 
the  necessity  for  activity  in  that  direction  are  able  to 
live  up  to  their  convictions.  The  belief  that  if  war 
should  come,  we  shall  be  able  through  the  intelligence, 
patriotism  and  pluck  of  the  people  to  provide  for  it 
after  it  gets  in  sight,  is  widespread  and  sincere. 
While  the  Army  is  respected  for  its  character  and  the 
services  it  has  rendered,  people  impressed  by  the  fact 
that  it  is  not  necessary  to  our  present  welfare,  do  not 
realize  that  its  preservation  in  the  highest  state  of  pro- 
ficiency and  efficiency  is  necessary  as  an  assurance  of 
safety  in  the  future. 

On  the  easy  and  agreeable  assumption  that  we  shall 
have  no  more  wars,  Army  offices  come  to  be  regarded 
as  well  paid  positions,  in  which  there  is  nothing  of 


JUSTICE  IN  THE  ARMY.  151 

importance  to  do,  and  which  one  man  can  fill  as  well 
as  another.  Viewed  in  this  way  it  is  quite  natural 
that  Army  offices  in  time  of  peace  should  be  used  to 
the  fullest  extent  of  the  law,  to  reward  services,  po- 
litical or  personal,  rendered  by  a  candidate  or  his 
backers. 

The  only  protection  against  this  eril  seems  to  be  in 
positive  laws  requiring  promotion  (in  time  of  peace  at 
least),  to  be  by  seniority,  even  to  the  very  top.  Some 
points  concerning  corps  and  arms  of  service  would 
have  to  be  considered,  but  they  would  give  rise  to  no 
practical  difficulty.  Our  liberal  and  comprehensive 
system  of  retirement  would  prevent  serious  injury  to 
the  Service  from  the  occupation  of  high  places  by 
worn-out  or  broken-down  men.  It  would  be  better 
for  the  Army  to  have  majorities  in  the  Pay  Depart- 
ment filled  by  promoting  the  senior  Captains  in  the 
line,  and  vacancies  in  the  captaincies  of  the  Quarter- 
master's Department  and  Subsistence  Department 
filled  by  promoting  the  senior  first  Lieutenants  of  the 
line,  than  to  have  them  filled  as  at  present  by  so-called 
selection. 


AKTICLE  IV. 

Law  in  the  Army/ 

Division  and  Department  commanders  have  fre- 
quently— in  fact  generally,  of  late — retained  authority 
when  beyond  the  limits  of  their  commands.  This  has 
occurred  when  absence  was,  and  also  when  it  was  not, 
on  duty,  and  somewhat  regardless  of  the  distance  the 
commander  might  go  or  the  length  of  time  he  might 
stay.  There  is  no  doubt  that  such  proceedings  have 
led,  and  may  continue  to  lead,  to  serious  embarrass- 
ment, and  it  is  clearly  in  the  interest  of  the  public 
service  that  General  Gibbon  files  a  temperate  and  re- 
spectful objection  to  them.  But  he  appears  to  go  too 
far  in  charging  that  they  are  a  direct  violation  of  the 
122d  Article  of  War.  That  Article  says : 

"AnT.  122.  If,  upon  marches,  guards,  or  in  quarters, 
different  corps  of  the  Army  happen  to  join  or  do  duty 
together,  the  officer  highest  in  rank  of  the  line  of  the 
Army,  marine  corps,  or  militia,  by  commission,  there 
on  duty  or  in  quarters,  shall  command  the  whole,  and 
give  orders  for  what  is  needful  to  the  Service,  unless 
otherwise  specially  directed  by  the  President,  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  of  the  case." 

General  Gibbon  maintains  that  this  Article  pre- 
scribes the  rule  of  succession  in  command,  not  only  in 
all  the  organizations  of  the  Army  as  created  by  law, 
but  also  in  the  sub-divisions  of  the  country  made  by 

*  See  article  in  the  4th  number  of  the  Journal. 

152 


LAW  IN  THE  AEMY. 


153 


the  President  for  the  welfare  of  the  Service,  and  for 
his  convenience  as  Commander-in-Chief ;  and  he  takes 
the  extreme  ground  that  absence  instantaneously  dis- 
qualifies the  regularly  assigned  commander,  and  that, 
"  the  moment  he  absents  himself,  the  law  steps  in,  and 
says  "  (Art.  122)  "that  the  next  in  rank  'is  the  com- 
mander? r     This  broad  claim  does  not  appear  to  be 
sustained  by  the  Article  quoted.     It  cannot  fairly  be 
said  that  the  troops   posted   and   habitually  encom- 
passed within  the  limits  of  a  geographical  department 
"  happen  to  join  or  do  duty  together  "  in  the  meaning 
of  this  Article  ;  nor  can  the  temporary  absence  of  the 
designated  Department   commander  give  rise  to  the 
contingency  or  happening  which  it  is  clearly  the  pur- 
pose of  the  Article  to  provide  for.     In  fact  there  is  no 
statute  law  requiring  the  transfer  or  relinquishment  of 
command  on  account  of  the  temporary  absence  of  a 
Division  or  Department  commander.     The  attempt  to 
correct  what  threatened  to  be  an  abuse  is  weakened  by 
presenting  the  dangerous  practice  as  a  violation  of  any 
particular  Article  of  War.     The  Judge  Advocate  Gen- 
eral has  reached  substantially  the  same  conclusion  that 
General  Gibbon  arrives  at  on  the  main  question,  but 
he  does  so  by  a  process  of  reasoning,  not  by  alleging  a 
direct  violation  of  law.     He  says  "the  place— it  is 
submitted — of  the  action  taken  is  material  to  the  ques- 
tion of  a  proper  exercise  of  an  attribute  of  command." 
But  the  views  of  the  Judge  Advocate  General  on  this 
subject  have  been  examined  by  the  Attorney-General 
of  the  United  States  and  overruled.      The  opinion- 
with  which    General  Gibbon    was   probably  not  ac- 
quainted when  he  wrote — is  as  follows : 


154  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  JUSTICE, 

Washington,  August  28,  1880. 
THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

SIR  :  Yours  of  the  24th  instant,  asking  whether  a 
Department  commander,  assigned  by  the  President  to 
command^  can  exercise  the  functions  of  his  office  to 
appoint  general  courts-martial,  and  act  upon  the 
record  of  proceedings  of  the  same  when  he  is  outside 
the  territorial  limits  of  his  command,  has  been  duly 
considered,  in  connection  with  Orders  No.  26,  Wash- 
ington, May  18,  1878,  in  the  case  of  General  Kautz, 
and  Orders  No.  9,  Vancouver  Barracks,  Washington 
Territory,  May  14,  1880,  transmitted  by  you  in  the 
same  connection ;  and  herewith  I  submit  a  reply. 

The  division  and  subdivision  of  the  territory  of  the 
United  States  into  military  divisions  and  departments 
is  a  matter  of  discretion  for  the  President,  and  scarcely 
anything,  and  that  indirect  and  for  the  present  purpose 
uninstructive,  is  to  be  found  upon  the  subject  in  the 
statutes.  Orders  making  such  geographical  divisions, 
and  assigning  officers  to  their  commands,  are  also  very 
brief,  and  throw  no  special  light  upon  the  present 
question. 

In  the  absence  of  special  orders  or  legislation  to  that 
effect,  I  am  of  opinion  that  personal  presence  within 
the  territorial  limits  of  his  Department  is  not  essential 
to  the  validity  of  commands  given  by  a  Department 
commander  to  be  executed  within  such  limits — such, 
for  instance,  as  the  appointment  of  a  court-martial. 

The  question  which  you  put,  is  general,  as  regards 
the  absence  in  question,  so  that  my  answer  is  neces- 
sarily general  also.  Whether  there  may  be  exceptions 


IAW  IN  THE  ARMY.  155 

to  it  growing  out  of  special  circumstances  attending  ab- 
sence, can  be  best  determined  when  those  circumstances 
arise.  But  I  see  no  reason  why  mere  absence  should 
have  the  effect  of  invalidating  such  commands. 

The  distribution  of  military  command  into  geograph- 
ical departments,  is,  as  I  suppose,  mainly  for  the  pur- 
pose of  preventing  collision  and  confusion,  and  so  of 
securing  individual  responsibility  in  the  execution  of 
commands  by  officers  otherwise  of  like  authority. 
Practically,  such  collision  is  to  be  apprehended  rather 
in  execution  than  in  exercise.  It  seems,  therefore,  that 
the  place  of  the  action  taken  is  material  to  the  question 
of  the  proper  execution  of  command  rather  than  to  that 
of  its  proper  exercise.  In  the  analogous  cases  of  civil 
authority,  the  incident  of  geographical  limits  for  its 
execution  has  not,  in  the  absence  of  special  features, 
been  considered  to  require,  ex.  gr.,  judicial  orders  to  be 
issued  by  a  judge  only  whilst  within  such  limits.  In 
order  to  render  this  necessary,  something  else  must 
concur  to  indicate  the  will  of  the  constituting  au- 
thority. The  ground  of  this  opinion  is  that  there  is 
present  here  nothing  else  to  indicate  the  will  of  the 
President  or  other  proper  superior  authority,  that  the 
functions  of  commanding  officers  should  be  so  limited. 
In  the  meantime,  the  arguments  in  its  favor  are  such 
as  are  for  consideration  only  by  the  power  having  leg- 
islative or  quasi  legislative  control  of  the  question  (i.  <?., 
by  statute  or  by  order). 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

S.  F.  PHILIPS,  Solicitor- General. 

Approved.          CHAS.  DEVENS,  Attorney -General 


156  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

This  leaves  nothing  more  to  be  said  at  present  on 
the  law  of  the  subject.  As  the  legal  authority  of  a 
Department  commander  is  not  necessarily  impaired 
by  his  temporary  absence,  of  course  he  may  exercise 
that  authority  through  his  Adjutant-General  as  usual ; 
and  General  Gibbon's  argument  that  by  doing  so  the 
law  is  violated  and  a  junior  (the  Adjutant-General) 
is  put  in  command  of  a  senior,  falls.  But  this  does 
not  fully  dispose  of  the  practical  questions  involved. 
The  Attorney- General  admits  that  there  may  be  ex- 
ceptions "growing  out  of  special  circumstances  attend- 
ing absence."  It  is  in  relation  to  these  that  lines 
should  be  drawn.  It  would  not  do  to  have  an  officer 
in  a  department  or  division  assume  that  he  was  next 
in  rank,  and  then  assume  command  every  time  he 
heard  the  regularly  assigned  commander  was  across 
the  boundary.  That  would  be  replacing  one  bad 
practice  by  another  involving  more  mischievous  con- 
sequences. Nor  can  it  be  admitted  that  the  responsi- 
bility devolves  on  the  next  in  rank  merely  because 
the  commander  on  whom  the  President  has  placed 
that  responsibility  steps  over  the  line.  Such  a  shift- 
ing of  authority  and  responsibility  would  be  a  wrong 
not  only  to  the  Service  but  to  the  officer  next  in  rank. 
That  officer  could  not  fairly  be  held  accountable  for 
military  operations  far  beyond  his  observation  and 
about  which  he  might  have  no  information,  and  for 
administrative  affairs  which  he  would,  in  most  cases, 
be  without  the  facilities  for  managing.  This  becomes 
the  more  apparent  when  we  consider  the  vast  areas 
covered  by  our  geographical  departments,  and  recall 
the  fact  that  the  troops  in  some  of  them  frequently 


LAW  IN  THE  ARMY.  157 

occupy  regions  and  operate  on  lines  which  have  no 
regular  communication  with  one  another.  It  is  no 
doubt  partly  to  meet  this  condition  of  things  that  the 
President  assigns  commanders  of  Departments,  puts 
their  headquarters  at  suitable  points,  and  gives  them 
the  necessary  staff  for  the  performance  of  their  duties. 

On  the  other  hand  when  it  is  known  from  absence 
or  any  other  cause  that  orders  purporting  to  be  those 
of  the  commander  do  not,  and  cannot,  emanate  from 
him,  his  troops  should  not  be  expected  to  obey  them. 
This  brings  us  to  the  auxiliary  argument  in  General 
Gibbon's  article.  It  is  in  relation  to  the  validity  of 
orders  promulgated  by  a  staff  officer  in  the  name  of 
his  commander.  He  discusses  at  length  a  case  grow- 
ing out  of  contested  orders  in  the  Department  of  the 
Columbia,  the  commander  being  absent  with  the  sanc- 
tion of  the  General  of  the  Army,  who  said  to  him : 
"Let  the  Assistant  Adjutant-General  run  affairs  as 
usual,  referring  to  General  McDowell's  action  such 
matters  as  are  requisite."  The  question  here  is  as 
stated  above,  the  one  of  long  standing,  as  to  the  force 
of  orders  promulgated  by  an  Adjutant- General  in  the 
name  of  his  commander.  This  question  may  arise 
when  the  commander  is  within,  as  well  as  when  he  is 
beyond,  the  limit  of  his  Department.  There  never  has 
been,  and  probably  never  will  be,  an  act  of  Congress 
settling  it. 

General  Gibbon  maintains,  when  a  Department 
commander  who  is  beyond  the  limits  of  his  command, 
issues  orders  through  his  Adjutant-General,  that  the 
Adjutant-General  is  thereby,  and  in  violation  of  law, 
put  in  command  of  his  seniors  in  rank. 


158 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


That  way  of  putting  the  point  appears  to  cloud  the 
main  issue.  No  one  in  the  Army  advocates  or  at- 
tempts putting  a  junior  in  command  of  his  senior.  If 
the  orders  were,  or  purported  to  be  those  of  the 
junior,  there  would  be  no  difficulty.  They  would  be 
disregarded,  and  the  junior,  if  not  treated  more  se- 
riously, would  be  laughed  at.  The  trouble  in  the 
matter  under  consideration  arises  from  the  very  fact 
that  the  orders  purport  to  be,  and  with  rare  excep- 
tions, are  in  fact,  those  of  a  common  superior — the 
regularly  assigned  commander.  The  Duke  of  Wel- 
lington said :  "  Every  staff  officer  must  be  considered 
as  acting  under  the  direct  orders  and  superintendence 
of  the  superior  officer  for  whose  assistance  he  is  em- 
ployed, and  who  must  be  considered  responsible  for 
his  acts.  To  consider  the  relative  situation  of  general 
officer  and  staff  in  any  other  light  would  tend  to 
alter  the  nature  of  the  service,  and  in  fact  to  give  the 
command  of  the  troops  to  the  subaltern  staff  officer 
instead  of  to  the  general  officer.  If  Lieutenant  - 

has  conducted  himself  improperly,  Major-General 

is  responsible,  and  Colonel  -  -  has  no  more  right  to 
notice  the  deficiencies  of  Lieutenant in  the  per- 
formance of  his  duty  toward  Major-General  -  -  than 
the  Major-General  has  to  interfere  in  a  matter  of 
detail  between  the  respective  officers  and  the  barrack- 
master.  .  .  ." 

The  principle  thus  announced  by  the  Iron  Duke  in 
1827  has,  by  the  custom  of  Service  acquired  among 
us  the  force  of  law ;  and  the  rule  is  that  any  order, 
written  or  verbal,  not  palpably  illegal,  that  the  Adju- 
tant-General of  a  command  promulgates  in  the  name- 


LAW  IN  THE  ARMY.  159 

of  the  General  commanding  is  binding  on  all  within 
the  sphere  of  the  General's  authority,  the  Adjutant- 
General  being  responsible  only  to  his  commander,  and 
the  commander  being  in  turn  responsible  to  his 
superior  for  the  Adjutant-General  as  well  as  for  the 
rest  of  the  command, 

It  is  the  evil  of  orders  issued  by  Deparment  com- 
manders when  they  are  absent  that  doubts  arise  as  to 
whether  they  are  in  fact  the  orders  of  the  commander. 
He  who  disobeys  them  does  so  at  his  peril.  He  may 
turn  out  to  be  right,  but  he  incurs  a  heavy  burthen  of 
proof,  especially  in  these  times  when  railroads  and 
telegraphs  enable  such  rapid  and  full  communication 
between  the  absent  commander  and  his  staff  at  head- 
quarters. To  prevent  all  doubt  and  embarrassment 
whenever  the  absence  of  a  Division  or  Department 
commander  is  to  be  such  as  to  disqualify  him  for 
command,  he  should  be  formally  relieved  and  a  suc- 
cessor assigned.  Recent  orders  making  temporary 
assignments  in  the  absence  of  regular  Department 
commanders  indicate  a  return  to  this  course.  It 
must,  as  a  rule,  rest  with  superior  authority  to  decide 
when  the  occasion  has  arisen  for  such  changes  in 
command  of  divisions  and  departments.  Too  much 
latitude  in  either  direction  indicates — not  violation  of 
law — but  faults  of  administration.  While  the  man- 
agement of  Army  affairs  must  be  strictly  legal,  it 
should  at  the  same  time  be  practical.  Much  of  our 
military  legislation  is  loosely  drawn  and  every  year 
brings  more  skill  in  the  art  of  construction.  Army 
statutes  have  become  martyrs  to  it.  They  are  now 
liable  to  almost  as  many  interpretations  as  they  con- 


160 


MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 


tain  words.  The  unwritten  law  alone  escapes.  The 
practices  of  a  well  governed  military  establishment, 
when  hardened  into  "customs  of  Service  "make  the 
soundest  and  plainest  laws  for  the  internal  affairs  of 
an  army.  They  are  the  experience  of  years  speaking 
to  the  soldier  in  the  vernacular.  We  have  such  cus- 
toms and  we  cannot  be  construed  out  of  them.  The 
more  they  are  respected  and  cherished  the  better. 


ARTICLE  V. 

Obedience  in  the  Army  and  Navy. 

A  communication  in  one  of  the  Washington  papers 
says  that  "  very  intelligent  gentlemen "  advance  the 
doctrine  that  the  duty  of  a  soldier  is  "  blind  obedience 
to  every  order  of  his  superior  officer,  lawful  or  unlaw- 
ful." "  If,"  says  the  writer,  "  such  opinions  as  these 
are  held  by  gentlemen  of  intelligence  not  in  the  Army 
or  Naval  Service,  what  can  be  expected  from  the 
officer  or  the  private  soldier,  the  best  part  of  whose 
life  has  been  passed  in  strict  obedience  to  rigorous 
military  discipline  ? "  We  protest  against  the  assump- 
tion that  less  knowledge  on  this  point  is  to  be  expected 
from  officers  and  men  in  the  Army  and  Navy,  than  from 
very  intelligent  gentlemen  not  in  them.  Prompted  by 
duty  as  well  as  by  interest,  those  in  the  public  service 
have  made  themselves  quite  well  acquainted  with  this 
important  subject. 

The  Article  of  War  which  enjoins  obedience  by  sub- 
ordinates to  all  lawful  commands  of  superiors  is 
familiar  to  the  Army.  The  difficulty  is  in  the  appli- 
cation of  it.  An  illustration  of  this  is  given  in  the 
columns  of  the  very  issue  which  contains  the  com- 
munication we  are  considering.  A  commanding  officer 
ordered  a  Lieutenant  of  his  command  not  to  visit  the 
sutler's  store.  The  Lieutenant,  after  careful  considera- 
tion of  the  subject,  positively  declined  to  regard  the 
order  as  legal,  and  on  that  ground  disobeyed  it.  He 

161 


162 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


was  tried,  found  guilty,  sentenced  to  forfeit  fifty  dol- 
lars of  his  pay 'per  month  for  four  months,  and  to  be 
severely  reprimanded  in  General  Orders.  The  finding 
and  sentence  were  approved  by  the  reviewing  author- 
ity. The  Lieutenant  was  acquainted  with  the  Article 
of  War ;  but  failed  in  the  application  of  it  to  his  own 
case.  It  is  in  disposing  of  the  questions  which  arise 
under  the  law,  that  the  man  in  the  Service  encounters 
difficulty. 

What  is  meant  by  lawful  commands  ? 

Is  the  person  commanded  to  judge  in  all  cases  of 
the  lawfulness  of  the  commands  ? 

If  not,  in  what  cases,  or  class  of  cases,  is  the  com- 
mander the  judge  of  the  lawfulness  ? 

In  these  last-mentioned  cases,  if  there  be  such, 
would  the  law  military  protect  the  subordinate  in  dis- 
obeying an  unlawful  command  ? 

When  is  it  right  to  obey  unlawful  commands  ? 

Whether  to  him  who  gives  an  unlawful  command, 
to  him  who  executes  it,  to  the  two  jointly,  or  in  what 
degree  to  each,  responsibility  should  attach,  are  ques- 
tions of  deep  concern  to  the  public  service  and  to  the 
community. 

These  are  some  of  the  questions  with  which  the 
military  service  has  to  deal,  not  theoretically  alone, 
but  practically.  The  soldier  is  not  enabled  to  solve 
them  by  being  told  simply,  that  he,  like  the  private 
citizen,  is  bound  to  obey  the  laws  of  the  land.  With- 
out undertaking  to  discuss  these  questions  seriatim^ 
we  present  some  remarks  and  authorities  bearing  upon 
them. 

Responsibility  must  attach  to  somebody  for  viola- 


OBEDIENCE  IN  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY.        163 

tion  of  law.  There  is  a  formidable  array  of  authori- 
ties in  support  of  the  view  that  the  illegal  command 
of  a  superior  is  not  in  the  eye  of  the  common  law  a 
justification  for  the  unlawful  act  of  a  subordinate. 
But  the  rulings  are  generally  coupled  with  explana- 
tions and  reservations  which  greatly  restrict  their 
operation  in  practice.  Then,  again,  there  are  argu- 
ments and  authorities  directly  in  support  of  the  oppo- 
site view.  Whether  a  command  is  lawful  often  de- 
pends on  circumstances  with  which  the  superior  is 
acquainted  but  of  which  the  subordinate  is  ignorant. 
The  limits  of  authority  are  not  determined  by  written 
law.  Whatever  is  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of 
military  discipline  falls  within  the  scope  of  military 
authority.  "  The  soldier  forfeits  that  portion  of  his 
civil  rights  which  would  interfere  with  the  discipline 
of  the  army/'  says  Burke.  u  He  is  bound,"  says 
Clode,  "  to  obey  and  to  give  his  personal  service  to  the 
Crown  under  the  punishments  imposed  upon  him  for 
disobedience  by  the  Mutiny  Act  and  Articles  of  War. 
No  other  obligation  must  be  put  in  competition  with 
this ;  neither  parental  authority,  nor  religious  scruples, 
nor  personal  safety,  nor  pecuniary  advantages  from 
other  service.  All  the  duties  of  his  life  are,  according 
to  the  theory  of  military  obedience,  absorbed  in  that 
one  duty  of  obeying  the  commands  of  the  officers  set 
over  him."  By  a  principle  inherent  in  the  system, 
the  subordinate  position  held  by  the  person  to  whom 
a  command  is  addressed,  forbids  the  presumption  that 
lie  may  decide  whether  or  not  the  thing  commanded  is 
necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  discipline.  The 
person  who  gives  the  command  is  recognized  as  the 


164 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


one  who  has  the  means  of  deciding  as  to  its  necessity, 
and  to  him  attaches  the  responsibility  of  deciding 
correctly.  Whatever  the  right  to  give  an  order  may 
be,  the  right  to  disobey  cannot  be  founded  on  the  fact 
that  the  thing  commanded  is  not  a  usual  or  recognized 
subject  of  a  military  order ;  for  circumstances  in  the 
knowledge  of  him  who  gives  the  command  may  bring 
within  the  sphere  of  military  authority  that  to  which 
it  would  not  ordinarily  extend.  While  members  of 
the  military  and  naval  service  are  bound  by  a  solemn 
oath  to  obey  all  lawful  orders  of  their  superiors,  they 
are  not  sworn  to  disobey  unlawful  ones.  Disobedience 
of  unlawful  orders  is  left  entirely  to  the  discretion  of 
the  actor  in  each  particular  case,  subject  to  approval 
or  punishment  as  may  be  subsequently  adjudged.  In 
all  cases  where  there  is  the  least  doubt  as  to  the  law- 
fulness of  orders,  the  moral  obligation  of  the  oath 
calls  for  obedience.  Obedience  to  unlawful  orders  is 
often  not  only  justifiable,  but  highly  meritorious. 
This  is  shown  by  the  readiness  and  unanimity  with 
which  indemnity  laws  are  passed  for  the  protection  of 
those  concerned,  and  by  the  public  approval  and  favor 
sometimes  shown  to  the  most  conspicuous  actors  in 
disobedience.  The  Act  of  March  7,  1867,  and  the 
fame  acquired  by  General  Dix  for  his  order  to  shoot 
on  the  spot  any  man  who  attempted  to  haul  down  the 
American  flag,  are  cases  in  point. 

It  is  in  consideration  of  the  moral  obligations  of  his 
oath,  and  of  the  requirements  of  that  discipline  with- 
out which  the  military  service  would  not  only  fail  in 
the  purpose  for  which  it  is  maintained,  but  would  be- 
come a  vexation  to  the  community,  a  danger  to  the 


OBEDIENCE  IN  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY.        165 

Government,  and  a  menace  to  freedom,  that  the  best 
authorities  have  expressed  themselves  so  pointedly  in 
support  of  rigid  obedience.  As  for  example  : 

"  So  general  is  the  rule,  that  the  orders  of  a  superior 
shall  be  imperative  on  the  military  inferior,  that  it 
will  admit  not  of  exception,  unless  in  the  instance 
when  the  orders,  or  more  accurately  speaking,  the 
things  commanded  to  be  done,  are  directly  repugnant 
or  contrary  to  law.  In  the  case,  only,  when  the  orders 
would  afford  no  legal  excuse  in  a  court  of  law  for  the 
act  committed  under  them,  can  the  inferior  question  or 
hesitate  to  obey  the  commands  he  receives  from  his 
superior ;  such  as  if  he  were  directed,  in  a  moment  of 
delirium  by  his  officer,  to  fire  on  a  peaceful  and 
unoffending  bystander,  or,  if  such  a  thing  could  be  sup- 
posable,  to  plunder  the  property,  or  to  commit,  or  as- 
sist in  committing  some  personal  injury  on  a  fellow 
subject.  It  is  only  then  in  orders,  which,  if  executed, 
would  effect  some  palpable  outrage  against  moral  or 
religious  obligations,  which  all  laws  profess  to  regard, 
and  which  cannot  be  superseded  by  the  partial  regula- 
tions of  a  particular  society,  that  soldiers  can  hope  for 
indemnity,  in  resistance  of  the  commands  of  a  superior. 
And,  even  then,  when  the  alternative  is  between 
two  offences,  and  the  choice  must  be  determined  by 
the  adoption  of  the  less,  instead  of  the  greater ;  of  the 
disobedience  of  command,  or  of  the  commission  of  some 
outrageous  civil  or  military  crime  ;  the  responsibility 
will  always  be  upon  the  inferior,  and  in  this  case  a 
dreadful  responsibility,  to  show,  that  the  commands, 
which  he  would  otherwise  be  bounden  to  obey,  are 
manifestly  and  palpably  illegal ;  else  he  may  involve 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

himself  in  the  guilt,  and  certainly  in  the  penalty  of  a 
positive  crime,  under  the  supposition  or  pretence  of 
avoiding  an  imaginary  one. 

".  .  .  Prompt,  ready,  unhesitating  obedience,  in 
soldiers,  to  those  who  are  set  over  them,  is  so  neces- 
sary to  the  safety  of  the  military  state,  and  to  the  suc- 
cess of  every  military  achievement,  that  it  would  be 
pernicious  to  have  it  understood,  that  military  diso- 
bedience, in  any  instance,  may  go  unquestioned.  .  .  . 

"Except  in  the  solitary  instance,  when  the  illegality  of 
an  order  is  glaringly  apparent  on  the  face  of  it,  a  mili- 
tary subordinate  is  compelled  to  a  complete  and  un- 
deviating  obedience  to  the  very  letter  of  the  command 
received. 

".  .  .  Hence  it  is  scarcely  possible  to  imagine  a 
case,  where  a  subordinate  officer  would  be  at  liberty  to 
depart  from  the  positive  command  of  his  superior." 
(Samuel's  "  Law  Military.") 

".  .  .  And  the  true  and  practical  intent  and 
meaning  of  this  appears  to  be  that  so  long  as  the  or- 
ders of  a  superior  are  not  obviously  and  decidedly  in 
opposition  to  the  well-known  and  established  customs 
of  the  Army,  or  to  the  laws  of  the  land  ;  or,  if  in  op- 
position to  such  laws,  do  not  tend  to  an  irreparable  re- 
sult; so  long  must  the  orders  of  a  superior  meet  prompt, 
immediate,  and  unhesitating  obedience.  It  surely  can- 
not accord  with  justice  to  render  a  soldier  responsible, 
even  in  courts  of  civil  judicature,  for  an  illegal  act  re- 
sulting from  the  execution  of  an  order,  not  in  itself  so 
glaringly  opposed  to  all  law,  as  for  its  illegality  to  be 
apparent  without  reflection  or  consideration :  hesitation 
in  a  soldier  is,  in  certain  circumstances,  a  crime ;  and 


OBEDIENCE  IN  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY.        167 

hesitation  is  inseparable  from  reflection  and  considera- 
tion ;  reflection  and  consideration,  therefore,  ivlicn  tend- 
ing to  question  the  order  of  a  superior,  must,  in  some 
sense,  be  considered  as  a  military  offence"  (" Simmons 
on  Courts-martial.") 

"  Obedience  to  command  is  the  chief  military  virtue, 
in  relation  to  which  all  others  are  secondary  and  sub- 
ordinate ;  and  disobedience  is  reckoned  among  the 
principal  military  crimes,  and  is  justly  liable  to  the 
most  exemplary  punishment.  So  general  is  the  rule, 
that  the  orders  of  a  superior  shall  be  imperative  on  the 
military  inferior,  that  it  will  not  admit  of  exception, 
unless  when  the  orders,  or  the  thing  commanded  to  be 
done,  are  directly  contrary  to  law.  An  inferior  officer 
may  at  times  be  reluctant  to  execute  an  order  which 
he  may  think  to  be  illegal,  afraid  alike  of  the  responsi- 
bility of  refusing  and  the  risk  he  may  run  by  obeying, 
should  any  damage  be  done  to  property,  etc.  But,  in 
such  a  case,  the  officer  giving  the  order  will  be  an- 
swerable for  the  legal  penalties."  (Hough's  "Prece- 
dents on  Military  Law.") 

" '  It  would,'  said  the  late  Sir  Robert  Peel,  <  be  ut- 
terly impossible  to  maintain  discipline  if  soldiers  were 
allowed  to  be  political  partisans,  correspondents  to 
newspapers,  or  members  of  political  clubs.  Then  in- 
deed a  standing  army  would  be  in  truth  a  curse — then 
they  (the  House  of  Commons)  might  bid  farewell  to 
liberty.'  He  denied  the  truth  of  the  doctrine  that  '  a 
soldier  continued  to  enjoy  all  the  rights  of  a  citizen.' 
It  was  clear  that  l  he  must  forfeit  that  portion  of  his 
civil  rights  which  would  interfere  with  the  discipline 
of  the  army.' 


168  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

"  One  thing,  however,  is  clear,  and  the  language  in 
which  the  rule  has  been  laid  down  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  realm,  when  applied  to  the  combatant 
branches  4of  the  army,  is  terribly  emphatic.  '  A  sub- 
ordinate officer  must  not/  even  to  save  the  lives  of 
others  or  his  own  life  (how  much  less  the  public  treas- 
ure), 'judge  of  the  danger,  propriety,  expediency,  or 
consequences  of  the  order  lie  receives — he  must  obey — 
nothing  can  excuse  him  but  a  physical  impossibility? 
And  the  same  learned  judges  (Mansfield  and  Lough- 
borough)  went  on  to  declare,  l  that  the  first,  second 
and  third  part  of  a  soldier  is  obedience.'  The  doctrine 
of  this  case  has  never  been  disputed  in  the  common 
law7  courts,  and  it  is  the  essence  of  the  military  sys- 
tem. 

"The  distinctive  feature  of  our  military  allegiance 
is  that  of  implicit  obedience.  '  We  have  not,'  to  quote 
the  words  of  Mr.  Burke,  already  used,  i  distracted  our 
army  by  dividing  principles  of  obedience ;  we  have 
put  them  under  one  single  authority.'  In  acting, 
therefore,  against  the  civil  community  under  military 
orders,  what  intervening  sanction  between  the  Sover- 
eign and  the  military  officer  does  the  law  require,  to 
make  the  order  as  between  the  officer  and  the  civil 
community  a  lawful  order,  and  one  to  be  implicitly 
obeyed  by  him  ?  The  answer  to  this  question  is  sug- 
gested by  the  words  of  a  great  soldier.  '  Soldiers/ 
wrote  the  late  General  Sir  Charles  Napier,  t  must  obey 
the  King,  and  the  King  acts  by  the  advice  of  his  min- 
isters. If  in  his  name  they  order  the  soldiers  to  do 
wrong,  let  the  minister's  head  pay  the  forfeit ;  with 
that,  the  soldiers  have  nothing  to  do  beyond  taking 


OBEDIENCE  IN  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY.  169 

care,  when  guarding  the  scaffold,  that  no  man  impedes 
the  executioner  in  the  functions  of  his  calling.'  Un- 
questionably, therefore,  the  authority  of  a  responsible 
minister  is  needed  to  give  constitutional  validity  to 
orders  for  the  action  of  the  military  in  matters  affect- 
ing the  civil  community.  When  the  command  of  the 
Sovereign  is  communicated  to  the  military  officer 
through  the  channel  of  his  responsible  minister,  the 
remedy,  when  sought  by  legal  proceedings,  civil  or 
criminal,  must  (it  is  submitted),  be  rather  against  the 
minister  giving  than  against  the  officer  honestly  obey- 
ing the  command."  (Clode's  "  Forces  of  the  Crown.") 

"  Military  obedience  is  the  result  of  reflection,  not  of 
blindness;  and  is  invariably  found  to  be  most  perfect 
among  the  most  civilized  nations.  .  .  .  It  is  wrong 
to  give  trifling  orders,  but  right  to  obey  all  orders." 
(Sir  Charles  Napier.) 

"If  an  individual  ratifies  an  act  done  on  his  behalf, 
the  nature  of  the  act  remains  unchanged ;  it  is  still 
a  mere  trespass,  and  the  party  injured  has  his  op- 
tion to  sue  either.  If  the  Crown  ratifies  an  act,  the 
character  of  the  act  becomes  altered,  for  the  ratifica- 
tion does  not  give  the  party  injured  the  double  option 
of  bringing  his  action  against  the  agent  who  com- 
mitted the  trespass,  or  the  principal  who  ratified  it ; 
but  a  remedy  against  the  Crown  only  (such  as  it  is), 
and  actually  exempts  from  all  liability  the  person  who 
commits  the  trespass."  (Buron  v.  Denman,  2  Exch. 
R,  166,  Parke,  B.) 

The  Lord  Chancellor,  in  1853,  said  in  the  House  of 
Lords : 

"  It  was  the  duty,  in  case  of  a  riot,  for  every  one  of 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

her  Majesty's  subjects  to  exert  himself  singly,  or  in 
combination,  to  stop  that  riot  especially  with  the  least 
possible  violence.  That  applied  equally  to  soldiers  as 
to  all  other  persons  placed  in  a  position  that  enabled 
them  to  stop  a  riot.  What  effect  had  that  upon  the 
position  of  soldiers?  It  imposed  it  upon  them,  or 
rather  upon  those  who  commanded  them,  as  an  impera- 
tive duty,  that  they  should  interfere  on  such  an  occa- 
sion. ...  It  was  impossible  to  define  the  limit 
when  the  orders  of  a  commanding  officer  were  or  were 
not  fit  to  be  obeyed.  It  was  the  duty  of  the  soldier  to 
obey  Ms  officer  and  to  do  that  with  the  least  possible 
cost  of  life  or  limb." 

The  Earl  of  Darlington  said  that  "  every  man  who 
was  a  military  man  was  bound  to  obey  the  orders 
given  him,  let  those  orders  be  what  they  might. 
('  No  !  No  ! ')  He  begged  pardon  ;  he  spoke  as  a 
military  man,  and  he  would  still  say  it  was  his  duty 
to  obey  the  orders  of  his  superior  officer.  It  was 
perfectly  true  a  man  might  receive  an  order  which  his 
superior  officer  was  not  justified  in  giving,  but  it  was 
the  man's  duty  to  obey  that  order  in  the  first  instance, 
and  afterwards  to  obtain  redress" 

The  Earl  of  Stratford  said : 

"  A  standing  army  and  military  law  has,  my  Lords, 
been  always  inconsistent  with  the  liberties  of  the  peo- 
ple. The  officers  and  soldiers  under  such  a  regulation, 
are  always  obliged  to  give  the  most  implicit  obedience 
to  the  commands  of  their  superior  officers;  they  must 
observe  and  execute  the  orders  they  receive  without  any 
reserve  or  hesitation ;  they  must  not  inquire  whether 
their  orders  be  according  to  the  law  ;  if  they  do  they 


OBEDIENCE  IN  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY. 

are  guilty  of  mutiny,  and  may  be  immediately  shot  for 
any  such  disobedience." 

Mr.  Napier,  Attorney- General  of  Ireland,  at  the  time 
of  riot,  said  (in  the  Six-mile  Bridge  case)  :  "  Though 
the  soldiers,  in  point  of  military  discipline,  were  bound 
to  obey  the  order  of  their  officer,  that  mere  order  of  it- 
self would  not  furnish  a  justification  of  the  act  of  the 
soldiers  in  a  court  of  law. "  Sir  John  Elley  said  in  the 
same  debate :  "  Did  the  House  wish  the  army  to  be- 
come a  deliberative  body  ?  If  they  did,  where  was 
their  boasted  discipline  ?  The  duty  of  the  British 
soldier  was  to  obey  the  order  of  his  commanding  offi- 
cer, and  not  to  argue  the  propriety  of  his  command." 

"  While  subordinate  officers  and  soldiers  are  pausing 
to  consider  whether  they  ought  to  obey,  or  are  scru- 
pulously weighing  the  evidences  of  the  facts  upon 
which  the  Commander-in-Chief  exercises  the  right  to 
demand  their  services,  the  hostile  enterprise  may  be 
accomplished  without  the  means  of  resistance.  If  a 
superior  officer  has  a  right  to  contest  the  orders  of  the 
President  upon  his  own  doubts  as  to  the  exigency 
having  arisen,  it  must  be  equally  the  right  of  every 
inferior  officer  and  soldier ;  and  any  act  done  by  any 
person  in  furtherance  of  such  order  would  subject 
him  to  responsibility  in  a  civil  suit  in  which  his  de- 
fence must  finally  rest  upon  his  ability  to  re-establish 
the  facts  by  competent  proofs.  Such  a  course  would 
be  subversive  of  all  discipline,  and  expose  the  best 
disposed  officers  to  the  chances  of  ruinous  litigation." 
(Martin  v.  Mott,  12  Wheaton,  19.  U.  S.  Supreme 
Court.) 

"  '  It  is  a  general  and  sound  principle,'  said  Spencer, 


172 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


J.  (in  Vanderheyden  v.  Young,  11  Johnson  R.,  150), 
i  that  whenever  the  law  vests  any  person  with  the 
power  to  do  an  act,  and  constitutes  him  a  judge  of 
the  evidence  on  which  the  act  may  be  done,  and,  at 
the  same  time,  contemplates  that  the  act  is  to  be  car- 
ried into  effect,  through  the  instrumentality  of  agents, 
the  person  thus  clothed  with  power  is  invested  with 
discretion,  and  is,  quoad  hoc,  a  judge.  His  mandates 
to  his  legal  agents,  on  his  declaring  the  event  to  have 
happened,  will  be  a  protection  to  those  agents ;  and  it 
is  not  their  duty  or  business  to  investigate  the  facts 
thus  referred  to  their  superior,  and  to  re  judge  his  de- 
termination. In  a  military  point  of  view,  the  contrary 
doctrine  would  be  subversive  of  all  discipline,  and  as 
it  regards  the  safety  and  security  of  the  United  States, 
and  its  citizens,  the  consequences  would  be  deplorable 
and  fatal ' 

"  Except  in  a  plain  case  of  excess  of  authority,  when 
at  first  blush  it  is  apparent  and  palpable  to  the  com- 
monest understanding  that  the  order  is  illegal,  I  can- 
not but  think  that  the  law  should  excuse  the  military 
subordinate,  when  acting  in  obedience  to  the  orders  of 
his  commander.  Otherwise  he  is  placed  in  the  danger- 
ous dilemma  of  being  liable  in  damages  to  third  par- 
ties for  obedience  to  an  order,  or  to  the  loss  of  his 
commission  and  disgrace,  for  disobedience  thereto. 
.  .  .  4  The  first  duty  of  a  soldier  is  obedience,' 
and  without  this  there  can  be  neither  discipline  nor 
efficiency  in  the  Army.  If  every  subordinate  officer 
and  soldier  were  at  liberty  to  question  the  legality  of 
the  orders  of  the  commander,  and  obey  them  or  not 
as  they  may  consider  them  valid  or  invalid,  the  camp 


OBEDIENCE  IN  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY.        173 

would  be  turned  into  a  debating  school,  where  the 
precious  moment  for  action  would  be  wasted  in  wordy 
conflicts  between  the  advocates  of  conflicting  opin- 
ions. .  .  .  Nor  is  it  necessary  to  the  ends  of  jus- 
tice that  the  subordinate  or  soldier  should  be  respon- 
sible for  obedience  to  the  illegal  order  of  a  superior. 
In  any  case,  the  party  injured  can  have  but  one  satis- 
faction, and  that  may  and  should  be  obtained  from 
the  really  responsible  party — the  officer  who  gave  the 
illegal  order.  I  am  aware  that  in  civil  life  the  rule  is 
well  settled  otherwise,  and  that  a  person  committing  an 
illegal  act  cannot  justify  his  conduct  upon  the  ground 
of  a  command  from  another.  But  the  circumstances  of 
the  two  cases  are  entirely  different.  In  the  latter  case 
the  party  giving  the  command  and  the  one  obeying  it 
are  equal  in  the  eye  of  the  law.  The  latter  does  not 
act  upon  compulsion;  he  is  a  free  agent,  and  at  liberty 
to  exercise  his  judgment  in  the  premises.  Personal 
responsibility  should  be  commensurate  with  freedom 
of  action  to  do  or  refrain  from  doing.  For  acts  done 
under  what  is  deemed  compulsion  or  duress,  the  law 
holds  no  one  liable.  In  contemplation  of  law,  the 
wife  is  under  the  power  and  authority  of  the  husband. 
Therefore,  for  even  criminal  acts,  when  done  in  the 
presence  of  the  latter,  she  is  not  held  responsible. 
The  law  presumes  that  she  acted  under  coercion  of 
her  husband,  and  excuses  her.  If  the  law  excuses  the 
wife  on  the  presumption  of  coercion,  for  what  reason 
should  it  refuse  a  like  protection  to  the  subordinate 
and  soldier  when  acting  in  obedience  to  the  command 
of  his  lawful  superior?"  (McCall  v.  McDowell,  1 
Abbott,  212.  Deady,  J.) 


174 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  vests  the 
President  with  certain  executive  functions,  in  the 
exercise  of  which  he  has  absolute  and  unlimited  discre- 
tion. Amongst  the  most  important  of  these  functions 
are  those  of  Commander-in-Chief.  They  must  neces- 
sarily be  exercised  through  the  medium  of  subordinates 
to  whom  the  same  discretion  extends,  but  their  aces  are, 
in  such  cases,  his  acts;  their  discretion,  his  discretion. 
(Pomeroy's  "Constitutional  Law,"  p.  422.)  When  the 
President  acts  within  the  sphere  of  his  constitutional 
powers  as  Commander-in-Chief,  in  the  exercise  of  that 
absolute  discretion  which  belongs  to  him,  he  acts  in  a. 
quasi  judicial  capacity,  and  the  subordinate  cannot 
assume  the  power  of  disobeying  his  mandates  on  the 
ground  of  their  illegality.  The  responsibility  rests- 
with  him,  and  may  be  tested  by  impeachment. 

As  to  this  question  of  responsibility,  it  may,  in 
brief,  be  said  that  the  vindication  of  public  justice 
and  private  rights  does  not  make  it  necessary  that 
both  the  person  giving  the  order  and  the  one  obeying 
it  should  be  held  responsible.  They  would,  except 
in  the  case  of  a  flagrant  violation  of  law,  be  satisfied 
if  the  responsibility  be  fixed  with  either  the  one  or  the 
other.  Now,  although  as  a  general  rule,  a  command 
cannot  be  pleaded  as  a  defence  for  an  illegal  act,  it  i& 
believed  that  a  military  command  does  not  ordinarily 
come  within  the  rule,  because  it  is  not  reconcilable 
with  the  law  of  the  land,  which — as  a  protection  to 
the  people  as  much  as  for  any  other  reason — makes 
implicit  and  unhesitating  obedience  the  duty  of  the 
soldier.  But  it  is  reconcilable  with  this  law,  as  well 
as  a  sufficient  safeguard  to  the  community  and  reason- 


OBEDIENCE  IN  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY. 

able  in  itself,  that  the  one  who  commands  rather  than 
the  involuntary  agent,  should  be  responsible. 

"  If  one  person  makes  use  of  another,  who  is  a  mere 
instrument,  to  do  any  act,  the  thing  done  is  the  act, 
not  of  him  who  is  merely  the  instrument,  but  of  the 
person  who  uses  him  as  such  instrument."  (Ilott  v. 
Wikes,  3  Barn,  and  Aid.,  315.)  "  The  justification  of 
the  soldier  in  obeying  it  (the  order)  would  be,  first, 
under  the  rule  of  the  common  law,  that  an  inferior, 
in  an  ordinary  criminal  case,  must  be  held  justified  in 
obeying  the  directions — not  obviously  improper  or 
contrary  to  law — of  a  superior  officer,  that  is,  if  the 
inferior  acted  honestly  upon  what  he  might  not  unrea- 
sonably deem  to  be  the  effect  of  the  orders  of  his  super- 
ior ;  and,  secondly,  under  the  Mutiny  Act  and  Articles 
of  War."  (Clode's  "Military  Forces,"  Vol.  II,  p.  151. 
See  also  cases  there  cited.) 

The  writer,  whose  communication  furnishes  the  text 
of  this  article,  closes  his  argument  in  favor  of  dis- 
obedience of  unlawful  commands  by  referring  to  u  the 
New  Orleans  usurpation,  and  the  Charleston  enor- 
mity," and  then  warns  "  gentlemen  of  the  Army  and 
Navy "  to  keep  their  "  hands  off  the  national  legis- 
lature." It  is  generally  conceded  that  the  Army  has 
behaved  in  the  South  with  remarkable  prudence  and 
wisdom.  Orders  have  in  no  case  been  disobeyed. 
The  responsibility  rests  with  those  who  gave  orders, 
not  those  who  executed  them.  If  these  orders  have 
violated  specific  laws,  or  public  justice,  there  are 
direct,  available  modes  of  proceeding  against  the 
responsible  parties;  and  we  do  not  doubt  that  these 
parties  are  quite  willing  and  ready  to  accept  and 


176 


MILITAEY  MISCELLANIES. 


answer  the  responsibility.  Except  in  its  more  im- 
portant bearing  upon  the  discipline  of  the  Service, 
the  question  of  obedience  or  disobedience  is  a  personal 
one  affecting  the  individual  citizen  or  soldier,  and  not 
the  nation  at  large.  If  ever  the  liberties  of  this 
people  are  so  far  jeopardized  as  to  rest  upon  dis- 
obedience of  unlawful  commands  issued  by  superiors 
to  their  subordinates  in  our  little  Army,  they  will  be 
already  lost,  whether  the  commands  be  obeyed  or 
disobeyed. 


ARTICLE   VI. 

Justice  for  the  Army.* 

The  Array,  persevering  in  the  trial  and  conviction 
of  its  guilty  members,  is  at  last  receiving  that  support 
which  is  necessary  to  its  purification.  The  Secretary 
of  War  is  earnestly  co-operating  in  the  detection  and 
prosecution  of  offenders,  and  the  President  is  approv- 
ing the  findings  of  courts-martial  and  executing  their 
sentences  without  partiality,  favor,  or  affection.  The 
Military  Committee  of  the  Senate  is  said  to  be  opposed 
to  legislative  reinstatement  of  dismissed  officers,  and 
the  public  press  of  the  country  is  aroused.  It  cannot 
be  denied  that  recent  exposures  make  us  appear  badly, 
but  it  will  be  remembered  that  more  is  heard  of  de- 
linquents in  the  military  than  in  other  professions,  for 
the  reason  that  they  are  publicly  tried  by  the  profes- 
sion itself,  and  are  chargeable  with  many  offences 
common  to  all  walks  of  life  but  punishable  only  among 
soldiers.  In  other  words,  while  soldiers  live  under 
the  general  code,  they  are  in  addition  under  an  exact- 
ing special  code.  All  their  wrong-doings  are  exposed. 
All  the  sins  of  the  people's  military  service  are  open 
to  the  people's  scrutiny.  In  judging  the  Army  the 
public  is  not  likely  to  forget  that  many  unworthy  men 
were  put  into  the  regular  service  through  political 
influence  at  the  close  of  the  war,  and  many  such  have 
been  appointed  since  through  the  same  influence.  The 

*Army  and  Navy  Journal,  August  25,  1883. 

177 


178  MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 

Army  is  not  responsible  for  the  appointment  of  bad 
men,  but  it  is  accountable  if  it  does  not  proceed 
against  them  as  soon  after  appointment  as  their  con- 
duct calls  for  it.  That  has  been  done  at  all  times  con- 
sistently and  conscientiously. 

The  Army  would  be  culpable  if  it  showed  any  dis- 
position to  keep  unworthy  officers  in  its  ranks  or  to 
protect  them  from  exposure  and  punishment.  But  not 
being  responsible  for  their  appointment,  and  doing  all 
in  its  power  to  expose  and  expel  them,  it  ought  to  be 
credited  with  its  open  and  vigorous  efforts  to  purify 
itself.  It  is  not  chargeable  with  demoralization  for 
containing  bad  material  which  it  did  not  select  and 
which  it  is  doing  all  in  its  power  to  get  rid  of.  The 
Army's  efforts  for  its  own  purification  have  been  seri- 
ously interfered  with.  The  interposition  of  higher 
authority  in  favor  of  offenders  has  been  so  frequent 
since  the  war,  especially  from  1876  to  1880,  as  to  be 
a  great  injury  to  the  Service.  Many  of  the  evils  which 
have  been  exposed  recently  are  fairly  chargeable  to 
executive  and  legislative  reversal  of  Army  action. 
The  New  York  Herald,  of  Jan.  21,  1881,  contained 
important  facts  on  this  point.  It  gave  a  list  of  cases 
in  which  sentences  of  courts-martial  were  mitigated 
or  set  aside  and  gross  offences  condoned  by  President 
Hayes.  It  said  that  "Mr.  Hayes  might  justly  be 
called  the  promoter  of  intemperance  in  the  Army  and 
the  friend  and  defender  of  wrong-doers."  "  Up  to  the 
present  time,"  said  the  Herald,  "  out  of  sixty  convic- 
tions for  gross  offences,  most  of  them  involving  ex- 
treme cases  of  drunkenness  on  duty,  only  nineteen 
have  been  confirmed  by  him,  while  forty-one  have  by 


JUSTICE  FOR  THE  AEMY.  179 

his  personal  order  been  so  mitigated  as  to  retain  the 
offending  officers  in  the  Army."  The  Herald  then  re- 
cited the  sixty  cases,  giving  the  names  of  the  officers, 
their  offences  and  sentences. 

The  offences  condoned  included  drunkenness  on 
duty ;  misuse,  and  misapplication  of  public  property ; 
selling  pay  accounts  on  several  occasions  for  the  same 
month  to  different  individuals;  violation  of  a  solemn 
pledge ;  conduct  unbecoming  an  officer  and  a  gentle- 
man, with  specifications  too  gross,  vulgar  and  profane 
for  republication ;  extreme  cruelty  to  enlisted  men 
and  gross  and  most  indecent  blackguardism  and  pro- 
fanity towards  them  and  fellow-officers ;  assaulting  a 
fellow-officer  who  had  but  one  arm,  striking  him  a 
severe  blow  in  the  face  and  calling  him  a  liar ;  gross 
cruelty  to  sick  enlisted  men,  causing  the  death  of  one 
and  imperilling  the  lives  of  several ;  riding  in  uniform 
in  a  carriage  with  a  private  soldier  and  two  notorious 
prostitutes,  and  drinking  with  them,  and  carousing 
until  handcuffed  and  taken  to  jail.  Of  the  last  case, 
the  Herald  says  the  offender  "  had  been  appointed 
from  civil  life  the  year  before  and  his  restoration  was 
due  solely  to  political  influence."  How  could  the 
Army  purify  itself  when  the  Executive  pronounced 
such  men  fit  to  be  kept  in  it !  When  the  strong  -  cur- 
rent of  military  justice  is  dammed  by  the  authorities 
set  over  tlie  Army,  stagnant  pools  are  formed  which 
breed  scandal,  fraud,  disobedience,  dissipation  and 
disgrace,  sometimes  even  among  those  educated  for 
the  Service.  The  Army  itself  damns  its  culprits,  but 
never  dams  the  steady  stream  of  military  law. 


ARTICLE  VII. 

The  Honor  of  the  Army. 

The  New  York  Sun  in  its  issue  of  April  24,  1881, 
gives  a  list  of  "  Army  officers  charged,  tried,  convicted 
and  dismissed  by  court-martial  since  1867."  The  Sun 
parades  this  list  as  "  a  very  bad  record  for  the  boasted 
honor  of  Army  officers,"  and  adds,  "  There  is  no  other 
profession  or  branch  of  business  in  which  such  a  large 
proportion  of  its  followers  have  been  found  unfaith- 
ful and  unworthy."  This  assertion  is  unjust  to  the 
military  profession.  There  would  be  some  founda- 
tion for  it  if  the  unworthy  officers  composing  the  list 
had  been  kept  in  the  Army.  But  that  is  not  the  case. 
It  is  a  list  of  men  who  have  been  ejected.  To  settle 
the  account  fairly  the  President  and  Senate  may  be 
charged  with  putting  these  men  into  office  and  the 
Army  credited  with  thrusting  them  out  of  it.  The 
list  shows  the  vigor  and  persistence  of  the  military 
service  in  purifying  itself  since  the  close  of  the  re- 
bellion. Accepting  the  Sun's  list  as  correct,  the  fol- 
lowing table  gives  actual  numbers  and  percentages 
for  each  year : 

No.  of  Commissioned  No.  Dismissed  by             p         . 

Officers  in  Service.  Court-Martial. 

In  1868 2,988  26  .87 

In  1869 2,988  28  .93 

In  1870 2,277  22  .87 

In  1871 2,287  12  .52 

In  1872 2,264  12  .52 

In  1873 2,263  12  .52 

180 


THE  HONOR  OF  THE  ARMY.  181 

No.  of  Commissioned  No.  Dismissed  by            •pow.0,ntnn 

Officers  in  Service.  Court-Martial. 

In  1874 2,253  10  .44 

In  1875 2,204  15  .68 

In  1876 2,168  6  .27 

In  1877 2,151  14  .65 

In  1878 2,157  6  .27 

In  1879 2,153  5  .23 

In  1880 2,155  7  .32 

In  1881.  .r 2,155  3  .13 

When  the  legal,  medical  and  other  professions  shall 
have  proceeded  as  vigorously  and  openly  in  purging 
themselves  as  the  Army  has,  and  when  merchants, 
bankers,  brokers  and  even  newspapers  have  done  the 
same,  we  shall  be  better  able  to  judge  whether  it  is 
true  of  the  Army  "that  there  is  no  profession  or 
branch  of  business  in  which  such  a  large  proportion 
of  its  members  and  followers  "  are  in  fact  unfaithful 
and  unworthy.  The  military  service  is  governed  by 
stringent  Jaws  and  rules  not  applicable  to  other  pro- 
fessions and  branches  of  business.  It  is  a  merit  pecul- 
iar to  that  service  that  the  "unfaithful  and  unworthy  " 
are  not  only  u  found,"  but  are  legally  and  publicly 
tried  and  condemned  by  the  profession  itself  and  are 
promptly  and  adequately  punished  in  all  cases,  except 
those  in  which  the  Executive  clemency  is  interposed. 
A  list  of  dismissals  affords  a  bad  record  for  the  honor 
of  the  officers  included  in  the  list,  but  as  proof  that 
the  Army  finds  and  casts  out  the  unworthy  members 
the  record  is  certainly  a  good  one  for  the  "  boasted 
honor"  of  the  Army  itself.—  World,  May  16,  1881. 


ARTICLE  VIII. 

A  Military  Court  of  Appeals. 

Colonel  Lieber,  Judge  Advocate,  is  one  of  the  best 
authorities  on  military  law.  He  holds  that  military 
obedience  "  can  only  be  enforced  by  prompt  punish- 
ment ;  that  the  recognition  of  this  has  led  to  a  depar- 
ture from  the  ordinary  forms  of  trial,  and  to  the  build- 
ing up  of  a  new  system  for  the  very  purpose  of  having 
one  sufficiently  summary  in  its  nature;  that  in  carrying 
out  this  object,  a  common  law,  military,  has  grown  up 
of  necessity,  to  a  large  extent,  at  variance  with  the 
common  law,  civil,"  etc. ;  that  u  military  law  is  founded 
upon  the  idea  of  a  departure  from  the  civil  law  and 
should  not  become  a  sacrifice  to  principles  of  civil 
jurisprudence  at  variance  with  its  object";  that  "the 
fundamental  principle  of  a  code  of  military  punish- 
ments is  the  enforcement  of  prompt  obedience  by  prompt 
punishment"  and  he  adds:  " Because  we  have  made 
progress  in  the  amelioration  of  punishment,  we  must 
not,  however,  jump  to  the  conclusion  that  this  includes 
delay  in  its  execution."  .  .  .  "  The  admission  of 
new  features  favoring  delay  is  inconsistent  with  the 
object,"  etc. 

These  propositions  admit  of  some  explanation  or 
qualification.  They  do  not  justify  the  conclusion  that 
the  efficacy  of  military  punishment  depends  on  its 
promptness  alone.  The  claim  in  favor  of  promptness 
is,  of  course,  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  finding 

182 


A  MILITARY  COURT  OF  APPEALS.  183 

is  correct.  The  proceedings  of  courts-martial  should 
be  sound  as  well  as  summary.  Inasmuch  as  the  mili- 
tary is  a  more  arbitrary  and  despotic  system  than  the 
civil,  so  is  uniform  and  even-handed  justice  the  more 
necessary  in  it. 

The  claim  in  favor  of  prompt  punishment  is  a  claim 
for  prompt  proceedings  and  true  findings.  The  amel- 
ioration of  punishment  is  due  to  progress  in  enlighten- 
ment. Promptness  in  military  punishment  is  a  feature 
designed  to  increase  the  exemplary  effect  by  adding  to 
the  terror  of  the  infliction.  But  in  the  Army  as  well 
as  out  of  it,  government  through  terror  is  gradually 
yielding  to  the  control  of  a  higher  sense  of  justice. 
Promptness  must  now  submit  to  all  the  delay  which 
legally  constituted  authority  finds  necessary  to  the 
ascertainment  of  truth  according  to  the  highest  lights 
of  the  time.  It  is  not  so  important  that  the  punish- 
ment be  prompt  as  that  it  be  inevitable.  That,  nowa- 
days cannot  be,  until  guilt  is  clearly  established.  The 
practical  question,  therefore,  is  :  What  shall  be  the 
procedure  to  attain  this  end  ?  Colonel  Lieber  says : 
"  Military  law,  like  other  sciences,  is  progressive.  It 
is  not  a  stagnant  pool.  But  it  has,  by  virtue  of  its  na- 
ture, been  to  a  large  extent  progressive  within  its  own 
sphere  independently  of  others." 

The  science  of  Military  Law  is  progressive,  and  so  is 
the  science  of  Civil  Law  in  a  greater  degree  and  in  a 
larger  field.  If  progress  in  the  science  of  civil  law  has 
brought  to  light  principles  or  modes  of  procedure 
which  are  essential  to  the  ascertainment  of  truth,  they 
could  not  be  "  at  variance  with  the  objects  of  the  Mili- 
tary Code,*'  and  they  ought  to  be  applied  to  it.  Any 


184  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

lack  of  promptness  in  punishment  which  might  result, 
would  be  outweighed  by  the  increased  chance  of  cer- 
tainty of  just  punishment. 

It  is  probably  in  deference  to  a  deeply-seated  con- 
viction that  all  available  means  of  ascertaining  truth 
are  not  invariably  resorted  to  by  courts-martial — that 
their  findings  and  sentences  are  so  often  interfered 
with  by  the  legislative  and  executive  branches  of  our 
Government.  The  President  and  Congress  are  the 
only  sources  of  appeal  in  such  cases.  They  often  re- 
ceive evidence  which  satisfies  them  that  the  findings  of 
courts-martial  are  not  just.  The  fact  that  the  proceed- 
ings were  summary  and  the  punishment  prompt,  is 
usually  a  point  in  favor  of  the  complainant,  and  thus, 
promptness — on  the  presumption  that  it  has  interfered 
with  justice — tends  to  defeat  the  good  effect  which  it 
is  designed  to  secure.  The  certainty  of  punishment  is 
overthrown  by  doubts  which  might  be  forestalled  by 
less  promptness.  Cases  are  reopened  which  were  sup- 
posed to  be  closed,  and  are  retried  by  tribunals  with- 
out legal  power  and  without  judicial  modes  of  pro- 
cedure. This  is  probably  more  injurious  to  the  Ser- 
vice than  less  promptness  and  unquestionable  judicial 
proceedings  would  be. 

During  the  past  eighteen  months,  bills  or  resolu- 
tions have  been  introduced  in  the  U.  S.  Senate  or 
House  for  the  restoration  of  about  thirty-six  officers 
of  the  Army  who  have  been  dismissed  by  sentences 
of  courts-martial.  There  are  now  on  the  rolls  of  the 
Army  eight  officers  who  were  dismissed  by  sentences 
of  courts-martial,  and  after  remaining  out  of  service 
for  some  time,  were  re-instated  by  special  Acts  of 


A  MILITARY  COURT  OF  APPEALS.          185 

Congress,  and  eight  similarly  dismissed  who  were 
reinstated  or  reappointed  by  the  President.  These 
facts  suggest  the  inquiries:  Is  not  the  progress  of 
military  law  kept  rather  too  closely  "  within  its 
own  sphere "  for  our  Republic,  by  continuing  to  re- 
gard our  ordinary  courts-martial  as  courts  of  final 
jurisdiction  in  cases  of  sentences  to  death,  or  dismissal 
of  officers  ?  Could  we  introduce  to  advantage  a  Su- 
preme Court-martial  with  final  jurisdiction  in  such 
cases,  by  appeal  from  lower  tribunals  of  military 
justice  ? 

Congress  can  "  raise  and  support  armies,"  and 
"make  rules  for  the  government  of  the  land  and 
naval  forces." 

Courts-martial  are  what  Congress  chooses  to  make 
them  under  this  provision  of  the  Constitution.  At 
present  they  are  regarded  as  courts  of  final  jurisdic- 
tion, but  they  are  not  so  in  fact.  Appeals  from  them 
are  entertained,  as  already  stated,  both  by  the  execu- 
tive and  legislative  branches  and  by  both  are  their 
findings  set  aside.  Not  only  this,  but  after  courts- 
martial  have  been  dissolved,  new  tribunals  (as  in  the 
Hammond  and  Fitz-John  Porter  cases)  have  been  con- 
stituted, for  the  purpose  of  rehearing  questions  long 
before  settled  by  defunct  courts.  In  the  light  of  these 
facts  the  question  is  repeated,  would  it  be  wise  and  prac- 
ticable for  the  law-making  power  to  create  a  Military 
Court  of  Appeal  and  final  jurisdiction  in  the  cases 
which  the  Articles  of  War  now  require  shall  go  before 
the  President  for  confirmation  ? 

One  of  the  earliest  codes  of  war,  if  not  the  first 
formal  code,  was  that  published  to  his  army  by  Gus- 


186 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


tavus  Adolphus  in  1620,  and  printed  in  English  in 
1639  in  Ward's  "  Animadversions  of  Warre."  Among 
its  articles  creating  courts-martial,  is  one  establishing 
a  military  court  of  appeal.  It  is  in  the  following 
terms : 

"151.  All  questions  in  like  manner  happening 
betwixt  officers  and  their  souldiers,  if  they  suspect 
our  lower  court  to  be  partiall  any  way,  then  may  they 
appeale  unto  our  highest  court  who  shall  decide  the 
matter." 

As  this  article  was  abandoned  long  before  our  day, 
it  of  course  could  not  be  offered  as  a  strong  argument 
in  support  of  introducing  now  a  similar  practice  to  the 
one  it  prescribed.  But  it  is  the  purpose  of  this  paper 
merely  to  present  a  subject  for  consideration — not  to 
advocate  it.  The  old  article  is  therefore  quoted  for 
what  it  is  worth,  with  the  remark  that  the  abandon- 
ment of  a  liberal  measure  in  the  armies  of  Europe  is 
not  sufficient  proof  that  it  would  not  suit  our  Service 
if  given  a  fair  trial. 

To  render  the  change  under  consideration  effect- 
ive, it  would  be  necessary  to  transfer  by  law  to  the 
Supreme  Court-martial  the  power  to  confirm  sentences 
which  the  Articles  of  War  now  confer  on  the  Presi- 
dent. 

"  For  the  general  safety,"  Macaulay  says :  "  A 
summary  jurisdiction  of  terrible  extent  must  in  camp 
be  entrusted  to  rude  tribunals,  composed  of  men  of 
the  sword."  In  view  of  this,  the  Articles  of  War  con- 
tain severe  and  specific  penalties  for  the  grave  offences 
of  soldiers.  For  some,  death,  and  for  others,  dismissal 
is  the  penalty  fixed  by  tlie  laiv.  The  discretion  of 


A  MILITARY  COURT  OF  APPEALS.  187 

courts-martial  in  those  cases  is  limited  to  the  question 
"  Guilty  or  not  guilty  ? "  Dealing  with  the  one  matter 
of  dismissal  (which  it  is  the  aim  of  this  article  to  treat), 
we  find  that  it  is  required  by  the  law,  in  case  of  any 
officer  who  takes  a  bribe,  who  knowingly  makes  a 
false  muster  or  a  false  return,  who  is  found  drunk  on 
guard,  party,  or  other  duty,  who  is  guilty  of  conduct 
unbecoming  an  officer  and  a  gentleman,  and  so  on  with 
several  other  offences.  Stringent  provisions  in  the 
Articles  of  War,  and  rigid  enforcement  of  them  are 
necessary  to  prevent  insubordination  which  would  not 
only  destroy  the  usefulness  of  the  Army,  but  might  in 
critical  times,  endanger  the  public  freedom. 

The  purpose  of  the  law  to  preserve  the  discipline 
and  purity  of  the  Service  is  shown  not  only  by  the  pro- 
visions which  require  that  unworthy  officers  be  thrust 
out,  but  is  clearly  exhibited  in  the  3d  Article,  which 
makes  it  a  dismissable  offence  for  any  officer  to  bring 
unworthy  men  into  the  ranks  by  enlisting  intoxicated 
persons,  deserters  from  the  military  or  naval  service, 
or  any  person  who  has  been  "  convicted  of  any  infam- 
ous criminal  offence."  It  is  doing  quite  as  much  vio- 
lence to  the  policy  of  the  law  to  retain  or  reappoint 
an  officer  guilty  of  being  drunk  on  duty,  as  it  is  to  en- 
list an  intoxicated  man  as  a  private  soldier. 

A  good  deal  of  complaint  is  made  of  the  power  exer- 
cised by  the  President  in  remitting  or  mitigating  sen- 
tences of  dismissal  which  go  before  him  for  confirma- 
tion as  required  by  the  106th  Article  of  War,  which 
says :  "  In  time  of  peace,  no  sentence  of  a  court-martial, 
directing  the  dismissal  of  an  officer,  shall  be  carried 
into  execution  until  it  shall  have  been  confirmed  by 


188 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


the  President."  All  the  power  to  mitigate  which  the 
Commander-in-Chief  has,  as  such,  is  conferred  and  reg- 
ulated by  Congress.  It  is  more  restricted  in  the  Ar- 
ticles governing  the  Army,  than  in  those  governing  the 
Navy,  and  is  distinct  from  the  constitutional  pardon- 
ing power  of  the  President.  In  illustration  of  this,  a 
case  of  dismissal  from  the  Navy  may  be  mentioned  in 
which  the  Attorney-General  of  the  United  States  said  :: 
"  It  is  not  necessary  to  go  into  consideration  of  the  na- 
ture or  extent  of  the  pardoning  power  conferred  upon 
the  President  by  the  Constitution,  because  the  whole 
question  in  this  case  may  be  regarded  as  fully  disposed 
of  by  the  Act  of  Congress  approved  on  the  23d  day  of 
April,  1800,  entitled  '  An  Act  for  the  better  govern- 
ment of  the  Navy  of  the  United  States.'  By  the  42d 
Article  it  is  provided  that  '  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  or  when  the  trial  takes  place  out  of  the  United 
States,  the  commander  of  the  fleet  or  squadron,  shall 
possess  full  power  to  pardon  any  offence  committed 
against  these  Articles  after  conviction,  or  mitigate  the 
punishment  decreed  by  a  court-martial.'  The  sen- 
tence in  the  present  case,  of  dismissal  f  ro7n  the  service, 
was  punishment  decreed  by  the  court-martial ;  and 
the  power  of  the  President  to  mitigate  this  punishment 
was  as  full  and  ample  as  Congress,  by  any  act  of  leg- 
islation in  the  most  unrestricted  terms,  can  confer" 
(op:  V.,p.  43.) 

The  court-martial  record,  in  case  of  dismissal  in  the 
Army,  goes  before  the  President  in  his  capacity  of  Com- 
mander-in- Chief,  and,  under  the  106th  Article  of  War, 
he  acts  on  it  in  that  capacity,  though  the  act  is  a  judi- 
cial one;  "The  powers  and  duties  of  the  President  as. 


A  MILITARY  COURT  OF  APPEALS.  189 

Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy  [says  Tif- 
fany in  his  work  on  "  Government  and  Constitutional 
Law  "]  are  separate  and  distinct  from  his  powers  and 
duties  as  the  simple  executive  head  of  the  nation. 
Neither  of  those  functions  of  the  presidential  office 
derives  any  strength  from  the  other." 

In  all  ordinary  cases  military  commanders  who  have 
power  to  approve  and  execute  sentences,  have  power 
to  remit  or  mitigate  them,  but  dismissal  forms  an  ex- 
ception. Here  the  112th  Article  of  War  steps  in  and 
says :  "  Every  officer  who  is  authorized  to  order  a  gen- 
eral court-martial,  shall  have  power  to  pardon  or  miti- 
gate any  punishment  adjudged  by  it,  except  the  punish- 
ment of  death  or  dismissal  of  an  officer" 

This  gives  rise  to  a  question  whether  strict  construc- 
tion of  the  106th  Article,  in  connection  with  the  112th 
just  quoted,  does  not  require  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
as  such,  merely  to  confirm  or  not  confirm  in  those  cases 
where  the  law — limiting  the  power  of  the  court  to  say 
guilty,  or  not  guilty — has  specifically  fixed  dismissal 
as  the  penalty,  and  where  the  purpose  of  the  penalty 
is  so  important  and  so  clearly  set  forth.  If  he  con- 
firms the  sentence  it  would  seem  that  his  power 
over  the  case  as  Cornmander-in-Chief  ends,  and  the 
offender  stands  dismissed  by  the  law.  But  just  -here, 
in  practice,  another  authority  comes  in.  It  is  the  par- 
doning power  of  the  Chief  Executive ;  and  notwith- 
standing the  fact  that  the  powers  and  duties  of  the 
President  as  Commander-in-Chief  and  as  Chief  Execu- 
tive are  separate  and  distinct,  they  become  mixed  in 
the  cases  under  consideration,  and  we  find  such  records 
as  the  following  in  relation  to  an  officer  sentenced  to 


190  MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 

dismissal  for  drunkenness  on  duty  and  conduct  unbe- 
coming an  officer  and  a  gentleman  :  "  The  President 17 
(as  Comniander-m-Chief)  "  approves  the  proceedings, 
findings  and  sentence,  but  is  pleased "  (no  doubt  as 
Chief  Executive  with  the  pardoning  power)  "  to  com- 
mute the  sentence  to  suspension  for  one  year  from 
rank  and  command  and  from  pay,  except  $50  per 
month."  It  will  be  remembered  that  if  a  sentence  of 
dismissal  from  the  Army  is  confirmed  by  the  Corn- 
mander-in-Chief,  the  law  intends  to  dismiss  the  ac- 
cused, and  it  denies  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  as 
such  (112th  Article),  the  power  to  mitigate.  The 
President  is  required  by  the  Constitution  to  "take 
care  that  the  laws  be  faithfully  executed."  The  law 
says  that  in  such  a  case  as  the  one  just  quoted  the 
offender  shall  be  dismissed.  But  the  Constitution 
gives  the  Chief  Executive  the  power  to  pardon,  which 
includes  partial  pardon,  or  mitigation. 

Tiffany  says :  "  The  propriety  of  pardoning  a  crim- 
inal after  he  has  been  convicted  of  a  crime  against  the 
public  has  been  seriously  questioned  by  learned  and 
able  men."  ("  Tiffany  on  Government  and  Constitu- 
tional Law,"  page  332.)  "  The  legislative  authority 
which  creates  an  offence  or  crime  and  announces  its 
penalty  can  repeal  or  modify  the  law  at  pleasure ;  can 
excuse  the  delinquent  upon  such  conditions  as  it  sees 
fit  to  impose.  But  this  authority  has  its  foundation 
in  prerogative,  not  in  executive  power.  It  can  be  exer- 
cised by  the  Sovereign,  not  by  the  mere  Executive" 
(Ibid.)  "  If  the  operation  of  the  law  is  to  be  sus- 
pended, it  is  the  province  of  the  law-making  authority 
to  suspend  it,  not  of  him  who  is  entrusted  with  the 


A  MILITARY  COUET  OF  APPEALS.  191 

exercise  of  mere  executive  powers,  with  the  authority 
attendant  to  reprieve  or  pardon  those  who  are  con- 
demned and  put  into  his  hands  to  receive  the  pen- 
alty." (Ibid.) 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court 
has  decided  in  relation  to  the  pardoning  power,  that, 
"  This  power  of  the  President  is  not  subject  to  legis- 
lative control.  Congress  can  neither  limit  the  effect 
of  his  pardon,  nor  exclude  from  its  exercise  any  class 
of  offenders.  The  benign  prerogative  of  mercy  re- 
posed in  him  cannot  be  fettered  by  any  legislative 
restrictions."  (Ex-parte  Garland  v.  Wallace,  K.  333, 
380.) 

And  Pomeroy  says :  "  Is  any  legislative  action 
needed  to  aid  the  President,  or  can  any  legislative 
action  restrain  him  in  the  exercise  of  his  function  ? 
Plainly  not.  Pardoning  is  clearly  a  kind  of  executing, 
not  of  making  laws.  As  far  as  authority  is  conferred 
upon  the  Chief  Magistrate,  it  can  neither  be  extended 
nor  limited  by  Congress.  A  statute  passed  to  give 
construction  to  the  Constitution,  and  to  confine  its 
operation  to  particular  classes  of  pardons,  would  be  a 
palpable  usurpation  of  the  judicial  functions.  Thus 
an  Act  of  Congress  which  should  take  away  the  Pres- 
ident's power  to  grant  constitutional  pardons,  or  to 
grant  pardons  before  trial,  would  be  absolutely  void." 
("Pomeroy  on  Constitutional  Law,"  page  465.) 

It  is  manifest  that  the  President  finds  it  impracti- 
cable in  the  cases  we  are  considering  to  exercise  both 
constitutional  functions — take  care  that  the  law  re- 
quiring dismissal  is  faithfully  executed,  and  after- 
wards, if  he  is  so  inclined,  apply  pardon  to  so  much 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

of  the  punishment  as  pardon  may  be  able  to  reach. 
In  this  view  of  the  position  in  which  the  President  is 
placed,  we  are  brought  back  to  the  question ;  Would 
it  be  well  for  the  law  to  transfer  the  confirming  power 
to  a  Supreme  Court-martial,  and  leave  the  President 
to  exercise,  in  these  cases,  merely  the  constitutional 
pardoning  power  ?  In  the  present  system  in  which 
power  to  confirm  is  given  to  the  President  by  law, 
and  power  to  pardon  by  the  Constitution,  his  duty  as 
Comniander-in-Chief,  and  his  duty  as  Chief  Executive 
are  not  only  commingled,  but  too  much  prominence 
and  facility  seem  to  accrue  to  the  pardoning  branch. 
Every  case  of  dismissal  going  before  the  President  as 
Commander-in-Chief  for  confirmation  is  by  that  very 
fact — as  part  of  the  trial  under  the  law — thrust  upon 
his  attention  as  a  question  of  pardon  under  the  Con- 
stitution. In  this  respect  the  offender  against  the 
military  law  has  a  better  chance  to  escape  punishment 
than  the  offender  against  the  civil  law,  notwithstand- 
ing it  is  admitted  that  the  just  punishment  of  the  for- 
mer should  be  more  prompt,  severe  and  certain  than 
of  the  latter. 

It  is  true  that  the  power  of  Congress  and  the  Presi- 
dent's pardoning  power  would  exist  with  a  Military 
Court  of  Appeal,  just  as  they  do  without  it,  but  the 
temptation  and  the  opportunity  to  exercise  these 
powers  would  be  materially  reduced.  Moreover,  the 
rights  of  the  accused  must  be  fully  weighed.  The 
sentences  of  dismissal  awarded  by  courts-martial  are 
sometimes  wrong.  While  the  President's  pardoning 
power,  or  an  Act  of  Congress,  may  prevent  some  of 
the  consequences  of  the  wrong,  neither  the  President 


A  MILITARY  COURT  OF  APPEALS.  193 

nor  Congress  can  proceed  judicially  in  ascertaining 
the  truth,  nor  can  they  rectify  the  wrong.  That  could 
-only  be  done  fully,  on  ascertainment  of  truth  through 
a  judicial  tribunal,  created  and  empowered  for  such 
cases.  Do  we  need  one  ? 

The  sentence  of  dismissal  (with  which  we  are  deal- 
ing, as  the  matter  of  practical  importance)  is  blasting 
in  its  consequences.  It  involves  loss  of  profession, 
loss  of  pay,  and  loss  of  reputation.  The  same  "  rude 
tribunal"  which  has  had  final  jurisdiction  of  it  for 
centuries,  has  it  still.  Yet,  as  we  are  told,  and  admit, 
"  Military  law  is  not  a  stagnant  pool.  Within  its 
own  sphere  it  is  progressive."  Will  that  progress 
justify  the  establishment  of  a  Military  Court  of  Ap- 
peal as  a  remedy  for  the  evils  which  have  been  indi- 
cated ?  Would  the  remedy  be  worse  than  the  disease? 
Military  punishment  should  be  prompt,  but  it  must  be 
just.  Taking  things  as  they  are  in  our  Service  would 
delay  in  final  action  in  cases  of  dismissal  be  increased 
or  reduced,  by  having  a  Court  of  Appeal,  with  all  the 
finality  of  jurisdiction  that  law  could  confer  upon  it? 
Neither  the  legislative  nor  the  executive  branch  of  the 
G-overnment  is  disposed  to  violate  its  trust  in  the  ac- 
tion of  which  we  hear  so  much  complaint  concerning 
dismissals.  They  merely  grope  for  justice,  which  -such 
a  tribunal  as  that  under  consideration  might  make  so 
•clear  as  to  prevent  their  interference,  or  at  least  so 
probable  as  to  give  them  good  grounds  for  declining 
to  interfere.* 

*  Now  as  to  the  court-martial  question  alluded  to  by  Senator  Harri- 
son in  referring  to  the  appeals  to  him.  It  must  be  remembered  that  a 
court-martial  must  consist  of  thirteen  members  and  its  findings  be  ap- 
proved by  the  President.  I  am  quite  willing  to  see  a  court  of  appeals 


194  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

on  courts-martial  established.  It  would  settle  a  great  many  vexed 
questions  and  give  a  legitimate  channel  for  subsequent  operations  in- 
stead of  those  who  make  the  laws  being  told  the  findings  are  all  wrong 
by  some  fellow  working  up  his  own  case  on  ex-parte  statements. — Gen. 
Sherman's  remarks  to  graduating  class  at  West  Point,  June  12,  1882 
(Neiv  York  Herald). 

The  Times  of  to-day,  in  an  editorial  headed  "Gen.  Swaim's  Case," 
points  out  with  clearness  and  force  the  ' '  juggling  of  words  ' '  by  the 
court-martial  when  it  substituted  "wrong"  for  u  fraud."  "This," 
you  say,  ' '  is  quibbling  unworthy  of  a  judicial  body,  most  of  all  a  court- 
martial."  That  is  quite  true,  but  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that 
courts-martial  do  not  belong  to  the  judicial  system,  and  are  not  in  fact 
judicial  bodies.  They  are  founded  on  the  constitutional  power  of  Con- 
gress to  "  raise  and  support  armies,"  and  "  make  rules  for  their  govern- 
ment and  regulation,"  and  are  created  as  provided  by  the  Articles  of 
War,  not  by  laws  concerning  the  judiciary.  They  are  not  designed  to 
violate  the  principles  of  justice,  but  to  secure  the  most  rigid  and  sum- 
mary enforcement  of  them.  They  are,  however,  merely  instruments 
which  the  law  authorizes  military  commanders  to  use  as  their  auxilia- 
ries in  establishing  and  maintaining  discipline,  good  order,  etc. ,  in  the 
land  and  naval  forces.  From  the  nature  of  these  tribunals  and  the  fact 
that  they  are  composed  of  officers  taken  in  turn  or  by  chance,  without 
regard  to  their  qualifications  for  such  service,  it  is  not  strange  that  the 
judicial  mind  of  the  country  is  sometimes  amazed  and  horrified  at  their 
judgments  in  important  cases.  Extraordinary  as  their  judgments  are 
in  some  instances,  it  has  been  held  by  high  authorities  that  the  findings 
of  courts-martial  are  final.  The  sounder  view,  it  seems  to  me,  is  that 
they  are  final  only  in  the  sense  that  there  is  no  appointed  tribunal  to 
which  it  is  expressly  provided  an  appeal  can  be  taken.  Neither  Con- 
gress nor  either  branch  of  it  can  properly  assume  to  be  a  court  of  ap- 
peal and  revise  to  acquit  or  revise  to  convict  a  man  tried  by  court-mar- 
tial ;  but  there  is  nothing  in  the  Constitution,  nor  in  the  decisions  of 
the  courts,  nor  in  the  terms  or  policy  of  the  laws  which  forbids  the 
Government  to  correct  a  manifest  and  flagrant  wrong  involved  in  the 
sentence  of  a  court-martial.  If,  for  example,  the  court-martial  should, 
through  a  mistake  of  identity,  sentence  the  wrong  man  to  be  shot,  his 
execution  would  not  be  imperative  because  the  judgments  of  courts 
martial  are  technically  final.  Permit  me,  further,  to  file  an  exception 
to  a  statenlent  by  the  President  in  his  remarks  upon  the  Swaim  case. 
Regarding  the  vacancy  in  the  Army  which  Swaim's  displacement  from 
his  present  office  would  create,  the  President  says :  ' '  The  constitutional 
power  of  the  Executive  in  filling  vacancies  cannot  be  restricted  to  indi- 


A  MILITARY  COURT  OP  APPEALS.  195 

viduals."  No  one  has  ever  contested  the  right  of  Congress  to  regulate 
promotions  in  the  Army  by  virtue  of  its  constitutional  power  to  ' '  make 
rules  for  the  government  and  regulation  of  the  land  and  naval  forces. '  * 
It  is  a  fact  settled  by  the  courts,  by  the  executive  and  legislative  de- 
partments, and  by  custom  that  a  promotion  in  the  Army  is  an  "  ap- 
pointment." Regulating  promotion  by  law  is  nothing  less  than  re- 
stricting the  President  to  individuals  in  filling  vacancies  in  the  Army. 
It  is  a  right  Congress  always  has  exercised  and  always  ought  to  exer- 
cise. 

JAMES  B.  FRY,  United  States  Army. 
NEW  YORK,  Feb.  25,  1885. 

— N.  Y.  Times,  Feb.  27,  1885. 


ARTICLE  IX. 

An  Elastic  Regular  Army.* 

The  subject  of  reorganizing  the  Army  has  been  un- 
der consideration  for  years  and  is  yet  pending  in  Con- 
gress. The  discussion  has  brought  forth  a  variety  of 
opinions  on  minor  points,  but  it  is  admitted  on  all 
hands  that  our  companies  now  contain  so  few  enlisted 
men  as  to  make  it  impossible  for  them  to  perform 
efficiently  their  current  duties,  and  keep  pace  with  the 
progress  of  the  military  profession.  This  defect  is 
aggravated  by  the  fact  that  the  companies  are  scat- 
tered among  many  stations ;  but  even  if  the  number  of 
posts  should  be  reduced  it  would  not  be  removed. 
The  companies  are  too  small  to  work  upon  effectively 
for  purposes  of  military  instruction.  The  only  remedy 
is  to  increase  the  number  of  enlisted  men  in  each  com- 
pany. But  instead  of  being  willing  to  increase  the 
strength  of  the  Army,  Congress  has  evinced  a  dispo- 
sition to  reduce  it,  and  has  emphatically  refused  to 
oarry  the  aggregate  beyond  the  twenty-five  thousand 
men  at  present  authorized. 

The  problem,  therefore,  of  augmenting  the  strength 
of  the  companies  admits  of  but  little  manipulation. 

As  the  number  of  men  for  the  entire  Army  cannot 
be  increased,  the  number  of  companies  must  be  re- 
duced. When  this  reduction  in  the  number  of  com- 
panies is  made,  and  the  strength  of  each  is  increased 

*  Tfie  Field  Glass,  September,  1879. 

196 


AN  ELASTIC  EEGULAB  ARMY.  197 

in  a  corresponding  ratio,  it  makes  no  material  differ- 
ence in  the  instruction  of  the  troops,  or  the  perform- 
ance of  their  duties,  either  in  peace  or  war,  whether 
the  companies  are  thrown  into  regiments  of  ten  com- 
panies or  into  battalions  of  four  companies. 

When  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  broke  out  in  1861, 
the  infantry  in  our  regular  army  consisted  of  ten  regi- 
ments of  ten  companies  each.  The  exigency  of  public 
affairs  necessitated  an  increase  of  this  force,  and,  at 
the  instance,  mainly,  of  Major-General  McDowell,  the 
increase  was  made  by  creating  nine  new  regiments  of 
infantry,  each  regiment  consisting  of  not  less  than  two 
nor  more  than  three  battalions,  each  battalion  consist- 
ing of  eight  companies,  thus  introducing  the  form  of 
organization  proposed  at  present  by  the  advocates  of 
an  elastic  system. 

These  nine  regiments  remained  in  service  with  the 
above-described  organization  until  1866.  That  is  to 
say,  we  had  during  the  entire  civil  war  ten  regi- 
ments of  infantry,  of  ten  companies  each,  under  the 
present  regimental  plan  of  organization,  and  nine 
under  the  battalion  organization  now  proposed  for  re- 
adoption. 

As  these  battalions  continued  from  the  beginning 
to  the  close  of  the  war,  there  is  good  reason  to"  sup- 
pose that  their  particular  form  of  organization  was 
fairly  tested.  It  probably  received  no  special  favors, 
but  was  simply  tried  upon  its  merits.  The  result  was 
that  when  the  Army  was  reorganized  in  1866,  the  bat- 
talion plan  was  abandoned  without  a  protest  or  mur- 
mur, and  the  entire  infantry  force  was  remodelled  on 
the  former,  and  present,  regimental  non-elastic  basis. 


198  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

The  subject,  however,  of  battalion  organization  has 
recently  been  brought  again  into  notice. 

There  has  certainly  been  nothing  in  our  own  expe- 
rience since  its  abandonment  in  1866  to  afford  proofs 
of  the  wisdom  of  returning  to  it  now.  The  fact  that 
it  is  in  use  in  foreign  services  has  been  brought  into 
prominence  by  officers  who  have  recently  travelled 
abroad,  but  that  was  well  known  to  us  when  we 
adopted  the  battalion  organization  in  1861,  and  as- 
suredly was  not  forgotten  when  we  discontinued  it  in 
1866.  The  present  effort  to  return  to  it  is  not  made 
upon  the  ground  that  it  will  affect  in  any  important 
way  the  present  duties  of  the  troops,  but  results  from 
the  assumption  that  it  will  make  the  regular  army  so 
elastic  as  to  fit  it  for  expansion  to  meet  the  demands  of 
war,  and  for  contraction  to  accommodate  itself  to  the 
requirements  of  peace. 

It  is,  therefore,  proper  to  consider  the  subject  in  the 
light  of  that  anticipation.  First,  let  us  see  what  is 
proposed  by  the  so-called  "  Burnside  Bill,"  which  is 
the  product  of  a  Joint  Commission  of  the  two  Houses, 
and  which  may  be  regarded  as  the  plan  of  those 
officers  who  advocate  an  elastic  regular  army. 

We  now  have  twenty -five  regiments  of  infantry, 
each  regiment  having  ten  companies ;  ten  regiments 
of  cavalry,  each  with  twelve  companies ;  and  five 
regiments  of  artillery,  each  with  twelve  companies ; 
making  in  all  two  hundred  and  fifty  companies  of 
infantry,  one  hundred  and  twenty  of  cavalry,  and 
sixty  of  artillery. 

The  "  reorganization "  proposes  that  there  shall  be 
eighteen  regiments  of  infantry,  each  regiment  to  have 


AN  ELASTIC  REGULAR  AKMY.  199 

four  battalions  of  four  companies  each ;  eight  regi- 
ments of  cavalry,  each  to  have  four  battalions  of  four 
troops  each  ;  and  five  regiments  of  artillery,  each  to 
have  four  battalions  of  four  companies  each.  The 
third  battalion  of  each  regiment  to  have  its  officers, 
but  no  enlisted  men,  and  the  fourth  battalion  to  have 
neither  officers  nor  men.  In  other  words,  the  "  reor- 
ganization "  provides  for  one  hundred  and  forty-four 
companies  of  infantry,  sixty-four  of  cavalry,  and  forty 
of  artillery,  fully  officered  and  manned  ;  seventy-two 
of  infantry,  thirty-two  of  cavalry,  and  twenty  of  artil- 
lery, with  officers,  but  no  men,  and  a  like  number  of 
companies  as  these  last,  with  neither  officers  nor  men. 
While  the  third  battalion  is  a  legal  skeleton,  the 
fourth  is  merely  the  shadow  of  a  skeleton.  It  cannot 
have  any  substance  without  a  law  permitting  it.  In 
other  words,  Congress  is  asked  to  pass  a  bill  author- 
izing some  future  Congress  to  make  a  law  for  increas- 
ing the  Army,  and  prescribing  how  the  increase  shall 
be  made.  Such  legislation  would  seem  rather  unnec- 
essary, and  would  probably  be  fruitless.  The  proposed 
bill  would,  in  the  infantry,  entail  an  increase  in  the 
present  establishment,  of  officers  for  two  companies  to 
each  regiment,  and  in  the  cavalry  and  artillery  it 
would  retain  at  the  public  cost  a  surplus  of  officers 
for  four  companies  to  each  regiment ;  thiis  making 
surplus  one  hundred  and  eight  officers  of  infantry, 
ninety-six  of  cavalry,  and  eighty  of  artillery,  to  be 
maintained  at  large  cost  to  await  emergencies.  Judg. 
ing  from  experience,  the  probabilities  are  that  a  law 
creating  a  surplus  which  might  not  be  needed  for  the 
regular  duties  of  their  offices,  would  speedily  be  fol- 


200  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

lowed  by  another  abolishing  it  entirely,  even  though 
the  supernumeraries  might  be  performing  special  du- 
ties by  detail. 

What  are  the  ultimate  purposes  for  which  it  may 
be  assumed  that  these  additional  battalions  in  the 
elastic  army  are  to  be  called  out  and  applied  ? 

First.  There  are  the  ever-present  hostilities  with  the 
Indian  tribes  on  the  frontiers.  The  elastic  system  can 
scarcely  be  necessary  in  this  connection,  as  the  best 
authorities  agree  that  danger  from  Indians  is  rapidly 
decreasing  from  year  to  year.  The  frontiersmen,  un- 
der the  protection  of  the  Army,  are  spreading  over  the 
whole  Indian  country,  east  and  west  of  the  Rocky 
Mountains,  and  as  they  become  firmly  settled  and 
united,  the  necessity  for  affording  them  military  pro- 
tection will  continue  to  diminish.  There  would  seem 
to  be  no  use  therefore  in  creating  an  expansive  army 
system  for  this  purpose. 

Second.  Is  it  for  the  suppression  of  internal  disor- 
ders and  riots  ?  It  is  generally  admitted  to  be  the 
duty  of  the  States,  not  the  General  Government,  to 
suppress  internal  disturbances ;  but,  granting  for  the 
moment  that  the  regular  army  should  be  organized  so 
as  to  admit  of  expansion  for  this  purpose,  it  needs  no 
argument  to  show  that  elasticity  would  be  of  no  use 
here.  Riots  and  disorders  usually  arise  suddenly,  and 
as  suddenly  collapse.  A  little  reflection,  even  if  we 
had  not  had  experience,  would  demonstrate  the  im- 
practicability, almost  impossibility,  of  expanding  the 
Army  by  enlisting,  organizing,  arming  and  equipping 
companies  after  a  riot  is  started,  or  even  foreseen,  in 
time  to  be  of  any  use  in  quelling  it.  The  memorable 


AN  ELASTIC  KEGULAR  ARMY.  201 

labor  riots  of  the  summer  of  1877  burst  forth  unex- 
pectedly, and  rose  in  a  few  days  to  a  terrible  mag- 
nitude, but  were  on  the  decrease  long  before  new  troops 
for  the  regular  army  could  by  any  possibility  have 
been  raised  to  suppress  them. 

Third.  The  only  other  purpose  is  a  foreign  •war. 
This,  presumably,  is  the  main  object  of  the  proposed 
elastic  system.  But  will  the  expansion  to  the  utmost 
limit  allowed  by  the  proposed  plan  be  of  any  practi- 
cal service  in  this  connection  ?  To  fill  the  third  bat- 
talion of  each  regiment  (which  is  to  be  ready  with  its 
officers,  but  no  men)  would  only  make  an  addition  of 
25  per  cent,  to  the  present  force  of  25,000  men,  and  a 
further  increase,  if  a  law  should  be  enacted  author- 
izing it,  by  filling  the  fourth,  or  paper  battalion, -would 
simply  double  the  present  force,  and  give  us  an  army 
of  fifty  thousand  men. 

At  the  close  of  the  AVar  of  the  Rebellion  we  had  a 
million  of  men  in  arms,  and  even  with  the  large  forces 
in  the  field  at  all  times,  it  was  found  impossible  to 
end  the  war  speedily.  We  have  no  reason  to  suppose 
that  a  war  entered  into  by  us  with  a  foreign  power 
would  not  be  of  the  same  magnitude  as  other  contests 
of  modern  times. 

The  principle  in  war  that  in  order. to  achieve  speedy 
and  satisfactory  results,  large  bodies  of  troops  must 
be  massed,  and  placed  quickly  in  the  field  of  action, 
was  never  of  more  practical  value  than  at  present. 
The  elastic  scheme  proposed,  giving  us  only  fifty 
thousand  men  of  all  arms,  would  fall  far  short  of  meet- 
ing this  requirement. 

Its  insufficiency  is  only  too  apparent  when  consid- 


202 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


ered  in  connection  with  the  chances  of  a  foreign 
war. 

But,  after  all,  and  here  is  the  essential  point,  there 
is  no  way  of  securing  enlisted  men  for  the  proposed 
elastic  army  when  a  necessity  for  expansion  arises. 
Without  attempting  to  convince  by  argument,  a  little 
reflection  will  show  that  in  order  to  insure  certainty 
in  filling  the  ranks  of  a  large  regular  army,  it  would 
be  necessary  to  resort  to  compulsory  service,  or  in 
other  words,  the  draft.  But  that  measure,  obnoxious 
as  a  final  resort,  would  be  actually  impossible  as  a  pri- 
mary or  preliminary  one.  The  first  effort  to  enforce 
upon  the  citizen  military  service  in  the  regular  army 
would  arouse  a  public  sentiment  that  would  compel  a 
call  for  the  national  forces,  as  contemplated  in  our  plan 
of  government,  and  as  has  heretofore  been  done.  In 
fact,  there  is  no  other  way  by  which  we  could  carry  on 
a  great  war,  and  our  experience  from  1861  to  1865 
sufficiently  developed  the  fact  that  the  plan  of  calling 
out  the  national  forces,  and  using  the  regular  army, 
mainly  for  organizing,  supplying  and  instructing  them, 
and  generally  for  leavening  the  whole  lump,  is  the 
best  for  our  purpose. 

The  system  of  an  elastic  regular  army  is  applicable 
to  a  nation  in  which  every  male  is  born  into  the  mili- 
tary service,  and  can  only  absent  himself  from  the  du- 
ties pertaining  thereto,  even  to  attend  to  the  ordinary 
pursuits  of  life,  when,  and  for  as  long  a  time  as  the 
sovereign  pleases.  Such  a  system  is  wholly  unsuited 
to  our  Government,  and  to  our  people  in  their  present 
condition. 

So  far  as  the  United  States  are  concerned,  the  ad- 


AN  ELASTIC  REGULAR  ARMY.  203 

vantages  of  an  elastic  regular  army,  such  as  lias  been 
proposed  for  ours,  are  purely  theoretical.  The  diffi- 
culty of  expanding,  so  as  to  grapple  with  sudden 
emergencies,  would,  as  suggested  in  the  foregoing  re- 
marks, be  very  great ;  but  the  difficulty  in  that  direc- 
tion would  be  no  greater  than  in  the  opposite  one  of 
reduction,  after  an  increase  had  once  been  made.  Con- 
gress has,  especially  since  the  close  of  the  Rebellion, 
had  much  experience  on  this  point,  and  should  be  fully 
able  to  estimate  the  magnitude  of  the  effort  necessary 
to  effect  a  reduction  of  the  Army.  Justice  to  those 
who  render  great  services'  in  time  of  war,  coupled  with 
the  various  personal  questions  which  arise,  makes  this 
a  grave  matter.  There  is  no  more  difficult  and  painful 
task  than  to  dispose  of  the  crop  of  ^heroes  left  by  war. 
The  Government  has  the  power  to  reduce  the  Army 
at  pleasure  without  any  regard  to  the  wishes,  feelings, 
or  positions  of  those  vitally  interested,  but  it  will  be 
conceded  that  sudden  and  frequent  expansions,  fol- 
lowed by  similar  reductions,  of  a  regular  army,  would 
be  very  injurious  to,  if  not  entirely  destructive  of,  its 
military  spirit.  Slow  promotion  in  a  standing  army, 
though  discouraging,  is  bearable,  but  occasional  set- 
backs with  uncertainty  of  tenure  are  fatal. 


ARTICLE  X. 

Admission  to  the  Military  Academy.* 

In  Peace  prepare  for  War  is  a  maxim  as  old  as  war 
itself.  It  is  expressed  in  the  Fable  of  the  Boar 
quietly  whetting  his  tusks,  with  no  enemy  in  sight. 
Ward,  in  his  "Animadversions  of  Warre,"  as  early 
as  1639  heads  a  chapter,  "  It  is  good  in  time  of  peace 
to  provide  for  warre  "  ;  and*,  having  established  that 
proposition,  he  follows  with  a  chapter  entitled  "Of 
the  things  necessarily  to  be  provided  ;  and  first,  of 
1  victuals.'' '  Evidently  he  believed,  as  has  since  been 
said,  an  army  moves  upon  its  belly. 

We  attach  peculiar  importance  to  the  maxim,  be- 
cause the  Father  of  his  Country  transmitted  it  to  us. 
But  to  provide  "  victuals "  beforehand  was  not  the 
preparation  Washington  had  in  mind.  He  deemed 
military  education  a  duty  of  peace  ;  and  in  1793  rec- 
ommended the  creation  of  means  "  for  the  study  of 
those  branches  of  the  art "  (of  war)  "  which  can 
scarcely  ever  be  attained  by  practice  alone."  The 
Military  Academy  grew  out  of  the  necessity  which  he 
experienced  during  the  long  struggle  for  freedom  ;  and 
for  many  years  past  that  Institution  has  been  supply- 
ing with  remarkable  success  the  demands  for  high 
military  education  which  from  time  to  time  have  been 
made  upon  it.  There  is  no  national  institution  of  any 
description  that  has  fulfilled  its  purpose  better,  or  is- 

*  Journal  of  Military  Service  Institution,  1883. 

204 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  205 

more  creditable  to  its  various  managers  than  the  U.  S. 
Military  Academy. 

It  is  with  due  deference  to  this  fact  that  it  is  pro- 
posed to  discuss  the  examination  for  admission  to  it  as 
now  conducted  by  the  authorities.  There  are  but  two 
statutes  on  the  subject  of  the  qualifications  of  candi- 
dates. Section  3,  Act  of  April  29,  1812,  says:  "Each 
cadet  previously  to  his  appointment  by  the  President 
of  the  United.  States  shall  be  well  versed  in  reading, 
writing  and  arithmetic."  This  was  the  whole  law 
upon  the  subject  until  1866.  The  Academy  itself, 
long  prior  to  1866,  had  been  finding  fault  with  the 
quality  of  the  material  admitted  under  the  statute  of 
1812.  It  desired  that  the  standard  for  admission 
should  be  raised,  without,  however,  raising  the  stand- 
ard of  graduation.  In  other  words,  it  was  desired 
that  the  candidate  should  have  more  education  to  get 
in,  but  that  the  graduate  might  go  out  with  about  the 
same  amount  as  formerly.  It  was  not  the  purpose  of 
the  Academy,  however,  to  escape  its  duty  of  giving  a 
thorough  education,  or  even  to  lessen  its  own  labor. 
The  aim,  no  doubt,  was  to  secure  pupils  who,  on  ac- 
count of  their  advanced  preparation,  would  be  more 
likely  to  master  the  military  course  and  turn  out  the 
most  accomplished  graduates. 

In  1866  it  was  enacted  (by  joint  resolution  of  June 
16,  Section  2)  that  "  in  addition  to  the  requirements 
necessary  for  admission,  as  provided  by  Section  3  of 
the  Act  making  further  provision  for  the  Corps  of 
Engineers,  approved  April  29,  1812,  candidates  shall 
be  required  to  have  a  knowledge  of  the  elements  of 
English  grammar,  of  descriptive  geography,  particu- 


206 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


larly  of  our  own  country,  and   of  the  history  of  the 
United  States." 

This  Act  admits  of  great  latitude  in  construction. 
It  requires  "  a  knowledge  of  the  elements  of  English 
grammar,"  etc.,  etc.  What  is  "  a  knowledge,"  and 
what  are  "the  elements,"  are  questions  left  for  decis- 
ion of  the  Academy.  This  law  certainly  raised  the 
standard  of  admission.  It  did  so,  however,  only  by 
exacting  a  knowledge  of  the  elements  of  English 
grammar,  geography,  and  history  of  the  United  States, 
in  addition  to  previous  requirements.  The  Act  of 
1812,  which  requires  merely  that  the  candidate  shall 
be  "  well  versed  in  reading,  writing,  and  arithmetic," 
has  not  been  changed.  No  higher  standard  in  those 
subjects  is  authorized.  But  the  standard  in  them  has 
been  raised.  The  law  simply  requires  that  the  can- 
didate shall  be  well  versed  in  reading,  writing,  and 
arithmetic.  The  Academic  Regulations — construing 
and  enlarging  the  law — say  he  "must  be  able  to 
perform  with  facility  and  accuracy  the  various  oper- 
ations of  the  four  ground  rules  of  arithmetic,  of  reduc- 
tion, of  simple  and  compound  proportion,  and  of  vul- 
gar and  decimal  fractions,"  etc.  The  Regulations  in- 
crease the  severity  of  the  law.  The  Academic  Board 
increases  the  severity  of  the  Regulations.  "  Well 
versed  in  arithmetic"  as  used  in  the  law,  and  as  con- 
strued by  the  Academy  in  early  times,  means  skill  in 
the  handling  of  known  quantities — knowledge  of  the 
rules  of  arithmetic,  doing  sums  in  figures — not  profi- 
ciency in  solving  problems,  involving  unknown  quan- 
tities, and  perhaps  calling  for  the  use  of  letters  and 
signs.  In  short,  the  candidate,  by  the  law,  must  be 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  207 

well  versed  in  arithmetic,  not  algebra.  The  following 
ten  (10)  questions  in  arithmetic  (?)  put  to  candidates 
in  June,  1882,  are  submitted  as  evidence  of  the 
severity  of  the  Academic  Board : 

Time  allowed  three  and  a  half  hours. 

1.  How  many  times  will  £641  14s.  \\\d.  contain  <£2 

15s.  6jrf.  ? 

2.  Find  the  smallest  number  greater  than  3  which, 

divided  by  54,  69  and  132,  will  give  in  each  case 
a  remainder  of  2^. 

3.  On  October  12,  1881,  A  was  33  years,  6  months,  16 

days  old,  and  B  was  42  years,  3  months,  2  days. 
On  what  day  of  the  month  and  year  was  B  ex- 
actly five  times  as  old  as  A,  and  why  did  he  not 
remain  so  ? 

4.  A  does  jo  of  a  piece  of  work  in  14  days;  he  then 

calls  in  B  and  they  finish  the  work  in  2  days.  In 
how  many  days  would  B  have  done  the  work  alone? 

5.  Multiply  4.32  by  .00012. 

6.  Explain  the  reason  for  placing  the  decimal  point  in 

example  5.  (The  rule  for  doing  so  is  not  the 
reason.) 

7.  If  35  men  do  a  piece  of  work  in  24  days,  in  how 

many  days  will  2}  of  that  number  do  a  piece  of 
work  7  £  times  as  great,  providing  the  second  set 
of  men  work  twice  as  fast  as  the  first,  but  only 
wrork  one-third  as  long  in  a  day  ? 

8.  Separate  772f  into  three  numbers,  which  shall  be  in 

the  same  proportion  as  2J,  70  and  5  ? 

9.  How  many  fifteenths  are  there  in  1.03  ? 

10.  At  a  game  of  ball  A  wins  9  games  out  of  15  when 

playing  with   B,  and   16  out  of  25  when  playing 


208  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

against  C.     How  many  games  out  of  118  could 
C  win  playing  against  B  ? 

The  questions  submitted  to  candidates  in  Septem- 
ber, 1882,  were  of  the  same  kind.  Three  of  them 
are  as  follows  : 

"  A  cistern  can  be  filled  by  a  pipe  in  18  minutes,  and 
by  another  in  one -third  of  an  hour,  and  can  be 
emptied  by  a  tap  in  two-thirds  of  an  hour ;  how 
much  of , the  tank  will  be  filled  in  10  minutes,  all 

being  open  ? " 
****** 

"  A  wheel,  five  feet  in  diameter,  makes  2,500  turns  and 
goes  6  miles.  The  circumference  is  3.1416  times 
the  diameter,  how  much  did  the  wheel  lose  by 

turning  around  ? " 
****** 

"The  stage  leaves  Rousley  at  12.30  P.M.,  and  travels 
1 5  miles  in  two  hours.    How  far  can  a  boy  travel 
in  a  stage  so  that  travelling  3J  miles  an  hour  he 
may  reach  Rousley  at  2.45  P.M.?  " 
So  much  for  arithmetic. 

The  law  says  the  candidate  shall  be  "  well  versed 
in  reading  and  writing."  The  Regulations  say  he 
"must  be  able  to  read  and  write  the  English  language 
correctly "  (which  is  more  than  all  college  graduates 
can  do),  and  shall  have  a  knowledge  of  English  gram- 
mar. To  enforce  this  regulation  the  Academic  Board 
divides  grammar  into  three  parts  named  and  valued  as 
follows : 

1st,  Definition,  value  15 

2d,  Parsing,  -        "45 

3d,  Correcting  errors  in  English,       -  "40 

Total,        -        100 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  209 

The  candidate  who  fails  to  get  60  of  the  total  is 
•generally  rejected. 

"  A  knowledge  of  the  elements  "  is  an  elastic  term, 
as  already  stated,  and  it  rests  primarily  with  the  Aca- 
•demic  Board  to  determine  its  scope,  but  statistics 
hereinafter  given,  taken  with  the  foregoing  facts,  indi- 
cate that  the  time  has  come  for  higher  authority  to 
interpret  the  law  and  revise  the  Regulations  on  the 
subject  of  admission.* 

No  classification  of  candidates  by  their  knowledge 
when  entering  is  authorized  or  necessary.  They  are 
arranged  alphabetically  for  beginning  their  academic 
course,  and  their  subsequent  classification  is  wholly 
according  to  merit  as  ascertained  by  examination  in 
the  courses  taught  at  the  Academy.  The  conclusion 
from  the  foregoing  premises  is  that  the  present  system 
of  examination  does  not  conform  to  the  law,  or  at 
least  to  a  proper  interpretation  of  it. 

It  is  maintained,  in  addition  to  this,  that  the  system 
is  not  calculated  to  secure  the  best  results.  It  is  not 
now  and  never  has  been  the  purpose  of  the  Military 
Academy  merely  to  produce  the  Second  Lieutenants 
required  by  the  regular  army.  As  Mr.  McHenry, 
Secretary  of  War,  said,  in  1 800 :  u  It  is  not  enough 
that  the  troops  it  may  be  deemed  proper  to  maintain 
be  rendered  as  perfect  as  possible  in  form,  organiza- 
tion and  discipline ;  the  dignity,  the  character  to  be 
supported,  and  the  safety  of  the  country  further  re- 
quire that  it  should  have  military  instruction  capable 

*  Woolwich  only  requires  of  candidates  ' '  a  competent  knowledge  of 
the  first  four  rules  of  arithmetic,  the  rule  of  three,  the  declination  of 
the  nouns,  and  conjugation  of  verbs  by  the  Latin  grammar."  (Clode's 
"  Forces  of  the  Crown,"  pp.  459,  460.) 


210  MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 

of  perpetuating  the  art  of  war.  Military  science  ought 
to  be  cultivated  with  peculiar  care,  so  that  a  sufficient 
stock  may  always  exist  ready  to  be  imparted  and  dif- 
fused to  any  extent,  and  a  competent  number  of  per- 
sons be  prepared  and  qualified  to  act  as  engineers," 
etc. 

Washington,  in  1796,  urging  that  there  should  be  a 
school  to  keep  the  nation  "  supplied  with  an  adequate 
stock  of  military  knowledge,"  said,  -'The  art  of 
war  is  extensive  and  complicated ;  it  demands  much 
previous  study  ;  the  possession  of  it  in  its  most  iwi- 
proved  and  perfect  state  is  always  of  great  moment  to 
the  security  of  a  nation." 

President  Monroe  said,  in  1822,  "The  Military 
Academy  forms  the  basis  in  regard  to  science  on  which 
the  military  establishment  rests." 

The  various  laws  concerning  the  creation,  organiza- 
tion and  re-organizations  of  the  Military  Academy 
sustain  the  assertion  that  the  main  purpose  of  the  In- 
stitution is  the  one  set  forth  in  the  foregoing  extracts. 
The  Academy,  besides  furnishing  Lieutenants  for  the 
current  duties  of  the  regular  army,  should  keep  the 
nation  supplied  with  persons  thoroughly  educated  and 
acquainted  with  the  "art  of  war"  "in  its  most  ap- 
proved and  perfect  state"  among  whom  men  may  always 
be  found  qualified  for  high  command,  and  for  the 
duties  of  the  artillery,  the  engineers  and  the  staff. 

With  a  view  to  securing  better  material  for  this 
purpose,  the  standard  of  admission  has  been  raised, 
and  the  Academic  Board  about  1870  established  a 
new  method  of  examining  candidates.  Formerly  the- 
candidate  was  examined  orally  and  at  the  black-board, 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  211 

in  the  presence  of  the  whole  faculty.  Sometimes  he 
was  under  the  disadvantage  of  embarrassment,  but 
the  experience,  patience  and  skill  of  the  professors 
overcame  that,  and  disclosed  not  only  how  much  of 
the  subject  upon  which  he  was  examined  the  candi- 
date understood,  but  led  to  a  pretty  close  estimate  of 
the  character  and  calibre  of  his  mind.  An  examina- 
tion conducted  in  this  way  was  thorough,  considerate, 
liberal,  and  resulted  in  well-founded  convictions  and 
comparatively  correct  conclusions.  The  objection  to 
it  was  that  it  exposed  the  Board  to  the  charge  of 
being  influenced  by  feeling  one  way  or  the  other,  and 
of  not  having  an  exact  record  of  the  examinations  with 
which  to  defend  its  action.  It  was  largely,  if  not 
wholly,  a  defensive  measure,  not  in  the  interest  of  the 
candidate,  that  the  Academic  Board  abandoned  that 
system.  Under  the  present  system  the  candidates  are 
(for  examination)  known  to  the  Board  only  by  num- 
bers. Questions  in  the  various  subjects,  written  out 
beforehand,  are  submitted  to  the  candidates,  who, 
under  the  eye  of  an  assistant-professor,  but  without 
aid  or  consultation,  work  for  a  limited  time  to  pro- 
duce the  answers  in  writing.  The  merit  in  these 
answers  is  indicated  by  numbers  fixed  arbitrarily  by 
the  Board. 

If  the  number  received  in  a  subject  does  not  come 
up  to  the  level  prescribed,  the  Board  rejects  without 
learning  any  more  about  the  person  concerned  than 
these  written  questions  and  answers  convey — without, 
in  fact,  knowing  who  the  person  is.  This  has  the 
effect  of  putting  "  cramming  "  at  a  premium,  instead 
of  a  discount,  for  entry  to  the  Institution  in  which 


212 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


cramming  is  most  roundly  condemned  and  most  posi- 
tively interdicted.  This  examination  is  free  from 
partiality  and  prejudice,  and  affords  a  record  made  by 
the  candidate  himself  with  which  the  Board  can  de- 
fend its  action,  and,  in  case  of  complaint,  confuse  and 
confound  the  candidate  and  his  friends.  Nevertheless 
it  is  harsh  and  unwise,  and  is  at  variance  with  the 
mode  of  proceeding  at  all  subsequent  examinations. 
While  (if  the  questions  be  proper)  it  might  be  made 
to  fulfil  the  requirements  of  the  law,  it  is  not  the  way 
to  secure  that  material  to  which  the  course  of  instruc- 
tion at  the  Military  Academy  can  be  applied  with  the 
best  results.  It  gives  no  consideration  to  lack  of  years 
or  lack  of  opportunities  for  schooling.  It  calls  for  as 
much  book  knowledge  from  the  Western  farmer  boy 
of  17  as  from  the  man  of  22  from  Boston,  the  seat  of 
learning.  No  account  is  taken  of  the  fact  that  the 
training  of  the  former  may  have  been  such  as  to  give 
high  development  to  traits  essential  in  the  genuine 
soldier — industry,  energy,  fidelity,  obedience,  courage, 
perseverance,  and  self-reliance.  The  tendency  of  the 
high  standard  of  admission  and  the  present  mode  of 
examination  is  to  discriminate  against  the  poorer  Con- 
gressional Districts  and  Territories,  in  the  enjoyment 
equally  with  the  rich,  of  the  right  of  representation  at 
the  national  Military  Academy.  From  1838  to  1876 
—the  only  period  for  which  statistics  on  this  point 
are  at  hand — the  Academic  Board  rejected  one-third 
of  the  candidates  from  Arkansas,  nearly  one-half  of 
those  from  Colorado,  nearly  one-third  from  Kansas, 
nearly  two-thirds  from  Nevada,  one-half  from  West 
Virginia,  and  five-sixths  from  Idaho  ;  while  for  the 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  213 

same  period  it  rejected  but  little  more  than  one-twelfth 
from  the  District  of  Columbia,  about  one-seventh  from 
Connecticut,  one-tenth  from  Maine,  less  than  one-four- 
teenth from  Massachusetts,  one-thirteenth  from  Rhode 
Island,  less  than  one-twentieth  from  Vermont,  and  less 
than  one-twenty-third  from  New  Jersey.  The  Military 
Academy,  in  a  way  and  degree  peculiar  to  itself, 
develops  the  reasoning  powers  and  gives  scope  and 
grasp  to  the  mind  in  dealing  with  the  various  prob- 
lems of  life  as  they  are  encountered  from  day  to  day. 
This  is  the  merit  of  the  West  Point  system.  Hence 
the  more  of  the  aggregate  knowledge  required  for 
graduation  which  a  pupil  acquires  through  that  system 
the  better  mental  training  he  will  have. 

The  youth  of  true  manliness,  with  mind  enough  to 
master  the  studies,  is  a  better  subject  for  receiving  the 
West  Point  course  in  its  full  force,  if  he  has  just 
enough  education  to  enter,  than  he  would  be  with  a 
greater  amount  of  modern  cramming.*  In  other  words, 
early  cramming  is  opposed  to  the  distinctive  purpose 
of  the  West  Point  system,  which  is  high  development 
of  reasoning  power  and  thorough  understanding  of 
principles. 

Of  the  class  which  entered  in  1839  (Grant's)  the 
Academic  Board  rejected  but  2  out  of  78.  From 
1840  to  1849  the  rejections  by  the  Academic  Board 
ranged  from  zero  to  15£  per  cent.,  the  annual  average 


*  In  a  recent  lecture  for  candidates  for  admission  to  the  India  Civil 
Service,  published  since  this  article  was  prepared,  Prof.  Max  Muller 
says  :  "  That  process  of  cramming  and  crowding  which  has  of  late  been 
brought  to  the  highest  pitch  of  perfection,  instead  of  exciting  an  appe- 
tite for  work,  is  apt  to  produce  an  indifference,  if  not  a  kind  of  intellec- 
tual nausea,  that  may  last  for  life." 


214  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

being  7  per  cent.  The  class  which  entered  in  1849 
had  no  rejections.  It  graduated  McPherson  No.  1, 
Sill  No.  3,  Schofield  No.  7,  Tyler  No.  22,  Sheridan 
No.  34,  and  Hood  No.  44. 

During  the  next  decade  beginning  with  1850  the 
rejections  averaged  12  £  per  cent.,  the  lowest,  3  per 
cent.,  being  in  the  class  which  entered  in  1850.  The 
class  that  entered  in  1850  graduated  G.  W.  C.  Lee 
No.  1,  Abbot  No.  2,  Ruger  No.  3,  Howard  No.  4, 
Pegram  No.  10,  J.  E.  B.  Stuart  No.  13,  Stephen  D. 
Lee  No.  17,  Greble  No.  21,  S.  H.  Weed  No.  27,  and 
B.  F.  Davis  No.  32.  The  greatest  number  of  rejec- 
tions in  the  decade  was  in  the  class  which  entered  in 
1859.  That  class  graduated  Meigs  No.  1,  Michie  No. 
2,  and  Twining  No.  3. 

The  average  percentage  of  rejections  in  the  next 
decade  beginning  with  1860  was  18,  the  smallest  8, 
in  1863,  and  the  largest  30,  in  1868. 

In  the  next  seven  years,  from  1870  to  1876,  the 
average  percentage  rose  to  37,  reaching  the  enormous 
figure  52  in  the  year  1870. 

Prior  to  1866  the  law  did  not  permit  the  examina- 
tion of  candidates  in  grammar,  geography  or  history. 
From  1840  to  1849,  52  persons  were  rejected  ;  of  these 
21  failed  in  reading,  24  in  writing,  21  in  spelling,  and 
52  in  arithmetic.  Many  of  these,  as  indicated  by  the 
figures,  failed  in  more  than  one  subject.  From  1850 
to  1859,  118  persons  were  rejected;  30  failures  in 
reading,  80  in  writing,  85  in  spelling,  and  58  in  arith- 
metic. 

In  the  following  decade  grammar,  geography  and 
history  became  subjects  for  examination,  and  170  re- 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITAKY  ACADEMY.  215 

jections  occurred  ;  46  in  reading,  98  in  writing,  91  in 
spelling,  and  94  in  arithmetic ;  and  although  only 
three  classes  were  examined  under  the  law  adding  the 
new  subjects  above  mentioned,  there  were  50  failures 
in  grammar,  35  in  geography,  and  41  in  history. 

During  the  seven  years  from  1870  to  1876  there 
were  401  rejections  ;  35  in  reading,  165  in  writing, 
165  in  spelling,  161  in  arithmetic,  257  in  grammar, 
204  in  geography,  and  171  in  history. 

There  is  something  startling,  if  not  alarming,  in  the 
rapid  increase  in  rejections,  and  in  the  magnitude  of 
the  final  figures.  The  average  yearly  percentage  of 
rejections  has  gone  up  from  7  in  1840  to  52  in  1870; 
and  the  actual  number  of  persons  turned  away  has 
risen  from  70  for  the  ten  years  from  1840  to  1849,  to 
401  for  the  seven  years  from  1870  to  1876. 

Two  causes  only  could  operate  to  produce  this  re- 
markable result — first,  the  higher  standard  of  admis- 
sion, including  the  introduction  of  new  subjects  and 
the  manner  of  conducting  the  examination  ;  and,  sec- 
ond, inferiority  in  the  candidates  as  compared  with 
their  predecessors.  As  the  means  of  so-called  educa- 
tion have  increased  greatly  during  the  period  under 
consideration,  it  would  seem  that  the  later  candidates 
should  be  better  prepared  than  the  earlier  ones  were. 
If  that  were  so  the  enormous  increase  in  rejections 
would  be  due  wholly  to  the  operation  of  the  law  and 
the  action  of  the  Academy.  But  there  is  good  reason 
to  think  that  in  later  years  candidates  have  not  been 
as  well  qualified  as  formerly.  This  may  be  attributed 
to  the  fact  that  instruction  in  the  ordinary  branches  is 
not  as  thorough  under  the  popular  school  system  of 


216 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


the  present  day  as  it  was  under  the  private  school 
system  of  earlier  times.  It  is  a  law  of  nature  that 
cost  is  the  measure  of  value.  The  public  school  sys- 
tem, it  is  true,  costs  enough — over  eighty  millions  of 
dollars  a  year — but  that  system  is  based  on  the  as- 
sumption that  people  are  entitled  to  schooling  whether 
they  pay  or  not.  Some  get  it  without  cost,  direct  or 
indirect.  This  tends  to  depreciate  the  quality  of  the 
article  as  well  as  the  estimate  placed  upon  the  gratuity 
by  its  beneficiaries.  When  parents  were  directly  re- 
sponsible and  settled  at  so  much  a  quarter  for  having 
their  boys  taught  the  three  R's,  they  took  more  pains 
to  see  they  were  getting  what  they  paid  for  than  they 
do  now,  when  the  State  determines  what  education  is, 
assumes  the  responsibility,  decides  as  to  the  quid  pro- 
quo ',  and  pays  the  bills.  The  compulsory  feature  of 
the  public  school  system  bears  directly  on  the  view 
here  presented.  When  schooling  was  a  commodity 
which  could  not  be  obtained  except  by  direct  payment 
of  hard-earned  cash,  it  was  mainly  sought  for  in  cases 
of  minds  inclined  and  fitted  to  receive  it.  Hence  in 
those  days  intellect  and  schooling  were  more  frequent- 
ly found  together  than  they  are  now,  when  all  intel- 
lects are  bound  by  law  to  take  schooling.  The  pro- 
portion of  intellectual  among  the  educated  boys  was 
greater,  and  the  boy  who  had  average  information  was 
then  more  apt  than  now  to  possess  the  necessary  intel- 
lect for  West  Point. 

General  Schofield  said  in  1880,  while  Superintendent 
of  the  Military  Academy,  "  I  have  understood  it  as  the 
general  opinion  of  the  older  officers  here  that  the  can- 
didates exhibit  less  thoroughness  of  elementary  in- 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  217 

struction  than  they  did  in  earlier  times."  The  late 
Professor  Church  reported  as  follows  to  the  Board  of 
Visitors  in  1876  :  "From  my  experience  in  the  exam- 
ination of  candidates  for  admission  to  the  Military 
Academy,  I  am  satisfied  that  there  is  somewhere  a 
serious  defect  in  the  system  of  instruction  or  in  its 
application,  in  the  schools  of  our  country,  for  educa- 
tion in  the  elementary  branches ;  particularly  in  arith- 
metic, reading,  and  spelling.  I  think  our  candidates 
are  not  as  thoroughly  prepared  as  they  were  twenty 
years  ago." 

In  1880  Professor  Kendrick  said,  "I  frequently 
conversed  with  Mr.  Church  upon  the  subject;  we 
were  in  full  agreement  thereon.  Judging  from  what 
we  see  here,  the  common  branches — reading,  spelling, 
grammar,  arithmetic,  geography — are  not  so  thoroughly 
taught  in  the  schools  of  the  country  as  they  were 
twenty-five  years  ago.  The  young  men  who  come  to 
us  are  not  taught  to  observe  and  to  reason  so  well  as 
they  were  forty  years  ago.  The  schools  of  a  large 
part  of  New  England  form  no  exception  to  this  re- 
mark." 

In  support  of  the  foregoing  views,  it  should  be  borne 
in  mind  that  in  former  times  the  candidates  were  a  year 
younger  than  now,  the  limits  then  being  16  and  21, 
whereas  they  are  now  17  and  22,  thus  giving  a  year 
longer  for  preparation. 

But,  after  allowing  full  weight  to  the  falling  off  in 
preparation,  the  fact  remains  that  the  Academy  exacts 
a  higher  degree  of  mere  acquirements  than  formerly, 
and  that  doing  so  tends  to  the  admission  of  "  crammed" 
candidates  and  the  rejection  of  good  raw  material,  and 


218  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

is  not  likely  to  further  the  purpose  of  the  Institu- 
tion. 

During  the  decade  from  1840  to  1850,  869  cadets 
were  admitted,  and  427  graduated,  49.1  per  cent. 
From  1850  to  1860,  807  were  admitted,  and  383  grad- 
uated, 47.4  per  cent.  From  1860  to  1870,  778  were 
admitted,  and  494  graduated.  This  period  embraced 
the  Civil  War,  and  the  percentage  of  graduates  arose 
to  63.4,  but  in  the  next  decade,  1870  to  1880,  the  per- 
centage fell  to  53.4,  there  being  948  admissions  and 
507  graduations. 

Adopting  1866  as  the  date  of  the  high  standard  of 
admission,  the  records  disclose  the  facts  that  for  ten 
years  just  preceding  that  time — that  is,  from  1857  to 
1866 — the  Academic  Board  rejected  only  17.3  per 
cent,  of  the  candidates  for  admission,  whereas  for  the 
ten  years  following  the  introduction  of  the  high  stand- 
ard, 1867  to  1876,  the  average  of  rejections  was  34.4. 
That  is  to  say,  the  percentage  under  the  new  standard 
for  the  period  named  is  double  what  it  is  under  the 
old.  If  this  enormous  increase  is  based  on  sound 
principles  it  ought  to  show  a  corresponding  increase 
in  the  percentage  of  graduates.  But  we  find  that  for 
the  period  from  1867  to  1876  the  rejections  increased 
a  hundred  per  cent,  over  the  preceding  decade,  while 
of  those  admitted  there  has  been  an  increase  of  less 
than  6  per  cent,  in  the  graduations.  To  this  it  may 
be  added  that  the  percentage  of  graduates  in  the 
class  of  1882  is  less  than  in  any  class  for  25  years  pre- 
ceding the  time  the  standard  was  raised.  It  appears 
from  this  that  raising  the  standard  of  admission  has 
not  materially  increased  the  quantity  of  graduates.  It 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  219 

cannot,  as  yet  at  least,  be  claimed  that  it  lias  improved 
the  quality  of  them. 

All  who  graduated  prior  to  1866  were  admitted  un- 
der the  old,  or  low  standard.  They  have  been  tried 
by  time  in  peace  and  war.  The  civil  as  well  as  the 
military  walks  of  life  attest  their  excellence.  It  re- 
mains to  be  seen  how  the  graduates  who  entered  or 
may  enter  under  the  higher  standard  of  admission  will 
compare  with  them. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  the  average  number  of  cadets 
at  the  Academy  is  not  materially  greater  than  it  was 
years  ago,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  in  consequence 
of  increase  of  population,  the  number  authorized  by 
law  has  gone  up  from  250  in  1850  to  253  in  1860,  to 
263  in  1870,  and  to  312  in  1880.  There  were  only 
about  185  cadets  at  the  Academy  from  January  to 
June,  1882,  and  twelve  per  cent,  of  these  had  been 
found  deficient  and  turned  back  for  a  year  to  go  over 
the  course  a  second  time.  Of  the  original  102  persons 
who  entered  in  1878  only  26  graduated  June,  1882. 

The  Academy  is  a  popular  Institution  designed  to 
confer  its  advantages  with  as  near  approach  to  equal- 
ity as  practicable  throughout  the  country.  The  law 
says  that  "  each  Congressional  and  Territorial  District 
and  the  District  of  Columbia  shall  be  entitled  to  -have 
one  cadet  at  said  Academy,"  and  that  "  the  individual 
selected  shall  be  an  actual  resident  of  the  Congres- 
sional District  of  the  State,  or  Territory,  or  District  of 
Columbia,"  from  which  the  appointment  purports  to  be 
made.  In  executing  this  law,  the  President  deems  it 
his  duty  to  appoint  the  candidate  recommended  to 
him  by  the  Congressional  Representative  of  the  Dis- 


220  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

trict.  This  system  was  established  in  full  light  of  the 
fact  that  inequality  existed  and  would  continue  in  the 
educational  opportunities  of  the  residents  of  the 
various  Congressional  Districts  and  Territories.  It 
calls  for  a  construction  of  the  law  which  will  favor  a 
low  rather  than  a  high  standard  of  admission  in  order 
to  give  the  fairest  chance  possible  for  representation 
to  districts  in  which  the  opportunities  for  preparatory 
education  are  comparatively  limited.  It  is  a  well 
known  fact  that,  once  in,  boys  with  but  little  educa- 
tion prior  to  admission  sometimes  make  the  best  prog- 
ress in  the  four  years'  course  at  the  Academy,  and 
become  distinguished  men.  The  law  foresaw  inequal- 
ity among  cadets,  not  only  when  admitted,  but  when 
graduated,  and  provided  that,  "  after  going  through  all 
the  classes,"  the  cadet  "  shall  be  considered  as  among 
the  candidates  for  a  commission  in  any  corps  according 
to  the  duties  lie  may  be  competent  to  perform.'1'' 

The  foregoing  remarks  are  designed  to  show  that 
the  examination  required  by  law  for  admission  is  not 
conducted  as  it  ought  to  be.  But  beyond  this,  con- 
sidering all  the  facts  on  the  subject,  especially  the 
way  appointments  to  the  Academy  are  made  (one 
from  each  Congressional  District  on  the  recommenda- 
tion of  the  Member  of  Congress),  it  is  quite  possible 
that  it  would  be  better  to  dispense  by  law  with  a 
mental  examination  for  admission,  and  let  every  phys- 
ically qualified  appointee  enter  upon  the  course  and 
remain  until  found  deficient  in  a  subject  taught  by  the 
Academy.  This  would  require  the  Institution  to 
bestow  six  months  or  so  of  its  labor  on  a  much  larger 
number  than  it  does  now.  But  none  of  the  instruction 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  221 

would  be  lost.  Much  or  little,  it  would  in  cases  of 
discharge  be  taken  back  to  be  "imparted  and  dif- 
fused "  in  the  Congressional  District  entitled  to  it. 

It  would  simplify  matters  at  the  Academy  if  every 
appointee  were  capable  of  graduating.  But  that  is 
hardly  possible.  A  preparatory  year  as  a  part  of  the 
course  of  the  Institution,  in  addition  to  the  four  years' 
term,  as  at  present  established,  might  increase  the  per- 
centage of  graduates,  and  would  afford  appointees  a 
fair  chance  of  admission  to  the  regular  course. 

In  providing  a  military  education  for  a  limited 
number  of  its  sons,  the  Government  certainly  ought 
to  see  that  its  bounty  is  wisely  bestowed.  Could  not 
that  be  done  sufficiently  well  by  care  in  appointment, 
rather  than  by  rejecting  the  appointee  before  he  has  had 
a  trial  in  the  course  taugJit  by  the  Academy  ?  In  any 
event,  the  Academy  will  not  fail  to  do  its  part  in  pro- 
viding a  good  education,  in  the  broadest  acceptance  of 
the  term,  for  all  appointees  confided  to  it. 

ADMISSION  TO    THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY. CONTINUED. 

Remarks  at  a  General  Meeting  of  the  Military  Ser- 
vice Institution  of  the  United  States : 

GENERAL  JAMES  B.  FRY — Mr.  Chairman  and  Gen- 
tlemen :  I  wish  to  express  my  gratification  at  the  able 
and  interesting  paper  just  read  by  Professor  Andrews. 
I  have  no  doubt  he  will  in  due  time  receive  from  this 
meeting  a  hearty  vote  of  thanks.  I  am  personally  in- 
debted to  him  for  the  kind  terms  in  which  he  has 
alluded  to  me.  I  wish  to  say  that  I  disclaim  any  in- 
tention in  this  discussion  of  criticising  the  general 
methods  of  the  Academy.  My  comments  here  have 


222  MILITAEY  MISCELLANIES. 

been  in  respect  to  the  manner  of  getting  material,  not 
as  to  the  use  made  by  the  Academy  of  the  material 
confided  to  it.  On  this  point  my  opinions  do  not  re- 
sult from  any  action  of  the  Academy  in  particular 
cases,  nor  have  they  been  hastily  formed.  A  paper 
read  by  Professor  Michie  before  this  Institution  De- 
cember 10,  1879,  and  the  discussion  following  it,  are 
printed  in  our  Journal  (Vol.  I.,  No.  2).  My  remarks 
on  that  occasion  are  given  in  the  Journal  as  follows : 
"  There  is  one  point  frequently  discussed  touched  upon 
in  the  professor's  paper  to-night,  to  which  I  will  ask 
a  moment's  attention.  It  is  the  question  of  raising  the 
standard  of  admission  to  the  Military  Academy.  It 
seems  to  me  that  raising  the  standard  wxmld  not  be 
quite  consistent  with  the  large  claims  we  make  in  favor 
of  the  West  Point  system  of  education.  We  insist,  and 
I  think  with  good  reason,  that  the  great  merit  of  the 
Military  Academy  in  its  intellectual  relations  is  the 
mental  Gaining  it  affords ;  that  in  a  way  and  in  a  de- 
gree peculiar  to  itself  it  develops  the  reasoning  powers, 
gives  the  scope  and  grasp  to  the  mind  which  enables 
it  to  deal  promptly  and  vigorously  with  the  various 
problems  of  life  as  they  may  be  encountered  from  day 
to  day ;  and  we  attach  a  very  subordinate  importance 
to  the  mere  acquisition  from  the  text-books  or  lectures 
of  ascertained  facts  or  accepted  theories.  We  claim, 
further,  that  the  extended  and  rigid  course  of  mathe- 
matics prescribed  for  the  Academy,  and  the  peculiar 
manner  in  which  that  course  is  taught,  are  the  princi- 
pal means  through  which  the  desired  mental  training 
is  secured.  These  things  being  so,  it  seems  to  me  that 
the  best  material  the  Academy  can  have  to  work  upon 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  223 

is  that  which  can  be  admitted  under  a  standard  about 
like  the  present  one,*  which,  though  low,  gives  as  a 
general  thing  reasonable  assurance  of  sufficient  mental 
capacity  on  the  part  of  the  candidate  to  receive  the 
West  Point  system  and  assimilate  it  in  the  easiest  and 
most  effective  way.  Of  course  the  more  the  cadet  can 
receive  of  this  system  the  better.  I  assume  it  is  ad- 
mitted that,  speaking  generally,  the  candidates  who 
present  themselves  have  acquired  what  knowledge 
they  possess  under  a  system  entirely  different  from 
that  of  the  Military  Academy ;  that  they  have  learned 
by  rule  and  rote,  or,  in  other  words,  that  their  educa- 
tion is  to  a  great  extent  a  course  of  cramming,  which 
I  am  inclined  to  think  the  common  school  system  of 
the  day  is  encouraging.  If  this  is  true,  as  I  assume  it 
to  be,  raising  the  standard  of  admission  at  West  Point 
would  be  calling  for  more  cramming.  The  candidates 
would  have  to  increase  the  amount  of  their  acquire- 
ments, but  of  course  could  not  be  expected  to  change 
the  system  under  which  education  such  as  theirs  is 
given  throughout  the  country.  The  additional  cram- 
ming would  not,  it  seems  to  me,  facilitate  the  mental 
development  aimed  at  by  the  West  Point  system,  and 
might  possibly  have  the  effect  of  retarding  it." 

In  the  paper  which  I  read  on  November  18,- 1882, 
to  which  the  professor  has  just  replied,  I  elaborated 
the  foregoing  views,  and  gave  some  statistics  and  other 
evidence  in  support  of  them. 

In  connection  with  the  subject  of  getting  material 

*  When  this  remark  was  made  I  had  the  old  standard  in  mind,  and 
did  not  know  how  much  the  standard  had  been  raised  in  the  last  few 
years. 


224  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

for  the  Academy,  I  alluded  in  general  terms  to  the 
purpose  of  the  Institution.  The  professor  has  treated 
that  point  pretty  thoroughly,  and  I  think,  in  relation 
to  it,  there  is  a  fair  and  square  issue  between  us.  I 
understand  him  to  hold  that  the  intention  of  the  law 
is  that  the  Military  Academy  shall  have  the  lest 
material  in  the  land.  I  do  not  look  upon  that  as  the 
Intention  of  the  laws  creating  and  providing  for  the 
institution,  nor  as  desirable.  Other  professions  and 
occupations  should  be  considered.  The  church,  the 
law,  medicine,  etc.,  etc.,  have  a  claim  equal  at  least  to 
that  of  the  Army  for  the  best.  It  is  difficult  to  agree 
upon  the  original  or  present  purpose  of  the  Military 
Academy.  I  understand  it  to  be  the  intention  of  the 
law,  however,  to  distribute  the  appointments  to  it 
over  the  whole  country.  In  that  I  see  there  is  a 
direct  difference  of  opinion  between  the  professor  and 
myself.  As  he  stated  in  his  introductory  remarks 
that  he  had  the  co-operation  of  his  associate  professors 
in  the  preparation  of  his  paper,  I  suppose  we  may  re- 
gard what  he  has  said  as  the  West  Point  view.  I  ac- 
cept it  as  such,  and  admit  that  the  side  is  well  put.  I 
understand  the  professor  to  mean  that  it  would  be  a 
wise  proceeding  for  the  Government  if  it  found  the 
best  material  each  year  from  New  England,  say,  to 
accept  the  whole  batch  of  cadets  from  that  section.  I 
dissent  from  this.  I  regard  the  Academy  as  national, 
and  think  it  should  work  on  material  from  every  dis- 
trict in  the  United  States  ;  and  I  am  sure  there  is  no 
district  that  cannot  furnish  somebody  who  can  com- 
ply with  the  requirements  of  the  laws  if  they  are 
properly  administered.  The  professor  has  dwelt  up- 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  225 

on  the  fact  that  Boards  of  Visitors  have  favored  a 
high  standard  of  admission.  In  fact,  I  may  say  that 
these  reports  are  the  authorities  he  relies  upon.  This 
is  an  argument  of  apparent  importance  ;  but  I  must 
say  that  it  seems  to  me  the  reports  of  Boards  of  Visi- 
tors on  this  point  are  not  entitled  to  the  consideration 
which  we  might  suppose  from  the  composition  of  the 
Boards.  If,  instead  of  Boards  of  Visitors  as  at  present 
constituted,  there  was  a  Board  of  Supervision,  a  Super- 
visory Board  of  Education,  composed  of  the  same 
members  from  year  to  year,  made  responsible  jointly 
with  the  Academic  Board  for  the  rules  of  admission 
and  the  course  of  instruction,  I  should  have  great 
respect  for  its  report.  But  quite  the  reverse  of  that  is 
the  case.  From  an  experience  of  five  years  as  an  in- 
structor and  as  adjutant  and  secretary  of  the  Academic 
Board  at  West  Point,  and  from  pretty  close  observa- 
tion since,  I  am  led  to  think  that  Boards  of  Visitors 
adopt  many  of  the  opinions  of  the  Academy,  and  on 
many  points  their  reports  are  in  reality  West  Point 
speaking  by  another  voice.  I  do  not  mean  to  assert 
that  Boards  of  Visitors  give  themselves  away,  but 
they  are,  perhaps  unavoidably,  influenced,  if  not  large- 
ly governed,  in  many  things  by  the  West  Point  opin- 
ion, which  is  not  only  a  very  plausible,  but  a-  very 
persistent  one  upon  all  matters  affecting  the  Academy. 
The  result  is  that  the  Board  of  Visitors — a  temporary 
'body — instead  of  advising  the  Academy  in  educational 
matters  for  which  the  Academy  is  responsible,  is  in 
reality  advised  by  the  Academy.  I  cannot  recall  all 
the  points  in  my  paper  upon  which  Professor  Andrews 
has  commented.  I  shall  notice  all  I  remember.  He 


226  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

criticised  my  statement  that  the  regulations  increase 
the  severity  of  the  law,  and  the  Academic  Board  in- 
creases the  severity  of  the  regulations  in  the  matter  of 
the  requirements  for  admission. 

I  do  not  think  he  has  proved  me  in  error  on  that 
point.  The  law  says  the  appointee  shall  be  "  well 
versed "  in  arithmetic,  etc.  The  regulations  say  he 
shall  perform  with  "  facility  and  accuracy,"  etc.  I 
make  a  distinction  between  the  meaning  of  these 
terms,  and  regard  the  latter  as  exacting  more  than  the 
former.  In  my  opinion,  it  is  in  the  power  of  the 
Board  to  proceed  more  rigidly  under  this  regulation 
requiring  "  facility  and  accuracy  "  than  is  contemplated 
by  the  law,  which  merely  requires  the  appointee  to  be 
"well  versed,'"  etc.  As  to  the  other  point,  that  the 
Board  exceeds  the  regulations,  I  submit  the  questions 
asked  last  June.  If  they  are  so  simple,  as  the  profes- 
sor says,  that  inability  to  solve  them  will  produce 
smiles  on  some  faces  and  blushes  on  others,  then  my 
assertion  that  the  Board  has  enlarged  upon  the  regula- 
tions is  not  sustained.  That  I  leave  to  others  for  de- 
cision, remarking  only  that  in  a  letter  which  I  shall 
soon  read,  Colonel  Lazelle,  late  Commandant  of  Cadets, 
says :  "  I  think  that  the  tendency  and  the  actual 
present  practice  is  to  exact  everything  possible  within 
the  Board's  construction  of  the  statute.  I  remember 
on  one  occasion  calling  attention  to  the  fact  that  one 
of  the  printed  problems  was  a  subject  in  alligation 
which  I  regarded  as  beyond  elementary  proportion, 
and  therefore  beyond  even  the  requirements  of  the 
Military  Academy  regulations  for  admission  of  candi- 
dates." Before  he  began  his  address  the  professor  dis- 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  227 

tributed  in  this  assembly  printed  copies  of  the  questions- 
asked  in  June  last,  with  the  solution  in  each  case  given 
with  the  problem.  If  the  problems  are  so  simple  that 
men  ought  to  blush  at  being  unable  to  solve  them, 
why  was  it  necessary  for  the  Academy  to  prepare  and 
print  solutions  of  them  for  such  a  meeting  as  this  ? 
I  say  with  frankness  and  sincerity  that  the  solutions 
confirm  me  in  the  opinion  that  these  problems,  taken 
as  a  whole,  are  not  a  proper  test  in  arithmetic  for  ad- 
mission to  the  Military  Academy.  If,  says  the  pro- 
fessor, these  problems  are  so  difficult,  how  is  it  that  so- 
many  of  the  candidates  of  1882  were  admitted  upon 
them  ?  That  question,  I  confess,  puzzles  me  almost  as 
much  as  the  problems  did  before  they  were  made 
easier  by  being  shown  how  to  do  them.  The  only 
answer  which  occurs  to  me  is  that  the  candidates  of 
that  year  may  have  been  unusually  well  coached.  Pos- 
sibly a  larger  proportion  had  been  prepared  at  the 
special  schools  of  Colonels  Symonds  and  Huse.  Col- 
onels Symonds  and  Huse  are  both  graduates,  and  for- 
mer instructors  at  the  Academy.  I  have  nothing  to 
say  against  their  institutions.  On  the  contrary,  I  be- 
lieve they  are  good  schools,  and  the  higher  the  West 
Point  standard  of  admission  the  better  for  them  ;  and 
with  the  present  high  standard,  the  sooner  an  ap- 
pointee to  the  Military  Academy  gets  into  one  of 
them  the  better  for  him,  provided  he  can  stand  the 
expense.  But  I  invite  attention  to  the  probability 
that  their  special  character,  if  not  their  existence,  is 
due  to  the  modern  standard  of  admission  at  West 
Point,  and  if  special  preparation  is  necessary  for  ad- 
mission, as  indicated  by  these  schools,  I  suggest  the 


228 


MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 


question  whether  or  not  the  Government  should  es- 
tablish and  regulate  the  schools  for  it.  Upon  the 
subject  of  the  present  requirements  and  the  necessity 
for  special  preparation  to  meet  them,  Colonel  Huse 
has  issued  a  circular*  which  is  quite  significant.  It  is 
as  follows : 

To  YOUNG  MEN  INTENDING  TO  ENTER  WEST  POINT. 

In  the  ten  years,  1847-1856,  the  number  of  candi- 
dates appointed  to  West  Point  was  962.  Of  this 
number  132  (13J  per  cent.)  failed  to  enter. 

In  the  next  ten  years  1,082  were  appointed,  and 
288  (26  per  cent.)  failed  to  enter. 

In  the  next  ten  years,  1867-1876,  the  latest  date 
for  which  I  have  the  official  report  of  appointments 
and  failures,  1,560  were  appointed,  and  697  (44^  per 
cent.)  failed  to  enter. 

It  thus  appears  that  while  thirty  years  ago  nearly 
seven-eighths  of  the  appointees  to  West  Point  became 
cadets,  of  late  years  nearly  one-half  have  failed  to  enter. 

The  failures  are  not,  as  might  be  supposed,  confined 
to  young  men  who  have  had  no  advantages.  High 
School  graduates,  bearing  diplomas  that  might  be  ex- 
pected to  carry  them  in  without  examination,  and  un- 
dergraduates of  even  the  most  prominent  colleges  have 
been  rejected. 

It  is  plain,  then,  that  candidates  should  not  take  it 
for  granted  that  they  have  nothing  to  do  after  secur- 
ing their  appointment ;  nearly  all  require  more  or  less 
preparation,  and  some  cannot  do  with  less  than  a  year 
of  persistent  study. 

*  I  have  italicized  some  sentences  in  this  circular  to  call  attention  to 
their  bearing  on  points  I  have  alluded  to. 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  229 

The  figures  given  above  show  how  muck  more  difficult 
it  is  to  enter  now  than  it  was  thirty  years  ago,  and  old 
graduates  should  be  careful  in  giving  information  to 
their  young  friends  as  to  the  character  of  the  examina- 
tion. It  is  probable  that  candidates  have  failed  from 
judging  themselves  by  the  standard  of  friends  who 
entered  West  Point  when  the  requirements  were  lower 
than  they  are  now. 

Success  cannot  be  secured  by  any  system  of  cram- 
ming, or  by  the  use  of  "  influence  "  at  Washington. 

The  examination  papers  are  recast  from  year  to  year 
with  great  care,  so  that  coaching  on  examples  and 
questions  similar  to  what  appear  in  old  examination 
papers  is  quite  useless,  and  favoritism  is  securely 
guarded  against  by  the  anonymous  system,  candidates 
being  known  only  by  number.  Nothing  but  a  good 
knowledge  of  first  principles  avails  a  candidate  at  a 
West  Point  examination. 

At  my  school,  the  Highland  Falls  Academy,  special 
attention  is  paid  to  preparing  West  Point  candidates. 

i  am  a  graduate  of  West  Point,  and  served  as  an 
instructor  there  seven  years.  It  may  be  thought, 
therefore,  that  a  weak  candidate  can  come  to  me  a 
few  weeks  before  examination  and  by  some  special 
process  of  mine  be  got  into  West  Point.  This -is  an 
error.  I  have  been  of  service  to  candidates  that  have 
come  to  me  only  a  short  time  before  their  examina- 
tion, and  some  of  these  young  men  have  owed  their 
success  to  my  efforts ;  but  I  am  not  willing  to  do 
mere  cramming  work,  and  in  fact  it  is  difficult  to  cram 
a  deficient  candidate  so  as  to  deceive  the  examiners. 

Most  young  men  can  spend  at  least  a  year  profit- 


230  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

ably  in  preparing  for  West  Point,  and  in  order  that 
the  failures  may  be  as  few  as  possible  the  War  De- 
partment recommends  members  of  Congress  to  nomi- 
nate candidates  one  year  in  advance  of  the  vacancies 
they  are  to  fill. 

Many  young  men  fail  in  Spelling.  Few  persons 
have  any  idea  of  the  labor  and  patience  required  on 
the  part  of  both  instructor  and  pupil  to  make  a  cor- 
rect speller  of  a  young  man  of  seventeen  who  cannot 
spell. 

I  have  never  had  a  candidate  fail  in  this  respect 
that  has  spent  a  year  with  me,  though  I  have  had 
some  whose  case  seemed  hopeless  when  they  came. 

In  Arithmetic  mere  figuring  is  of  little  value.  The 
candidate  must  show  an  acquaintance  with  fundamen- 
tal principles  and  an  ability  to  think,  to  satisfy  the 
Board. 

The  following  questions  have  been  asked  within  a 
year  or  two : 

"  If  the  same  number  be  added  to  both  terms  of  an 
improper  fraction  will  the  value  of  the  fraction  be 
increased  or  diminished,  and  why  ? " 

"  What  is  the  reason  for  placing  the  decimal  point 
in  example  5 — multiply  4.32  by  .00012?  The  rule 
for  doing  so  is  not  the  reason." 

No  candidate  can  answer  such  questions  from  mere 
coaching.  Questions  like  them  may  not  be  asked 
again  for  years,  but  equally  searching  ones  will  be, 
and  problems  requiring  careful  thought  are  given 
every  year. 

In  Grammar  no  mere  routine  parsing  is  received. 
At  the  examination  this  year  some  candidates  hardly 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  231 

knew  what  to  write  when  they  read  the  direction  on 
the  Grammar  Paper  not  to  give  gender,  number  or 
person.  The  grammatical  construction  of  certain 
underlined  words  was  all  that  was  required,  and  this 
was  just  what  many  could  not  give. 

For  most  young  men  that  come  to  me,  a  year  is  not  too 
long  to  spend  in  preparatory  work,  and  some  require 
more  time.  Those  that  do  not  require  much  prepara- 
tion for  the  examination  are  put  at  French,  Geometry 
and  Algebra,  subjects  which  a  candidate  may,  if  he  has 
a  good  instructor,  study  to  advantage  before  entering. 
To  some  careful  previous  training  in  these  subjects  is 
very  important,  for  the  fourth  class  examinations 
prove  fatal  to  many  that  enter  without  any  previous 
knowledge  of  them. 

I  employ,  as  far  as  practicable,  West  Point  methods 
of  instruction,  and  keep  myself  informed  as  to  all 
changes,  however  slight,  in  the  system  of  examination ; 
and  my  pupils,  being  so  near  West  Point,  have  oppor- 
tunities of  learning  for  themselves  from  cadet  acquain- 
tances what  will  be  required  of  them  after  entering. 
I  may  claim,  therefore,  to  offer  all  the  advantages 
likely  to  be  found  in  any  preparatory  school. 

My  pupils  have  been  remarkably  successful  during 
the  four  years  I  have  been  preparing  candidates,  not 
only  a  larger  number,  but  a  larger  per  cent,  of  my 
candidates  having  entered  West  Point  than  from  any 
other  school  during  that  time. 

My  charge  for  tuition,  board,  fuel  and  lights,  and 
washing,  except  of  starched  clothing,  which  is  done 
at  reasonable  rates  by  laundresses  in  the  neighbor- 
hood, is  $500  for  [the  school  year,  and  at  the  same 


232  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

rate  for  longer  periods  than  four  months.  For  shorter 
periods  $65  per  month,  and  anything  more  than  half 
a  month  will  be  charged  as  a  mouth. 

Pupils  will  furnish  their  own  books,  napkins,  towels, 
blankets  and  sheets  (single  beds). 

Candidates  are,  of  course,  subject  to  the  ordinary 
rules  of  the  school,  circular  of  which  is  herewith  en- 
closed. 

CALEB  HUSE,  Principal, 

Highland  Falls  Academy. 

HIGHLAND  FALLS,  N.  Y.,  September,  1882. 

The  professor  alluded  with  but  little  respect,  I  think, 
to  the  earlier  examinations  for  admission.  He  said 
they  were  oral,  brief,  and  that  the  wonder  is  that  any- 
body failed  to  pass ;  that  the  Board  could  not,  or  did 
not,  get  at  the  knowledge  of  a  candidate,  etc.  But  he 
has  not  disputed,  and  I  think  cannot  dispute,  that  the 
graduates  under  that  system  of  admission  have  proved 
good  officers  and  able  men — as  good  and  able  as  the 
higher  standard  of  admission  has  produced.  The  pro- 
fessor's remark  was  rather  disparaging  to  the  Academic 
Boards  of  earlier  times.  My  conviction  as  to  the 
earlier  examinations  is  very  strong.  It  is  that  the 
Board,  say  from  1840  to  1860,  was  competent  and 
thorough.  It  was  composed  most  of  the  time  of  Ma- 
han,  Bartlett,  Church,  Bailey  or  Kendrick,  Weir,  Agnel 
and  others  I  need  not  name,  with  Robert  E.  Lee  and 
Richard  Delafield  as  Superintendents.  I  think  it  was 
fully  competent  to  weigh  the  information  it  obtained, 
and  that  it  took  time  enough  to  obtain  the  necessary 
amount  of  information  to  judge  of  the  candidate's  fit- 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITAEY  ACADEMY.  233 

ness.  I  say  this  after  nearly  five  years'  experience  as 
Secretary  of  that  Board.  I  therefore  reiterate  my 
opinion  for  what  it  is  worth,  that  the  Board  did  by 
that  test  get  a  good  knowledge  of  what  the  candidate 
knew,  and  formed  a  pretty  correct  opinion  as  to  what 
he  was  likely  to  accomplish  if  admitted. 

Now,  as  to  the  mode  of  admission.  The  professor 
has  set  forth  the  arguments  in  favor  of  the  anonymous 
written  examination  at  present  in  vogue  for  candidates. 
If  this  system  has  great  merit  for  admitting  candi- 
dates, I  do  not  see  why  it  is  not  used  for  subsequent 
examinations  of  progress  in  studies.  The  system  for 
admission  has  been  changed  by  introducing  the  anony- 
mous paper  examination  without  applying  that  system 
to  subsequent  examinations.  I  will  only  add  on  this 
point  what  was  written  to  me  by  a  United  States  Sen- 
ator. I  do  not  give  his  language.  He  said  that  to 
expect  to  find  what  the  candidate  knows  by  these 
slips  of  paper  is  as  unreasonable  as  to  expect  a  jury  to 
get  at  the  truth  of  a  subject  by  having  written  state- 
ments from  witnesses.  I  will  here  explain  that  the 
old  system  of  admission  for  which  I  contend  was  not 
literally  oral ;  much  of  it  was  written.  The  candidate, 
however,  was  not  withdrawn  from  and  unknown  to 
the  faculty,  as  at  present.  On  the  contrary,  he  was 
before  it,  wrote  upon  the  blackboard  in  its  presence, 
and  in  addition  was  questioned  by  the  professors  as 
thoroughly  as  they  thought  best.  By  that  system  the 
fate  of  a  candidate  rests  on  what  he  knows.  By  the 
present  anonymous  paper  system  his  fate  may  be  settled 
by  what  he  does  not  know.  The  former,  properly 
enough,  was  called  examination  for  admission.  A 


234 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


more  appropriate  name  for  the  latter  would  be  exam- 
ination for  rejection. 

The  professor  also  referred  to  my  remarks  respecting 
cramming.  I  said :  "  The  youth  of  true  manliness, 
with  mind  enough  to  master  the  studies,  is  a  better 
subject  for  receiving  the  West  Point  course  in  its  full 
force,  if  he  has  just  enough  education  to  enter,  than  he 
would  be  with  a  greater  amount  of  modern  cramming. 
In  other  words  early  cramming  is  opposed  to  the  dis- 
tinctive purpose  of  the  West  Point  system,  which  is 
high  development  of  the  reasoning  powers  and  thor- 
ough understanding  of  principles."  The  professor 
draws  from  this  the  conclusion  that  I  regard  learning 
as  a  disadvantage ;  that  I  argue  in  favor  of  ignorance. 
I  did  not  intend  to  be  so  understood.  I,  however, 
make  a  distinction,  which  he  does  not  seem  to  regard, 
between  mere  learning  and  real  education.  If  my 
meaning  is  not  plain  enough  in  the  terms  of  the  fore- 
going quotation,  a  foot-note, which  was  read  and  printed 
as  part  of  my  article,  shows  it  unmistakably.  The 
foot-note  is  :  "  In  a  recent  lecture  for  candidates  for 
admission  to  the  India  Civil  Service  published  since 
this  article  was  prepared,  Professor  Max  Muller  says : 
1  That  process  of  cramming  and  crowding  which  has  of 
late  been  brought  to  the  highest  pitch  of  perfection, 
instead  of  exciting  an  appetite  for  work,  is  apt  to  pro- 
duce an  indifference,  if  not  a  kind  of  intellectual  nausea 
that  may  last  for  life.7 '  After  having  written  with 
that  very  thought  in  mind  I  was  pleased  to  come  across 
the  foregoing  statement  by  Professor  Muller,  which 
sustains  my  view  that  an  overdose  of  modern  cram- 
ming may  be  an  injury  to  an  appointee  to  West  Point. 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  235 

That  was  my  meaning.  I  think  it  is  clearly  enough 
expressed,  and  I  adhere  to  the  statement. 

The  professor  advocates,  as  I  understand  him,  the 
system  of  competitive  examination.  Without  going 
into  a  general  discussion  of  this  subject,  I  must  ex- 
press my  unfriendliness  to  it  as  a  system.  But  if,  as 
a  principle,  it  ought  to  be  applied  to  candidates  for 
admission,  then,  as  a  principle,  I  think  it  should  be 
applied  also  in  the  selection  of  the  professors  who 
teach  them.  But  I  do  not  believe  in  the  system  at  all. 

Such  statistics  as  Professor  Andrews  presents  cover 
only  short  periods.  On  the  other  hand,  I  took  the  whole 
range  back  to  1840.  I  do  not  understand  that  he  has 
answered  or  impaired  the  force  of  the  statistical  facts 
in  my  paper.  He  does  not  dispute  my  statement  that 
"  the  average  yearly  percentage  of  rejections  has  gone 
up  from  7  in  1840  to  52  in  1870 ;  and  the  actual  num- 
ber of  persons  turned  away  has  risen  from  70  for  the 
ten  years  from  1840  to  1849,  to  401  for  the  seven  years 
from  1870  to  1876."  Nor  does  he  controvert  my  con- 
clusion drawn  from  the  enormous  increase  in  rejections 
under  the  high  standard  of  admission :  to  wit,  that  if 
the  high  standard  theory  is  sound,  it  ought  to  show  a 
corresponding  increase  in  the  percentage  of  graduates. 
But,  as  I  showed,  instead  of  that,  we  find  -for  the 
period  from  1867,  when  the  high  standard  began,  to 
1876,  the  rejections  increased  a  hundred  per  cent,  over 
the  preceding  decade  (old,  or  low  standard  of  admis- 
sion), while  of  those  admitted  there  was  an  increase 
of  less  than  six  per  cent,  in  the  graduations.  The  pro- 
fessor makes  no  explanation  of  this. 

In  relation  to  my  statistics  showing  the  large  pro- 


236 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


portion  of  rejections  from  Arkansas,  Colorado,  Kansas, 
Nevada,  West  Virginia  and  Idaho,  he  names  some 
Western  Territories  which  he  says  I  forgot  to  men- 
tion. But  he  does  not  show  that  the  omission  im- 
paired the  soundness  of  my  conclusion.  The  statistics 
I  gave  were  to  support  my  assertion  that  "  the  ten- 
dency of  the  high  standard  of  admission  and  the 
present  mode  of  examination  is  to  discriminate  against 
the  poorer  Congressional  Districts  and  Territories  in 
the  enjoyment  equally  with  the  rich  of  the  right  of 
representation  at  the  national  Military  Academy." 
The  professor  denies  the  correctness  of  this  statement, 
and  adds  that  some  of  the  poorest  candidates  come 
from  the  richest  districts,  and  some  of  the  best  from 
the  poorer  ones.  These  may  be  facts,  but  they  do  not 
disprove  the  tendency  I  asserted  to  discrimination  in 
a  high  standard  of  admission  and  the  present  mode  of 
examination. 

The  professor's  remark  that  the  poor  man's  son  has 
no  more  right  than  the  son  of  the  rich  man  to  a  place 
for  which  he  is  not  qualified  is  quite  true,  but  it  seems 
irrelevant.  No  question  has  been  raised  as  to  rich 
men's  sons  and  poor  men's  sons,  nor  as  to  the  occupa- 
tion by  either  of  places  for  which  they  are  not  quali- 
fied. The  questions  are,  What  qualifications  should 
be  required  ?  and  how  should  they  be  ascertained  ? 

The  professor  concedes  that  in  getting  rid  of  what 
he  calls  "  ignoramuses "  young  men  of  ability  and 
character  may  be  rejected.  But  he  destroys  the  value 
of  this  concession  by  asking,  if  the  young  man  has 
ability  and  character,  how  is  it  he  has  not  obtained 
a  common  school  education  ?  All  that  is  required,  he 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITAEY  ACADEMY. 


237 


says,  may  be  learned  in  a  common  school,  and  there  is 
no  part  of  the  country  where  a  common  school  educa- 
tion cannot  be  obtained.  I  do  not  undertake  to  answer 
his  question,  nor  do  I  admit  the  correctness  of  his  as- 
sertions, but  the  logic  of  what  he  says  is  that  ability 
and  character  imply  preparation ;  hence  all  young  men 
of  ability  and  character  are  prepared  to  enter  the  Mili- 
tary Academy  under  the  present  standard  ;  and  if  the 
Academic  Board  finds  candidates  not  prepared,  it  fol- 
lows conversely  they  have  not  ability  and  character. 
Preparation,  therefore,  according  to  Professor  Andrews' 
argument,  is  the  test  of  and  measure  for  ability  and 
character.  This  is  a  strong  claim  for  "culture."  The 
professor  asks,  If  a  man  is  a  dunce  why  should  he  be 
sent  to  the  Academy  ?  If  he  is  a  dunce,  he  should  not 
be  sent  there,  but  I  do  not  admit  that  lack  of  prep- 
paration  to  pass  the  examination,  at  present  required, 
proves  a  man  a  dunce.  The  professor  appears  to  think 
it  does.  If  that  is  so,  it  disposes  of  an  important  part 
of  our  subject. 

I  understood  the  professor  to  say  that  the  examina- 
tion in  grammar  is  very  slight.  I  was  under  the  im- 
pression that  it  is  rather  severe.  From  1870  to  1876 
there  were  401  rejections — 35  in  reading,  165  in 
writing,  165  in  spelling,  161  in  arithmetic,  .204  in 
geography,  171  in  history,  and  257  in  grammar.  That 
must  mean  something.  Colonel  Huse,  in  his  circular 
of  September,  1882,  already  cited,  warns  candidates 
that  "in  grammar  no  mere  routine  parsing  is  re- 
ceived." 

In  my  paper  I  said,  "  In  former  times  the  candidates 
were  a  year  younger  than  now,  the  limits  then  being 


238  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

16  and  21,  whereas  now  they  are  17  and  22,  thus  giv- 
ing a  year  longer  for  preparation." 

I  now  suggest  that  these  limits  are  too  broad. 
Under  them  boys  and  men,  to  the  disadvantage  of  the 
former,  become  candidates  for  the  same  class.  This 
after  admission  proves  a  disadvantage  to  the  Institu- 
tion in  discipline  and  general  administration,  as  the 
same  rules  and  regulations  are  applied  to  all,  boys  and 
men  alike.  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  the  ages  for 
admission  ought  to  be  from  17  to  18,  or  at  most  from 

17  to  19. 

Now,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  desire  to  present  another 
point.  In  my  article  of  November  18th,  I  stated  that 
the  present  system  of  examination  for  admission  does 
not  conform,  strictly  to  the  law,  and  I  suggested  that 
it  might  be  well  if  Congress  would  pass  a  law  dispens- 
ing entirely  with  a  mental  examination  for  admission, 
letting  every  physically  qualified  appointee  enter  upon 
the  course  and  remain  until  graduated  or  found  defi- 
cient in  a  subject  taught  by  the  Academy.  The  profes- 
sor, I  believe,  looks  upon  that  as  a  premium  on  igno- 
rance. I  do  not  see  it  in  that  light.  In  fact  I  now  go 
a  little  farther  than  I  did  at  first.  I  am  inclined  to 
think  that  the  existing  law  is  sufficient  to  dispense 
with  an  examination  for  admission  by  the  Academic 
Board.  I  doubt  whether  the  law,  if  strictly  construed, 
would  justify  the  present  so-called  examination  for  ad- 
mission. It  is  the  Act  of  1812  ;  the  subsequent  Acts  do 
not  bear  upon  this  point.  Its  terms  are :  "  Each  cadet 
previously  to  his  appointment  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States  shall  be  well  versed  in  reading,  writing, 
and  arithmetic."  The  meaning,  it  seems  to  me,  is  that 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITAKY  ACADEMY.  239 

it  shall  be  ascertained  that  the  boy  is  well  versed  in 
reading,  writing  and  arithmetic  before  the  President 
appoints  him — not  before  he  is  admitted  but  before  he 
is  appointed.  If  this  is  so,  he  should  not  be  examined 
for  admission,  but  for  appointment.  As  the  President 
deems  it  his  duty  in  executing  this  law  to  accept  the 
recommendation  of  the  Congressional  Representative 
of  the  District,  it  seems  to  me  to  rest  with  the  Con- 
gressman, who  recommends,  and  the  President,  who 
appoints,  to  ascertain  before  appointment  whether  the 
boy  has  the  qualifications  required  by  the  law. 

GENERAL  VOGDES — A  cadet,  as  I  understand,  does 
not  receive  his  warrant  until  the  January  examination. 

GENERAL  FRY — It  is  true  that  after  passing  exami- 
nation in  January  the  cadet  receives  a  warrant,  about 
which  the  law  says  nothing,  but  he  receives  in  the 
first  instance  what  is  called  a  conditional  appointment. 
That  is  the  very  appointment  which,  in  my  opinion, 
this  law  refers  to.  That  is  the  appointment  upon 
which  he  reports  at  the  Academy,  and  upon  which  he 
is  mustered,  paid,  court-martialed,  etc.,  and  it  is  to 
that  appointment,  as  it  seems  to  me,  that  the  law  re- 
fers when  it  says  previously  to  his  appointment  by  the 
President  the  boy  must  be  well  versed  in  arithmetic, 
etc.  When  that  appointment  is  made,  it  appears  to 
me  all  questions  of  qualifications  in  reading,  writing 
and  arithmetic  are  closed.  The  examination  in  Jan- 
uary is  not  to  ascertain  whether  the  law  prescribing 
qualifications  for  appointment  has  been  observed.  On 
the  contrary,  it  is  conducted  exclusively  upon  those 
things  taught  by  the  Academy  between  July  and  Jan- 
uary. 


240  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

Mr.  Chairman,  of  course  opinions  as  well  as  statistics 
are  of  value  in  the  consideration  of  the  matter  we  have 
in  hand.  I  desire,  therefore,  to  present  extracts  from 
a  few  of  the  many  letters  I  have  received  from 
graduates  of  the  Military  Academy.  Here  is  one  from 
an  officer  of  prominence  formerly  connected  with  the 
Academy,  and  still  feeling  a  deep  interest  in  it. 

"  SAN  FRANCISCO,  December  4,  1882. 
"  MY  DEAR  GENERAL  : 

"  I  write  to  say  that  I  am  very  much  pleased  to  see 
that  you  have  brought  the  system  of  examination 
practised  on  beginners  at  the  Military  Academy  under 
discussion.  I  trust  that  you  will  bring  out  clearly  the 
features  of  this  system  and  its  bearings  upon  the 
Service  before  you  dismiss  it  from  attention.  It  is  an 
innovation  which  I  have  watched  with  some  surprise 
as  practised  in  examinations  of  teachers.  In  this 
application  it  ignores  the  real  qualifications  which  it 
ought  to  be  the  object  of  the  examination  to  bring 
out.  It  breeds  a  frequent  scandal  by  the  early  ac- 
quaintance which  some  get  with  the  proposed  questions 
in  advance  of  others.  This  is,  however,  a  minor  ob- 
jection. 

"  I  think  you  have  attributed  a  distinction  to  the 
system  by  admitting  that  its  standard  is  high,  which 
is  not  deserved.  I  am  not  able  to  see  that  there  is 
any  standard  in  the  system  by  which  to  measure  what 
you  desire  to  ascertain  in  regard  to  the  mental  quality 
or  educational  acquirements. 

"  Some  of  the  questions  cited  by  you  as  given  to  the 
last  class  may  properly  be  called  puzzles,  or  enigmas, 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  241 

when  given  to  boys  not  trained  in  this  kind  of  thing. 
They  belong  to  the  same  place  in  mathematics  that 
sleight  of  hand  bears  in  the  mechanical  world.  They 
seem  to  me  to  bear  only  a  remote  relation  to  the 
qualities  and  acquirements  we  have  a  right  to  look  for 
in  the  boys  who  aspire  to  a  military  career. 

"  It  would  not  surprise  me  to  learn  that  those  who 
give  the  best  promise  in  the  mathematical  tournament 
fail  of  substantial  progress  in  the  subsequent  course  of 
study.  An  analogy  may  be  found  in  the  physical 
failure  in  after  life  of  the  prodigies  of  muscular  devel- 
opment in  the  gymnasium  or  boat-pulling  contests. 

"  The  argument  for  the  system  appears  to  be  that 
it  permits  no  partiality  to  be  shown  by  the  Academic 
Boards,  I  am  loth  to  think  that  the  charge  against 
the  Board  thus  implied  can  be  well  founded.  If,  un- 
fortunately, it  is  well  founded,  the  case  would  seem  to 
require  a  remedy  of  a  different  character.  The  sys- 
tem appears  to  me  to  introduce  a  discrimination  in* 
favor  of  those  trained  by  a  special,  if  not  a  bad 
method,  to  the  injury  of  individuals,  and,  what  is 
worse,  to  the  injury  of  the  Service.  While  open  to 
this  objection  it  applies  no  test  of  real  value.  I  can 
well  understand  that  the  very  best  minds  in  the  class, 
with  fair  preparation,  too,  are  quite  likely  to  appear 
among  the  worst  in  such  a  contest,  and  that  the  or- 
dinary person  may  appear  to  the  best  advantage.  A 
three  hours'  contest  to  a  boy  not  trained  to  attack 
quirks  and  puzzles  may  show  him  in  a  light  of  ap- 
parent ignorance  which  he  does  not  deserve,  and,  con- 
versely, trained  mediocrity  may  appear  too  well.  This 
makes  little  difference  unless  the  good  boy  is  found 


242  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

deficient,  otherwise,  if  the  subsequent  instruction  is 
what  it  was,  he  will  soon  establish  his  position.  It 
would  seem  necessary,  to  make  the  system  fair,  that  a 
boy  failing  on  enigmas  should,  before  being  pro- 
nounced deficient,  be  subjected  to  such  a  discreet 
examination  as  Professor  Church  was  wont  to  give  us, 
and  have  the  opportunity  to  show  that  his  failure  was 
due  not  to  want  of  reasonable  knowledge,  but  to  other 
circumstances.  This  personal  element  of  the  candi- 
date— his  personal  appearance,  the  intelligence  exhib- 
ited, his  embarrassment  or  confidence — ought  not,  it 
appears  to  me,  to  be  eliminated  in  an  examination. 
They  are  essential  quite  as  much  as  a  little  knowl- 
edge, more  or  less,  which  at  best  is  small. 

"  I  am  inclined  to  think  favorably  of  your  proposi- 
tion to  admit  every  one  not  grossly  and  obviously 
incompetent,  and  try  all  by  the  test  of  the  course. 
Some  instances  of  development,  after  the  boys  had 
*taken  in  the  air  of  the  place,  struck  me  with  force 
during  my  connection  with  the  Academy.  One  case 
was  that  of  a  boy,  who  did  not  begin  to  open  until  he 
entered  the  course  of  mechanics.  He  started  near 
foot  in  a  class  of  six  sections,  and  before  the  year  was 
out  he  was  in  the  first  section,  and  was  graduated 
about  twelfth.  It  was  a  wonderful  development.  He 
was  killed  in  the  war.  I  think  he  would  have  con- 
tinued to  expand.  This  case  proves  little  beyond  the 
fact,  and  cannot  be  taken  as  a  guide,  yet  it  goes  to 
illustrate  the  necessity  of  some  elasticity  or  power  of 
adjustment  in  the  system  which  is  applied  on  entrance. 
A  rigid  set  of  questions  that  not  one-half  the  officers 
of  the  Army  to-day  could  solve  in  three  hours  is  plain- 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  243 

ly  not  the  one  to  govern  in  the  admission  of  a  lot  of 
comparatively  untrained  men,  whom  you  are  going  to 
train  in  some  other  way,  I  hope,  than  in  the  system 
indicated  by  the  questions. 

"  The  obvious  tendency  is  to  cramming,  the  one  thing 
which  the  traditions  of  the  Academy  have  hitherto 
consigned  to  ignominy. 

"  It  has  been  the  pride  of  the  Academy  to  range 
men,  at  least  in  the  most  important  studies,  by  what 
they  really  knew,  while  appearance  of  knowledge, 
which  was  not  really  present,  has  always  provoked 
scorn  and  derision.  This  system  is  a  revolution.  It 
establishes  premiums  for  knowledge  of  curiosities,  and 
appears  to  me  to  lack  conspicuously  the  only  merit  that 
I  knew  to  be  claimed  for  it — namely,  impartiality. 

"  I  hope  you  will  take  this  letter  as  an  indication  of 
my  sympathy  in  this  business,  which  appears  to  me  to 
have  considerable  importance. 

"  Yours  truly, 

"  G.  H.  MENDELL. 

"  P.  S.  —  In  examination  for  places  as  teachers  in 
public  schools  it  may  well  be  that  it  is  necessary  to 
have  a  system  of  competition  by  which  the  examiners 
shall  be  guided  in  assigning  a  position  to  one  of  ten 
applicants.  There  is  no  reason  at  West  Point-  for 
competition  at  the  first  examination,  which  does  not 
pretend  to  arrange  in  order  of  merit,  the  object  of  this 
examination  being  merely  to  determine  a  fair  proba- 
bility that  the  candidate  will  make  good  progress  in 
the  course  to  follow,  and  not  to  determine  whether 
one  is  a  better  scholar  than  another.  This  considera- 
tion, together  with  the  past  history  of  the  Academy, 


244 


MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 


seems  to  me  to  show  that  the  innovation  is  not  necessary, 
and  that  it  is  not  an  improvement  on  old  methods." 

I  may  mention  that  Colonel  Mendell  is  interested  in 
public  school  education.  He  was  Assistant  Professor 
of  Philosophy  at  West  Point  from  January  3,  1859,  to 
June  18,  1863. 

On  Colonel  Mendell's  letter  is  written,  "  I  concur  in 
the  above.  Charles  S.  Stewart  "-—Colonel  Stewart, 
of  the  Engineers.  I  have  also  a  great  many  others 
here,  but  will  only  take  time  to  refer  to  a  few  of 
them.  Colonel  Henry  M.  Lazelle,  lately  Commandant 
of  Cadets,  says : 

"  COMMONWEALTH  HOTEL, 
"BOSTON,  MASS.,  October  14,  1882. 
"  DEAR  GENERAL  FRY  : 

****** 

"  I  am  glad  that  at  last  this  subject  and  its  cor- 
relative have  attracted  attention  in  the  Army  outside 
of  West  Point;  and  I  am  equally  glad  that  they  are  to 
have  a  hearing  within  Army  circles,  and  I  hope,  their 
remedy  there. 

****** 

"  I  think  that  the  tendency  and  the  actual  present 
practice  is  to  exact  everything  possible  within  the 
Board's  construction  of  the  statute. 

"  I  remember  on  one  occasion  calling  attention  to 
the  fact  that  one  of  the  printed  problems  was  a  sub- 
ject in  alligation,  which  I  regarded  as  beyond  elemen- 
tary proportion,  and  therefore  beyond  even  the  re- 
quirements of  the  Military  Academy  regulations  for 
admission  of  candidates. 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITAEY  ACADEMY.  245 

"  It  is  true  that  there  can  be  no  partiality,  that  the 
examination  is  wholly  impersonal ;  but  it  is  unques- 
tionably exacting  to  the  smallest  details ;  while  the 
previous  opportunities  or  disadvantages,  the  peculiari- 
ties or  the  future  possibilities  of  the  student  applicant, 
are  never  known,  under  the  present  system,  to  the 
Academic  Board,  and  in  no  way  interest  its  members. 
In  my  judgment  the  questions  in  some  subjects,  espe- 
cially in  history  and  geography,  are  so  numerous,  and 
of  so  wide  a  scope,  that  only  a  rapid  writer,  perfectly 
familiar  with  the  answers  required,  could  present  a 
perfect  paper  within  the  allotted  time ;  and  it  is  need- 
less to  say  that  such  a  being  does  not  often  present 
himself. 

"  I  think  that  the  Academic  Board  attaches  great 
weight  to  the  idea  that  it  spares  to  the  candidate  the 
mortification  of  a  future  failure ;  and  to  the  Academy 
much  expense  by  the  summary  rejection  (without  in- 
quiry) of  those  unable  to  secure  the  percentage  re- 
quired. While  this  may  be  true  to  a  certain  extent, 
there  is  at  the  same  time,  on  the  other  hand,  afforded 
the  applicant  a  full  opportunity  to  avail  himself  of 
his  cramming  (as  you  have  stated),  without  cross-ques- 
tioning, or  the  sifting  out  of  the  reasons  of  things— 
the  whys  and  wherefores — in  the  present  silent  written 
examinations ;  and  there  is  further  completely  ignored 
the  fact  that  the  minds  of  youth  of  equal  aptitude  and 
ultimate  possibilities  have  developed  unequally,  be- 
cause of  unequal  training  in  a  given  direction,  some 
having  had,  perhaps,  only  very  meagre  preparatory 
advantages.  And  yet  every  graduate  knows  that 
many  of  these  raw  specimens,  barely  able  to  enter, 


246  MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 

climb  during  the  four  years  to  very  near  the  top  of 
their  class.  Such  an  institution  of  the  people,  and  for 
the  people,  should  be  fairly  within  their  reach  with- 
out an  expensive  preparatory  course.  Such,  evidently, 
was  the  intention  of  the  founders  of  the  Military 
Academy.  And  it  is  plain  that  antagonisms  will  be 
generated  sooner  or  later,  in  the  public  mind  towards 
an  institution  whose  benefits  are  not  to  be  obtained 
except  by  a  costly  preliminary  process;  and  which 
even  then  rejects  on  an  average  more  than  one-third  of 
all  applicants  at  their  first  trial. 

*  •&  •*  -H-  *•  * 

"  It  is  within  the  knowledge  of  all,  that  during  the 
past  twelve  or  fifteen  years  the  steady  tendency  at 
West  Point  has  been  toward  increasing  the  course  of 
studies  in  extent  and  difficulty.  And  it  is  no  reflec- 
tion upon  any  one  that  this  is  so,  since  it  is  an  inevi- 
table result  of  the  rapid  multiplication  of  the  methods 
and  of  the  truths  of  science.  Each  professor  there 
has  been  ambitious  to  keep  pace  with  progress  else- 
where ;  has  been  jealous  of  the  time  given  to  subjects 
in  departments  other  than  his  own ;  and  anxious  per- 
haps to  swell  the  dimensions  of  his  own  depart- 
ment of  instruction.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  the 
natural  result  of  this  would  be  to  declare  deficient, 
without  much  toleration  or  charity.  An  additional 
language  —  Spanish  —  is  now  taught,  and  I  think 
that  I  am  safe  in  saying  that  in  every  other  de- 
partment of  study  there  the  course  has  been  in- 
creased, while  the  period — four  years — is  the  same 
as  formerly. 

"  The  consequences  of  all  the  united  causes  are,  few 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  247 

successful  candidates  for   admission,  and   very  small 
graduating  classes. 

*  *  *  *  *  # 

"  The  mental  strain  of  the  present  course  and  its 
exactions  are,  it  seems  to  me,  from  beginning  to  end, 
too  much.  It  leaves  the  cadet  exhausted,  and  on 
graduating,  he  throws  his  professional  studies  aside  to 
be  resumed  only  when  compelled  to  do  so.  But  a  rel- 
atively small  proportion  of  the  large  number  present- 
ing themselves  each  June  at  West  Point  can  stand  it 
for  four  years.  Hence  the  Corps  of  Cadets  will  con- 
tinue to  be  small,  and  the  number  of  graduates  in  the 
Service  disproportionate  to  the  number  of  non-gradu- 
ates so  long  as  existing  conditions  continue. 

"  The  Military  Academy  was  certainly  created  for 
the  Army,  and  not  the  reverse ;  and  the  public  sooner 
or  later,  out  of  patience  and  sympathy  with  it,  as  now 
producing,  will  demand  that  it  supply  the  needs  of  the 
Army.  When  it  is  considered  that  no  purely  military 
instruction  is  given,  except  in  tactics,  until  the  last 
year,  and  that  cadets  are  very  seldom  found  deficient 
in  that  year,  that  the  deficiencies  are  chiefly  in  pure  or 
applied  mathematics  and  the  languages,  it  does  seem 
that  less  pressure  might  and  should  be  exerted  in  these 
last  named  studies.  As  cadets  doing  fairly  -well 
therein  would  easily  master  the  fourth  year's  course, 
the  Army  would  have  many  more  graduates,  who,  per- 
haps, if  not  fitted  for  the  higher  duties  of  their  pro- 
fession, would  be  eminently  qualified  for  those  of  the 
line;  and  it  certainly  would  be  a  great  gainer  in  intel- 
ligence and  in  professional  qualifications.  And  cer- 
tainly, as  you  have  said,  the  law  establishing  the  course 


248  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

of  studies  at  the  Academy  and  providing  for  its  grad- 
uates contemplated  this  gradation  in  Academic  pro- 
ficiency with  the  view  of  increasing  the  number  of 
graduates. 

"  I  beg,  General,  that  you  will  pardon  any  indiscre- 
tions of  language  or  hasty  thoughts  that  may  appear 
herein. 

*  *  #•  #  vf  * 

"  With  the  highest  esteem,  I  remain  most  sincerely, 
"  Your  obedient  servant, 

"H.  M.  LAZELLE." 

Colonel  C.  S.  Stewart,  Engineer  Corps,  writes  as 
follows : 

aSAN  FRANCISCO,  GAL.,  December  2,  1882. 
"  MY  DEAR  FRIEND  : 

"  Let  me  thank  you  for  your  good  words  as  given  in 
the  Army  and  Navy  Journal  of  last  week,  which  call 
attention  to  the  illegal  tests  required  of  candidates  for 
admission  by  the  Academic  Board  at  the  Military 
Academy.  The  arithmetical  jugglery  and  legerde- 
main may,  however,  be  theoretically  ordered  by  the 
Secretary  of  War,  but,  if  so,  he,  it  seems  to  me,  goes 
far  beyond  the  intent  and  meaning  of  the  statutes.  I 
trust  he  may  be  induced  to  make  the  Board  go  back 
to  a  simple  examination,  which  would  give  some  chance 
to  many  a  fellow  now  turned  off  to  hold  on,  and,  with 
the  training  at  the  Academy,  make  as  good  an  officer 
as  any  now  obtained. 

"It  is  only  within  a  very  few  years  that  I  have 
had  any  knowledge  of  this,  as  it  seems  to  me,  out- 
rageous system  of  examination  for  admission  at  West 
Point.  .  .  . 

"  C.  SEAFORTH  STEWART." 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  249 

Colonel  Stewart  graduated  head  of  the  class  in 
which  McClellan  was  second,  and  has  a  son  who  passed 
the  examination  for  admission  and  is  now  a  cadet  at 
the  Academy. 

General  W.  W.  Burns,  of  the  Subsistence  Depart- 
ment, authorizes  me  to  use  the  following  letter  ad- 
dressed by  him  to  the  Army  and  Navy  Register: 


"  SIR  :  Your  correspondent  (unknown  quantity) 
seems  to  be  anxious  to  popularize  West  Point  so  that 
the  people  will  look  upon  the  Sieves  with  more  favor. 
He  would  lengthen  the  term  a  year,  grant  leaves  to 
visit  and  keep  up  current  relations  with  the  times  and 
people,  raise  the  standard  of  admission,  and  would 
remodel  the  course  so  as  to  take  in  knowledge  of  mod- 
ern warfare,  etc.  In  a  word,  would  place  it  more  on 
a  footing  with  other  colleges.  He  says  he  is  a  young 
man,  and  therefore. ad  vises  the  doing  away  with  old 
methods  to  square  with  young  and  vigorous  ideas  suit- 
able to  steam,  electricity,  breech-loaders,  armor  de- 
fences, etc.  These  are  taking  suggestions,  and  strike 
the  popular  heart.  i  Progress '  is  the  tocsin  of  the 
times.  Festina  lente.  Principles  are  not  young  ;  dis- 
coveries may  be.  The  Medes  and  the  Persians — 
Homer's  Greeks — based  military  education  upon  order 
and  discipline.  Order,  heaven's  first  law  ;  discipline, 
the  rule  of  wisdom.  Discipline  of  the  mind  and  body. 
Mathematics  discipline  the  mind,  calisthenics  the  body; 
both  require  order  and  healthful  restraint.  Military 
education  forms  a  matrix  for  knowledge  which  comes 
after,  as  the  sprout  from  the  rich  soil.  Whatever  seed 


250  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

be  planted  finds  quick  root  and  flourishes.  A  democ- 
racy fosters  military  education  as  a  necessary  evil,  for 
its  method  is  autocratic.  It  can  never  be  popularized. 
It  ought  not  to  be  in  our  body  politic,  but  should  be 
treated  as  gunpowder,  kept  secluded  and  safe,  re- 
spected for  its  use,  guarded  against  abuse.  The  cadet 
should  be  taken  as  a  young  colt  from  the  field,  with- 
out false  training  or  loose  handling,  vigorous  from  his 
native  stock  (the  people),  ambitious  to  improve  his 
condition,  eager  to  win  the  goal,  his  eye  upon  his 
country's  eagle  and  flag  waving  above  him.  Reading, 
writing,  arithmetic,  his  country's  history  and  geogra- 
phy imbibed  from  his  common  school,  mathematics 
and  drill  will  soon  test  his  natural  abilities.  Then  let 
the  chaff  be  blown  away  and  the  sound  seed  ground 
in  the  mill  of  discipline,  both  of  mind  and  body, 
healthily,  as  was  done  at  West  Point.  Then  he  should 
be  reserved  for  his  country's  use,  not  his  own  or  that  of 
popular  friends.  Knowledge  of  current  war,  history, 
morals  and  manners  should  follow  at  such  schools  as 
Fort  Monroe  and  Leavenworth,  in  corps  or  regiments. 
He  is  dedicated,  set  apart  for  the  people,  who  are  sov- 
ereign, as  a  servant  of  the  public.  His  life  a  school, 
theoretical,  practical,  progressive,  for  emergencies. 
High  schools  are  destroying  the  youth  of  our  times, 
turning  out  loose  professionals,  or  degenerating  indus- 
trial classes  into  an  overstock  of  clerks,  poorly  paid, 
would-be  gentlemen.  Loose  habits  and  smattering 
science  to  be  unlearned  would  take  half  of  the  West 
Point  term ;  the  character  could  never  be  reformed. 
It  is  brain,  nerve  and  muscle  that  West  Point  requires, 
not  knowledge  in  a  diversified  curriculum.  Bacon 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  251 

recommends  few  books,  well  digested,  not  for  knowl- 
edge, but  for  the  mind  discipline.  Doubtless  the 
young  professors  now  at  West  Point  understand  this. 

"  REPUBLIC.  " 

General  L.  C.  Hunt  writes  me  as  follows : 

UA^N  ARBOR,  MICHIGAN,  March  15,  1883. 

"  DEAR  FRY  : 

****** 

"  West  Point  always  has  been,  as  it  is  now,  intensely 
conservative.  There  is  so  much  that  is  really  admir- 
able at  the  Institution,  under  any  regime,  and  so  much 
that  is  fascinating  in  its  surroundings  and  belongings, 
that  each  generation  of  men  stationed  there  will  regard 
as  heretical  any  change  or  criticism  or  any  reversion 
to  the  methods  of  the  past  which  we  know  to  have 
worked  better. 

"  For  my  part  I  am  satisfied  that  the  methods  since 
the  war  have  not  been  up  to  the  old  mark — too  much 
crowding,  exaction,  cramming  specially — not  enough 
of  broad  general  outlook. 

"L.  C.  HUNT." 

General  Webb,  President  of  the  College  of  the  City 
of  New  York,  writes  : 
"  MY  DEAR  GENERAL  : 

"  In  answer  to  your  request  that  I  should  furnish 
you  with  a  copy  of  the  remarks  that  I  was  induced  to 
make  after  hearing  you  read  your  most  interesting 
paper  upon  the  admission  of  new  cadets  to  the  U.  8. 
Military  Academy,  I  regret  to  state  that  I  have  been 
unable  until  this  late  day  to  put  them  in  writing.  I 
hope  you  will  accept  this  letter,  therefore,  as  simply 
the  result  of  an  effort  to  recall  sentiments  forced  from 


252 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


me  by  hearing  your  arguments  in  favor  of  a  change  in 
the  examination  of  candidates  for  our  Alma  Mater. 

"  If  one  who  has  had  six  years'  experience  as  an  in- 
structor at  West  Point  and  fourteen  years'  experience 
as  president  of  a  college,  extending  over  a  period 
during  which  he  has  conducted  the  examination  of 
over  12,000  candidates  for  admission  from  the  New 
York  public  schools,  can  be  of  any  service  in  securing 
a  settled  conviction  in  the  mind  of  our  average  Con- 
gressman as  to  his  duties  in  regard  to  this  matter  of 
selecting  candidates  for  West  Point,  and  securing  a 
proper  representation  of  his  State  and  district  in  the 
Military  Academy,  I  will  gladly  do  my  part  in  this 
letter. 

"  We  all  know  the  working  of  the  law,  and  we  know 
that  each  candidate  represents  a  Congressional  Dis- 
trict, but  there  are  two  points  to  which  I  would  call 
special  attention,  and  one  is  already  covered  by  your 
paper. 

"The  first  is  as  you  stated.  The  duty  devolved 
upon  those  appointed  to  conduct  the  affairs  of  the 
Academy  is  to  secure,  as  far  as  may  lie  in  their  power, 
under  suitable  regulations,  adopted  to  protect  the 
Academy  from  suffering  any  diminution  in  a  proper 
standard  in  a  knowledge  of  belle  lettres,  arts  and  mili- 
tary science  on  the  part  of  its  graduates,  while  at  the 
same  time  they  shall  secure,  as  far  as  possible,  a  rep- 
resentation from,  all  parts  of  our  country. 

"  We  therefore  feel  at  once  that  this  question  of  ex- 
aminations for  admission,  and  the  question  of  the  du- 
ties of  members  of  Congress  in  regard  to  making  ap- 
pointments, will  both  give  rise  to  as  many  discussions 


ADMISSION  TO  TEE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  253 

and  as  many  methods  of  discussing  them  as  you  may 
find  men  willing  to  write.  You  will  therefore  find 
from  me  in  this  paper  only  what  I  recall  as  having 
said  in  the  presence  of  the  Military  Service  Institution 
on  these  two  subjects. 

"  The  Military  Academy,  as  a  national  school,  has 
always  stood  on  about  the  same  footing  in  regard  to 
the  ordinary  boys'  school  as  most  of  our  leading  col- 
leges have  been  supposed  to  stand.  The  gravest  error 
that  has  been  committed  has  been  that  which  fostered 
the  idea  that  the  Military  Academy  should  seek  her 
recruits  from  among  college  graduates.  To  print  a 
number  of  questions,  said  to  be  of  about  sunicient 
testing  qualities  in  the  various  subjects,  and  to  hold 
them  up  as  models  for  those  who  are  preparing  them- 
selves to  enter  West  Point,  is  proper,  and  conducive 
to  produce  among  the  boys'  schools  of  our  country  a 
fine  appreciation  of  what  a  good  common  school  edu- 
cation ought  to  be  in  this  country.  This  is  all  that 
the  law  contemplated  ;  indeed,  all  that  the  law  allows. 
And  so  much  for  entrance  examinations.  The  com- 
mon sense  of  the  Academic  Board  at  West  Point  must 
govern  this  whole  matter  until  it  may  be  made  neces- 
sary for  Congressmen  to  encroach  upon  the  privileges 
and  rights  of  that  body,  when  the  privileges  and  rights 
of  their  constituents  are  interfered  with  by  them. 
And  now  as  to  the  duties  of  these  Congressmen. 

"  If  the  district  a  citizen  is  called  upon  to  represent 
in  Congress  be  in  a  condition  such  as  to  prevent  the 
member  from  selecting  a  suitable  candidate  for  West 
Point,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Congressman  to  refrain 
from  making  such  selection  until  through  his  influence 


254 


MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 


he  may  raise  the  standard  of  education  in  that  district. 
If  the  district  be  one  capable  of  furnishing  a  suitable 
candidate,  fully  equal  to  pass  the  moderate  examina- 
tion which  should  be  required  for  entrance  to  West 
Point,  he  must  under  the  law  select  one  fitted  by  nature, 
and  by  habits,  and  by  associations  to  become  the  com- 
rade of  officers  of  the  Army,  and  all  the  certificates  of 
boards  and  committees  and  politicians  are  worthless 
in.  the  eyes  of  the  law  when  the  question  of  the  re- 
sponsibility of  the  Congressman  is  brought  up. 

"  The  brightest  brain  in  any  district  never  has  been 
and  never  will  be  the  best  fitted  for  the  duties  of  an 
Army  officer.  No  member  of  Congress  has  the  right 
to  send  to  West  Point  a  coarse,  bright  fellow,  simply 
because  he  passes  a  Board  of  Examiners,  called  to- 
gether possibly  to  free  him  from  the  responsibility 
which  the  law  put  upon  him.  If  he  wants  to  do  his 
duty  through  a  board  let  him  announce  that  the 
board  is  to  pick  out  the  man  best  fitted  physically, 
morally,  intellectually,  and  in  habits  and  disposition 
to  receive  so  important  an  appointment  from  the  Gov- 
ernment ;  if  the  Congressman  himself  knows  nothing 
about  his  candidate's  habits  and  calling,  the  people  in 
the  vicinity  will.  Some  Congressmen  have  pursued 
this  course  conscientiously,  but  I  fear  many  have  not. 
Therefore  it  should  be  understood  that  there  is  noth- 
ing whatsoever  which  under  the  law  can  free  a  Con- 
gressman from  these  responsibilities.  And  when  a 
common  fellow  is  dismissed  from  West  Point  the 
name  of  the  man  who  selected  one  notoriously  unfit 
should  be  published.  If  these  rules  were  adopted 
you  would  not  find  many  self-mutilators  or  liars. 


ADMISSION  TO  THE  MILITARY  ACADEMY.  255 

"  If  these  be  the  duties  of  Congressmen,  how  care- 
ful must  the  Academic  Board  be  not  to  place  the 
standard  for  admission  beyond  the  reach  of  the  young 
man  who  would  be  deemed  in  his  district  best  fitted 
for  college. 

"And  now,  agreeing  with  you  in  the  spirit  of  your 
paper  and  expressing  as  I  have,  possibly  in  too  strong 
a  manner,  the  feelings  that  have  arisen  when  I  have 
heard  West  Point  discussed  during  the  past  eight 
years,  I  turn  to  another  question  which  will,  I  hope, 
call  for  earnest  consideration  from  the  Academic 
Board. 

"  Nothing  can  be  more  important  to  the  young  candi- 
date than  the  old-fashioned  oral  examination  made  in 
a  public  way  by  kind-hearted,  intelligent  professors, 
who  seek  solely  the  good  of  the  Academy,  and  are 
above  dwelling  in  a  pedantic  manner  upon  technicali- 
ties which  do  not  affect  the  general  capacity  and 
knowledge  of  the  young  man.  You  may  answer  that 
we  conduct  our  examinations  in  this  college  through 
written  matter.  Yes,  but  I  have  a  thousand  young 
men  to  examine  in  seven  subjects,  and  it  is  not  in  my 
power  to  require  the  oral  examination,  whose  loss  I 
deplore.  The  best  of  heart  and  the  best  of  headwork 
is  lost  to  me.  The  examination  of  the  eight  hundred 
students  for  advancement  is  required  by  law  to  be 
oral  whenever  possible. 

"  I  think  I  have  been  sufficiently  explicit,  but  I  sin- 
cerely regret  that,  writing  at  the  last  moment  and 
under  pressure,  I  am  prevented  from  sending  you  a 
better  digested  document.  I  have  expressed,  however, 
the  results  of  a  long  experience.  If  cadets  could  be 


256  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

chosen  by  such  able  men  as  Mr.  Hewitt,  West  Point 
would  not  suffer.  But  if  some  of  the  other  members 
do  not  profit  by  his  example  in  spirit  and  in  deed,  the 
Academic  Board  at  West  Point  will  continue  to  be 
antagonistic  to  the  best  interests  of  maoy  members  of 
Congress. 

"  Therefore  I  say,  finally,  let  us  all  know  that  you  do 
not  require  a  young  man  to  know  too  much  to  enter 
West  Point.  Then  let  the  members  of  Congress  read 
the  law  in  a  proper  spirit  and  correspond  to  its  pro- 
visions. 

"  I  remain  truly  yours, 

"  ALEX.  S.  WEBB. 

"NEW  YORK,  June  1,  1883." 

I  now  repeat  that  I  am  under  obligations  to  Pro- 
fessor Andrews  for  the  kind  terms  in  which  he  has 
mentioned  me,  and,  as  an  officer  of  this  Institution,  I 
thank  him  for  reading  his  paper.  I  have  no  doubt 
that  the  Army  will  receive  it  with  interest,  and  that 
the  proper  authorities  will  in  due  time  pass  impartially 
and  wisely  on  the  subject  under  discussion. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  move  a  vote  of  thanks  to  Professor 
Andrews. 

JUDGE  ADVOCATE  GARDNER — I  move,  Mr.  President, 
as  an  amendment  to  the  resolution,  the  addition  of 
these  words,  viz. :  "  and  that  a  copy  be  requested  for 
the  archives  of  this  Institution." 

The  amendment  was  accepted  by  General  Fry. 


ARTICLE  XI. 

The    Militia.* 

There  are  many  indications  of  a  deep-seated  pur- 
pose to  have  the  country  derive  permanent  advantage 
from  the  military  lessons  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion 
while  the  principal  actors-  in  the  great  struggle  are 
spared  to  us  as  teachers.  The  able  paper  to  which 
we  have  just  listened  adds  to  the  proofs  that  there  is 
a  widespread  feeling  in  favor  of  doing  something  more 
than  has  yet  been  done  to  promote  the  military  in- 
terests of  the  country.  It  is  in  response  to  that  feel- 
ing that  this  Institution  exists.  The  question  is,  upon 
what  should  the  friends  of  progress  concentrate  their 
efforts  ?  I  feel  that  I  shall  be  in  a  small  minority 
when,  dissenting  from  the  paper  of  the  illustrious  Gen- 
eral of  the  Army,  I  answer,  not  upon  the  Militia. 

General  Sherman  (as  I  understand  him)  says  all 
parties  agree  that  it  is  the  settled  policy  of  our 
Government  to  maintain  the  smallest  kind  of  a  Regular 
Army  as  a  school  of  instruction  ;  that  in  case  of  war 
the  armies  which  Congress  is  empowered  to  raise  and 
support  must  be  supplemented  by  the  militia;  that 
the  militia  is  the  physical  force  on  which  the  Chief 
Magistrate  of  the  nation  must  mainly  depend  ;  that  it 
is  our  duty  as  soldiers  and  citizens  to  aid  as  far  as  we 
may  to  mould  the  militia  into  a  form  in  which  it  may 

*  Remarks  by  General  Fry  upon  a  paper  on  ' '  The  Militia, ' '  read  by 
General  Sherman  before  the  Military  Service  Institution. 

257 


258 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


be  made  valuable  when  called  into  active  service  ; 
and  lie  advocates  a  bill,  now  before  Congress,  for  re- 
organizing and  making  an  appropriation  for  the  militia. 
With  due  deference  to  the  high  source  from  which 
these  views  emanate,  I  venture  to  express  dissent  from 
some  of  them.  I  do  not  underestimate  the  value  of 
military  organization  and  instruction  among  the  peo- 
ple, for  it  is  to  the  people  the  Government  must  go  in 
one  way  or  another  for  its  defence  and  support.  But 
the  trouble,  as  I  see  it,  is  that  the  General  Government 
can  accomplish  no  appreciable  good  under  its  power 
to  provide  for  organizing  and  disciplining  the  militia. 
Militiamen  are  not  "  troops,"  or  "  soldiers  "  ;  they  are 
armed  civilians,  the  arms-bearing  citizens  of  the  vari- 
ous States.  They  constitute  a  State  force  of  which 
the  Governor  is  Commander-in-chief.  The  character 
of  this  force  is  not  changed  by  the  fact  that  it  may 
for  a  limited  time,  and  for  specified  purposes,  be  placed 
on  detached  service  under  the  President  of  the  United 
States.  The  Constitution  clearly  separates  and  distin- 
guishes the  militia  from  the  "  armies  "  of  the  United 
States.  It  says :  Congress  shall  have  power,  1st,  to 
provide  and  maintain  a  navy  ;  2d,  to  raise  and  support 
armies ;  and  3d,  to  provide  for  calling  forth  the  militia. 
If  General  Sherman  is  correctly  reported,  he  said  in  a 
letter  to  Governor  Long  of  Massachusetts,  in  1880,  he 
was  "  more  than  willing  that  the  organized  militia  and 
volunteers  of  the  country  shall  be  considered  as  a  part 
of  the  Army  of  the  United  States."  I  am  unable  to 
perceive  how  the  militia  can  be  considered  a  part  of 
the  Army,  or  how  any  one  of  the  three  species  of  force 
which  the  General  Government  is  authorized  by  the 


THE   MILITIA.  259 

Constitution  to  use,  can  be  considered  part  of  either 
of  the  other  two. 

The  power  given  to  Congress  by  the  Constitution 
to  provide  for  organizing  and  disciplining  the  militia, 
is  in  fact  a  nullity,  because  the  militia  is  composed  of 
the  arms-bearing  citizens  of  the  States,  and  the  Con- 
stitution reserves  to  the  States  the  right  to  appoint 
the  officers  and  train  the  militia,  and  the  Governor  of 
the  State  is  the  militia's  commander-in-chief.  It  is  not 
practicable  for  the  General  Government  to  control  the 
militia,  even  so  far  as  to  establish  uniformity  through- 
out the  different  States.  If  uniformity  were  attempt- 
ed in  earnest,  the  General  Government  would  be  com- 
pelled to  set  up  a  standard  and  then  seek  conformity 
to  it  by  force  of  law.  It  will  no  doubt  be  admitted 
without  argument  that  forcible  process  is  not  practi- 
cable if  it  were  constitutional ;  so  that  the  question  is 
narrowed  to  the  simple  inquiry,  should  the  General 
Government  set  up  a  standard  of  proficiency  for  the 
militia  of  all  the  States  and  make  itself  responsible  for 
securing  conformity  to  that  standard  by  persuasion — 
by  offering  inducements  or  rewards  ?  Such  a  course 
suggests  several  grave  questions.  Congress  has  the 
right  to  appropriate  money  for  arming  the  militia,  but 
its  right  to  appropriate  prize-money  to  induce  militia- 
men to  improve  in  the  profession  of  arms  may  well  be 
questioned.  If  the  General  Government  fixed  a  stand- 
ard, and  sought  conformity  to  it  in  any  way,  even 
through  temptation  to  share  in  appropriations,  it 
would  necessarily  incur  responsibility  which  might 
lead  to  annoyances  and  even  serious  complications. 
It  may  fairly  be  held  that  the  military  purposes  for 


260  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

which  Congress  should  appropriate  money  (except  as 
specifically  provided  for  in  the  matter  of  arming  the 
militia)  must  be  found  under  its  constitutional  power 
to  raise  and  support  armies,  which  is  wholly  separate 
and  distinct  from  its  power  to  call  forth  the  militia 
and  from  its  nominal  power  to  provide  for  organizing 
and  disciplining  the  militia. 

The  only  purposes  for  which  the  General  Govern- 
ment can  call  forth  the  militia  are,  first,  "  to  execute 
the  laws  of  the  Union  "  ;  second,  "  to  suppress  insur- 
rections, etc." ;  and  third,  "  to  repel  invasion"  Al- 
though offensive  warfare  as  a  necessary  part  of  repel- 
ing  invasion  might  be  carried  on  to  a  limited  extent 
by  militia,  the  General  Government  has  no  constitu- 
tional power  to  call  forth  the  militia  for  the  purpose 
of  invasion,  or  for  any  other  purpose  than  one  of  the 
three  named. 

In  view  of  the  foregoing  facts,  and  others  which  I 
have  not  time  to  mention,  I  see  no  reason  to  believe 
that  the  military  interests  of  the  country  can  be  im- 
proved materially  by  any  effort  of  the  General  Govern- 
ment to  do  more  under  its  power  to  provide  for  or- 
ganizing and  disciplining  the  militia  than  it  has  here- 
tofore done.  All  of  importance  that  can  be  done 
toward  organizing,  disciplining,  and  instructing  the 
militia,  must,  it  seems  to  me,  be  done  by  the  States. 

It  is  well  to  bear  in  mind  that  although  the  militia 
has  been  severely  let  alone  by  the  General  Govern- 
ment, the  subject  of  its  improvement  has  been  under 
discussion  ever  since  the  Government  was  founded. 
On  the  21st  of  January,  1790,  President  Washington 
submitted  to  Congress  an  elaborate  report  from  his 


THE   MILITIA. 


261 


Secretary  of  War,  General  Knox,  upon  a  well-organ- 
ized militia,  and  a  plan  for  securing  it.  General  Knox 
said :  "  An  energetic  militia  is  to  be  regarded  as  the 
capital  security  of  a  free  republic,  and  not  a  standing 
army  forming  a  distinct  class  of  the  community ; "  but 
he  admitted  the  impracticability  of  "  disciplining  at 
once  the  mass  of  the  people,"  and  added  :  "  All  dis- 
cussions on  the  subject  of  a  powerful  militia  will  re- 
sult in  one  or  the  other  of  the  following  principles  : 
First,  either  efficient  institutions  must  be  established 
for  the  military  education  of  the  youth,  and  that  the 
knowledge  acquired  therein  shall  be  diffused  through- 
out the  community  by  the  means  of  rotation  ;  or,  sec- 
ondly, that  the  militia  must  be  formed  of  substitutes, 
after  the  manner  of  the  militia  of  Great  Britain."  In 
1792  the  existing  militia  law  was  passed. 

In  1803  a  committee  reported  to  the  House  that 
"  after  full  investigation  "  they  were  of  opinion  that 
the  law  of  May  8,  1792,  "embraceth  all  the  objects  of 
a  militia  institution  delegated  to  Congress  " ;  and  they 
added:  "the  principles  of  that  law  lay  the  founda- 
tions of  a  militia  system  on  the  broad  basis  prescribed 
by  the  Constitution,  and  are  well  calculated  to  insure 
a  complete  national  defence  if  carried  into  effect  by  the 
State  governments  agreeably  to  the  power  reserved  to 
the  States  respectively  by  the  Constitution ;  and 
therefore  ought  not  to  be  altered  "  ;  and  the  commit- 
tee recommended  that  the  President  "  be  requested  to 
write  to  the  Executive  of  each  State,"  urging  the  im- 
portance of  vigorous  exertions  by  the  State  govern- 
ments. 

In   1806,  a  committee  reported  at  length  to    the 


262  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

House,  and  closed  by  saying,  "  that  it  is  inexpedient 
to  adopt  measures  for  the  classification  or  new  organi- 
zation of  the  militia." 

In  1809  another  committee  reported  to  the  House, 
"  that  having  carefully  examined  the  subject  referred 
to  them,  they  are  of  opinion  that  it  would  not  be 
proper,  at  this  time,  to  make  any  alteration  in  the 
militia  system  of  the  United  States." 

In  1810  a  committee  reported  to  the  Senate:  "If 
the  States  are  anxious  for  an  effective  militia,  to  them 
belongs  the  power,  and  to  them  belong  the  means  of 
rendering  the  militia  our  bulwark  in  war  and  our 
safeguard  in  peace  ;  and  as  the  committee  are  willing 
to  hope  that  the  States  will  not  be  unmindful  of  the 
great  duty  of  providing  for  the  national  safety  by  a 
well-ordered  and  effective  militia,  and  as  the  committee 
are  unwilling  to  declare  any  powers  to  Congress  not 
expressly  given  by  the  Constitution,  nor  necessarily 
incident  to  the  powers  delegated,  they  submit  the  fol- 
lowing resolution,  viz. :  Resolved,  That  the  committee 
be  discharged  from  further  consideration  of  this  sub- 
ject." 

The  House  also  considered  the  subject  in  1810,  so 
far  as  to  collect  information  upon  it.  It  was  in  re- 
sponse to  an  inquiry  from  Mr.  Tallmadge,  of  the 
House,  at  that  session,  that  General  Huntington,  of 
Connecticut,  who  was  an  officer  in  the  Revolution,  a 
Brigadier- General  in  the  Provisional  Army  of  1798-99, 
and  twice  a  member  of  Congress,  said :  "  I  have  never 
seen  any  system  proposed  in  which  I  have  confidence ; 
nor  do  I  believe  any  system  commensurate  to  the  object 
will  ever  be  adopted  by  the  Government,  or,  if  adopted, 


THE   MILITIA. 


263 


be  submitted  to  by  the  sovereign  people.  .  .  .  Let 
the  Government  proceed  to  regulate  the  militia  to  the 
utmost  length  their  masters,  the  sovereign  people,  will 
bear ;  it  will  be  just  so  far  as  to  make  them  food  for 
powder  in  the  day  of  battle  ;  and  death,  or  what  is 
worse,  loss  of  honor,  must  be  expected  by  every  officer 
of  spirit  connected  with  them." 

In  1816  the  Secretary  of  War  communicated  to  the 
House  a  plan  for  organizing  and  disciplining  the 
militia. 

In  1817  Mr.  Harrison  reported  to  the  House  upon 
the  two  points  :  "  First,  Is  it  desirable  that  the  whole 
male  population  of  the  United  States,  of  the  proper 
age,  should  be  trained  to  the  use  of  arms,  so  as  to 
supersede  under  any  circumstances  the  necessity  of  a 
standing  army  ?  "  "  Second,  Is  it  practicable  ?  "  Upon 
these  inquiries  an  able  and  elaborate  report  was  made. 
The  conclusions  were  that  "  the  liberties  of  America 
must  be  preserved  as  they  were  won,  by  the  arms,  the 
discipline,  and  the  valor  of  her  f  reeborn  sons  "  ;  that 
"nothing  can  be  more  dangerous  in  such  a  govern- 
ment than  to  have  a  knowledge  of  the  military  art 
confined  to  a  part  of  the  people,  for  sooner  or  later 
that  part  will  govern  "  ;  that  "  there  can  scarcely  be  a 
restraint  more  vexatious  and  disgusting  to  a  grown 
man  than  the  initiatory  lessons  of  the  military  art "  ; 
that  "  to  this  cause  is  to  be  attributed  the  little  prog- 
ress that  has  been  made  in  training  the  militia  of  the 
United  States  "  ;  and  that  there  is  "  no  prospect  that 
any  change  of  system  could,  with  regard  to  the  pres- 
ent militia,  produce  the  result  at  which  we  aim." 
Hence  the  committee  concluded  that  to  establish  a 


264  MILITAEY  MISCELLANIES. 

sound  military  system  we  must  begin  on  the  youth  of 
the  country;  and  that  we  ought  "  to  devise  a  system  of 
military  instruction  which  shall  be  engrafted  on  and 
form  part  of  the  ordinary  education  of  our  youth, 
extended  without  exception  to  every  individual  of  the 
proper  age — not  in  distant  schools  established  for  the 
purpose,  but  that  it  should  form  a  branch  of  education 
in  every  school  within  the  United  States." 

In  1819  Mr.  Harrison  made  to  the  House  another 
full  report  upon  the  subject. 

In  1822  the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means  re- 
ported to  the  House:  "It  is  not  expedient  at  this 
time  to  increase  the  annual  appropriation  for  arming 
the  militia." 

In  1826  the  Secretary  of  War,  James  Barbour,  made 
an  earnest  effort  in  relation  to  the  militia.  He  ad- 
dressed a  circular-letter  to  Governors  of  States  and 
other  prominent  persons  for  their  views.  He  adopted 
it  as  an  unquestionable  political  maxim,  that  "  a  well- 
organized  and  well-disciplined  militia  is  the  natural 
defence  of  a  free  people  " ;  and  added  :  "  I  am  anxious 
to  see  a  system  adopted  by  the  National  Legislature 
which  will  realize  the  hopes  of  us  all  in  reference  to 
this  great  arm  of  national  defence."  The  many  and 
elaborate  replies  he  received  presented  various  phases 
of  the  subject.  No  better  authority  responded  than 
Timothy  Pickering,  who  served  with  the  Massachu- 
setts militia  in  1775,  was  a  member  of  the  Continental 
Board  of  War,  Quartermaster-General  in  1780,  Post- 
master-General in  1791,  Secretary  of  War,  January, 
1795;  Secretary  of  State,  December,  1795;  United 
States  Senator  in  1803,  and  member  of  the  United 


THE   MILITIA.  265 

States  House  of  Representatives  in  1813.  He  said: 
"  The  opinion  that  a  well-organized  and  well-disci- 
plined militia  is  the  natural  defence  of  a  free  people 
is  entitled  to  the  character  given  to  it  by  the  Secre- 
tary, that  of  a  maxim,  but  surely  the  experience  of 
the  people  of  the  United  States  will  not  authorize  the 
conclusion  ;  because  a  well-disciplined  militia  compre- 
hending the  active  mass  of  able-bodied  men  never  had, 
and,  I  do  not  hesitate  to  say,  never  will  have,  an  ex- 
istence in  our  country."  "  If,"  added  Pickering,  "  the 
worse  than  useless  project  of  training  the  whole  body 
of  the  militia  be  abandoned,  some  encouragement 
would  be  requisite  to  induce  men  to  join  select  volun- 
teers" 

General  E.  P.  Gaines  also  took  hold  of  the  subject 
in  1826,  and  made  a  ]ong  report  upon  it;  and  in  1829 
it  was  again  fully  reported  upon  in  the  House.  A 
bill  was  offered,  and  some  new  points  made  in  its  sup- 
port. It  was  boldly  asserted  that  "  the  object  of  an 
organization  of  the  militia  of  the  United  States  should 
be  to  make  every  individual  thereof  liable  to  enrol- 
ment,— a  citizen-soldier,  and  to  give  to  the  whole  the 
character  and  efficiency  of  an  army"  "  To  accomplish 
this  great  object,"  it  was  asserted,  "  liberal  disburse- 
ments must  be  made  from  the  Treasury  of  the  United 
States " ;  and  the  Government  was  openly  charged 
with  "  a  disastrous  and  withering  parsimony  "  toward 
the  militia;  and  then,  somewhat  as  now,  the  surplus 
in  the  United  States  Treasury  was  urged  as  a  reason 
for  a  government  appropriation  for  the  militia.  The 
committee  said  :  "Already  have  propositions,  novel  and 
experimental  in  their  character,  to  dispose  of  an  antici- 


266  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

pitted  burdensome  surplus  in  the  Treasury  of  the 
United  States,  been  presented  to  Congress  for  consid- 
eration. If  such  anticipations  are  well  founded,  the 
claim  of  the  militia  of  the  United  States  to  a  liberal 
share  of  such  surplus  is  irresistible,"  and  the  committee 
offered  a  bill.  But  notwithstanding  all  these  efforts, 

o 

including  the  last  one  mentioned,  to  deplete  a  plethoric 
treasury,  the  General  Government  could  not  be  led  into 
legislating  for  the  militia  of  the  States  further  than 
making  the  usual  appropriation  for  arms. 

States  also,  and  their  militia  officers,  petitioned  Con- 
gress from  time  to  time  without  effect.  It  is  not  nec- 
essary to  refer  specially  to  the  efforts  of  later  times. 
It  seems  to  be  a  crystallized  conviction,  and  I  think  a 
sound  one,  that  it  is  neither  constitutional  nor  practi- 
cable for  the  General  Government  to  make  a  reliable 
military  force  of  the  militia;  and  that  the  General 
Government  ought  not  to  make  appropriations  directly 
for  militia  purposes,  otherwise  than  providing  arms. 

The  second  article  of  Amendments  to  the  Constitu- 
tion says :  "A  well-regulated  militia  being  necessary 
to  the  security  of  a  free  State,  the  right  of  the  people 
to  keep  and  bear  arms  shall  not  be  infringed."  The 
right  secured  to  our  people  by  this  article  is  a  precious 
one ;  and  eminent  jurists,  statesmen,  and  soldiers  have 
reaffirmed  the  assumption  or  maxim  upon  which  it  is 
predicated,  to  wit:  that  a  well-regulated  militia  is 
necessary  to  the  security  of  a  free  State ;  but,  as  Pick- 
ering said  in  1810,  there  is  nothing  in  our  experience 
to  confirm  it.  No  one  will  maintain  that  we  have 
ever  had  a  well-regulated  militia,  or  any  thing  ap- 
proaching it,  and  we  are  farther  from  it  to-day  than 


THE   MILITIA.  267 

we  ever  were.  Yet  we  have  had  both  foreign  and 
domestic  wars  and  we  are  still  free. 

In  a  letter  to  Congress  Washington  said :  "If  called 
upon  to  declare  upon  oath  whether  the  militia  have 
been  most  serviceable  or  hurtful  on  the  whole,  I  should 
subscribe  to  the  latter";  and  Pickering  said  it  had 
"  never  done  any  good  to  the  country  except  in  the 
single  affair  of  Banker  Hill." 

The  bad  behavior  of  the  militia  in  the  War  of  1812 
— including  its  refusal  to  cross  the  Canada  frontier — 

o 

is  a  matter  of  history. 

The  conclusion  is,  that  instead  of  depending  upon  a 
well-regulated  militia,  our  liberties  depend,  primarily, 
upon  the  character,  spirit,  and  intelligence  of  our  peo- 
ple, and  secondarily,  upon  a  wise  exercise  of  the  con- 
stitutional power  of  Congress  to  raise  and  support 
armies. 

In  the  letter  from  Washington  already  cited  he 
says :  "  The  jealousy  of  a  standing  army  and  the  evils 
to  be  apprehended  from  one  are  remote,  and,  in  my 
judgment,  situated  and  circumstanced  as  we  are,  not 
at  all  to  be  dreaded." 

But,  Mr.  President,  the  real  proposition  before  us  is 
not  to  improve  and  enforce  the  so-called  "  well-regu- 
lated militia "  system  of  the  Constitution,  but  to 
abandon  it. 

As  I  have  shown,  I  do  not  expect  the  General  Gov- 
ernment to  derive  much  benefit  from  that  system,  but 
I  dissent  from  the  grounds  upon  which  it  is  proposed 
to  abandon  it.  The  proposition  is  that  the  General 
Government  shall  appropriate  money  directly  for  the 
aid  or  encouragement  of  certain  volunteer  military 


268 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


organizations,  of  which  the  so-called  National  Guard 
of  the  State  of  New  York  is  a  good,  if  not  the  best, 
example.  This  force  is  in  fact  a  State  army,  though 
as  it  marches  under  the  militia  ilao^  I  do  not  assert 

o 

that  it  is  in  violation  of  the  Constitution,  which  says : 
"  No  State  shall,  without  the  consent  of  Congress 
keep  troops  or  ships  of  war  in  time  of  peace." 
Certainly  the  National  Guard  of  New  York  is  an  ex- 
cellent military  force.  I  look  with  respect  and  admi- 
ration upon  the  devotion  of  its  members  to  the  unsel- 
fish and  noble  task  of  preparing  themselves  for  afford- 
ing military  protection  to  the  very  fellow-citizens  who 
are  their  competitors  in  civil  life,  and  who  profit  by 
the  time  these  National  Guardsmen  take  from  their 
regular  pursuits,  and  for  the  general  welfare  devote 
to  improvement  in  the  profession  of  arms.  I  repeat, 
I  respect  and  admire  the  purposes  and  zeal  of  these 
citizen-soldiers.  But  we  are  considering  the  public 
question,  whether  upon  the  facts  in  the  case,  the  Gen- 
eral Government  ought  to  appropriate  money  for  their 
assistance,  under  its  constitutional  power  to  provide 
for  organizing  and  disciplining  the  militia.  I  think 
not.  Certainly  not,  if  a  well-regulated  militia  such  as 
our  forefathers  meant,  and  our  Constitution  and  laws 
contemplate,  is  necessary  to  our  security ;  for  this  Na- 
tional Guard  is  a  substitute  for  the  militia — an  eva- 
sion of  the  militia  laws,  or  rather  the  State's  apology 
for  not  enforcing  the  militia  laws  upon  all  able-bodied 
male  citizens  between  eighteen  and  forty-five  years  of 
age.  If  the  General  Government  should  recognize  and 
aid  this  special  State  force  it  would  to  the  extent  of 
that  recognition  and  aid  oppose  the  enforcement  of 


THE   MILITIA.  269 

the  militia  system,  and  substitute  for  it  a  system  of 
standing  armies,  for  the  States ;  and  it  would  be  build- 
ing up  these  State  standing  armies  under  cover  of  the 
very  militia  system  which  their  existence  would  de- 
stroy. The  militia  is  in  service  by  law;  it  is  a  com- 
pulsory force.  These  National  Guardsmen  enlist  vol- 
untarily, but  they  receive  all  there  is  in  the  militia 
laws  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the  State,  to  further 
their  military  purposes.  They  are  enlisted,  organized, 
uniformed,  equipped,  drilled,  instructed,  and  disci- 
plined as  soldiers.  "  Nothing,"  said  Mr.  Harrison,  in 
his  report  to  the  U.  S.  House  of  Representatives  in 
1816,  "can  be  more  dangerous  in  such  a  government 
than  to  have  a  knowledge  of  the  military  art  confined 
to  a  part  of  the  people ;  for  sooner  or  later  that  part 
will  govern."  I  do  not  share  Mr.  Harrison's  appre- 
hensions, but  this  National  Guard  is  the  "part  of  the 
people  "  to  which  all  or  nearly  all  knowledge  of  the 
military  art  under  control  of  the  various  States  is  con- 
fined ;  and  to  this  restriction  of  military  knowledge  it 
is  proposed  the  General  Government  shall  give  direct 
aid  and  encouragement  by  an  appropriation  of  money. 
It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  liberties  of  the  people 
of  this  country  will  ever  be  in  jeopardy  from  either 
the  Army  of  the  United  States,  or  from  these  armies 
of  the  respective  States  ;  but  it  may  be  asserted  with 
safety  that  the  danger  is  no  more  remote  from  one  of 
these  forces  than  from  the  other ;  and  of  the  two,  the 
General  Government  had  better  devote  its  money  to 
the  development  and  support  of  the  former.  With- 
out dwelling  longer  upon  this  point,  I  may  say  it  seems 
to  me  there  are  weighty  objections  to  the  General  Gov- 


270 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


ernment  appropriating  money  directly  for  these  spe- 
cial State  forces,  as  well  as  to  appropriations  for  the 
militia  of  the  laws.  It  is  beyond  dispute  that  such 
State  armies  as  the  National  Guard  of  New  York  are 
valuable  military  bodies,  whose  services  may  be  need- 
ed at  any  moment.  Promoting  their  military  effi- 
ciency, however,  is  a  matter  that  rests  with  the  States 
who  create  and  control  these  substitutes  for  the  militia, 
not  with  the  General  Government.  As  U.  S.  Senator 
Smith  reported  in  1810:  "If  the  States  are  anxious 
for  an  effective  militia,  to  them  belongs  the  power, 
and  to  them  belong  the  means  of  rendering  the  militia 
truly  our  bulwark  in  war  and  our  safeguard  in  peace." 
But  notwithstanding  the  duty  of  the  States,  it  can- 
not be  denied  that  our  military  defence  rests  largely  and 
directly  upon  the  General  Government ;  and  if  that 
Government  is  not  to  create,  maintain,  or  encourage 
"  the  militia,"  or  its  substitute  the  National  Guard,  by 
direct  appropriations,  through  what  channels  shall  it 
proceed  to  meet  the  responsibility  it  is  under  ?  The 
answer  seems  to  be,  through  its  constitutional  powers 
to  provide  and  maintain  a  navy,  and  to  raise  and  sup- 
port armies,  and  make  rules  for  their  government  and 
regulation.  This  includes  the  power  to  enlist  and  to 
draft  the  men,  appoint  the  officers,  and  to  organize, 
discipline,  educate,  feed,  clothe,  equip,  transport,  and 
pay  the  forces.  The  right  of  the  General  Government 
to  promote  military  education  through  the  exercise  of 
its  power  to  raise  and  support  armies,  is  limited  only 
by  the  will  of  the  people  as  expressed  through  Con- 
gress. That,  no  doubt,  was  the  view  taken  by  the 
committee  which  reported  to  the  U.  S.  House  of  Kep- 


THE   MILITIA.  271 

resentatives  in  1817,  that  we  ought  "  to  devise  a  system 
of  military  instruction  which  shall  be  engrafted  on 
and  form  part  of  the  ordinary  education  of  our  youth," 
and  under  which  officers  of  the  Army  are  now  detailed 
for  service  at  a  number  of  the  schools  and  colleges  of 
the  country.  I  have  no  doubt  that  more  can  be  done 
in  that  way  for  the  military  interests  of  the  country, 
than  can  be  accomplished  by  any  effort  of  the  General 
Government  to  force  or  coax  grown  men  to  submit  to 
militia  training. 

In  addition  to  these  schools  for  youth,  much  can  be 
accomplished  through  the  military  schools  established 
and  maintained  under  the  power  to  raise  and  support 
armies.  The  Military  Academy  at  West  Point,  the 
Engineer  School  at  Willet's  Point,  the  Artillery 
School  at  Fort  Monroe,  the  Infantry  School  at  Fort 
Leavenworth,  the  Cavalry  School  which  the  Lieuten- 
ant-General Commanding  the  Army  proposes  for  Fort 
Riley,  and  this  Military  Service  Institution  (composed 
of  twelve  hundred  officers  and  ex-officers  of  the 
Regular  Army)  laboring  to  preserve  the  true  military 
spirit  and  to  disseminate  military  information,  can  all 
be  developed  and  enlarged  to  any  extent  that  Con- 
gress may  deem  necessary  in  providing  military  in- 
struction for  the  security  of  the  country.  Further- 
more, military  geographical  departments,  and  military 
stations,  especially  the  permanent  posts  occupied  by 
the  artillery  near  our  seaboard  cities,  can — under  the 
power  to  raise  and  support  armies — be  made  practical 
fields  and  schools  for  all  the  volunteer  forces  that  care 
to  gather  together  in  and  around  them  for  military  ex- 
ercise and  instruction.  In  all  these  cases  the  General 


272  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

Government  would  have  full  control  and  responsi- 
bility. And  finally,  as  the  essential  basis  of  its  mili- 
tary system,  the  General  Government  should — as  it  has 
always  shown  itself  willing  to  do — support  a  standing 
army  large  enough  to  give  full  development  to  the 
various  arms  of  Service,  to  keep  pace  with  the  prog- 
ress of  the  military  profession  throughout  the  world, 
especially  in  matters  pertaining  to  the  staff,  and  the 
manufacture  of  and  improvements  in  weapons  and 
projectiles  of  war. 

I  venture  the  assertion  that  no  thinking  citizen  of 
the  republic,  when  he  recalls  the  behavior  of  our  Reg- 
ular Army  since  the  formation  of  the  Government,  and 
particularly  at  the  close  of  the  Rebellion  and  during 
the  period  of  reconstruction,  really  feels  afraid  that 
the  liberties  of  the  people  will  ever  be  endangered  by 
it.  If  we  ever  lose  our  freedom  it  will  be  from  the 
corruption  of  the  people,  from  loss  of  manliness,  from 
adopting  the  creed  that  u  the  wealth  of  nations  con- 
sists, not  in  national  virtues  and  primitive  simplicity, 
but  in  silk  and  cotton  and  something  they  call  capi- 
tal "  ;  and  not  from  the  Regular  Army.  The  truth  is, 
the  opposition  to  our  Regular  Army  is  in  reality  based 
on  economy,  or  parsimony  if  you  please.  No  one  who 
studies  the  subject  can  fail  to  see,  that  just  in  the  pro- 
portion that  a  body  politic  becomes  devoted  to  peace- 
able pursuits,  is  the  necessity  developed  for  setting 
apart  a  portion  of  the  community  for  special  military 
training  and  service. 

In  case  of  war,  I  regard  it  as  inevitable  that,  instead 
of  depend  ing  upon  the  militia,  the  General  Government, 
under  its  power  to  raise  and  support  armies,  will  call 


THE   MILITIA. 


273 


volunteers  into  its  own  service,  and  if  necessary,  enroll 
and  draft  the  "  national  forces "  as  it  did  by  the  so- 
called  Enrolment  Act  of  March  3,  1863.  In  New 
York  that  Act  was  held  to  be  unconstitutional  upon 
the  ground  that  it  attempted  to  create  a  national 
militia;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  in  Pennsylvania  it 
was  held  to  be  constitutional ;  and  it  is  now  recognized 
as  a  constitutional  exercise  of  the  power  to  raise  and 
support  armies.  If  the  national  forces  are  called  for 
directly  by  the  General  Government  they  are  quite  sure 
to  come ;  whereas,  calls  for  State  militia  may  be  re- 
fused as  they  were  in  1812  and  in  1861.  Upon  the 
latter  occasion  some  Governors  not  only  refused  but 
defied  the  National  Executive;  upon  the  former,  the 
Governors  of  Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  and  Rhode 
Island  refused  to  furnish  the  militia  called  for  by  the 
President  under  the  Act  of  April  10,  1812,  and  the 
Governor  of  the  first  named  State  took  the  broad 
ground  that  "  the  commanders-in-chief  of  the  militia 
of  the  several  States  have  a  right  to  determine  whether 
any  of  the  exigencies  contemplated  by  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  exist,  so  as  to  require  them 
to  place  the  militia,  or  any  part  of  it,  in  the  service  of 
the  United  States,  at  the  request  of  the  President,  to 
be  commanded  by  him,  pursuant  to  acts  of  Congress." 
In  this  view,  the  Governor  was  sustained  by  his  coun- 
cil, and  by  Justices  Parsons,  Sewell,  and  Parker  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  State.  These  Justices  said  : 
"As  this  power  is  not  delegated  to  the  United  States 
by  the  Federal  Constitution,  nor  prohibited  by  it  to 
the  States,  it  is  reserved  to  the  States  respectively  ; 
and  from  the  nature  of  the  power,  it  must  be  exercised 


274  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

by  those  with  whom  respectively  is  entrusted  the 
chief  command  of  the  militia."  This  doctrine  was 
disputed  by  Secretary  of  War  James  Monroe,  in  1815; 
and  in  the  case  of  Martin  v.  Mott,  the  U.  S.  Supreme 
Court  squarely  overruled  it  saying :  "  We  are  all  of 
opinion  that  the  authority  to  decide  whether  the  exi- 
gency has  arisen  belongs  exclusively  to  the  President ; 
and  that  his  decision  is  conclusive  upon  all  other  per- 
sons." But  notwithstanding  the  clearness  and  sound- 
ness of  the  Supreme  Court's  decision  upon  the  princi- 
ple, the  power  to  decide  whether  the  militia  as  such 
shall  be  called  out  and  put  under  the  President,  rests 
practically  with  the  Governors.  If  they,  dissenting 
from  the  President's  views  as  to  the  exigency,  refuse 
his  call,  there  is  no  process  provided  by  which  he  can 
secure  the  services  of  the  militia  with  any  certainty, 
even  though  he  appeal  directly  to  militia  officers  sub- 
ordinate to  the  Governor.  Hence  the  necessity  under 
the  power  to  raise  and  support  armies  for  accepting 
United  States  volunteers,  and  for  enrolling  and  draft- 
ing the  "  national  forces." 

I  am  not  unmindful  of  the  fact  that  the  elements 
which  make  up  the  "  national  forces  "  are  essentially 
the  same  as  those  which  constitute  the  militia  of  the 
States ;  and  that  whether  these  elements  are  to  respond 
to  our  necessities  as  national  forces,  or  State  militia,  it 
is  equally  to  the  interest  of  the  country  that  they  re- 
ceive beforehand  all  the  military  instruction  practi- 
cable. The  point  I  desire  to  make  here  is  that,  taking 
all  things  into  consideration,  the  least  dispute  as  to 
constitutional  power  and  public  expediency  will  arise, 
and  the  best  results  will  be  attained,  if  the  General 


THE   MILITIA. 


275 


Government  directs  its  efforts  to  secure  that  instruction 
through  its  ample  power  to  raise  and  support  armies, 
and  not  through  its  nominal  power  to  provide  for 
organizing  and  disciplining  the  militia  of  the  States, 
leaving  the  States  to  work  upon  their  citizens  as  militia. 


PART  II. 


ARTICLE    I. 

Abraham  Lincoln.* 

Although  I  do  not  remember  to  have  seen  Lincoln 
until  the  day  of  his  first  inauguration  as  President,  I 
knew  him  through  my  father.  Pioneers  from  Ken 
tucky  to  Illinois,  they  were  friends  from  an  early 
period.  Lincoln  was  a  private  in  the  volunteer  forces 
commanded  by  my  father  in  the  Black  Hawk  War  of 
1831-32.  He  was  always  a  man  of  note  among  his 
associates,  in  the  Indian  campaign  as  well  as  in  sub- 
sequent political  campaigns,  especially  in  the  contest 
with  Douglas  for  the  United  States  Senate.  Mv 

o  •/ 

father  was  an  ardent  personal  and  political  friend  of 
Douglas,  and  in  his  circle  it  was  looked  upon  as  pre- 
sumptuous and  ridiculous  for  Abe  Lincoln  to  compete 
with  the  "  Little  Giant "  for  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States. 

The  contest  proved  that  the  so  called  rail-splitter 
was  the  real  giant,  and  led  to  his  selection  for  the 
head  of  the  new  party  at  Chicago  in  the  summer  of 
1860,  and  to  his  election  to  the  Presidency  in  the  fol- 
lowing autumn.  Lincoln  and  his  Illinois  competitor, 

*  "  Reminiscences  of  Abraham  Lincoln,"  Edited  by  Allan  Thorndike 
Rice. 

277 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

Stephen  A.  Douglas,  formed  a  striking  contrast. 
Douglas  was  low  in  stature,  rotund  in  figure,  with  a 
short  neck,  a  big  bullet-head,  and  a  chubby  face. 
His  lips  were  forced  into  the  fixed  smile  character- 
istic of  the  popular  and  well-satisfied  public  man  of  a 
period  when  political  success  depended  largely  upon 
what  a  man  said,  how  he  said  it,  and  how  he  appeared 
in  personal  intercourse  with  the  people  ;  and  not,  as 
now,  much  upon  what  newspapers  say  of  him  and  for 
him. 

Lincoln  was  tall  and  thin  ;  his  long  bones  were 
united  by  large  joints,  and  he  had  a  long  neck  and  an 
angular  face  and  head.  Many  likenesses  represent  his 
face  well  enough,  but  none  that  I  have  ever  seen  do 
justice  to  the  awkwardness  and  ungainliness  of  his 
figure.  His  feet,  hanging  loosely  to  his  ankles,  were 
prominent  objects ;  but  his  hands  were  more  con- 
spicuous even  than  his  feet — due  perhaps  to  the  fact 
that  ceremony  at  times  compelled  him  to  clothe  them 
in  white  kid  gloves,  which  always  fitted  loosely. 
Both  in  the  height  of  conversation  and  in  the  depth 
of  reflection  his  hand  now  and  then  ran  over  or  sup- 
ported his  head,  giving  his  hair  habitually  a  disor- 
dered aspect.  I  never  saw  him  when  he  appeared  to 
me  otherwise  than  a  great  man,  and  a  very  ugly  one. 
His  expression  in  repose  was  sad  and  dull ;  but  his 
ever-recurring  humor,  at  short  intervals,  flashed  forth 
with  the  brilliancy  of  an  electric  light.  I  observed 
but  two  well-defined  expressions  in  his  countenance ; 
one,  that  of  a  pure,  thoughtful,  honest  man,  absorbed 
by  a  sense  of  duty  and  responsibility:  the  other,  that 
of  a  humorist  so  full  of  fun  that  he  could  not  keep  it 


ABRAHAM  LINCOLN.  279 

all  in.  His  power  of  analysis  was  wonderful.  He 
strengthened  every  case  he  stated,  and  no  anecdote  or 
joke  ever  lost  force  or  effect  from  his  telling.  He  in- 
variably carried  the  listener  with  him  to  the  very 
climax,  and  when  that  was  reached  in  relating  a 
humorous  story,  he  laughed  all  over.  His  large 
mouth  assumed  an  unexpected  and  comical  shape, 
the  skin  on  his  nose  gathered  into  wrinkles,  and  his 
small  eyes,  though  partly  closed,  emitted  infectious 
rays  of  fun.  It  was  not  only  the  aptness  of  his  stories, 
but  his  way  of  telling  them,  and  his  own  unfeigned 
enjoyment,  that  gave  them  zest,  even  among  the 
gravest  men  and  upon  the  most  serious  occasions. 

Nevertheless,  Lincoln — a  good  listener — was  not  a 
good  conversationalist.  When  he  talked,  he  told  a 
story  or  argued  a  case.  But  it  should  be  remembered 
that  during  the  entire  four  years  of  his  Presidency, 
from  the  spring  of  1861  until  his  death  in  April,  1865, 
civil  war  prevailed.  It  bore  heaviest  upon  him,  and 
his  mind  was  bent  daily,  hourly  even,  upon  the 
weighty  matters  of  his  high  office ;  so  that,  as  he 
might  have  expressed  it,  he  was  either  lifting  with  all 
his  might  at  the  butt-end  of  the  log,  or  sitting  upon  it 
whittling,  for  rest  and  recreation. 

Lincoln  was  as  nearly  master  of  himself  as  it  is  pos- 
sible for  a  man  clothed  with  great  authority  and  en- 
gaged in  the  affairs  of  public  life  to  become.  He  had 
no  bad  habits,  and  if  he  was  not  wholly  free  from  the 
passions  of  human  nature,  it  is  quite  certain  that  pas- 
sion but  rarely,  if  ever,  governed  his  action.  If  he 
deviated  from  the  straight  course  of  justice,  it  was 
usually  from  indulgence  for  the  minor  faults  or  weak- 


280 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


nesses  of  his  fellow-men.  I  observed  but  one  craving 
that  he  could  not  overcome  :  that  was  for  a  second 
term  of  the  Presidency.  He  was  fully  conscious  of 
the  grip  this  desire  had  upon  him,  and  once  said  in  the 
way  of  apology  for  it : 

"  No  man  knows  what  that  gnawing  is  till  he  has 
had  it." 

During  the  spring  of  1861  I  was  in  charge  of  the 
appointment  branch  of  the  Adjutant-General's  De- 
partment. Upon  one  occasion,  when  I  was  at  the 
White  House  in  the  course  of  duty,  the  President, 
after  disposing  of  the  matter  in  hand,  said  : 

"  You  are  in  charge  of  the  Appointment  Office.  I 
have  here  a  bushel-basketful  of  applications  for  offices 
in  the  Army.  I  have  tried  to  examine  them  all,  but 
they  have  increased  so  rapidly  that  I  have  got  behind 
and  may  have  neglected  some.  I  will  send  them  all 
to  your  office.  Overhaul  them,  lay  those  that  require 
further  action  before  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  file 
the  others." 

The  bushel-basketful  came,  and  the  papers  were 
overhauled.  They  were  dotted  with  notes,  comments, 
and  queries  by  the  President.  One  slip  of  paper— 
which  I  handed  back  to  the  President  with  the  remark 
that  I  supposed  he  would  not  care  to  have  it  placed 
upon  the  official  files — bore  a  memorandum  in  his  own 
handwriting  as  follows : 

"  On  this  day  Mrs.  called  upon  me.     She  is  the 

wife  of  Major of  the  Regular  Army.     She  wants 

her  husband  made  a  Brigadier-General.  She  is  a  saucy 
little  woman,  and  I  think  she  will  torment  me  till  I 
have  to  do  it. — A.  L." 


ABRAHAM  LINCOLN.  2<Sl 

It  was  not  long  before  that  little  woman's  husband 
was  appointed  a  Brigadier-General. 

At  a  later  date  I  heard  a  conversation  between  Lin- 
coln and  Stanton  in  relation  to  the  selection  of  Briga- 
dier- Generals.  The  many  applications  and  recommen- 
dations were  examined  and  discussed.  Lincoln  finally 
said  : 

u  Well,  Mr.  Secretary,  I  concur  in  pretty  much  all 
you  say.  The  only  point  I  make  is,  that  there  has 
got  to  be  something  done  that  will  be  unquestionably 
in  the  interest  of  the  Dutch,  and  to  that  end  I  want 
Schimmelfennig  appointed." 

The  Secretary  replied : 

"  Mr.  President,  perhaps  this  Schimmel-what's-his- 
name  is  not  as  highly  recommended  as  some  other 
German  officer." 

"  No  matter  about  that,"  said  Lincoln,  "  his  name 
will  make  up  for  any  difference  there  may  be,  and  I'll 
take  the  risk  of  his  coming  out  all  right." 

Then,  with  a  laugh,  he  repeated,  dwelling  upon  each 
syllable  of  the  name,  and  accenting  the  last  one, 
"  Schim-mel-fen-/?/<7  must  be  appointed." 

There  is  no  purpose  here  to  question  General 
Schimmelfennig's  merits.  The  only  object  is  to  show 
that  Lincoln  had  reasons,  in  addition  to  Schimmelfen- 
nig's  recommendations,  for  appointing  him  Brigadier. 
General. 

After  I  became  Provost-Marshal-General  of  the 
United  States — March,  1863 — the  duty  of  enrolling 
and  drafting  the  national  forces  required  me  to  see  a 
great  deal  of  the  President. 

Once  when  I  went  into   his  office   at   the    White 


282 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


House,  I  found  a  private  soldier  making  a  complaint 
to  him.  It  was  a  summer  afternoon.  Lincoln  looked 
tired  and  careworn ;  but  he  was  listening  as  patiently 
as  he  could  to  the  grievances  of  the  obscure  member 
of  the  military  force  known  as  "Scott's  nine  hundred," 
then  stationed  in  Washington.  When  I  approached 
Lincoln's  desk  I  heard  him  say : 

"  Well,  my  man,  that  may  all  be  so,  but  you  must 
go  to  your  officers  about  it." 

The  man,  however,  presuming  upon  Lincoln's  good- 
nature, and  determined  to  make  the  most  of  his  op- 
portunity, persisted  in  re-telling  his  troubles  and  plead- 
ing for  the  President's  interference.  After  listening 
to  the  same  story  two  or  three  times  as  he  gazed 
wearily  through  the  south  window  of  his  office  upon 
the  broad  Potomac  in  the  distance,  Lincoln  turned 
upon  the  man,  and  said  in  a  peremptory  tone  that 
ended  the  interview. 

"  Now,  my  man,  go  away,  go  away  !  I  cannot  med- 
dle in  your  case.  I  could  as  easily  bail  out  the  Poto- 
mac River  with  a  teaspoon  as  attend  to  all  the  details 
of  the  Army." 

The  following  is  a  good  example  of  Lincoln's  clear- 
ness and  force  in  stating  a  case.  It  relates  to  the 
vexed  question  that  prevailed  in  1864-65  concerning 
the  quota  of  troops  to  be  furnished  by  the  States.  The 
Legislature  of  Rhode  Island  sent  a  committee  to 
Washington  to  confer  with  the  President  upon  the 
subject  of  the  number  of  men  required  from  that  State. 
The  committee  said  in  its  report : 

a  The  President  at  this  point  interrupted  the  com- 
mittee to  say  that  complaints  from  several  States  had 


ABRAHAM  LINCOLN.  283 

already  been  made  to  the  same  effect,  and  in  one  in- 
stance the  subject  had  been  earnestly  pressed  to  his 
attention,  and  that  he  had  personally  taken  the  pains 
to  examine  for  himself  the  formula  which  the  Provost- 
Marshal-General  had  adopted  for  the  calculation  and 
distribution  of  the  quotas  for  the  different  States,  and 
had  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  it  was  impossible 
for  any  candid  mind  to  doubt  or  question  its  entire 
fairness.  In  order  that  your  committee  might  be  fully 
possessed  of  his  opinion  upon  this  subject,  the  Presi- 
dent read  the  following  paper,  the  original  of  which 
had  been  forwarded  to  his  Excellency  the  Governor  of 
the  State  of  Vermont : 

" '  EXECUTIVE  MANSION,      ) 
WASHINGTON,  February,  8,  1865.  j" 

" '  Complaint  is  made  to  me  by  Vermont  that  the 
assignment  of  her  quota  for  the  draft  on  the  impend- 
ing call  is  intrinsically  unjust,  and  also  in  bad  faith  of 
the  Government's  promise  to  fairly  allow  credits  for 
men  previously  furnished. 

"  '  To  illustrate,  a  supposed  case  is  stated  as  follows : 
Vermont  and  New  Hampshire  must  between  them  fur- 
nish six  thousand  (6,000)  men  on  the  pending  call ;  and 
being  equals,  one  must  furnish  as  many  as  the  other 
in  the  long-run.  But  the  Government  finds  that  on 
former  calls  Vermont  furnished  a  surplus  of  five  hun- 
dred (500),  and  New  Hampshire  a  surplus  of  fifteen 
hundred  (1,500).  These  two  surpluses  make  2,000, 
and  added  to  the  six  thousand  (6,000)  make  eight 
thousand  (8,000)  to  be  furnished  by  the  two  States ; 
or  four  thousand  each,  less  fair  credits.  Then  sub- 
tracting Vermont's  surplus  of  five  hundred  (500)  from 


284 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


her  four  thousand  (4,000),  leaves  three  thousand  five 
hundred  (3,500)  as  her  quota  on  the  pending  call ; 
and  likewise  subtracting  New  Hampshire's  surplus  of 
fifteen  hundred  (1,500)  from  her  four  thousand  (4,000), 
leaves  two  thousand  five  hundred  (2,500)  as  her 
quota  on  the  pending  call.  These  three  thousand  five 
hundred  (3,500)  and  two  thousand  five  hundred 
(2,500)  make  precisely  the  six  thousand  (6,000)  which 
the  supposed  case  requires  from  the  two  States  ;  and 
it  is  just  equal  for  Vermont  to  furnish  one  thousand 
(1,000)  more  now  than  New  Hampshire,  because  New 
Hampshire  has  heretofore  furnished  (1,000)  more  than 
Vermont,  which  equalizes  the  burden  of  the  two  in  the 
long  run  ;  and  this  proceeding,  so  far  from  being  bad 
faith  to  Vermont,  is  indispensable  to  keeping  good  faith 
with  New  Hampshire.  By  no  other  process  can  the  six 
thousand  (6,000)  men  be  obtained  from  the  two  States, 
and  at  the  same  time  deal  justly  and  keep  faith  with 
both ;  and  we  do  but  confuse  ourselves  in  questioning 
the  operation  by  which  the  right  result  is  reached. 

"  i  The  supposed  case  is  perfect  as  an  illustration. 

"  'The  pending  call  is  not  for  three  hundred  thou- 
sand (300,000)  men,  subject  to  fair  credits,  but  is  for 
three  hundred  thousand  (300,000)  remaining  after  all 
fair  credits  have  been  deducted;  and  it  is  impossible 
to  concede  what  Vermont  asks  without  coming  out 
short  of  the  three  hundred  thousand  (300,000)  men, 
or  making  other  localities  pay  for  the  partiality  shown 
her.  This  upon  the  case  stated.  If  there  be  different 
reasons  for  making  an  allowance  to  Vermont,  let  them 
be  presented  and  considered. 

(Signed)  "  'A.  LINCOLN.'  ' 


ABRAHAM  LINCOLN.  285 

This  statement  of  the  case  by  Lincoln  was  a  conclu- 
sive answer  to  both  Vermont  and  Rhode  Island. 

A  story  has  long  been  current  that  Lincoln  sent  an 
applicant  for  office  with  a  note  to  the  Secretary  of 
War,  directing  that  a  letter  of  appointment  be  pre- 
pared for  the  man  to  the  office  he  sought ;  that  the 
applicant  returned  to  the  President  and  announced 
that  Stanton  refused  to  obey  the  order;  that  the  Presi- 
dent looked  disappointed,  but  merely  expressed  his 
regret  at  the  result,  and  remarked  that  he  had  not 
much  influence  with  the  administration.  The  anecdote 
has  generally  been  interpreted  as  meaning  that  Lincoln 
could  not  control  Stanton.  The  inference  is  erroneous. 
Lincoln,  so  far  as  I  could  discover,  was  in  every  re- 
spect the  actual  head  of  the  administration,  and  when- 
ever he  chose  to  do  so  he  controlled  Stanton  as  well  as 
all  the  other  Cabinet  ministers. 

I  will  cite  one  instance  in  relation  to  Stanton. 

After  compulsory  military  service  was  resorted  to, 
States  and  districts  tried  to  fill  their  quotas,  and  save 
their  own  citizens  from  being  drafted  into  the  Army, 
by  voting  bounties  to  buy  men  wherever  they  could 
be  found.  The  agent  appointed  by  a  county  in  one 
of  the  Middle  States,  and  supplied  with  bounty  money, 
learned  that  some  Confederate  prisoners  of  war  at 
Chicago  were  about  to  be  released  and  enlisted  in  our 
army  for  service  against  the  Indians  in  the  Northwest. 
The  thrifty  thought  occurred  to  the  agent  to  pay  these 
prisoners  a  bounty  for  what  they  were  going  to  do 
without  any  pay  at  all,  and  in  return  for  this  payment 
have  them  credited  as  soldiers  furnished  by  his  county. 
Being  an  acquaintance  of  Lincoln,  the  agent  obtained 


286  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

from  him  an  order  to  have  the  men  credited  as  desired. 
But  the  Secretary  of  War  refused  to  have  the  credits 
allowed.  'Indignant  and  disappointed,  the  agent  re- 
turned to  the  President,  who  reiterated  the  order,  but 
without  effect.  Then  Lincoln  went  in  person  to  Stan- 
ton's 'office,  and  I  was  called  there  by  the  latter  to 
state  the  facts  in  the  case. 

I  reported  to  the  two  high  officials,  as  I  had  pre- 
viously done  to  the  Secretary  alone,  that  these  men 
already  belonged  to  the  United  States,  being  prisoners 
of  war;  that  they  could  not  be  used  against  the  Con- 
federates; that  they  had  no  relation  whatever  to  the 
county  to  which  it  was  proposed  they  should  be  cred- 
ited; that  all  that  was  necessary  toward  enlisting  them 
in  our  army  for  Indian  service  was  the  Government's 
release  of  them  as  prisoners  of  war;  that  to  give  them 
bounty  and  credit  them  to  a  county  which  owed  some 
of  its  own  men  for  service  against  the  Confederates 
would  waste  money  and  deprive  the  army  operating 
against  a  powerful  enemy  of  that  number  of  men, 
etc. 

Stanton  said : 

"  Now,  Mr.  President,  those  are  the  facts,  and  you 
must  see  that  your  order  cannot  be  executed." 

Lincoln  sat  upon  a  sofa  with  his  legs  crossed,  and 
did  not  say  a  word  until  the  Secretary's  last  remark. 
Then  he  said  in  a  somewhat  positive  tone :  "  Mr. 
Secretary,  I  reckon  you'll  have  to  execute  the  order." 

Stanton  replied  with  asperity: 

"Mr.  President,  I  cannot  do  it.  The  order  is  an 
improper  one,  and  I  cannot  execute  it." 

Lincoln  fixed  hi8  eye  upon   Stanton,  and  in  a  firm 


ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 


287 


voice,  and  with  an  accent  that  clearly  showed  his  de- 
termination, he  said : 

11  Mr.  Secretary,  it  will  have  to  be  done" 
Stan  ton  then  realized  that  he  was  overmatched. 
He  had  made  a  square  issue  with  the  President  and 
been  defeated,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  he  was 
in  the  right.  Upon  an  intimation  from  him  I  with- 
drew and  did  not  witness  his  surrender.  A  few  min- 
utes after  I  reached  my  office  I  received  instructions 
from  the  Secretary  to  carry  out  the  President's  order. 
Stanton  never  mentioned  the  subject  to  me  afterward, 
nor  did  I  ever  ascertain  the  special,  and  no  doubt  suf- 
ficient, reasons  which  the  President  had  for  his  action 
in  the  case. 

The  vexatious  duties  of  the  General  Government 
concerning  the  draft  made  demands  upon  Lincoln's 
ability  not  only  in  deciding  important  questions,  but 
in  avoiding  decisions  when  it  was  not  best  to  risk  a 
rupture  with  State  officials  by  rendering  them.  Upon 
one  occasion  the  Governor  of  a  State  came  to  rny 
office  bristling  with  complaints  in  relation  to  the 
number  of  troops  required  from  his  State,  the  details 
for  drafting  the  men,  and  the  plan  of  compulsory  ser- 
vice in  general.  I  found  it  impossible  to  satisfy  his 
demands,  and  accompanied  him  to  the  Secretary  of 
War's  office,  whence,  after  a  stormy  interview  with 
Stanton,  he  went  alone  to  press  his  ultimatum  upon 
the  highest  authority.  After  I  had  waited  anxiously 
for  some  hours,  expecting  important  orders  or  de- 
cisions from  the  President,  or  at  least  a  summons  to 
the  White  House  for  explanation,  the  Governor  re- 
turned, and  said  with  a  pleasant  smile  that  he  was 


288  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

going  home  by  the  next  train,  and  merely  dropped  in 
en  route  to  say  good-by.  Neither  the  business  he 
came  upon  nor  his  interview  with  the  President  was 
alluded  to. 

As  soon  as  I  could  see  Lincoln,  I  said  : 

"  Mr.  President,  I  am  very  anxious  to  learn  how 

you  disposed  of  Governor  .  He  went  to  your 

office  from  the  War  Department  in  a  towering  rage.  I 
suppose  you  found  it  necessary  to  make  large  conces- 
sions to  him,  as  he  returned  from  you  entirely  satisfied." 

"  Oh,  no,"  he  replied,  "  I  did  not  concede  anything. 
You  know  how  that  Illinois  farmer  managed  the  big 
log  that  lay  in  the  middle  of  his  field  !  To  the  in- 
quiries of  his  neighbors  one  Sunday,  he  announced 
that  he  had  got  rid  of  the  big  log.  i  Got  rid  of  it  ! ' 
said  they  ;  '  how  did  you  do  it  ?  It  was  too  big  to 
haul  out,  too  knotty  to  split,  and  too  wet  and  soggy 
to  burn  ;  what  did  you  do  ? '  '  Well,  now,  boys,'  re- 
plied the  farmer,  '  if  you  won't  divulge  the  secret,  I'll 
tell  you  how  I  got  rid  of  it — I  ploughed  around  it." 
Now,"  said  Lincoln,  "  don't  tell  anybody,  but  that's  the 
way  I  got  rid  of  Governor  -  — .  I  ploughed  around 
him,  but  it  took  me  three  mortal  hours  to  do  it,  and  I 
was  afraid  every  minute  he'd  see  what  I  was  at." 

Lincoln  w^as  a  good  judge  of  men,  and  quickly 
learned  the  peculiar  traits  of  character  in  those  he 
had  to  deal  with. 

I  recall  an  anecdote  by  which  he  pointed  out  a 
marked  trait  in  one  of  our  Northern  Governors.  This 
Governor  was  earnest,  able  and  untiring  in  keeping 
up  the  war  spirit  in  his  State,  and  in  raising  and 
equipping  troops  ;  but  he  always  wanted  his  own 


ABE  AH  AM  LINCOLN.  289 

way,  and  illy  brooked  the  restraints  imposed  by  the 
necessity  of  conforming  to  a  general  system.  Though 
devoted  to  the  cause,  he  was  at  times  overbearing  and 
exacting  in  his  intercourse  with  the  General  Govern- 
ment. Upon  one  occasion  he  complained  and  pro- 
tested more  bitterly  than  usual,  and  warned  those  in 
authority  that  the  execution  of  their  orders  in  hie 
State  would  be  beset  by  difficulties  and  dangers.  The 
tone  of  his  dispatches  gave  rise  to  an  apprehension 
that  he  might  not  co-operate  fully  in  the  enterprise  in 
hand.  The  Secretary  of  War,  therefore,  laid  the  dis- 
patches before  the  President  for  advice  or  instructions. 
They  did  not  disturb  Lincoln  in  the  least.  In  fact, 
they  rather  amused  him.  After  reading  all  the  papers, 
he  said  in  a  cheerful  and  reassuring  tone  : 

"  Never  mind,  never  mind  ;  those  dispatches  don't 
mean  anything.  Just  go  right  ahead.  The  Governor 
is  like  a  boy  I  saw  once  at  a  launching.  When  every- 
thing was  ready  they  picked  out  a  boy  and  sent  him 
under  the  ship  to  knock  away  the  trigger  and  let  her 
go.  At  the  critical  moment  everything  depended  on 
the  boy.  He  had  to  do  the  job  well  by  a  direct, 
vigorous  blow,  and  then  lie  flat  and  keep  still  while 
the  ship  slid  over  him.  The  boy  did  everything 
right,  but  he  yelled  as  if  he  was  being  murdered  from 
the  time  he  got  under  the  keel  until  he  got  out.  I 
thought  the  hide  was  all  scraped  off  his  back  ;  but  he 
wasn't  hurt  at  all.  The  master  of  the  yard  told  me 
that  this  boy  was  always  chosen  for  that  job,  that  he 
did  his  work  well,  that  he  never  had  been  hurt,  but 
that  he  always  squealed  in  that  way.  That's  just  the 
way  with  Governor  -  — .  Make  up  your  minds  that 


290 


MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 


he  is  not  hurt,  and  that  he  is  doing  the  work  right, 
and  pay  no  attention  to  his  squealing.  He  only  wants 
to  make  you  understand  how  hard  his  task  is,  and 
that  he  is  on  hand  performing  it." 

Time  proved  that  the  President's  estimate  of  the 
Governor  was  correct. 

Lincoln  watched  the  operations  of  the  armies  in  the 
field  with  the  deepest  interest,  the  keenest  insight, 
and  the  widest  comprehension.  The  congratulatory 
order  which  General  Meade  published  to  his  troops 
after  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  was  telegraphed  to  the 
War  Department.  During  those  days  and  nights  of 
anxiety,  Lincoln  clung  to  the  War  Office,  and  de- 
voured every  scrap  of  news  as  it  came  over  the  tele* 
graph  wires.  He  hoped  for  and  expected  substantial 
fruits  from  our  dearly  bought  victory  at  Gettysburg. 
I  saw  him  read  General  Meade's  congratulatory  order. 
When  he  came  to  the  sentence  about  "  driving  the  in- 
vaders from  our  soil,"  an  expression  of  disappointment 
settled  upon  his  face,  his  hands  dropped  upon  his 
knees,  and  in  tones  of  anguish  he  exclaimed,  "Drive 
the  invaders  from  our  soil !  My  God  !  Is  that  all  ?  " 

I  was  designated  by  the  Secretary  of  War  as  a  sort 
of  special  escort  to  accompany  the  President  from 
Washington  to  Gettysburg  upon  the  occasion  of  the 
first  anniversary  of  the  battle  at  that  place.  At  the 
appointed  time  I  went  to  the  White  House,  where  1 
found  the  President's  carriage  at  the  door  to  take  him 
to  the  station ;  but  he  was  not  ready.  When  he  ap- 
peared it  was  rather  late,  and  I  remarked  that  he  had 
no  time  to  lose  in  going  to  the  train.  "  Well,"  said  he, 
"I  feel  about  that  as  the  convict  in  one  of  our  Illinois 


ABRAHAM  LINCOLN.  291 

towns  felt  when  he  was  going  to  the  gallows.  As  he 
passed  along  the  road  in  custody  of  the  sheriff,  the 
people,  eager  to  see  the  execution,  kept  crowding  and 
pushing  past  him.  At  last  he  called  out :  l  Boys,  you 
needn't  be  in  such  a  hurry  to  get  ahead,  there  won't  be 
any  fun  till  I  yet  there.'' ' 

It  has  been  said,  I  believe,  that  Lincoln  wrote  in 
the  car  en  route  to  Gettysburg  the  celebrated  speech 
which  he  delivered  upon  that  historic  battle-ground. 
I  am  quite  sure  that  is  an  error.  I  have  no  recollec- 
tion of  seeing  him  writing  or  even  reading  his  speech 
during  the  journey.  In  fact,  there  was  hardly  any  op- 
portunity for  him  to  read  or  write. 

In  April,  1865,  I  was  sent  with  the  government  ex- 
cursion from  AVashington  to  Charleston  to  take  part 
in  the  ceremony  of  raising  over  Fort  Sumter  the  flag 
that  had  been  lowered  there  in  April,  1861.  When  I 
reported  to  Stan  ton  upon  my  return,  he  gave  me  a  de- 
tailed account  of  the  awful  tragedy  which  had  been 
enacted  in  the  national  capital  during  our  absence. 
He  said  that  he  had  never  felt  so  sensible  of  his  deep 
affection  for  Lincoln  as  he  did  during  their  final  inter- 
view. At  last  they  could  see  the  end  of  bloody, 
fratricidal  war.  Peace  was  dawning  upon  their  be- 
loved country.  "  Well  done,  good  and  faithful  ser- 
vants ! "  was  upon  the  lips  of  the  nation.  As  they 
exchanged  congratulations,  Lincoln,  from  his  greater 
height,  dropped  his  long  arm  upon  Stanton's  shoul- 
ders, and  a  hearty  embrace  terminated  their  rejoicings 
over  the  close  of  the  mighty  struggle.  Stanton  went 
home  happy.  That  night  Lincoln  was  assassinated, 
and  a  black  pall  covered  the  land. 


ARTICLE  II. 

Ail  Acquaintance  with  Grant.* 

One  afternoon  in  June,  1843,  while  I  was  at  West 
Point,  a  candidate  for  admission  to  the  Military  Acad- 
emy, I  wandered  into  the  riding  hall,  where  the  mem- 
bers of  the  graduating  class  were  going  through  their 
final  mounted  exercises  before  Major  Richard  Dela- 
field,  the  distinguished  engineer,  then  superintendent, 
the  Academic  Board,  and  a  large  assemblage  of  spec- 
tators. When  the  regular  services  were  completed, 
the  class,  still  mounted,  was  formed  in  line  through 
the  centre  of  the  hall,  the  riding-master  placed  the 
leaping-bar  higher  than  a  man's  head,  and  called  out 
"  Cadet  Grant ! "  A  clean-faced,  slender,  blue-eyed 
young  fellow,  weighing  about  120  pounds,  dashed 
from  the  ranks  on  a  powerfully  built  chestnut-sorrel 
horse,  and  galloped  down  the  opposite  side  of  the  hall. 
As  he  turned  at  the  farther  end  and  came  into  the 
straight  stretch  across  which  the  bar  was  placed,  the 
horse  increased  his  pace,  and,  measuring  his  strides 
for  the  great  leap  before  him,  bounded  into  the  air 
and  cleared  the  bar,  carrying  his  rider  as  if  man  and 
beast  had  been  welded  together.  The  spectators  were 
breathless  !  "  Very  well  done,  sir  !  "  growled  "  old 
Hershberger,"  the  riding-master,  and  the  class  was 
dismissed  and  disappeared  ;  but  "  Cadet  Grant "  re- 
mained a  living  image  in  my  memory. 

*  North  American  Review.  December,  1885. 

292 


AN  ACQUAINTANCE  WITH  GRANT.  293- 

A  few  months  before  graduation,  one  of  Grant's 
classmates,  James  A.  Hardie,  said  to  his  friend  and  in- 
structor, "  Well,  sir,  if  a  great  emergency  arises  in  this 
country  during  our  lifetime,  Sam.  Grant  will  be  the 
man  to  meet  it."1  If  I  had  heard  Hardie's  prediction 
I  doubt  not  I  should  have  believed  in  it,  for  I  thought 
the  young  man  who  could  perform  the  feat  of  horse- 
manship I  had  witnessed,  and  wore  a  sword,  could  da 
anything. 

I  was  in  General  Grant's  room  in  New  York  City 
on  the  25th  of  May,  1885.  Forty  years  had  elapsed 
since  Hardie's  prediction  was  made,  and  it  had  been 
amply  fulfilled.  But,  alas  !  the  hand  of  death  was 
upon  the  hero  of  it.  Though  brave  and  cheerful,  he 
was  almost  voiceless.  Before  him  were  sheets  of  his 
forthcoming  book,  and  a  few  artist's  proofs  of  a  steel 
engraving  of  himself  made  from  a  daguerreotype  taken 
soon  after  his  graduation.  He  wrote  my  name  and 
his  own  upon  one  of  the  engravings  and  handed  it  to- 
me. I  said,  "  General,  this  looks  as  you  did  the  first 
time  I  ever  saw  you.  It  was  when  you  made  the 
great  jump  in  the  riding  exercises  of  your  graduation." 
"  Yes,"  he  whispered,  "  I  remember  that  very  well. 
York  was  a  wonderful  horse.  I  could  feel  him. gather- 
ing under  me  for  the  effort  as  he  approached  the  bar. 
Have  you  heard  anything  lately  of  Hershberger  ? "  I 
replied,  "No,  I  never  heard  of  him  after  he  left  West 
Point  years  ago."  "  Oh,"  said  the  General,  "  I  have 

*  In  the  summer  of  1845,  only  two  years  after  Grant's  graduation, 
his  class-mate  and  room-mate,  George  Deshon,  now  a  Catholic  priest  in 
New  York  City,  said  at  West  Point,  in  presence  of  Professor  Kendrick 
and  Mr.  Stebbins  of  Springfield,  Mass.,  that  Grant  would  some  day 
prove  to  the  Academic  Board  that  he  was  the  strongest  man  in  his  class. 


294  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

heard  of  him  since  the  war.  He  was  in  Carlisle,  old 
and  poor,  and  I  sent  him  a  check  for  fifty  dollars." 
This  early  friendship  had  lived  for  forty  years,  and 
the  old  master  was  enabled  to  say  near  the  close  of 
his  pupil's  career,  as  he  had  said  at  the  beginning-  of 
it,  "  Very  well  done,  sir  !  " 

During  the  period  of  Grant's  official  authority,  I 
saw  but  little  of  him.  I  was  not  one  of  the  so-called 
"  Grant  men  "  of  the  Army.  It  was  not  until  we  were 
near  neighbors  in  New  York  City,  in  1881-85,  that  I 
became  well  acquainted  with  him.  At  that  time  he 
was  out  of  office,  and  the  third  term  movement  to  re- 
store him  to  the  Presidency  had  failed.  My  acquaint- 
ance began  with  the  cadet.  It  matured  with  the 
General,  and  was  not  disturbed  by  partiality  or  in- 
terest. Grant  was  always  free  from  arrogance  of  office, 
but  in  the  little  I  had  seen  of  him,  prior  to  1881,  I 
had  not  been  able  to  get  through  the  crust  of  his  nat- 
ural reserve  or  diffidence,  and  I  was  behind  those  who 
knew  him  well,  in  my  estimate  of  his  character  and 
ability.  By  constant  and  free  personal  relations  with 
him  for  the  last  three  or  four  years  of  his  life,  and  a 
fuller  study  of  his  career,  I  caught  up  and  perceived 
the  soundness  of  the  exalted  public  judgment  of  this 
remarkable  man. 

It  may  be  said,  without  detracting  from  his  merits, 
that  perhaps  a  knowledge  of  his  many  good  and  great 
deeds  has  tended  to  make  it  somewhat  the  fashion, 
since  Grant's  death,  to  try  and  lift  him  above  all  the 
imperfections  of  men.  The  sounder  view  is  that  he 
was  not  free  from  human  frailties,  but  was  great  in 
spite  of  them.  He  was  what  military  men  call  "  nn- 


AN  ACQUAINTANCE  WITH  GRANT.  295 

soldierly  "  in  feeling,  bearing,  and  appearance ;  yet  he 
was  a  great  General,  and  the  most  essential  trait  of 
soldiership,  obedience,  was  next  to  a  religion  with  him. 
He  knew  the  value  of  discipline  in  an  army,  but  he 
had  neither  taste  nor  aptitude  for  establishing  or  en- 
forcing it,  and  instinctively  relied  more  upon  the  man 
than  upon  the  soldier.  He  loved  and  cherished  his 
army  associations  above  all  others,  but  did  not  like 
the  profession  of  arms.  In  an  interview  with  him  last 
winter,  I  alluded  to  his  lack  of  fondness  for  purely 
military  affairs,  whereupon  he  selected  a  sheet  from 
the  proofs  which  lay  before  him,  and  as  evidence  of 
his  taste,  pointed  to  a  statement  therein,  to  the  eifect 
that  soon  after  he  entered  the  Army,  1843,  he  reviewed 
his  West  Point  studies,  in  order  to  prepare  himself  for 
a  professorship  in  some  institution  of  learning  and 
leave  the  military  service. 

In  disposition,  Grant  was  patient,  kind,  and  consid- 
erate. In  manner,  he  was  natural,  quiet,  and  unas- 
suming, somewhat  diffident,  but  not  bashful  or  awk- 
ward. He  had  no  readiness  in  showing  off  his  acquire- 
ments ;  on  the  contrary,  his  acquirements  did  not 
appear  until  forced  to  the  front,  and  then  they  showed 
him  off  without  his  knowing  it.  He  was  well  edu- 
cated, but  it  is  probably  true  that  the  first  impression 
he  made  upon  strangers  was  that  he  was  a  plain  man 
without  elements  of  greatness.  A  closer  acquaintance 
however,  hardly  ever  failed  to  create  firm  belief  in  his 
extraordinary  reserve  power.  While  truth,  courage, 
tenacity,  and  self-reliance  were  his  ruling  traits,  he  had 
but  little  pride  of  opinion.  He  did  not  hesitate  in 
choosing  the  best  course,  no  matter  who  proposed  it ; 


296 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


and  in  military  affairs  he  would  execute  a  plan  pre- 
scribed by  higher  authority  with  as  much  vigor  and 
fidelity  as  if  it  had  been  his  own.  He  did  not  trouble 
himself  about  the  past  or  the  future,  but  concentrated 
all  his  faculties  upon  the  matter  he  was  at  the  moment 
called  upon  by  his  duty  to  deal  with. 

Neither  responsibility,  nor  turmoil,  nor  danger,  nor 
pleasure,  nor  pain,  impaired  the  force  of  his  resolution, 
or  interrupted  the  steady  flow  of  his  intellect.  The 
war  is  full  of  illustrations  of  his  bravery  and  deter- 
mination of  character,  and  of  his  self-reliance  and  self- 
possession  under  trying  circumstances.  History  does 
not  record  a  more  heroic  personal  effort  than  the  one 
he  made  in  writing  a  book,  when  he  was  in  agony 'and 
on  the  verge  of  the  grave,  to  rescue  his  family  from 
the  misfortunes  that  had  befallen  them. 

Grant  possessed  some  humor,  and  occasionally  told 
a  story,  but  rarely  indulged  in  figures  of  speech,  and  did 
not  exaggerate  or  emphasize  even  for  the  purpose  of  il- 
lustration. If  he  had  any  imagination  it  was  kept  under 
by  his  habit  of  literal  truth.  He  made  no  use  of  ex- 
pletives and  but  little  of  adjectives.  He  would  not 
have  indulged  in  profane  language  even  if  he  had  pos- 
sessed no  religious  scruples  on  the  subject.  Though 
he  was  not  without  temper  and  resentment,  he  was  so- 
patient  and  matter-of-fact,  that  he  never  felt  inclined 
to  damn  things,  as  men,  when  sorelv  tried,  sometimes 
do. 

In  congenial  company  he  conversed  with  pleasure- 
and  fluency,  but  he  felt  no  obligation  to  talk  for  the 
mere  purpose  of  entertaining  the  persons  in  his  pres- 
ence. He  spoke  only  because  he  had  something  to- 


AN  ACQUAINTANCE  WITH  GRANT. 


297 


tell.  Having  no  regard  for  forms  of  expression,  he 
never,  in  writing  or  speaking,  turned  sentences  for 
effect,  nor  could  he  dissemble  or  use  words  to  mislead. 
If  he  did  not  wish  to  express  his  thoughts  he  was 
silent,  and  left  people  to  draw  their  own  inferences. 

He  had  unlimited  faith  in  those  whom  he  once  took 
to  his  heart.  His  friendship  was  accompanied  by  the 
fullest  confidence,  and,  when  his  choice  was  not  wisely 
made,  it  served  to  facilitate  and  to  shield  evil  prac- 
tices, which  it  is  the  duty  of  that  high  sentiment  to 
restrain ;  and  thus  Grant's  friendship  sometimes  injured 
him  who  gave  and  him  who  received  it.  It  was  a 
principle  with  him  never  to  abandon  a  comrade  u  under 
fire  " ;  and  a  friend  in  disgrace,  as  well  as  a  friend  in 
trouble,  could  depend  upon  him  until  Grant  himself 
found  him  guilty.  I  called  upon  Grant  on  Sunday 
evening,  May  4,  1883,  the  day  that  he  borrowed  the 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars  from  Vanderbilt. 
He  was  very  cheerful,  and  said  to  me,  "I  expect  to 
have  a  game  of  cards  on  Tuesday  night,  and  would  be 
glad  to  have  you  come."  As  I  was  taking  my  leave  he 
repeated  the  invitation,  but  thinking  the  meeting  might 
depend  upon  further  arrangements,  as  sometimes  hap- 
pened, I  thanked  him,  and  said  I  would  hold  myself 
subject  to  his  call.  "  No,"  he  replied,  "  don't  wait  for 
further  notice.  Ward  is  certainly  coming,  and  the 
party  is  made."  On  Tuesday  morning  about  11  o'clock 
I  met  Grant  by  chance  in  a  car  going  down-town.  He 
was  upon  crutches  on  account  of  the  accident  he  had 
met  with  some  time  before.  He  talked  about  persons 
and  events  of  the  war,  without  restraint,  and  was  so 
much  interested  in  conversation  that  he  failed  to  get 


298  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

out  at  the  right  station.  As  he  left  the  car  he  said, 
"  I  shall  expect  you  to-night."  By  a  singular  coinci- 
dence we  fell  into  the  same  car  going  up-town  about 
3  P.M.,  and  I  again  seated  myself  by  his  side.  After  a 
few  minutes  of  gloomy  silence  on  his  part,  he  said, 
"  We  will  not  have  the  meeting  I  fixed  for  to-night; 
I  have  bad  news."  I  replied,  "  Why,  General,  I  hope 
it  is  nothing  serious."  "  Yes,"  he  continued,  "  the 
Marine  Bank  has  failed  or  is  about  to  fail.  It  owes 
our  firm  a  large  amount,  and  I  suppose  we  are  ruined. 
When  I  went  down-town  this  morning  I  thought  I  was 
worth  a  great  deal  of  money,  now  I  don't  know  that  I 
have  a  dollar ;  and  probably  my  sons,  too,  have  lost 
everything."  I  had  heard  nothing  of  the  financial 
crash  which  had  occurred  during  the  day.  I  said, 
"  General,  do  you  suspect  Ward  ? "  He  replied,  "  You 
know  I  expected  him  at  my  house  to-night.  If  he  had 
come  to  the  office  any  time  to-day  and  assured  me  all 
was  right,  I  should  have  believed  him  and  gone  home 
contented.  But  I  waited  until  nearly  3  o'clock,  and 
he  did  not  appear.  I  do  not  know  what  to  think." 
He  was  not  willing  even  then  to  accuse  the  knave  in 
whom  he  had  confided,  and  prior  to  that  time,  notwith- 
standing warnings  which  would  have  aroused  a  dis- 
honest man,  had  no  suspicion  that  villainy  had  been 
practised.  After  he  became  aware  of  the  truth,  three 
or  four  days  passed  before  the  enormity  of  the  dis- 
aster made  its  full  impression  upon  him,  but  he  never 
recovered  from  the  shock  of  the  deception  and  wrong 
practised  upon  him  by  one  of  the  basest  creatures  of 
the  age. 

Grant's  self-reliance  and  integrity  were  so  deeply 


AN  ACQUAINTANCE  WITH  GRANT.  299 

seated  and  highly  developed  that  it  was  difficult  for 
him  to  make  the  wishes  and  opinions  of  others  the 
basis  of  his  own  action  in  public  affairs.  Hence, 
though  long  a  controlling  factor  in  politics,  he  never 
was  a  politician.  Destitute  of  the  simplest  arts  of  de- 
ception, silence  was  his  recourse  when  urged  to  action 
he  did  not  approve.  Hence  he  was  called  silent,  and 
sometimes  even  stolid. 

Prior  to  1867  Grant  was  nothing  but  a  soldier.  He 
regarded  his  election  to  the  chief  magistracy  of  the 
nation  as  a  promotion,  and  did  not  at  first  realize  that 
while  the  scope  of  his  authority  had  been  enlarged  its 
nature  had  been  changed,  and  that  he  could  not  govern 
the  country  as  he  had  governed  the  Army.  He  soon 
discovered  that  his  forces,  now  political  instead  of 
military,  could  not  be  concentrated  upon  the  line  of 
operations  he  had  laid  down ;  and  he  promptly 
changed  base  to  the  party  that  elected  him,  and 
then  advanced  upon  the  new  line  with  as  much  con- 
fidence and  fidelity  as  if  it  had  been  his  first  choice. 
That  movement  consolidated  his  military  prestige,  his 
personal  power,  and  the  political  strength  of  the 
Republican  Party  into  a  public  force,  of  which— 
contrary  to  the  fated  powerlessness  of  ex-Presidents 
generally — he  was  the  real  head  to  the  day  of  his 
death,  and  wrhich  has  never  been  surpassed,  if  it  has 
been  equalled,  in  this  country.  When  the  change  of 
base  just  mentioned  became  known,  many  of  Grant's 
old  friends  thought  he  had  surrendered  to  the  politi- 
cians, but  he  had  not ;  nor  was  his  new  course  incon- 
sistent with  his  self-reliance  and  stern  sense  of  duty. 
He  had  become  sensible  of  the  fact  that  to  enforce 


300 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


"  no  policy  against  the  will  of  the  people/'  a  part  of 
public  affairs  had  to  be  conducted  according  to  the 
principles  and  dogmas  of  the  dominant  party ;  and  as 
far  as  he  could  clearly  identify  that  part  he  let  those 
whom  he  regarded  as  party  leaders  have  it  to  them- 
selves. But  in  all  other  matters — in  fact,  upon  special 
occasions  in  these — he  relied  upon  himself  and  acted 
up  to  his  own  sense  of  duty,  and  demanded  "  uncon- 
ditional surrender  "  from  all  who  opposed  him.  He 
not  only  crushed  Charles  Sumner,  who  ventured  into 
revolt,  but  probably  would  have  succeeded  in  prevent- 
ing his  return  to  the  United  States  Senate,  if  that 
distinguished  leader  had  not  died  before  the  time 
came  for  his  re-election. 

Grant  wrote  with  remarkable  facility.  His  war 
papers  are  not  only  his  owrn  composition,  but  many  of 
them  are  in  his  own  handwriting.  His  article  in  the 
North  American  Review  of  November,  1882,  is  an  ex- 
ample of  the  rapidity  with  which  he  could  write  what 
he  had  to  say,  as  well  as  of  the  clearness  and  force 
with  which  he  expressed  his  meaning.  It  was  com- 
menced on  the  24th  of  October,  and  was  in  the  editor's 
hands  on  the  25th.  He  said  of  it  at  the  time: 

"  It  does  not  appear  to  me  worthy  of  a  place  in  a 
magazine  of  the  standing  of  the  North  American  Re- 
view.  It  was  dictated  from  notes  prepared  hastily. 
The  subject,  however,  has  become  so  familiar  to  me, 
that  I  think  I  have  committed  no  error  in  the  state- 
ment of  facts." 

Grant  showed  but  little  interest  in  abstruse  subjects, 
and  rarely  took  part  in  the  discussion  of  them.  His 
conversation  was  always  marked  by  simplicity,  and 


AN  ACQUAINTANCE  WITH  GRANT.  301 

freedom,  from  vanity,  vainglory  and  mock-modesty. 
His  excellent  memory  was  a  store-house  upon  which  he 
drew  for  the  interesting  reminiscences  which  formed 
the  staple  of  his  conversation. 

He  was  wise,  but  having  no  gifts  as  a  debater,  he 
could  not  shine  in  council.  It  was  his  nature  or  his 
habit,  as  heretofore  stated,  to  concentrate  his  mind 
upon  subjects  which  required  his  own  action,  or  for 
which  he  was  responsible. 

The  prominence  of  these  affairs,  the  precedence  of 
the  practical  and  personal  over  the  theoretical  and 
general,  sometimes  misled  the  public  judgment  as  to 
his  real  power  and  ability.  Like  many  great  men, 
he  required  the  pressure  of  necessity  to  bring  out  his 
strength.  He  could  not  dwell  upon  theories,  or  appear 
to  advantage  in  hypothetical  cases,  and  even  in  practi- 
cal matters  his  mental  processes  were  carried  on  beneath 
the  surface.  Until  he  was  ready  to  act  he  gave  no 
sign  by  word  or  expression  of  his  own  train  of  thought 
or  the  impression  made  upon  him  by  others,  though 
they  might  make  him  change  his  mind  and  induce  action 
different  from  what  he  had  intended.  He  generally 
adhered  to  his  first  convictions,  but  never  halted  long 
between  two  opinions.  When  he  changed,  he  went 
over  without  qualification  or  regard  for  consequences, 
and  was  not  disturbed  by  lingering  doubts  or  regrets. 

The  Fitz-John  Porter  case  served  to  exhibit  one  of 
Grant's  best  traits — devotion  to  his  own  deliberate 
sense  of  duty,  despite  the  temptations  of  interest,  ease, 
and  expediency.  "  Consistency  is  a  jewel,"  but  so  is 
truth,  and  to  Grant  the  latter  was  more  precious  than 
the  former.  Porter's  claim  that  he  had  been  wronged 


302 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


by  the  court-martial  which  convicted  him  in  1863,  and 
that  new  evidence  to  prove  it  would  be  presented  if  a 
hearing  could  be  granted,  was  laid  before  Grant  as 
early  as  1867,  but  the  appeal  was  refused  or  neglected. 
As  long  as  Grant  was  General-in-Chief  of  the  Army 
and  President  of  the  United  States,  with  power  to  act 
effectively  in  redressing  the  alleged  wrong,  he  accepted 
the  verdict  of  the  court-martial  without  understanding 
the  record  of  that  tribunal  and  the  new  evidence 
which  Porter  offered  to  produce.  But  in  September, 
1881,  when  he  had  become  a  private  citizen  and  a 
resident  of  New  York  City,  Porter  asked  an  interview. 
To  this  Grant  replied  in  writing,  September  27,  1881 : 

"  I  will  hear  what  you  have  to  say,  and  will  en- 
deavor to  listen  without  prejudice  ;  and  if  convinced 
that  I  was  wrong  in  former  opinions,  entertained  and 
possibly  expressed,  T  would  be  willing  to  correct  them." 

The  result  was  that  Grant  agreed  to  study  the 
whole  case,  including  the  record  of  the  court-martial, 
and  state  his  conclusions.  The  investigation,  which 
was  prolonged  till  December  19,  convinced  him  that  a 
great  wrong  had  been  done,  and  he  became  deeply 
distressed  that  he  had  not  mastered  the  subject  while 
he  was  in  power.  Then,  regardless  of  the  inconsistent 
attitude  in  which  his  change  of  mind  placed  him,  and 
the  antagonisms  it  created,  he  devoted  all  of  his  ability 
and  influence  to  procure  for  Porter  the  justice  he 
thought  due  him.  In  a  letter  dated  November  3, 
1883,  which  was  given  to  the  public,  he  said  to  Porter: 

"  I  did  believe  that  General  Pope  was  so  odious  to 
some  of  the  officers  in  the  East,  that  a  cordial  support 
was  not  given  him  by  them.  ...  I  supposed  you 


AN  ACQUAINTANCE  WITH  QKANT.  303 

had  shared  in  this  feeling.  .  .  .  Until  1881,  when 
I  re-examined  for  myself,  my  belief  was  that  on  the 
29th  of  August,  1862,  a  great  battle  was  fought  be- 
tween General  Pope  commanding  the  Union  forces, 
and  General  Jackson  commanding  the  Confederate 
forces ;  and  that  you  with  a  corps  of  twelve  or  more 
thousand  men  stood  in  a  position  across  the  right  flank 
of  Jackson,  and  where  you  could  ea'sily  get  into  his 
rear ;  that  you  received  an  order  to  do  so  about  5  or 
5.30  o'clock,  which  you  refused  to  obey  because  of 
clouds  of  dust  in  your  front,  which  you  contended  in- 
dicated an  enemy  in  superior  force  to  you ;  that  you 
allowed  Pope  to  get  beaten  while  you  stood  idly  look- 
ing on  without  raising  an  am  to  help  him.  With  this 
understanding,  and  without  a  doubt  as  to  the  correct- 
ness of  it,  I  condemned  you." 

Then  he  proceeded  to  give  the  results  of  his  own 
examination  of  the  case,  expressed  his  regret  that  he 
had  not  made  the  investigation  while  he  was  in  office, 
and  added  : 

"  As  long  as  I  have  a  voice  it  shall  be  raised  in  your 
support,  without  any  reference  to  its  effect  upon  me  or 
others." 

On  the  30th  of  December,  1881,  he  replied  as  fol- 
lows to  a  letter  from  Senator  Logan  : 
"  MY  DEAR  GENERAL  : 

"  I  have  your  letter  of  yesterday.  It  is  true  that  I 
have  re-examined  the  proceedings  of  the  court-martial 
and  court  of  inquiry  in  Fitz-John  Porter's  case,  and 
believe  sincerely  that  I  have  done  him  an  injustice, 
and  have  so  written  to  the  President.  When  I  gave 
General  Porter  the  letter,  I  requested  him  to  send  you 


304 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


a  copy.  If  he  has  not  done  so  he  will,  or  I  will. 
That  letter  will  explain  all  I  would  otherwise  write 
you  on  this  subject.  I  reluctantly  came  to  the  con- 
clusion I  did,  but  was  convinced  beyond  all  precon- 
ceived notions,  and  felt  it  due  to  an  accused  man  to 
say  so.  Very  truly  yours, 

"  U.  S.  GRANT." 

In  a  letter  to  Porter,  dated  February  4,  1882,  he 
said : 

"My  whole  object  now  is  to  benefit  you;  and  to 
this  end  I  am  willing  to  do  anything  that  is  truthful." 

Grant  was  slow  to  take  offence,  was  not  malicious, 
and  did  not  hastily  resent  wrongs;  but  animosity 
sometimes  found  its  way  to  his  heart,  and  when  rooted 
there  it  was  as  hardy  as  his  friendship,  though  it  did 
not  assert  itself  in  action  unless  specially  invited  by 
circumstances.  His  course  towards  his  old  associates 
of  the  Regular  Army,  while  he  was  in  power,  affords 
many  illustrations  of  his  friendship,  and  possibly  a 
few  of  the  other  kind.  One  of  the  bulletins  which  he 
issued  during  his  last  sickness  announced  that  he  de- 
sired the  good-will  of  all ;  and  he  closed  a  letter  from 
Mt.  McGregor,  dated  June  22,  1885,  with  the  words: 

"  I  am  not  willing  to  do  any  one  an  injustice,  and  if 
convinced  that  I  have  done  one,  I  am  always  willing 
to  make  the  fullest  admission." 

That  was  not  only  the  truth,  but  was  no  doubt  the 
whole  truth  ;  and  was  quite  as  far  as  he  was  disposed 
to  go.  He  had  to  be  "  convinced  "  that  he  had  done 
injustice  before  he  was  willing  to  advance  towards 
reconciliations.  Some  of  his  opinions  of  men  were 
founded  in  error  or  misunderstanding,  and  some  of  his 


AN  ACQUAINTANCE  WITH  GRANT. 


305 


feelings  possibly  in  prejudice  ;  but  as  he  believed  they 
were  right,  it  was  not  in  the  power  of  approaching 
death  to  make  him  surrender  them.  Mr.  G.  W.  Childs 
has  said : 

"  General  Grant  always  felt  that  he  was  badly 
treated  by  Halleck.  .  .  .  During  my  long  friend- 
ship with  him,  I  never  heard  him  more  than  two  or 
three  times  speak  unkindly  of  Halleck." 

Grant  was  unjustly  accused  after  the  capture  of 
Donelson,  and  was  dissatisfied  with  the  treatment  he 
received  ;  but  his  animosity  towards  Halleck,  born  at 
Donelson,  got  its  growth  afterwards.  The  lapse  of 
time  and  the  whirl  of  events  probably  disqualified  him 
for  fixing  the  exact  course  of  it,  and  confused  him  as 
to  the  time  when  it  took  substantial  form. 

During  a  conversation  with  Grant  about  his  Shiloh 
article,  after  it  had  appeared  in  print,  one  of  the  per- 
sons present  asked  me  whether  it  was  true,  as  reported, 
that  Buell  was  going  to  answer  General  Grant.  I  re- 
plied : 

"I  do  not  understand  that  he  is  going  to  answer 
General  Grant,  but  he  will  write  an  article  giving  an 
account  of  the  battle." 

I  then  said  to  Grant : 

"  General,  you  and  Buell  will  never  agree  about  the 
battle  of  Shiloh,  but  in  a  recent  letter  to  me,  Buell 
spoke  most  kindly  of  you,  saying,  among  other  things, 
that  when  you  and  he  were  young  together  in  the 
Army  you  had,  as  he  expressed  it,  '  attractive,  even 
endearing  qualities.' ' 

I  waited  for  response,  but  in  vain.  Grant  remained 
silent.  I  construed  his  action  upon  this  and  a  sub- 


306 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


sequent  occasion  to  mean  that  the  remarks  commen- 
datory of  Buell's  character  and  ability,  made  in  the 
Shiloh  article,  conveyed  all  he  chose  to  express  upon 
that  subject  as  it  then  stood. 

The  bulk  of  Grant's  admiration  and  friendship  was 
no  doflbt  bestowed  upon  Sherman,  McPherson,  and 
Sheridan.  The  day  before  he  started  from  Nashville 
to  Washington,  in  March,  1864,  to  receive  his  commis- 
sion as  Lieutenant-General,  Grant  wrote  a  letter  to 
Sherman  expressing  a  full  sense  of  his  obligations  to 
subordinates,  and  saying : 

"  I  want  to  express  my  thanks  to  you  and  McPher- 
son as  the  men  to  whom,  above  all  others,  I  feel  in- 
debted for  whatever  I  have  had  of  success.  .  .  . 
I  feel  all  the  gratitude  this  letter  would  express,  giv- 
ing it  the  most  flattering  construction.  The  word  you 
I  use  in  the  plural,  intending  it  for  McPherson  also." 

Grant  had  antipathies  as  well  as  attachments.  His 
relations  to  his  generals  would  form  a  striking  chapter 
of  history ;  and  an  interesting  part  of  it  would  be  the 
story  of  the  estrangement  between  him  and  Hancock. 

In  his  account  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  published  in 
the  Century  Magazine,  Grant  said  : 

"  The  enemy  had  hardly  started  in  retreat  from  his 
last  position,  when,  looking  back  toward  the  river,  I 
saw  a  division  of  troops  coming  up  in  beautiful  order 
as  if  going  on  parade  or  review.  The  commander  was 
at  the  head  of  the  column,  and  the  staff  seemed  to  be 
bestowed  about  as  they  would  have  been  had  they 
been  going  on  parade.  When  the  head  of  the  column 
came  near  where  I  was  standing,  it  was  halted,  and 
the  commanding  officer,  General  A.  McD.  McCook, 


AN  ACQUAINTANCE  WITH  GRANT.  307 

rode  up  to  where  I  was,  and  appealed  to  me  not  to 
send  his  division  any  farther,  saying  that  they  were 
worn  out  with  marching  and  fighting.  ...  It  was 
not,  however,  the  rank  and  file  or  the  junior  officers 
who  asked  to  be  excused,  but  the  division  com- 
mander." 

This  was  a  remarkable  error,  and  did  great  injustice 
to  McCook.  Grant,  soon  after  the  publication  of  the 
foregoing  statement,  and  subsequently  in  the  Century 
Magazine,  admitted  the  injustice  of  it,  but  said  noth- 
ing as  to  how  he  happened  to  make  the  mistake.  Not 
long  after  the  article  appeared,  I  mentioned  the  error, 
and  told  the  General  I  thought  he  had  fallen  into  it 
by  merging  two  occasions  into  one  through  a  lapse  of 
memory — that  McCook's  division  did  march  in  column 
and  in  dress  parade  order,  from  the  river  to  the  line 
of  battle,  and  it  made  a  fine  spectacle,  but  it  was  quite 
early  in  the  morning  of  the  second  day's  fight.  That, 
no  doubt,  was  the  spectacle  which  impressed  itself 
iipon  the  General's  memory.  But  at  that  time  the 
enemy  had  not  "  started  in  retreat  from  his  last  posi- 
tion." Indeed,  the  only  question,  then,  was  whether 
we  could  beat  him,  not  whether  we  would  pursue 
him.  McCook's  division,  after  marching  up  in  column 
in  dress  parade  order,  formed  line,  attacked,  and  was 
actively  engaged  the  rest  of  the  day,  and  it  was  not 
until  evening,  when  the  enemy  had  been  defeated, 
that  the  question  of  pursuit  arose.  "  Then,"  I  said  to 
Grant,  "  you  probably  saw  McCook  a  second  time, 
and  the  conversation  which  you  mention  in  the  article 
took  place."  He  admitted  the  probability  that  the 
explanation  was  correct. 


MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 

When  the  second  session  of  the  last  Congress  began, 
a  bill  for  the  retirement  of  Grant  as  General  of  the 
Army  had  passed  the  Senate,  and  was  before  the 
House ;  the  Fitz-John  Porter  bill  had  been  vetoed,  and 
Grant,  though  a  wreck  financially  and  physically,  had 
written  to  Porter,  July  4 : 

"  You  can  scarcely  conceive  the  pain  it  caused  me 
to  read  the  veto  of  your  bill  by  the  President  yester- 
day. I  was  not  prepared  for  it.  This  message  is  the 
merest  sophistry.  It  is,  no  doubt,  a  great  disappoint- 
ment to  you  and  your  family,  but  I  believe  it  will 
result  ultimately  in  doing  you  full  justice.  You  were 
dismissed  unjustly,  and  you  are  entitled  to  restoration. 
Be  of  good  cheer,  and  pray  that  justice  may  yet  be 
-done  you  and  yours." 

This  letter,  of  course,  was  not  known  to  the  Presi- 
dent, but  in  the  condition  of  affairs  just  set  forth, 
President  Arthur,  in  his  last  annual  message,  said : 

"  I  recommend  that  in  recognition  of  the  eminent 
services  of  Ulysses  S.  Grant,  late  General  of  the  armies 
of  the  United  States,  and  twice  President  of  this  na- 
tion, the  Congress  confer  upon  him  a  suitable  pension." 

This  formal  recommendation  of  a  pension  implied 
that  the  President  did  not  favor  a  bill  to  place  Grant 
on  the  retired  list  of  the  Army.  Grant,  in  a  letter  to 
Senator  Mitchell,  dated  December  5,  1884,  requested 
that  the  pension  bill  be  withdrawn,  and  said  he  would 
not  accept  a  pension  if  the  bill  should  pass  and  be  ap- 
proved. This  ended  the  pension  movement. 

The  well-deserved  boon  of  retirement  came  at  last, 
and  with  a  unanimity  and  public  approval  that  made 
it  welcome,  and  the  dying  hero  received  it  gratefully. 


AN  ACQUAINTANCE  WITH  GRANT. 


509? 


The  time  has  not  come  for  final  judgment  of  Grant- 
He  had  great  abilities  and  great  opportunities.  Chance- 
is  undoubtedly  an  important  factor  in  the  race  of  glory  r 
and  perhaps  it  favored  Grant  in  the  War  of  Rebellion- 
General  Sherman  goes  so  far  as  to  have  said  since 
Grant's  death,  that,  "had  C.  F.  Smith  lived,  Grant 
would  have  disappeared  to  history  after  Donelson  "  ; 
but  that  is  conjecture.  Grant  was  one  of  the  "  singular 
few  "  who  possessed  qualities  which  probably  would 
have  gained  for  him  a  high  place  in  history,  no  matter 
who  had  lived  to  compete  with  him  in  our  great  War- 
No  man  was  known  by  reputation,  and  personally, 
to  so  many  men  of  his  time  as  Grant.  The  nations  of 
the  earth  read  of  him,  saw  him,  and  judged  him. 
After  the  fame  of  his  great  deeds  had  spread  over  the 
world,  he  travelled  through  both  hemispheres,  and  re- 
ceived the  willing  and  unstinted  homage  of  men  high 
and  low  in  various  climes  and  countries.  The  record 
of  what  he  has  said  and  what  he  has  done  must  place 
him  high  in  the  roll  of  the  world's  great  men.  Pos- 
terity will  see  to  that.  We  who  knew  him  face  to 
face  may  bear  witness  to  what  he  was  in  himself.  We 
need  not  inquire  to  what  extent  he  imbibed  and  as- 
similated the  wisdom,  the  knowledge,  or  the  morality 
of  worthy  parents,  of  early  teachers,  of  friends  and 
staff  officers,  such  as  McPherson,  and  Rawlins,  and 
Wilson,  and  Bowers.  Undoubtedly  with  him,  as  with 
other  men,  the  surrounding  influences  of  his  life  had 
much  to  do  with  making  him  what  he  was.  He  en- 
dured disappointment,  humiliation,  and  poverty ;  he 
was  tempted  by  military  success  and  glory,  and  en- 
countered the  rivalries,  the  jealousies,  the  intrigues  of 


310  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

ambitious  and  aspiring  generals ;  lie  floated  for  years 
upon  the  high  tide  of  popular  favor  and  good  fortune, 
and  then  fell  through  the  evil  of  others,  and  was 
wrongfully  and  cruelly  dashed  against  the  rocks  of 
financial  discredit  and  ruin ;  and  finally,  while  tried 
by  prolonged  and  excruciating  physical  torture,  he 
made  an  effort,  unsurpassed  in  its  heroism,  to  restore 
the  fortunes  of  his  family  by  the  work  of  his  own 
brain  and  hand.  What  did  the  duties,  the  obligations, 
the  temptations,  the  sorrows,  the  struggles  of  life, 
make  of  this  man  ?  One  of  the  truest,  strongest, 
bravest  human  entities  that  the  world  has  ever  pro- 
duced. 


ARTICLE   III. 

Grant  and  Matthew  Arnold. 
"An  Estimate."* 

Mr.  Arnold  introduced  General  Grant  to  the  people 
of  England  in  the  January  and  February  issues  of 
Murray's  Magazine,  and  his  articles  have  since  been 
published  in  book  form  by  Cupples,  Upham  &  Co.,  of 
Boston,  and  entitled  "  An  Estimate." 

As  Grant  had  visited  England  and  received  the 
most  cordial  welcome  from  all  classes,  there  is  no  con- 
ceivable reason  for  Mr.  Arnold's  post-mortem  introduc- 
tion of  him,  unless  it  be  that  Grant  never  lectured  in 
Great  Britain. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  introduce  Mr.  Arnold  to  the 
people  of  the  United  States.  We  know  him  by  his 
distinction  in  the  fields  of  learning,  and  besides  that 
he  has  lectured  to  us.  Indeed,  if  we  may  judge  by 
his  "  Estimate  "  of  Grant,  he  is  not  likely  to  lose  any 
opportunity  to  lecture  us.  Perhaps  we  need  it — cer- 
tainly we  can  bear  it.  But  we  must  be  permitted  a 
little  hero-worship,  though  our  idol  be  a  man  of  the 
sword,  not  of  the  pen. 

Having  been  General-in-Chief  during  a  great  war, 
and  twice  President  of  the  United  States,  Grant's 
career  is  open  to  the  closest  scrutiny  and  the  most 
rigid  public  judgment ;  and  having  published  a  book, 

*  North  American  Review,  April.  1887. 

311 


312  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

he  is  amenable  to  the  strictest  rules  of  fair  criticism, 
We  should  have  no  right  to  be  sensitive  concerning. 
Mr.  Arnold's  "  Estimate,"  if  it  did  not  do  injustice^ 
Mr.  Arnold  has  presented  a  weak  and  incorrect  ab- 
stract of  our  hero's  literary,  as  well  as  of  his  military 
work.  It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  article,  howeverr 
to  assume  the  task  of  setting  that  right.  The  world 
will  judge  for  itself  of  General  Grant's  "  Memoirs  "  and 
of  his  public  services.  Beyond  commenting  upon  a 
few  general  points,  the  only  purpose  of  this  article  is 
to  make  some  comparison  between  the  literary  work 
of  the  distinguished  but  matter-of-fact  American  sol- 
dier and  the  learned  British  critic. 

Mr.  Arnold  says  that  "  in  the  rage  for  comparison- 
making  the  Americans  beat  the  world."  That  shall 
not  deter  us  from  comparing  the  English  of  the  Amer- 
ican soldier  and  the  British  scholar. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  General  Grant  never 
posed  as  a  scholar,  and  that  he  wrote  his  "Memoirs  "  in 
the  throes  of  death,  with  no  time  to  choose  words.  ' 

Mr.  Arnold  says  of  Grant's  "  Memoirs  :"  "  I  found  a 
language  all  astray  in  its  use  of  will  and  shall,  should 
and  would — an  English  without  charm  and  without 
high-breeding."  This  expression  implies  the  assump- 
tion on  Mr.  Arnold's  part  that  he  is  master  of  pure 
English.  Does  his  article  sustain  that  pretension  ? 
High  lights  in  literature  express  their  meaning  accu- 
rately. When  Mr.  Arnold  says  that  Grant's  English 
is  without  "  high- breeding,"  he  does  not  mean  that 
Grant  himself  is  without  "  high-breeding."  He  uses 
the  term  high-breeding  in  relation  to  language,  not 
on  the  sly  in  relation  to  the  man.  We  understand 


GRANT  AND  MATTHEW  ARNOLD.          313 

high-breeding  in  men,  in  cattle,  in  dogs,  etc.,  but  Mr. 
Arnold  will  have  to  tell  us  what  high-breeding  in 
language  is. 

Grant  says  of  his  tiresome  life  at  the  Military  Acad- 
emy :  "  The  last  two  years  wore  away  more  rapidly 
than  the  first  two."  Mr.  Arnold,  putting  this  into 
high-bred  English,  says :  "  His  last  two  years  went 
quicker  than  his  first  two."  Grant  says,  "  I  had  grown 
six  inches  in  stature  "  ;  Arnold  says,  "  with  a  stature 
that  had  run  up  too  fast  for  his  strength."  Speaking 
of  a  large  public  meeting,  Grant  says,  "  In  the  evening 
the  court-house  was  packed."  Arnold  says,  "  In  the 
evening  the  court-house  was  crammed"  Grant  says, 
"  My  opinion  was,  and  still  is,  that  immediately  after 
the  fall  of  Fort  Donelson  the  way  was  opened  to  the 
National  forces  all  over  the  Southwest  without  much 
resistance.  If  one  General  who  would  have  taken  the 
responsibility  had  been  in  command  of  all  the  troops 
west  of  the  Alleghanies,  he  could  have  inarched  to 
Chattanooga,  Corinth,  Memphis,  and  Vicksburg  with 
the  troops  we  then  had,  and,  as  volunteering  was 
going  on  rapidly  over  the  North,  there  would  soon 
have  been  force  enough  at  all  these  centres  to  operate 
offensively  against  any  body  of  the  enemy  that  might 
be  found  near  them."  This  clear  statement,  when  put 
into  Mr.  Arnold's  high-bred  English  for  the  British 
public,  comes  out  as  follows:  "He  thought  both  then 
and  ever  after,  that  by  the  fall  of  Fort  Donelson  the 
way  was  opened  to  the  forces  of  the  North  all  over 
the  Southwest  without  much  resistance,  that  a  vigor- 
ous commander,  disposing  of  all  the  troops  west  of  the 
Alleghanies,  might  have  at  once  marched  to  Chatta- 


314  MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 

nooga,  Corinth,  Memphis,  and  Vicksburg,  and  broken 
down  every  resistance." 

Grant  says:  "On  the  22d  of  August,  1848,  I  was 
married  to  Miss  Julia  Dent,  the  ]ady  of  whom  I  have 
spoken.  In  April  following  I  was  ordered  to  Detroit, 
Michigan,  where  two  years  were  spent  with  but  few 
important  incidents.  ...  In  the  spring  of  1851 
the  garrison  at  Detroit  was  transferred  to  Sackett's 
Harbor,  and  in  the  following  spring  the  entire  Fourth 
Infantry  was  ordered  to  the  Pacific  Coast.  It  was  de- 
cided that  Mrs.  Grant  should  visit  my  parents  at  first 
for  a  few  months,  and  then  remain  with  her  own 
family  at  their  St.  Louis  home  until  an  opportunity 
offered  of  sending  for  her."  Mr.  Arnold  converts  this 
plain,  smooth  narrative  into  the  following  high-bred 
or  liy~brid  English :  "  When  the  evacuation  of  Mexico 
was  completed,  Grant  married,  in  August,  1848,  Miss 
Julia  Dent,  to  whom  he  had  been  engaged  more  than 
four  years.  For  two  years  the  young  couple  lived  at 
Detroit,  Michigan,  where  Grant  was  now  stationed ; 
he  was  then  ordered  to  the  Pacific  Coast.  It  was  set- 
tled that  Mrs.  Grant  should,  during  his  absence,  live 
with  her  own  family  at  St.  Louis."  If  there  is  any 
"  charm  "  in  the  construction  of  the  foregoing  state- 
ment by  Mr.  Arnold,  or  in  his  use  of  the  words  now, 
then,  and  settled,  it  is  well  concealed. 

Grant  says :  "  The  enemy  occupied  Grand  Gulf, 
Haines'  Bluff,  and  Jackson  with  a  force  of  nearly  sixty 
thousand  men.  Jackson  is  fifty  miles  east  of  Vicks- 
burg,  and  is  connected  with  it  by  a  railroad.  My  first 
problem  was  to  capture  Grand  Gulf  to  use  as  a  base." 

Mr.  Arnold's  version  of  this  is  as   follows :  "  The 


GRANT  AND  MATTHEW  ARNOLD.          315 

enemy  had  at  Grand  Gulf,  at  Haines'  Bluff,  north  of 
Vicksburg,  and  at  Jackson,  the  capital  of  the  State  of 
Mississippi,  in  which  all  these  places  are,  about  sixty 
thousand  men." 

Of  his  efforts  to  earn  a  living  after  he  resigned  from 
the  Army  in  1854  Grant  says:  "  My  wife  had  a  farm 
near  St.  Louis,  to  which  we  went,  but  I  had  no  means 
to  stock  it.  A  house  had  to  be  built  also.  I  worked 
very  hard,  never  losing  a  day  because  of  bad  weather, 
and  accomplished  the  object  in  a  moderate  way.  If 
nothing  else  could  be  done,  I  would  load  a  cord  of 
wood  on  a  wagon  and  take  it  to  the  city  for  sale.  I 
managed  to  keep  along  very  well  until  1858,  when  I 
was  attacked  by  fever  and  ague.  In  1858  I  sold  out 
my  stock,  crops,  and  farming  utensils  at  auction,  and 
gave  up  farming." 

The  English  wdth  "  charm,"  into  which  Mr.  Arnold 
throws  this  frank  and  pathetic  part  of  General  Grant's 
story,  is  as  follows:  "First  he  tried  farming  on  a  farm 
belonging  to  his  wife  near  St.  Louis  ;  but  he  could  not 
make  it  answer,  though  he  worked  hard.  He  had  in- 
sufficient capital  and  more  than  sufficient  fever  and 
ague."  Aside  from  the  flippancy  with  which  Mr. 
Arnold  treats  Grant's  poverty  and  sickness,  the  last 
sentence  just  quoted  entitles  him  to  the  credit  for  a 
fair  share  of  the  "  smartness  "  which  he  attributes  to 
Yankees. 

The  foregoing  are  examples  of  the  English  of  the 
man  of  the  sword  and  the  man  of  the  pen.  In  no  in- 
stance does  Mr.  Arnold's  change  in  General  Grant's 
English  improve  it. 

But  Mr.  Arnold's  failure  to  improve  General  Grant's 


316  MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 

English,  in  translating  it  for  the  British  public,  is  not 
the  only  particular  in  which  his  article  is  defective. 
In  some  instances  he  fails  to  express  the  General's 
meaning.  For  example,  speaking  of  the  preliminary 
operations  of  the  Mexican  War,  Grant  says  the  occu- 
pation of  certain  territory  was  apparently,  u  to  force 
Mexico  to  initiate  war."  "  We  were  sent  to  provoke 
a  fight,  but  it  was  essential  that  Mexico  should  com- 
mence it."  Surely  that  is  plain  enough.  But  Mr. 
Arnold  renders  it  as  follows ;  "  Ostensibly  the  Ameri- 
can troops  were  sent  to  prevent  filibustering  into 
Texas;  really  they  were  sent  as  a  menace  to  Mexico, 
in  case  she  appeared  to  contemplate  war."  Again, 
Grant  says  of  his  appointment  to  the  Military  Acade- 
my, Mr.  Harmer,  the  member  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, "  cheerfully  appointed  me."  Mr.  Arnold, 
observing,  perhaps  by  a  careless  reading,  that  a  Sena- 
tor from  Ohio  wras  addressed  upon  the  subject  of  the 
appointment,  says  :  "  The  United  States  Senator  for 
Ohio  procured  for  young  Grant,  when  he  was  seven- 
teen years  old,  a  nomination  to  West  Point."  The 
error  in  this  instance  is  not  serious,  but  as  Mr.  Arnold 
must  know  that  every  State  of  our  Union  has  two 
Senators,  his  use  of  the  definite  article  the  in  the  sen- 
tence, "  the  United  States  Senator  for  Ohio,"  suggests 
that  misuse  of  the  definite  article  is  not  set  down  in 
his  linguistic  category  as  an  offence.  In  fact,  with 
some  Englishmen  the  importance  of  scrupulous  care  in 
the  use  of  ivill  and  shall,  would  and  should,  seems  to 
overshadow  many  other  things  in  letters.  Nor  is  Mr. 
Arnold  more  particular  with  his  pronouns  than  with 
his  articles.  In  speaking  of  Meade  and  Grant,  he  says  : 


GRANT  AND  MATTHEW  ARNOLD.          317 

"  Both  Meade  and  Grant  behaved  very  well.  Meade 
suggested  to  Grant  that  he  might  wish  to  have  imme- 
diately under  him  Sherman,  who  had  been  serving 
with  Grant  in  the  West.  He  begged  him  not  to  hesi- 
tate if  he  thought  it  good  for  the  Service.  Grant  as- 

<_>  o 

sured  him  that  he  had  no  thought  of  moving  him,  and 
in  his  "  Memoirs/'  after  relating  what  had  passed,  he 
adds,"  etc. 

It  is  not  worth  while  to  multiply  illustrations,  but 
it  may  be  noted  that  Mr.  Arnold's  vocabulary  is  large. 
He  has  more  words  than  he  needs,  and  he  appears  to 
throw  in  the  surplus  to  get  rid  of  it.  Possibly,  how- 
ever, the  mystery  of  English  with  "  charm  "  and  "  high- 
breeding"  may  lie  hidden  in  the  distribution  of  this 
surplus.  Here  are  some  examples  :  "  The  afternoon 
of  that  same  day ; "  "  he  says  with  perfect  truth  ; " 
"high  genius  ;  "  "  the  United  States  Senator  for  Ohio 
procured  for  young  Grant  when  he  was  17  years  old ;  " 
"from  this  time  he  was  always  the  same  strong  man," 
etc. ;  "  almost  exactly  the  same  strength  as  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  campaign  ; "  "  if  the  South  could  suc- 
ceed in  prolonging  an  indecisive  struggle  year  after 
year  still,  the  North  might  probably  grow  tired  of  the 
contest ; "  "  in  the  field  there  was  some  sharp  fighting 
for  a  day  or  tivo  still ;  "  "  but  the  Mexican  war  came 
on  and  kept  him  in  the  Army;"  "Grant  declined  be- 
cause he  was  to  go  off  that  evening  to  visit  his  chil- 
dren." Perhaps  on  and  off,  as  they  stand  in  the  last 
two  sentences,  are  not  so  bad  as  they  would  be  if  they 
changed  places,  but  they  are  unnecessary,  unless  it  be 
that  they  give  "charm"  and  "  high-breeding "  to  the 
English. 


318  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

Without  making  more  comparisons  between  the 
English  of  General  Grant  and  Mr.  Arnold,  the  follow- 
ing may  be  taken  from  Mr.  Arnold's  article  as  fair  ex- 
amples of  his  English  with  charm  and  high-breeding. 
Comparing  Grant  before  he  went  to  West  Point  with 
English  school-boys,  Mr.  Arnold  calls  the  latter  "  our 
young  gentlemen "  /  and  speaking  of  the  way  Grant 
was  reared,  he  says :  "  The  bringing  up  of  Abraham 
Lincoln  was  also,  I  suppose,  in  this  wise"  Two  more 
examples  must  suffice.  Mr.  Arnold  says  :  "  After 
Grant  had,  after  a  hard  and  bloody  struggle  of  two 
days,  won  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  in  which  a  ball  cut  in 
two  the  scabbard  of  his  sword,  and  more  than  10,000 
men  were  killed  and  wounded  on  the  side  of  the 
North,  General  Halleck,  who  did  not  love  Grant,  ar- 
rived on  the  scene  of  action  and  assumed  the  com- 
mand." "  And,  therefore,  crossing  the  James  River  he 
invested,  after  failing  to  carry  it  by  assault,  Peters- 
burg, the  enemy's  stronghold  south  of  Richmond. 
.  .  .  Finally,  Grant,  resuming  operations  in  March, 
1865,  possessed  himself  of  the  outer  works  of  Peters- 
burg. .  .  .  Then  Grant  proceeded  to  possess  him- 
self of  the  railroad  by  which  Lee's  army  and  Rich- 
mond itself,  now  drew  their  supplies." 

Under  cover  of  a  statement  made  by  Grant,  Mr. 
Arnold  assumes  the  defence  of  the  sympathy  for  the 
South  shown  by  England  during  the  Rebellion.  Grant 
says  :  "  It  was  evident  to  my  mind  that  the  election 
of  a  Republican  President  in  1856  meant  the  secession 
of  all  the  slave  States  and  rebellion.  Under  these 
circumstances  I  preferred  the  success  of  a  candidate 
whose  election  would  prevent  or  postpone  secession, 


GRANT  AND  MATTHEW  ARNOLD.          319 

to  seeing  the  country  plunged  into  a  war,  the  end  of 
which  no  man  could  foretell." 

Upon  this  Mr.  Arnold  remarks  :  "  I  am  not  con- 
cerned to  discuss  Grant's  reasons  for  his  vote,  but  I 
wish  to  remark  how  completely  his  reflections  dispose 
of  the  reproaches  addressed  so  often  by  Americans  to 
England  for  not  sympathizing  with  the  North  attack- 
ing slavery  in  a  war  with  the  South  upholding  it. 
From  what  he  says,  it  is  evident  how  very  far  the 
North  was,  when  the  war  began,  from  attacking 
slavery." 

Did  Mr.  Arnold  have  to  learn  from  Grant's  book — 
"  from  what  he  says "-  —that  the  North  was  very  far 
from  attacking  slavery  when  the  War  began  ?  His- 
tory abounds  in  proof  of  that.  Our  Congress,  after 
war  broke  out,  passed  a  resolution  saying  that  "  the 
War  was  not  waged  for  the  purpose  of  overthrowing 
or  interfering  with  the  rights  or  established  institu- 
tions of  the  States,  but  to  defend  and  maintain  the 
permanency  of  the  Constitution  and  to  preserve  the 
Union  with  all  the  dignity  and  equal  rights  of  the 
several  States  unimpaired  "  ;  and  about  the  same  time 
the  Confederate  Commissioners,  Yancey,  Mann,  and 
Rust,  said,  in  a  letter  to  Earl  Russell :  "  It  was  from 
no  fear  that  the  slaves  would  be  liberated  that  seces- 
sion took  place.  The  very  party  in  power  has  pro- 
posed to  guarantee  slavery  forever  in  the  States,  if  the 
South  would  but  remain  in  the  Union."  That  Mr. 
Arnold  should  discover  these  historical  facts  by  draw- 
ing an  inference  from  General  Grant's  book  is  as  sur- 
prising as  his  discovery  of  General  Grant  in  1880  ; 
but  his  conclusion  from  the  discovery  is  more  surpris- 


320  MILITAEY  MISCELLANIES. 

ing  still.  From  the  fact  that  Grant  in  1856  held  the 
opinion  that  the  election  of  a  Democratic  President 
would  prevent  or  postpone  a  civil  war  in  his  country, 
and  voted  accordingly,  Mr.  Arnold  draws  the  con- 
clusion that  Americans  were  unjust,  or  at  least  incon- 
sistent, in  reproaching  "  England  for  not  sympathizing 
with  the  North  attacking  slavery,  in  a  war  with  the 
South  upholding  it."  The  meaning  is  that  as  the 
North  was  not  attacking  slavery  at  the  beginning  it 
had  no  claim  to  English  sympathy.  This  is  a  weak 
defence.  According  to  the  morals  of  England,  slavery 
was  a  monstrous  evil ;  and  in  this  judgment  a  large 
part  of  our  Northern  people  heartily  concurred.  But 
slavery,  having  been  found  by  us  as  it  was  left  here 
by  England,  was  imbedded  in  our  Constitution  ;  and 
our  Government  from  the  beginning  had  been  part 
slave  and  part  free,  with  the  free  part  located  in  the 
North,  growing  in  moral  strength  as  well  as  in  pro- 
portional numbers.  The  necessity  for  subjection  of 
the  slave-owners'  will  to  the  will  of  the  Union  after 
political  control  had  passed  to  the  North  in  I860,  the 
unwillingness  of  the  North  to  have  slavery  extended, 
and  a  violent  resentment  by  Southerners  of  abolition- 
ism in  the  abstract,  caused  the  Southern  States  to 
secede  from  the  Union,  and  proceed  to  set  up  a  gov- 
ernment of  which  Mr.  A.  H.  Stephens,  its  Vice-Presi- 
dent, said  in  a  public  speech,  March  21,  1861  :  "Its 
foundations  are  laid,  its  corner-stone  rests  upon  the 
great  truth  that  the  negro  is  not  equal  to  the  white 
man  ;  that  slavery  subordination  to  the  superior  race 
is  his  natural  and  normal  condition.  This,  our  new 
government,  is  the  first  in  the  history  of  the  world 


GRANT  AND  MATTHEW  ARNOLD.  321 

based  upon  this  great  physiological  and  moral  truth." 
Mr.  Arnold  tells  us  that  "  admiration  and  favor  are 
not  compellable  ;  we  admire  and  favor  only  an  object 
which  delights  us,  helps  us,  elevates  us,  does  us  good." 
The  government  described  by  Mr.  Stephens,  based 
upon  slavery,  is  the  one  which  Mr.  Arnold  admits 
many  Englishmen,  for  whom  he  now  offers  a  poor 
excuse,  admired  and  favored,  as  against  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Union,  founded  upon  the  principle  of 
human  freedom,  and  composed  largely  of  men  devoted 
to  the  general  enforcement  of  that  principle.  It  is 
true  that  the  Union,  choosing  between  evils  and  trust- 
ing to  the  appearance  of  some  peaceful  process  for 
eliminating  slavery,  was  willing,  at  first,  to  let  the  evil 
alone  where  it  existed,  rather  than  enter  upon  a  bloody 
civil  war,  the  end  of  which,  as  Grant  says,  no  man 
could  foretell.  But  this  dilemma  of  the  North  affords 
no  excuse  to  Englishmen,  who  were  not  in  the  dilem- 
ma, for  taking  sides  with  the  South ;  nor  does  Grant's 
action  in  1856  "  dispose  of  the  reproaches  addressed 
so  often  by  Americans  to  England  for  not  sympathiz- 
ing with  the  North  "  in  the  civil  war  of  1861-65.  If 
English  lack  of  sympathy  for  the  North  had  been,  as 
Mr.  Arnold  intimates,  because  the  North  did  -not  at- 
tack slavery  at  the  beginning,  then  surely,  as  soon  as 
the  Government  did  attack  it,  early  in  1863,  they 
would  have  been  with  the  North  heartily.  But  the 
abolition  of  slavery  did  not  divert  English  sympathies 
from  the  South  to  the  North. 

Mr.  Arnold  himself  probably  has  some  love  for 
Americans  in  general,  for  he  uses  the  lash  freely,  and 
we  are  told  that  whom  the  Lord  loveth  He  chasteneth. 


322 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


Grant,  Mr.  Arnold  tells  us,  ais  boastful,  as  Americans 
are  apt  to  be,  for  his  nation  "  ;  "  The  Americans  are 
too  self -laudatory  ; "  "  Grant  was  boastful  only  in  cir- 
cumstances where  nothing  but  high  genius  or  high 
training,  I  suppose,  can  save  an  American  from  being 
boastful ; "  "  The  United  States  would  be  more  attrac- 
tive to  us  if  they  were  more  backward  in  proclaiming 
themselves  the  greatest  nation  on  earth ; "  "  The 
Americans  in  the  rage  for  comparison-making  beat  the 
world ;  whatever  excellence  is  mentioned  America 
must,  if  possible,  be  brought  in  to  balance  or  surpass 
it.  That  fine  and  delicate  naturalist,  Mr.  Burroughs, 
mentions  trout,  and  instantly  he  adds,  British  trout, 
by  the  way,  are  not  so  beautiful  as  our  own." 

Mr.  Arnold  shows  a  keen  perception  of  the  fitness 
of  things  by 'closing  these  extravaganzas  with  a  fish 
story. 

It  is  to  the  chance  by  which  "  some  documents  pub- 
lished by  General  Badeau  in  the  American  newspapers 
first  attracted  his  (my)  attention  to  Grant "  that  the 
British  people  are  indebted  for  Mr.  Arnold's  discovery 
of  the  American  soldier,  and  it  must  be  admitted  that 
the  treatment  of  General  Grant  in  Mr.  Arnold's 
so-called  Estimate,  though  patronizing,  is  quite  com- 
mendatory. Indeed,  having  caught  from  America 
"  the  rage  for  comparison-making,"  he  compares  Grant 
to  the  Iron  Duke,  saying :  "  But  he  certainly  had  a 
good  deal  of  the  character  and  qualities  which  we  so 
justly  respect  in  the  Duke  of  Wellington."  .  .  . 
"  Surely,  in  all  this  he  resembles  the  Duke  of  Welling- 
ton." Englishmen  are  not  boastful.  They  merely  set 
up  one  of  their  own  heroes  as  the  standard  of  human 


GRANT  AND  MATTHEW  ARNOLD. 


823 


greatness,  and  measure  other  men  by  that  standard. 
So,  too,  Mr.  Arnold  does  honor  to  Grant's  "Memoirs." 
Notwithstanding  they  are  in  language  "  all  astray  in 
its  use  of  will  and  shall,  ...  an  English  without 
charm  and  without  high-breeding,"  Mr.  Arnold  com- 
forts us  by  saying,  "surely  the  Duke  of  Wellington 
would  have  read  these  i  Memoirs  '  with  pleasure." 

But  having  lifted  us  above  the  American  level  by 
admitting  that  Grant  "  had  a  good  deal  of  the  qualities" 
of  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  and  that  the  Duke  "  would 
have  read  these  'Memoirs'  with  pleasure,"  Mr.  Arnold 
drops  us  back  by  saying,  "  Cardinal  Mazarin  used  to 
ask  concerning  a  man,  before  employing  him,  est-il 
Jieureux?  Grant  was  Jieureux;  "  and  there  he  leaves 
us.  How  deeply  are  we  indebted  to  him  ? 

MARK  TWAIN  DEFENDS  GEN.  GRANT'S  ENGLISH— ATTACKING  MAT- 
THEW ARNOLD. — The  Army  and  Navy  Club  of  Connecticut  held  their 
annual  reunion  to-night  to  commemorate  the  anniversary  of  Gen. 
Grant's  birthday.  The  chief  address  on  the  memory  of  Gen.  Grant  was 
delivered  by  the  Rev.  Dr.  M.  B.  Riddle,  formerly  a  chaplain  in  the  Ser- 
vice. Toastmaster  V.  B.  Chamberlain  introduced  Mr.  S.  L.  Clemens 
(Mark  Twain),  who  spoke  as  follows : 

MARK  TWAIN'S  SPEECH. 

I  will  detain  you  with  only  just  a  few  words — just  a  few  thousand 
words ;  and  then  give  place  to  a  better  man — if  he  has  been  created. 
Lately  a  great  and  honored  author,  Matthew  Arnold  has  been'  finding- 
fault  with  Gen.  Grant's  English.  That  would  be  fair  enough,  may  be, 
if  the  examples  of  imperfect  English  averaged  more  instances  to  the 
page  in  Gen.  Grant's  book  than  they  do  in  Mr.  Arnold's  criticism  upon 
the  book — but  they  don't.  (Laughter  and  applause.)  It  would  be  fair 
enough,  may  be,  if  such  instances  were  commoner  in  Gen.  Grant's  book 
than  they  are  in  the  works  of  the  average  standard  author — but  they 
aren't.  In  truth,  Gen.  Grant's  derelictions  in  the  matter  of  grammar 
and  construction  are  not  more  frequent  than  are  such  derelictions  in 
the  works  of  a  majority  of  the  professional  authors  of  our  time  and  all 
previous  times  —authors  as  exclusively  and  painstakingly  trained  to  the 
literary  trade  as  was  Gen.  Grant  to  the  trade  of  war.  (Applause.) 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES 

MR.  ARNOLD'S  GRAMMAR. 

This  is  not  a  random  statement ;  it  is  a  fact,  and  easily  demonstrable. 
I  have  at  home  a  book  called  u  Modern  English  Literature,  its  Blemishes 
and  Defects,"  by  Henry  H.  Breen,  F.S.A.,  a  countryman  of  Mr.  Arnold. 
In  it  I  find  examples  of  bad  grammar  and  slovenly  English  from  the 
pens  cf  Sydney  Smith,  Sheridan.  Hallam,  Whateley,  Caiiyle,  both  Dis- 
raelis, Allison,  Junius,  Blair,  Macaulay,  Shakespeare,  Milton,  Gibbon, 
Southey,  Bulwer.  Cobbett,  Dr.  Samuel  Johnson,  Trench,  Lamb,  Landor, 
Smollett,  Wai  pole,  Walker  (of  the  dictionary),  Christopher  North. 
Kirke  White,  Mrs.  Sigourney,  Benjamin  Franklin,  Walter  Scott  and 
Mr.  Lindley  Murray,  who  made  the  grammar. 

In  Mr.  Arnold's  paper  on  Gen.  Grant's  book  we  find  a  couple  of 
grammatical  crimes  and  more  than  several  examples  of  very  crude  and 
slovenly  English — enough  of  them  to  easily  entitle  him  to  a  lofty  place 
in  that  illustrious  list  of  delinquents  just  named.  The  following  pas- 
sage, all  by  itself,  ought  to  elect  him :  ' '  Meade  suggested  to  Grant 
that  he  might  wish  to  have  immediately  under  him  Sherman,  who  had 
been  serving  with  Grant  in  the  West.  He  begged  him  not  to  hesitate 
if  he  thought  it  for  the  good  of  the  Service.  Grant  assured  him  that  he 
had  no  thought  of  moving  him,  and  in  his  'Memoirs,'  after  relating  what 
had  passed,  he  adds,"  &c.  To  read  that  passage  a  couple  of  times 
would  make  a  man  dizzy,  to  read  it  four  times  would  make  him  drunk. 
(Great  laughter.)  Gen.  Grant's  grammar  is  as  good  as  anybody's;  but 
if  this  were  not  so,  Mr.  Breen  would  brush  that  inconsequential  fact 
aside  and  hunt  his  great  book  for  far  higher  game.  Mr.  Breen  makes 
this  discriminating  remark  :  "To  suppose  that  because  a  man  is  a  poet  or 
a  historian,  he  must  be  correct  in  his  grammar,  is  to  suppose  that  an 
architect  must  be  a  joiner,  or  a  physician  a  compounder  of  medicines." 
Mr.  Breen 's  point  is  well  taken.  If  you  should  climb  the  mighty  Mat- 
terhorn  to  look  out  over  the  kingdoms  of  the  earth,  it  might  be  a  pleas- 
ant incident  to  find  strawberries  up  there;  but,  Great  Scott,  you  don't 
climb  the  Matterhorn  for  strawberries !  (Continued  applause.) 

GRANT'S  IMMORTAL  SENTENCES. 

There  is  that  about  the  sun  which  makes  us  forget  his  spots ;  and 
when  we  think  of  Gen.  Grant  our  pulses  quicken  and  his  grammar 
vanishes.  We  only  remember  that  this  is  the  simple  soldier  who,  all 
untaught  of  the  silken  phrase-makers,  linked  words  together  with  an 
art  surpassing  the  art  of  the  schools,  and  put  into  them  a  something 
which  will  still  bring  to  American  ears,  as  long  as  America  shall  last, 
the  roll  of  his  vanished  drums  and  the  tread  of  his  marching  hosts. 
(Applause.)  What  do  we  care  for  grammar  when  we  think  of  the  man 
that  put  together  that  thunderous  phrase,  "  Unconditional  and  imme- 


GRANT  AND  MATTHEW  ARNOLD.          325 

diate  surrender  ! ' '  And  those  others :  "I  propose  to  move  immediately 
upon  your  works  ! "  "I  propose  to  fight  it  out  on  this  line  if  it  takes 
all  summer!"  (Applause.)  Mr.  Arnold  would  doubtless  claim  that 
that  last  sentence  is  not  strictly  grammatical,  and  yet  nevertheless  it 
did  certainly  wake  up  this  nation  as  a  hundred  million  tons  of  Al, 
fourth  proof,  hard-boiled,  hide-bound  grammar  from  another  mouth 
couldn't  have  done.  And  finally  we  have  that  gentler  phrase,  that  one 
which  shows  you  another  true  side  of  the  man  ;  shows  that  in  his  sol- 
dier heart  there  was  room  for  other  than  gory  war  mottoes,  and  in  his 
tongue  the  gift  to  fitly  phrase  them  :  "  Let  us  have  peace."  (Prolonged 
applause  and  cheers.) — Hartford,  Conn.,  April  27. 


ARTICLE  IV. 

Halleck  and  Grant — Misunder- 
standings.* 

Grant  opened  his  Shiloh  article  in  the  Century 
Magazine  (February,  1885)  with  the  statement  that  he 
had  been  unjustly  treated  by  Halleck  after  the  capture 
of  Fort  Donelson;  and  his  "Personal  Memoirs  "  con- 
tain the  same  charge,  and,  in  addition,  are  laden  with 
adverse  criticism  of  Halleck.  The  leading  article  in 
the  North  American  Review  for  December,  1885,  by 
Colonel  F.  D.  Grant,  is  entitled  "  Halleck's  Injustice  to 
Grant ";  and  for  weeks  after  its  appearance  large  post- 
ers were  displayed  from  the  news-stands  in  New  York 
City,  bearing,  in  conspicuous  type,  the  words  "  Grant 
Vindicated  from  Halleck's  Slanders  ;  by  Colonel  F.  D. 
Grant." 

It  is  proper  to  state  that  Colonel  Grant  disclaims 
responsibility  for  the  heading  of  his  article,  and  while 
he  presents  official  documents  which  suggest,  but  do 
not  prove  injustice,  he  merely  disseminates,  without 
comment,  his  father's  sentiments  concerning  Halleck ; 
and  though  he  speaks  of  having  taken  the  documents 
from  his  father's  files,  they  are  to  be  found  in  their 
proper  places  in  the  "Records  of  the  Rebellion." 

Grant  and  Halleck  are  dead.  Though  not  equally 
successful,  they  were  equally  earnest  and  patriotic,  and 
both  deserved  well  of  their  country.  Halleck's  lot 

*  Magazine  of  American  History,  Dec.,  1886,  p.  561. 

326 


H ALLEGE  AND  GRANT.  327 

-was  disappointment  and  premature  death.*  Fair-play 
demands  that  all  questions  of  justice  between  him  and 
Grant  be  treated  according  to  their  merits,  apart  from 
the  comparative  military  ability,  eminence,  and  popu- 
larity of  the  two  great  men. 

Without  going  into  tedious  details,  it  may  be  as- 
sumed that  the  charge  of  injustice  has  one  main  and 
four  subordinate  specifications.  The  first  is,  that  after 
the  capture  of  Fort  Donelson,  February  16, 1862,  Hal- 
leek  sought  to  promote  C.  F.  Smith  to  a  major-gen- 
eralcy  over  Grant,  and  thus  give  Smith  the  honors  of 
the  victory. 

This  is  the  one  specification  of  real  substance  to 
prove  Halleck's  injustice  to  Grant.  Halleck  is  not 
guilty  of  it.  All  three  of  the  authorities  just  cited,f 
General  and  Colonel  Grant  and  General  Badeau,  have 
failed  to  present  one  essential  telegram  upon  the  sub- 
ject. They  set  forth  the  fact  that  on  the  19th  of  Feb- 
ruary, 1862,  Halleck  telegraphed  McClellan  :  "  Briga- 
dier-General Charles  F.  Smith,  by  his  coolness  and 
bravery  at  Fort  Donelson,  when  the  battle  was  against 
us,  turned  the  tide  and  carried  the  enemy's  works. 
Make  him  a  Major-General.  You  can't  get  a  better 
one.  Honor  him  for  this  victory  and  the  whole  coun- 
try will  applaud  ; "  and  leave  it  to  be  understood  that 
by  this  telegram  Smith  was  recommended  instead  of 
Grant,  and  to  the  neglect  and  prejudice  of  Grant. 
The  truth  is  that  Halleck  by  telegraph  recommended 

*  Halleck  died  January  9,  1872,  aged  57. 

t  "  Personal  Memoirs,"  vol.  i.,  p.  328;  North  American  Review,  De- 
cember, 1885,  p.  522 ;  Badeau's  Military  History  of  General  Grant, 
vol.  i.,  p.  54. 


328 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


Grant  for  a  major-generalcy  on  the  17th  of  February, 
two  days  before  he  recommended  Smith.  This  dis- 
patch (vol.  vii.,  p.  628,  "  Records  of  the  Rebellion,")  is 
plainly  of  record.  It  reads :  "  Make  Btiell,  Grant 
and  Pope  Major-Generals  of  volunteers,  and  give  me 
command  in  the  West.  I  ask  this  in  return  for  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson."  Grant's  name  was  promptly 
sent  to  the  Senate,  and  the  fact  was  announced  in  the 
newspapers  of  the  18th.  It  is  not  necessary  to  quote 
more  than  one.  The  New  York  daily  Tribune  of  Feb- 
ruary 18,  1862,  announced  Grant's  nomination  with 
the  heading,  "  Honor  to  the  brave  ! "  and  its  Washing- 
ton correspondent  on  the  same  day  wrote  :  "The  Sen- 
ate in  executive  session  to-day  unanimously  confirmed 
Grant  as  Major-General."  Halleck  recommended  Grant 
by  telegraph  on  the  17th;  the  President's  nomination 
of  Grant  was  announced  in  the  morning  papers  of  the 
18th.  Halleck  would  naturally  be  watching  for  the 
announcement,  and  it  is  safe  and  fair  to  say  he  knew 
of  the  nomination  on  the  18th — certainly  by  the  morn- 
ing of  the  19th,  the  day  on  which  he  recommended 
Smith.  But  be  that  as  it  may,  he  recommended 
Grant,  and  Grant  was  nominated  and  confirmed  be- 
fore Smith  was  recommended ;  which  is  conclusive  as 
to  what  Halleck  sought  to  do. 

Badeau,  ignoring  Halleck's  prior  recommendation 
of  Grant,  and  assuming  that  Halleck  designed  to  honor 
Smith  at  Grant's  expense,  says,  vol.  i.,  p.  54  :  "  Neither 
did  the  Government  agree  with  Halleck  that  Smith 
should  receive  the  honors  of  this  victory.  The  Secre- 
tary of  War  at  once  recommended  Grant  for  a  Major- 
General  of  volunteers,  and  the  President  nominated 


H ALLEGE  AND  GKANT.  329 

him  the  same  day."  This  version  of  the  transaction 
given  in  Badeau's  book,  published  in  1867,  is  mislead- 
ing, and  is  unjust  to  Halleck.  Though  the  foregoing 
statement  is  not  specified  by  Grant  as  one  of  the 
"  facts  "  relating  to  Donelson  which  Grant  says  in  his 
"Memoirs,"  p.  328,  "General  Badeau  unearthed,"  it  is 
probable  that  he  accepted  it  as  a  fact,  and  died  in  the 
belief  that  Halleck  tried  to  give  Smith  the  honor  and 
reward  for  Donelson.  As  the  minor  or  incidental 
matters  of  this  supposed  grievance  have  been  pre- 
sented formally,  they  must  be  considered. 

The  first  of  them  is  that,  failing  to  get  Smith  pro- 
moted to  rank  Grant,  Halleck,  nevertheless,  gave 
Smith  command  of  an  expedition  up  the  Tennessee 
early  in  March,  1862,  and  left  Grant  at  Fort  Henry, 
as  Grant  states  it,  "  virtually  in  arrest  and  without  a 
command."  * 

On  the  15th  of  February,  1862,  Halleck  gave  Grant 
command  of  the  "  District  of  West  Tennessee,"  "  limits 
undefined."  He  sent  a  telegram  on  the  1st  of  March, 
directing  Grant  to  move  his  column  up  the  Tennessee 
River  to  destroy  railroad  bridges.  Halleck  did  not 
designate  the  commanders  for  the  sub-columns  into 
which  the  expedition  was  to  be  divided  for  the  work 
to  be  done.  He  merely  said  :  "  General  C.  F.  Smith, 
or  some  very  discreet  officer,  should  be  selected  for 
such  commands ; "  and  "  that  competent  officers  should 
be  left  to  command  the  garrisons  of  Fort  Henry  and 
Donelson  in  your  absence."  He  intended  Grant  to 
go  with  the  expedition.  But  soon  after  Halleck  made 

*  "•  Personal  Memoirs,"  vol.  i.,  pp.  327-8 ;  Century  Magazine,  Febru- 
ary, 1885,  p.  594. 


330 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


the  order  for  the  movement,  he  heard — as  he  reported 
to  McClellan  on  the  3d  of  March — that  Grant  had  left 
his  command  and  gone  to  Nashville  without  authority, 
that  great  disorders  in  the  army  had  occurred  during 
Grant's  absence  ;  and  coupling  these  accounts  with  his 
failure  to  get  reports  and  returns  from  Grant,  and  with 
a  rumor  that  reached  him  on  the  4th — published  as 
one  of  the  telegrams  in  Colonel  Grant's  article — that 
Grant  had  "  resumed  his  former  bad  habits,"  Halleck 
on  the  4th  telegraphed  Grant,  "  You  will  place  Major- 
General  C.  F.  Smith  in  command  of  expedition,  and 
remain  yourself  at  Fort  Henry."  In  speaking  of  this 
affair  in  the  winter  of  1885,  Grant  said  that  Halleck 
left  him  at  Fort  Henry  "  in  arrest."  I  remarked  that 
I  thought  he  was  in  error  about  the  arrest,  but  he 
adhered  to  his  assertion.  His  Shiloh  article  for  the 
Century  Magazine  had  then  been  written,  but  not 
published.  When  it  appeared,  it  contained  the  state- 
ment that  he  was  "  virtually  in  arrest."  That  state- 
ment is  repeated  in  the  "  Personal  Memoirs,"  and  is 
strengthened  by  the  addition  that  he  was  "  without  a 
command." 

The  facts  upon  this  point  are,  that  McClellan,  in  a 
dispatch  of  March  3d,  authorized  Halleck  to  arrest 
Grant,  but  Halleck  answered  on  the  4th  that  lie  did 
not  "  deem  it  advisable."  There  was  no  order  of  ar- 
rest, no  report  or  return  indicating  arrest;  and  no  re- 
striction of  Grant's  authority.  The  telegram  directing 
him  to  remain  at  Fort  Henry  was  the  only  order  in 
the  case.  Grant's  authority  over  the  entire  District  of 
West  Tennessee,  including  the  expeditionary  force  un- 
der C.  F.  Smith,  was  uninterrupted  and  unlimited.  No 


H ALLEGE  AND  GRANT.  331 

one  lias  ever  pretended  to  show  any  order  or  instruc- 
tion to  the  contrary.  The  "  Records"  abound  in  proofs 
that  Grant  was  continuously  on  duty  and  in  full  com- 
mand of  his  district  and  troops.  On  the  5th  of  March 
he  issued  formal  orders  for  Smith  to  take  command  of 
the  expedition,  and  gave  him  instructions  for  conduct- 
ing it,  saying,  "  I  will  remain  at  Fort  Henry  and  throw 
forward  all  the  troops  that  can  be  provided  with 
transportation."  On  the  6th  he  reported  to  Halleck, 
"  All  transports  here  will  be  loaded  and  off  to-day,  if 
the  gunboats  arrive  to  convoy  them.  One  gunboat  has 
gone  to  Savannah.  The  transports  here  will  not  take 
all  the  troops  in  readiness  to  move.  Your  instructions 
contemplated  my  commanding  expedition  in  person. 
Dispatch  yesterday  changed  it."  On  the  same  day  he  re- 
ported to  Halleck :  "  Union  City  is  said  to  be  garrisoned 
by  rebels.  I  will  keep  a  lookout  to  prevent  a  surprise 
from  that  direction  while  the  garrison  is  weak  here." 
On  the  7th  he  wrote  to  General  S.  A.  Hurlburt,  com- 
manding fourth  division  :  u  Embark  your  forces  on  the 
transports  now  awaiting  you  as  rapidly  as  possible." 
.  .  .  Signed  "U.  S.  Grant,  Major- General,  Com- 
manding" On  the  same  day  and  over  the  same  signa- 
ture he  issued  an  equally  peremptory  order  to  "  Colonel 
K.  I.  Oglesby,  commanding  U.  S.  forces,  Fort  Donel- 
"son,  Tenn"  On  the  9th,  he  telegraphed  Halleck,  "I 
will  do  all  in  my  power  to  advance  the  expedition 
now  started  .  .  .1  renew  my  application  to  he  re- 
lieved from  further  duty"  showing  that  he  was  on 
duty.  On  the  9th  he  made  to  Halleck  a  statement  of 
the  forces  in  the  district:  those  composing  the  expedi- 
tion, 25,206;  those  at  Fort  Henry  awaiting  transport  a- 


'332 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


tiou,  5,740;  those  at  Clarksville,  1,173;  those  at  Fort 
Donelson,  2,328.  On  the  10th  he  telegraphed  Halleck, 
"  Third  Iowa  Infantry  just  arrived.  Effective  strength, 
676  ;  ordered  :to  join  General  Smith.  Advance  of  ex- 
pedition started  last  evening;"  and  also  on  the  10th 
to  Halleck,  "  To-morrow  is  the  day  when  all  persons 
of  proper  age  are  to  be  enrolled  in  this  State  in  the 
rebel  army.  Troops  are  now  in  Paris  to  enforce  the 
orders  of  Governor  Harris.  I  am  concentrating  the 
small  force  under  my  command  on  the  west  bank  of 
the  river,  to  defeat  their  object  as  far  as  lays  in  my 
power."  On  the  llth,  he  wrote  as  follows:  "  General 
C.  F.  Smith,  commanding  expedition  to  Upper  Ten- 
nessee. Send  back  steamers  as  rapidly  as  possible  to 
enable  us  to  forward  troops  .  .  .  U.  S.  Grant, 
Major- General,  Commanding;"  and  on  the  same  day, 
llth,  he  telegraphed  Halleck,  "I  shall  run  down  to 
Paducah  to-night."  These  dispatches  and  others  of 
like  import,  showing  Grant  to  have  been  constantly  on 
duty,  are  in  "  Records  of  Rebellion,"  vol.  x.,  part  ii.,  pp. 
3  to  29.  They  prove  that  he  was  not  in  arrest  of  any 
sort,  that  he  was  not  without  a  command,  and  that  he 
was  exercising  command  loyally  and  efficiently  over 
his  entire  district,  including  the  forces  under  imme- 
diate control  of  C.  F,  Smith. 

It  is  true  that  Grant's  detention  on  duty  at  Fort 
Henry  grew  out  of  Halleck's  disapprobation.  The  de- 
tention itself,  however,  would  not  have  been  a  griev- 
ance if  it  had  not  been  based  upon  special  causes. 
Halleck  had  required  Sherman,  who  was  Grant's  supe- 
rior officer,  to  remain  a  few  miles  in  the  rear  and  push 
forward  men  and  munitions  to  enable  Grant  to  capture 


H ALLEGE  AND  GRANT.  333 

Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  but  Sherman  did  not  com- 
plain that  he  was  virtually  in  arrest  or  without  a  com- 
mand. The  order  for  Grant  to  remain  at  Fort  Henry 
was,  in  fact,  of  no  practical  disadvantage  to  him.  It 
was  made  on  the  4th  of  March.  On  the  9th,  only  five 
days  afterward,  and  before  anything  of  importance  had 
been  done  up  the  Tennessee,  Halleck  terminated  the 
effect  of  the  order  by  telegraphing  to  Grant  to  be 
ready  to  take  the  advance  (vol.  x.,  part  ii.,  p.  27, 
"  Eecords  of  Rebellion.") 

This  notification  was  given  on  the  very  day  that  the 
advance  of  the  expedition,  as  reported  by  Grant,  started 
from  Fort  Henry ;  so  that,  practically,  Grant  was  not 
left  behind  at  all.  The  notification  was  repeated  on 
the  llth,  and  again  on  the  13th,  Halleck  saying  upon 
the  latter  date,  "  I  wish  you,  as  soon  as  your  new  army 
is  in  the  field,  to  assume  the  immediate  command  and 
lead  it  on  to  new  victories."  By  directing  Grant  to 
assume  immediate  command,  Halleck  recognized  that 
Grant  had  been  continuously  exercising  general  com- 
mand. Under  this  authority,  and  fixing  his  own  time 
for  starting  to  the  front,  Grant  proceeded  up  the  Ten- 
nessee and  reached  Savannah  on  the  17th  of  March. 
Not  having  been  relieved  from  command  by  arrest  or 
otherwise,  he  issued  no  order  assuming  command  on 
reaching  Savannah,  but  continued  in  the  exercise  of 
the  authority  conferred  by  his  assignment  of  February 
15th,  to  command  of  the  District  of  West  Tennessee. 
As  already  stated,  Grant's  detention  at  Fort  Henry, 
while  his  new  army  was  getting  ready  for  the  field, 
was  not  in  itself  a  grievance.  But  the  next  specifica- 
tion of  Halleck' s  injustice  to  Grant  rests  upon  the 


334  MILITAEY  MISCELLANIES. 

causes  which  led  to  the  detention.  Grant  specifies  as 
follows :  "  Halleck  reported  to  Washington  that  he  had 
repeatedly  ordered  me  to  give  the  strength  of  my  force, 
but  could  get  nothing  out  of  me ;  that  I  had  gone  to 
Nashville  beyond  the  limits  of  my  command  without 
his  authority,  and  that  my  army  was  more  demoralized 
by  victory  than  the  army  at  Bull  Run  had  been  by 
defeat."  ("  Personal  Memoirs,"  vol.  i.,  p.  327.) 

Halleck  did  not  say  that  Grant's  army  was  more  de- 
moralized— in  fact,  he  did  not  say  that  it  was  demoral- 
ized at  all.  He  said,  "  it  seems  to  be  as  muck  demoral- 
ized by  the  victory  of  Fort  Donelson  as  was  that  of 
the  Potomac  by  the  defeat  of  Bull  Run."  It  is  true 
that  Halleck  called  upon  Grant  for  reports  and  returns; 
and  that  he  reported  the  failure  to  get  them  to  McClel- 
lan,  who,  as  well  as  Halleck,  wanted  the  information. 
Some  of  Halleck's  calls  did  not  reach  Grant,  and  some 
of  Grant's  reports  did  not  reach  Halleck.  In  a  tele- 
gram to  Halleck  of  March  24,  Grant  says  :  "  I  have 
just  learned  to-day  that  your  dispatches  to  me  after  the 
taking  of  Fort  Donelson,  reached  Fort  Henry — some 
of  them  at  least — but  were  never  sent  to  me.  What 
has  become  of  the  operator  then  at  Fort  Henry  ?  I 
don't  know."  There  was  no  explanation  that  covered 
the  case  of  "  Returns,"  for  Grant  did  not  make  them. 
In  telegram,  March  9,  he  said  to  Halleck :  "  You  had 
a  better  chance  of  knowing  my  strength  whilst  sur- 
rounding Fort  Donelson  than  I  had.  Troops  were  re- 
porting daily  by  your  orders,"  etc. 

As  the  General-in-Chief  was  calling  upon  Halleck  for 
information  concerning  Grant's  force,  there  is  no 
ground  for  serious  complaint  because  Halleck  reported 


H ALLEGE  AND  GRANT. 


335 


his  inability  to  get  it  from  Grant.  No  one  disputes 
that  Grant  went  to  Nashville  without  Halleck's  au- 
thority. On  the  25th  of  Februar}^  he  notified  Cullum, 
Halleck's  Chief -of -Staff,  then  at  Cairo,  that  he  would 
"  go  to  Nashville  immediately  after  the  arrival  of  the 
next  mail,  should  there  be  no  orders  to  prevent  it." 
It  is  not  known  when  the  next  mail  arrived  ;  but  Grant 
went  to  Nashville  by  boat,  arriving  there  on  the  27th 
of  February.  Hearing  that  he  was  in  the  city,  Buell 
went  to  Grant's  steamer  to  see  him,  and  had  an  in- 
formal conversation  with  him.  During  the  day  Grant 
wrote  a  note  of  no  special  importance  to  Buell,  and 
left  in  the  evening.  He  claimed,  and  Halleck  after 
investigation  admitted,  that  the  trip  was  made  from  a 
"  desire  to  subserve  the  public  interests  "  ;  and  there 
is  no  purpose  here  to  question  the  propriety  of  it,  but 
it  cannot  be  said,  fairly,  that  it  was  unjust  for  Halleck 
to  mention  this  trip  to  McClellan  in  explanation  of 
failure  to  get  reports  and  returns  from  Grant.  In  his 
"Memoirs"  (vol.  i.,  p.  326),  Grant  contradicts  Hal- 
leck's assertion  that  Nashville  was  beyond  the  limit  of 
Grant's  command,  saying,  "  that  place  was  not  beyond 
the  limits  of  my  command,  which  it  had  been  expressly 
declared  in  orders  were  not  defined."  The. limits  of 
Grant's  district  were  not  defined,  but  Nashville  was 
beyond  the  limits  which  Halleck  had  a  right  to  go, 
and  beyond  the  limits  he  could  empower  Grant  to  go. 
Furthermore,  Nashville  was  in  Buell's  command  and 
in  his  possession,  and  Buell,  by  the  President's  order, 
was  independent  of  both  Halleck  and  Grant.  The 
exigencies  of  the  occasion  as  Grant  saw  them  no  doubt, 
required  him  to  go  to  Nashville  just  as  he  did ;  but 


336 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


there  was  nothing  in  the  fact  of  the  limits  of  his  dis- 
trict being  undefined  which  brought  Nashville,  then 
belonging  to  the  territory  of,  and  actually  occupied  by 
an  independent  army,  within  the  limits  of  Grant's  dis- 
trict. 

.  If  Halleck  did  Grant  any  injustice  in  the  causes 
which  led  to  the  latter's  detention  at  Fort  Henry,  it 
was  in  saying  that  "  Grant's  army  seems  to  be  as 
much  demoralized  by  the  victory  of  Fort  Donelson,  as 
was  that  of  the  Potomac  by  the  defeat  of  Bull  Run." 
That,  evidently,  wras  not  intended  as  a  specific  allega- 
tion. It  was  an  ejaculatory  expression  of  Halleck's 
displeasure  at  the  irregularities  of  which  he  com- 
plained. The  ground  for  it  was  that  he  could  get  "  no 
reports,  no  returns,"  that  Grant  had  "  gone  to  Nash- 
ville without  authority,"  and  that  serious  disorders  in 
his  army  had  occurred  during  his  absence.  Halleck 
received,  and  on  the  6th  of  March  transmitted  to 
Grant,  a  copy  of  a  letter  addressed  to  Judge  David 
Davis,  then  President  of  the  Western  Investigation 
Commission.  The  writer's  name  was  not  given,  but 
Judge  Davis  vouched  for  him  as  "  a  man  of  integrity 
and  perfectly  reliable."  The  letter  (vol.  x.,  part  ii., 
p.  13,  "Rec.  of  Reb."),  charged  various  frauds  and 
irregularities  among  officers  and  men  after  the  capture 
of  Fort  Donelson.  Grant  had  tried  to  correct  the  irreg- 
ularities and  did  not  deny  them  ;  in  fact,  his  orders 
go  to  prove  them  ("Rec.  Reb."  vol.  vii.,  pp.  599,  633, 
650),  and  his  letter  to  Halleck  of  March  18th,  with 
characteristic  frankness,  distinctly  admits  some  of 
them.  He  says :  "  I  have  found  that  there  was  much 
truth  in  the  report  that  captured  stores  were  carried 


HALLECK  AND  GKANT.  337 

off  from  Fort  Henry,  improperly ;  "  and  on  the  same 
day  he  issued  a  general  order,  saying :  "  A  better  state 
of  discipline  than  has  heretofore  been  maintained 
with  much  of  this  command  is  demanded,  and  will  be 
enforced."  ("Rec.  Reb.,"  vol.  x.,  part  ii.,  p.  47.)  On 
the  25th  of  March  he  said  in  a  telegram  to  Halleck, 
upon  this  subject :  "  I  most  fully  appreciate  your  just- 
ness, General,  in  the  part  you  have  taken  "  (p.  63) ; 
and  on  the  24th  of  March  he  said,  referring  to  another 
species  of  disorder  in  his  army,  to  which  Halleck  had 
called  his  attention :  "  I  acknowledge  the  justness  of 
your  rebuke  in  this  respect,  although  I  thought  all 
proper  measures  had  been  taken  to  prevent  such 
abuses,  and  will  see  that  no  such  violation  occurs  in 
future ; "  adding,  in  the  same  dispatch,  "  the  conduct 
of  the  Twenty-first  Missouri,  on  the  way  up  here, 
has  been  reported  to  me  as  infamous."  These  evi- 
dences of  a  bad  condition  of  affairs  in  Grant's  forces 
after  Donelson  are  reproduced,  not  as  a  reflection 
upon  Grant,  but  in  justice  to  Halleck,  as  the  explana- 
tion of  his  displeasure.  There  had  not  been  time  and 
opportunity  for  Grant  to  organize  and  discipline  the 
raw  levies  hurriedly  sent  to  him  for  that  early  cam- 
paign. But  in  the  interest  of  the  discipline  which 
Halleck  knew  must  be  established  as  soon  as  possible, 
for  the  sake  of  what  remained  to  be  done,  it  was  none 
the  less  his  duty  to  rebuke  disorders  even  in  Grant's 
victorious  forces.  The  War  Department,  in  a  letter 
of  March  10,  to  Halleck,  directed  him  to  make  a  for- 
mal report  of  what  he  had  mentioned  by  telegraph, 
concerning  Grant's  absence  at  Nashville,  and  his  fail- 
ure to  make  returns,  etc,  Halleck  investigated  the 


338  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

subject,  and  as  early  as  March  15,  made  a  full  report 
to  Washington,  saying,  among  other  things :  ''General 
Grant  has  made  the  proper  explanations.  As  he 
acted  from  a  praiseworthy,  although  mistaken  zeal  for 
the  public  service  in  going  to  Nashville  and  leaving 
his  command,  I  respectfully  recommend  that  no  fur- 
ther notice  be  taken  of  it.  There  never  has  been  any 
want  of  military  subordination  on  the  part  of  General 
Grant,  and  his  failure  to  make  returns  of  his  forces 
has  been  explained  as  resulting  partly  from  the  fail- 
ure of  Colonels  of  regiments  to  report  to  him  on  their 
arrival,  and  partly  from  an  interruption  of  telegraphic 
communication.  All  of  these  irregularities  have  been 
remedied."  ("Eec.  Eeb.",  vol.  v.,  p.  683.)  Before 
this  report  was  made,  Halleck  had  ordered  Grant  up 
the  Tennessee.  He  promptly  sent  Grant  a  copy  of 
the  communication  from  which  the  foregoing  extract 
is  taken,  and  also  a  copy  of  the  communication  to 
which  it  is  an  answer.  In  a  letter  dated  March  24r 
acknowledging  these  copies,  Grant  said :  "  I  most  fully 
appreciate  your  justness,  General,  in  the  part  you  have 
taken."  Halleck,  no  doubt,  felt  that  he  had  been 
generous.  In  that  way  the  affair  was  closed.  But 
after  the  war  the  case  was  re-opened  by  Badeau,  in 
his  "  Military  History  of  General  Grant,"  and  more 
recently  by  both  General  and  Colonel  Grant. 

Re-opening  this  case  has  given  rise  to  what  is 
treated  in  this  article  as  Grant's  third  subordinate 
specification  of  Halleck's  injustice.  The  complaint,  as 
stated  by  Grant  in  his  "  Personal  Memoirs,"  is,  that 
Halleck  forwarded  "a  copy  of  a  detailed  dispatch 
from  himself  to  Washington,  entirely  exonerating  me  ; 


H ALLEGE  AND  GRANT.  339 

but  lie  did  not  inform  me  that  it  ivas  his  oivn  reports 
that  had  created  all  the  trouble.  I  never  knew  the  truth 
until  General  Badeam  unearthed  the  facts  in  his  re- 
searches for  his  history  of  my  campaigns^ 

The  complaint  here  is  not  based  upon  the  contents 
of  the  dispatch,  which  Grant  assumes  "created  all 
the  trouble,"  but  upon  Halleck's  omission  to  send 
Grant  a  copy  of  that  dispatch ;  or,  "  its  concealment 
from  me  when  pretending  to  explain  the  action  of  his 
superiors,"  as  Grant  puts  it.  ("Personal  Memoirs,"  vol. 
i.,  p.  328.)  It  is  by  no  means  certain  that  Halleck's 
dispatch  "  created  all  the  trouble  " ;  but  aside  from 
that,  the  trouble  having  been  ended,  neither  duty  nor 
expediency  required  Halleck  to  re-open  it.  The 
wound  was  healed  by  the  report  of  March  15,  and 
Halleck  knew  that  Grant's  usefulness  would  probably 
be  increased  by  keeping  it  healed.  He  is  not  charge- 
able with  "  concealment,"  because  he  did  not  tell 
Grant  in  1862  all  that  passed  then  between  Halleck 
and  McClellan.  That  was  not  required  either  by 
army  regulations  or  custom  of  Service.  If  that  charge 
were  just  it  would  lie  against  Grant  as  well  as  Hal- 
leck. After  Grant  gained  confidence  and  power,  he 
sent  dispatches  to  Washington,  speaking  unfavorably 
of  other  Generals ;  but  he  is  not  chargeable  with 
wrongful  concealment  because  he  did  not  tell  the  sub- 
ordinate what  he  had  said  to  the  superior.  He  did 
simply  what  he  thought  duty  required.  A  brief  ex- 
planation of  the  dispatch  which  Grant  says  was  con- 
cealed from  him  and  unearthed  by  Badeau,  is,  how- 
ever, necessary.  It  was  from  Halleck  to  McClellan, 
March  3,  and  reads  as  follows :  "  I  have  had  no  com- 


340 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


munication  with  General  Grant  for  more  than  a  week. 
He  left  his  command  without  my  authority  and  went 
to  Nashville.  His  army  seems  to  be  as  much  demor- 
alized by  the  victory  of  Fort  Donelson  as  was  that  of 
the  Potomac  by  the  defeat  of  Bull  Run.  It  is  hard  to 
censure  a  successful  General  immediately  after  a  vic- 
tory, but  I  think  he  richly  deserves  it.  I  can  get  no 
returns,  no  reports,  no  information  of  any  kind  from 
him.  Satisfied  with  his  victory,  he  sits  down  and  en- 
joys it,  without  any  regard  to  the  future.  I  am  worn 
out  and  tired  with  this  neglect  and  inefficiency.  C.  F. 
Smith  is  almost  the  only  officer  equal  to  the  emer- 
gency." Badeau  says  in  his  u  History  "  (vol.  i.,  p.  65)? 
this  telegram  "  was  not  left  on  file  in  the  War  Depart- 
ment, but  was  obtained  by  me  after  long  research  and 
repeated  efforts." 

But  in  an  official  report  to  the  Secretary  of  "War, 
from  the  War  .Records  office,  it  is  stated  that  "  Hal- 
leek's  telegram  of  March  3,  1862,  to  McClellan,  was 
found  in  package  No.  96,  United  States  Military  Tele- 
graph Records,  filed  in  War  Department.  The  reply 
of  McClellan  bearing  the  approval  of  the  Secretary 
of  War  was  found  in  volume  of  'Telegrams  sent 
by  Major-General  McClellan  and  staff,  March  1  to  10, 
and  September  1  to  16,  1862,  ib.,  vol.  3.'  That 
'  volume  was  in  War  Department  files.  A  copy  of 
McClellan 's  reply  was  also  found  in  package  Xo.  96, 
referred  to  above.'  "  From  this  it  seems  that  Halleck's 
telegram  was  on  file  in  the  War  Department.  The 
statement  in  Badeau's  "  History,"  published  in  1867, 
that  this  telegram  was  not  left  on  file  in  the  War  De- 
partment, but  was  obtained  by  Badeau  after  long  re- 


HALLECK  AND  GRANT.  341 

search  and  repeated  efforts — was,  in  fact,  "  unearthed," 
as  Grant  expresses  it  in  his  "  Memoirs,"  implied  that 
somebody  had  concealed  it,  and  probably  made  upon 
Grant's  mind  and  fastened  there  an  impression  unjust 
to  Halleck.  The  injustice  to  Grant  involved  in  this 
telegram  of  March  3,  had  been  corrected  by  Halleck's 
full  report  of  March  15,  a  copy  of  which  had  been 
sent  to  Grant.  The  foregoing  quotation  from  the 
report  of  the  War  Records  office,  shows  that  no  wrong 
was  done  to  Grant  through  the  concealment  of  the 
dispatch  ;  shows,  in  fact,  that  there  was  no  conceal- 
ment. Here  the  details  in  refutation  of  Halleck's  so- 
called  injustice  to  Grant  after  the  battle  of  Fort 
Donelson  may  be  closed.  But  there  are  some  general 
considerations  which  bear  upon  the  subject.  The 
campaign  of  Fort  Uonelson  was  made  in  February, 
1862.  Halleck  was  high  in  authority,  being  one  of  the 
three  Major- Generals  of  the  Regular  Army.  Grant, 
one  of  Halleck's  many  subordinates,  was  but  a  Briga- 
dier-General of  volunteers.  The  operations  on  the 
Tennessee  and  Cumberland,  the  operations  on  the 
Mississippi  and  the  campaign  in  Missouri  and  Ar- 
kansas, under  Curtis,  were  all  directed  by  Halleck. 
Grant  was  merely  the  lieutenant  in  command  of  one 
of  Halleck's  columns.  Halleck's  reputation  as  well  as 
Grant's  was  at  stake,  and  he  was  necessarily  anxious 
and  exacting.  As  shown  further  on,  Grant  under- 
stood this,  and  as  late  as  1879  announced  that  he  bore 
Halleck  no  ill-will  on  account  of  the  action  then  taken. 
In  February,  1862,  the  War  was  young,  and  high 
officers  had  to  be  taken  on  trust.  Grant  did  not  pos- 
sess, nor  had  he  then  earned  the  confidence  of  the 


342  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

Government.  If  Grant's  ability  and  trustworthiness 
had  had  then  the  foundation  of  his  later  career,  Hal- 
leek's  anxiety  and  fault-finding  would  have  been  inde- 
fensible. «  But  as  matters  stood  at  the  time,  his  watch- 
fulness of  Grant,  even  his  doubts  and  misgivings,  were 
the  natural  outgrowth  of  attending  facts  and  circum- 
stances. Indeed,  it  is  remarkable  that  Halleck  should 
have  been  so  little  influenced  by  personal  preference. 
Sherman  and  Halleck  at  that  time  were  devoted 
friends,  and  Sherman  as  well  as  Grant  was  one  of 
Halleck's  subordinates.  Yet  Halleck  gave  Grant,  the 
junior,  command  of  the  column  on  the  Tennessee  and 
Cumberland,  because  he  was  first  identified  with  the 
service  in  that  quarter,  and  held  Sherman,  the  senior,  a 
few  miles  down  the  river,  while  Grant  reaped  the  glory 
and  reward  of  capturing  Forts  Henry  and  Donelsou. 
Sherman  made  no  complaint  of  injustice.  On  the  con- 
trary, as  Badeau  says,  he  wrote  Grant  February  13  : 
"  I  will  do  everything  in  my  power  to'  hurry  forward 
your  re-enforcements  and  supplies ;  and  if  I  could  be 
of  service  myself,  would  gladly  come  without  making 
any  question  of  rank  with  you  or  General  Smith." 

The  last  subordinate  specification  of  injustice  is,  as 
Grant  states  it,  that  a  few  days  after  the  battle  of 
Shiloh,  "  General  Halleck  moved  his  headquarters  to 
Pittsburg  Landing,  and  assumed  command  of  the  troops 
in  the  field.  Although  next  to  him  in  rank,  and  nomi- 
nally in  command  of  my  old  district  and  army,  I  was 
ignored  as  much  as  if  I  had  been  at  the  most  distant 
point  of  territory  within  my  jurisdiction."  ("  Personal 
Memoirs,"  vol.  i.,  p.  370;  Century  Magazine,  February, 
1885,  p.  594.) 


HALLECK  AND  GRANT.  343 

This  may  show  bad  judgment  on  Halleck's  part,  but 
the  facts  do  not  prove  injustice.  After  the  battle  of 
Shiloh,  Halleck  formed  his  army  into  the  left  wing 
under  Pope ;  the  center,  under  Buell ;  the  right  wing 
under  George  H.  Thomas,  and  the  reserve  under 
McClernand.  Grant,  still  in  command  of  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee  and  the  district  of  West  Tennessee,  was 
in  addition  assigned  as  second  in  command,  a  position 
without  defined  duties  or  specific  authority.  Nomi- 
nally, the  new  arrangement  was  an  honor  to  Grant— 
practically,  it  restricted  his  powers.  The  Donelson 
shadow  that  had  been  partly  cleared  away,  had  reap- 
peared after  Shiloh  and  hung  heavily  over  Grant.  It  did 
not  vanish  until  he  captured  Vicksburg  in  July,  1863. 

The  opinion  which  Halleck  held  of  Grant's  army  a 
week  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh  is  shown  by  the  follow- 
ing, dated, 

"PiTTSBURG  LANDING,  April  14,  1862. 

"To  Major-General  U.  S.  Grant,  commanding  District 
and  Army  in  the  field.  Immediate  and  active  measures 
must  be  taken  to  put  your  command  in  condition  to 
resist  another  attack.  Fractions  of  batteries  will  be 
united  temporarily  under  competent  officers,  supplied 
with  ammunition,  and  placed  in  position  for  service. 
Divisions  and  brigades  should,  where  necessary,  be  re- 
organized and  put  in  position,  and  all  stragglers  re- 
stored to  their  companies  and  regiments.  Your  army 
is  not  now  in  condition  to  resist  an  attack.  It  must 
be  made  so  without  delay.  Staff  officers  must  be  sent 
to  obtain  returns  from  division  commanders,  and  assist 
in  supplying  all  deficiencies. 

"H.  W.  HALLECK,  Major-General." 


344 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


At  that  time  there  was  a  deep  and  widespread  sen- 
timent adverse  to  Grant.  On  the  23d  of  April  the 
Secretary  of  War  telegraphed  Halleck :  "  The  President 
desires  to  know  .  .  .  whether  any  neglect  or  mis- 
conduct of  General  Grant  or  any  other  officer  contribu- 
ted to  the  sad  casualties  that  befell  our  forces  on 
Sunday."  This  telegram  was  not  due  to  anything 
Halleck  had  reported  about  Shiloh.  He  replied  :  "  The 
sad  casualties  of  Sunday  6th  were  due  in  part  to  the 
bad  conduct  of  officers  who  were  utterly  unfit  for  their 
places,  and  in  part  to  the  numbers  and  bravery  of  the 
enemy.  I  prefer  to  express  no  opinion  in  regard  to 
the  misconduct  of  individuals  till  I  receive  the  reports 
of  commanders  of  divisions." 

That  there  was  more  complaint  of  Grant  than  ap- 
pears in  detail  in  the  "Kecords,"  is  indicated  by  Hal- 
leek's  letter  of  May  12, 1862,  in  which  he  says  to  Grant : 
u  You  certainly  will  not  suspect  me  of  any  intention 
to  injure  your  feelings  or  reputation,  or  to  do  you  in- 
justice. .  .  .  For  the  last  three  months  I  have  done 
everything  in  my  power  to  ward  off  the  attacks  which 
were  made  upon  you." 

Fortunately  for  the  country  and  for  Grant,  he  had 
the  inherent  strength  to  bear  his  burden,  and  to  re- 
move adverse  feeling  by  his  great  deeds.  Much  of  the 
dissatisfaction  with  Grant  after  Shiloh  arose  from  the 
reported  surprise  of  his  army  on  the  6th.  Halleck,  in 
that  matter,  took  his  lieutenant's  part,  and  boldly  de- 
nied the  surprise,  saying  in  a  telegram  of  May  2,  to 
Stanton  :  "  The  newspaper  accounts  that  our  divisions 
were  surprised  are  utterly  false ; "  adding  in  his  formal 
report  of  June  15,  1862,  "the  impression  which  at  one 


HA.LLECK  AND  GKANT.  345 

time  seemed  to  have  been  received  by  the  Department 
that  our  forces  were  surprised  on  the  morning  of  the 
6th,  is  entirely  erroneous."  Time  seems  to  have 
proved  the  futility  of  all  denials  of  surprise,  but  Hal- 
leek's  denial  was  none  the  less  a  friendly  and  a  timely 
service  to  Grant. 

The  official  records,  informal  evidence,  and  Grant's 
"Personal  Memoirs,"  vol.  i.,  show  that  bad  feeling  did 
not  exist  between  Grant  and  Halleck  at  the  close  of 
the  war.  Grant  probably  felt  during  the  contest  that 
Halleck,  though  he  had  sometimes  found  fault,  had 
been  friendly  and  just  to  him.  On  the  llth  of 
August,  1863,  more  than  a  year  after  what  he  presents 
in  his  " Memoirs"  as  the  Shiloh  injustice,  Grant  said 
to  Halleck  in  a  letter  written  with  his  own  hand,  "  I 
feel  under  many  obligations  to  you,  General,  for  the 
interest  you  have  ever  taken  in  my  welfare,  and  that 
of  the  army  I  have  the  honor  to  command.  I  will 
do  the  best  I  can  to  satisfy  you  that  your  confidence 
has  not  been  misplaced." 

In  a  letter  to  a  distinguished  General  written  on 
the  16th  of  February,  1864,  Halleck  said :  "You  have 
probably  seen  the  attempt  in  the  newspapers  to  create 
difficulties  and  jealousies  between  me  and  Grant. 
This  is  all  for  political  eifect.  There  is  not  the  slight- 
est ground  for  any  such  assertions.  There  cannot,  and 
will  not,  be  any  differences  between  us.  If  he  is  made 
Lieutenant-General,  as  I  presume  he  will  be,  I  shall 
most  cordially  welcome  him  to  the  command,  glad  to  be 
relieved  from  so  thankless  and  disagreeable  a  position. 
I  took  it  against  my  will,  and  shall  be  most  happy  to 
leave  it  as  soon  as  another  is  designated  to  fill  it." 


346  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

In  a  letter  dated  July  16,  1864,  to  the  same  officer, 
Halleck  said,  speaking  of  Grant,  who  had  then  been 
put  over  Halleck's  head :  "  While  the  General  himself 
is  free  from  petty  jealousies,  he  has  men  about  him 
who  would  gladly  make  difficulties  between  us.  I 
know  that  they  have  tried  it  several  times,  but  I  do 
not  think  they  will  succeed." 

Immediately  after  Lee's  surrender  Grant  went  to 
Washington,  and  Halleck  from  Washington  to  Rich- 
mond for  duty.  On  the  17th  of  May,  1865,  Secretary 
Stanton  telegraphed  to  Halleck  :  "  General  Grant  is 
here  with  his  wife.  It  is  not  safe  for  him  to  be  at  the 
hotel,  and  he  is  reluctant  to  go  into  a  private  family. 
He  would  go  into  your  house  for  a  while  if  agreeable 
to  you.  Will  you  write  him  to  do  so  while  your 
family  are  absent  ?  "  Halleck  at  once  telegraphed 
Grant,  "  There  are  two  servants  and  most  of  the  fur- 
niture and  bedding  in  the  house  I  occupied  in  George- 
town. I  suggest  that  while  your  wife  is  with  you, 
you  move  right  in  and  make  yourself  comfortable. 
My  family  will  not  again  occupy  it,  and  I  do  not  re- 
quire the  furniture  here,  at  least  for  the  present. 
During  the  hot  weather  you  can  make  yourself  much 
more  comfortable  there  than  in  Washington."  Grant 
promptly  accepted  this  friendly  offer,  telegraphing 
Halleck,  "  Your  very  kind  dispatch,  placing  your 
house  at  Mrs.  Grant's  disposal  during  her  stay,  is 
received.  I  have  not  seen  Mrs.  Grant,  but  I  know 
that  she  will  be  delighted  to  get  out  of  the  hotel  for 
the  few  weeks  she  remains  here."  Halleck's  house 
was  occupied  by  General  and  Mrs.  Grant.  This  offer 
and  acceptance  of  hospitality  was  supplemented  by 


HALLECK  AND  GRANT. 


347 


the  following  expressions  of  friendliness  and  courtesy. 
Telegram  from  Grant  to  Halleck,  May  26:  "I  under- 
stand that  Mrs.  Halleck  is  expected  in  Washington. 
If  you  will  let  me  know  when  to  expect  her,  I  will  be 
glad  to  meet  her  at  the  wharf  with  a  carriage,  and 
have  Mrs.  Grant  entertain  her  during  her  stay  in  this 
city."  Halleck  to  Grant,  May  27:  "Mrs.  Halleck 
will  not  visit  Washington  till  she  goes  north  for  the 
summer.  The  house  will  therefore  remain  entirely 
at  your  disposal." 

The  foregoing  communications  show  that  Grant  en- 
tertained feelings  of  friendship  and  respect  for  Hal- 
leck at  the  close  of  the  War.  And  there  are  favorable 
expressions  from  him  of  a  much  later  date.  John 
Russell  Young,  in  his  book  "Around  the  World  with 
General  Grant"  (1879),  quotes  Grant  thus:  "In  the 
early  part  of  the  War  Halleck  did  very  good  service 
for  which  he  has  never  received  sufficient  credit — I 
mean  in  his  civic  administration.  Some  of  his  orders 
were  in  anticipation,  I  think,  of  those  of  Butler,  which 
gave  him  so  much  fame  in  New  Orleans "  (p.  465, 
vol.  ii.),  .  .  .  "  he  was  in  addition  a  very  able 
military  man.  Halleck  had  intellect  and  great  ac- 
quirements outside  of  his  military  education.  He 
was  at  the  head  of  the  California  bar  when  the  War 
broke  out,  and  his  appointment  to  the  Major-Generalcy 
was  a  gratification  to  all  who  knew  the  old  Army. 
When  I  was  made  Lieutenant-General,  General  Hal- 
leck became  Chief-of-Staff  of  the  Army.  He  was  very 
useful,  and  was  loyal  and  industrious ;  sincerely 
anxious  for  the  success  of  the  country,  and  without 
any  feeling  of  soreness  at  being  superseded.  In  this 


348  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

respect  Halleck  was  a  contrast  to  other  officers  of 
equal  ability,  who  felt  that  unless  they  had  the  com- 
mand they  craved  they  were  not  needed.  Halleck's 
immense  knowledge  of  military  science  was  of  great 
use  in  the  War  Office  to  those  of  us  in  the  field  "  (p. 
216,  vol.  ii.).  .  .  .  "After  Donelson  I  was  in  dis- 
grace, and  practically  without  a  command,  because  of 
some  misunderstanding  on  the  part  of  Halleck.  It  all 
came  right  in  time.  I  never  bore  Halleck  ill-will  for 
it.  He  was  in  command,  and  it  was  his  duty  to  com- 
mand as  he  pleased"  (p.  452,  vol.  ii.).  Grant's  unkind 
feeling  toward  Halleck  appears  to  have  been  engen- 
dered quite  recently,  and  was  due  probably  to  misun- 
derstanding of  the  facts  arising  from  Grant's  inability 
to  search  the  "  Records  "  thoroughly  for  himself. 

NEW  YOEK  CITY,  December  15,  1885. 


ARTICLE  V. 

Nicolay's  "  Outbreak  of  Rebellion."  * 

Colonel  Nicolay  has  made  an  important  contribu- 
tion to  history  and  has  done  the  readers  of  the  present 
day  a  service  of  incalculable  value.  Adhering  close- 
ly to  the  facts  established  by  official  records,  and  un- 
der the  restraint  of  presenting  occurrences  in  chrono- 
logical order,  he  invests  his  account  of  the  outbreak  of 
rebellion  with  the  charm  of  a  romance.  His  style  is 
excellent,  though  at  times  he  drops  below  the  sublime, 
as,  for  example,  in  stating  that  Ellsworth's  Zouaves 
were  received  at  the  Academy  of  Music,  in  New  York 
City,  by  "  as  fashionable  an  audience  as  ever  packed 
the  walls  or  split  their  Icid  gloves  to  encore  the  most 
famous  prima-donna."  Occasionally,  too,  an  adjective 
appears  which  may  improve  the  turn  of  a  sentence 
but  impairs  its  accuracy,  as  when  speaking  of  the 
affair  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  June  18,  1861,  the  author 
says  that  "  Tyler  withdrew  his  reluctant  officers  and 
men  from  the  fight."  There  was  no  reluctance  to 
speak  of  in  that  engagement.  Officers  and  men  were 
anxious  to  get  into  it,  and  more  anxious  to  get  out  of 
it.  Many  of  them  did  not  wait  to  be  withdrawn. 
Colonel  Nicolay  generally  views  his  subject  from  the 
extreme  standpoint  of  the  Republican  Party.  He 
places  the  responsibility  not  on  the  Southern  people, 

*  "  The  Outbreak  of  Rebellion,"  by  Colonel  John  G.  Nicolay.     Chas. 
Scribner's  Sons.  N.  Y. 

349 


350 


MILITAEY  MISCELLANIES. 


but  on  their  leaders,  and  regards  the  Rebellion  as  the 
fruit  of  a  deliberate  cunning  conspiracy  of  cliques  and 
cabals.  He  does  not  admit  that  the  South  had  any 
cause  of  complaint,  or  that  there  was  anything  in  the 
terms  of  the  Constitution  or  the  history  of  its  adop- 
tion on  which  to  found  the  so-called  "  State  rights  " ; 
and  to  support  his  condemnation  of  this  doctrine  he 
pronounces  State  rights  and  State  supremacy  synony- 
mous terms  and  uses  the  latter  term.  The  merit  of 
Colonel  Nicolay's  work  lies  chiefly  in  the  chapters 
which  deal  with  the  political  events  and  commotions 
that  preceded  the  outbreak  of  actual  hostilities.  There 
is  nothing  in  American  biography  surpassing  his  pen- 
pictures  of  Buchanan  and  Lincoln.  They  are  mere 
outline  sketches,  but  the  likenesses  are  nearly  perfect. 
His  personal  devotion  to  the  Martyr  President  per- 
haps carries  him  a  little  too  far  when  he  claims  that 
Lincoln's  "  countenance  "  when  "  illuminated  "  in  the 
utterance  of  a  strong  or  "  stirring  thought  "  was  "  posi- 
tively handsome,"  but  that  is  merely  a  matter  of  opin- 
ion or  taste,  and  if  he  errs  at  all  it  is  on  the  right 
side,  the  side  of  love. 

He  takes  the  5th  day  of  October,  1860,  as  the 
initial  point  of  the  "  American  Rebellion  "  because  on 
that  day  Governor  Gist  of  South  Carolina  commenced 
a  correspondence  with  the  Governors  of  the  Cotton 
States  concerning  secession.  That,  however,  does  not 
fix  an  initial  point.  Governor  Gist's  action  was  but  a 
continuation  of  treasonable  proceedings  which  had 
been  going  on  in  South  Carolina  for  many  years.  The 
first  overt  act  was  the  adoption  of  an  Ordinance  of 
Secession  by  the  South  Carolina  Convention,  Decem- 


NICOLAY'3  "  OUTBREAK  OP  REBELLION."  351 

ber  20,  1860.  That  is  the  true  initial  point  of  the 
Rebellion,  and  it  is  the  one  adopted  by  the  compiler 
of  the  "Records  of  the  Rebellion,"  Colonel  R.  N.  Scott, 
U.  S.  A.  It  is  well  merely  for  convenience  of  reference 
to  note  that  after  the  War  the  Federal  courts  decided 
that  "  the  proclamation  of  the  19th  of  April,  1861, 
was  the  first  formal  recognition  of  the  existence  of 
civil  war  by  the  National  authority,"  and  that  '•  the 
suppression  of  the  Rebellion  is  to  be  deemed  to  have 
taken  place  on  the  20th  of  August,  1866." 

Colonel  Nicolay  brings  his  narrative  down  to  Mc- 
Clellan's  appointment  as  General-in-Chief  in  1861,  giv- 
ing a  history  of  the  early  operations  in  West  Virginia, 
Patterson's  Harper's  Ferry  Campaign,  and  McDoAvell's 
Campaign  of  Manassas  or  Bull  Run.  His  account  of 
these  operations  is  interesting  and  in  the  main  accu- 
rate, but  is  not  marked  by  the  skill  and  vigor  that 
characterize  the  treatment  of  the  earlier  events  of  the 
outbreak.  He  recites  too  many  elementary  principles- 
It  might  have  been  of  use  to  the  raw  levies  brought 
forward  at  the  time  lie  writes  about,  to  announce  that 
"  war  combines  art  with  science  "  ;  that  "  the  superior 
work  of  the  veteran  comes  through  long  years  of  prac- 
tice "  ;  that  "  the  value  of  a  veteran  consists  as  much 
of  his  habitual  expertness  in  the  routine  of  camp  and 
march,  as  of  coolness  and  confidence  tinder  fire  "  ;  and 
that  an  army  develops  "  the  greatest  usefulness  from 
action  and  thoroughness  of  organization,"  but  it  is 
hardly  worth  while  for  Colonel  Nicolay  at  this  date 
to  give  such  precepts  so  much  prominence  in  a  narra- 
tive of  this  sort.  His  meaning  in  some  of  these  pre- 
cepts is  not  clear  ;  as,  for  example,  when  he  says,  "  of 


352  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

all  machines  an  army  develops  perhaps,  the  greatest 
inefficiency  from  mere  friction,"  and  he  is  rather  too 
hard  on  the  public  in  saying,  "  occasionally  an  idea 
finds  a  tenacious  and  almost  ineradicable  lodgment  in 
the  public  mind,  without  a  shadow  of  reason  or  truth 
to  justify  it.  Because  the  fanatic  John  Brown  selected 
Harper's  Ferry  as  the  scene  of  his  wild  exploit,  the 
public  mind  jumped  to  the  conclusion  that  the  spot 
was  a  natural  stronghold,  a  Gibraltar,  a  Thermopylae. 
Now  the  single  mountain  line  called  the  Blue  Ridge 
crossing  the  Potomac  River  at  Harper's  Ferry,  is  as 
far  from  being  a  mountain  stronghold  as  a  straight 
line  of  picket-fence  across  a  brook  is  from  being  a 
block  house.  John  Brown  was  as  unsound  in  war  as 
in  politics.  But  it  would  seem  that  even  in  highly 
civilized  nations  there  lingers  a  remnant  of  the  savage 
superstition  that  insanity  is  inspiration  ;  for  strong 
minds  caught  at  the  suggestion  that  he  had  recognized 
in  Harper's  Ferry  a  negro  Thermopylae." 

Colonel  Nicolay  discusses  Patterson's  Campaign 
about  Harper's  Ferry  at  considerable  length.  He 
shows  that  Patterson  was,  in  due  time,  informed  by 
General  Scott  that  McDowell  would  make  an  ad  vance 
from  Washington  "  against  Beauregard  at  Manassas, 
and  that  Johnston  must  be  defeated  or  detained  in 
the  Shenandoah  Valley  in  order  that  their  two  armies 
might  not  unite  and  defeat  McDowell,"  and  that  Pat- 
terson "  found  nothing  but  reasons  for  fear  and  justi- 
fication for  inaction  and  retreat,"  and  that  with  ample 
means  and  full  instruction  he  utterly  failed  either  to 
defeat  Johnston  or  detain  him.  Patterson,  the  author 
adds,  "  had  neither  the  skill  nor  courage  to  direct  the 


NICOLA.Y'8  "  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION."  353 

blow."  What  then  ?  Having  fixed  this  lamentable 
failure  upon  Patterson,  Colonel  Nicolay  undertakes  to 
transfer  the  blame  from  him  to  his  Assistant  Adjutant- 
General  !  He  sa}rs :  "  In  justice  to  him  (Patterson), 
however,  it  should  always  be  remembered  that  his 
personal  instinct  was  right,  and  that  he  was  led  into 
his  fatal  error  mainly  by  the  influence  of  his  Chief-of- 
Staff,  Fitz  John  Porter."  What  weight  suppressed 
"  personal  instinct "  is  entitled  to  in  extenuating  mili- 
tary failures,  it  is  hard  to  say,  but  certainly  nothing 
much  worse  can  be  said  of  a  commanding  general 
than  that  he  was  led  into  a  fatal  error  through  the 
"  influence  "  of  his  staff  officer.  It  is  no  apology  for 
failure  that  the  commander  adopts  bad  advice.  He 
has  the  power  and  the  glory.  It  is  not  fair  play  to 
try  to  shift  the  responsibility  from  him  to  his  power- 
less adviser.  That  merely  hurts  the  one  without 
helping  the  other.  It  is  remarkable  that  the  most 
extended  citation  of  proof  in  the  whole  volume  is 
made  in  support  of  the  unimportant  point  that  Patter- 
son was  led  into  error  by  the  influence  of  Fitz  John 
Porter ;  and  it  is  still  more  remarkable  that  the  testi- 
mony quoted  instead  of  proving  the  statement  clearly 
refutes  it.  The  author  says  Patterson's  "Senior  Aide- 
de-Camp,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War  relates  the  circumstances  un- 
der which  he  took  his  final  decision  :  i  At  one  time  ' 
(says  this  Aide-de-Camp) '  General  Patterson  had  given 
an  order  to  move  from  Bunker  Hill  to  Winchester. 
He  was  very  unwilling  to  leave  Johnston  even  at 
Winchester  without  attacking  him,  and  on  the  after- 
noon before  we  left  Bunker  Hill  he  decided  to  attack 
him  notwithstanding  his  force.' 


354 


MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 


"  i  Question.  Behind  his  intrenchments  ? ' 
"  i  Answer.  Yes,  sir ;  it  went  so  far  that  his  order 
was  written  by  his  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  Colo- 
nel Porter.  It  was  very  much  against  the  wishes  of 
Colonel  Porter,  and  he  asked  General  Patterson  if  he 
would  send  for  Colonel  Abercrombie  and  Colonel 
Thomas,  and  consult  them  on  the  movements.  General 
Patterson  replied:  u  No,  sir  ;  for  I  know  they  will  at- 
tempt to  dissuade  me  from  it,  and  I  have  made  up  my 
mind  to  fight  Johnston  under  all  circumstances."  That 
was  the  day  before  we  left  Bunker  Hill.  Then  Colo- 
nel Porter  asked  to  have  Colonel  Abercrombie  and 
Colonel  Thomas  sent  for  and  consulted  as  to  the  best 
manner  to  carry  out  his  wishes.  He  consented  and 
they  came,  and  after  half  an  hour  they  dissuaded  him 
from  it.' " 

This  is  one  of  the  many  ex-parte  statements  made 
before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War;  but 
as  Colonel  Nicolay  adopts  it,  it  is  not  proposed  here  to 
discredit  it.  It  shows  as  clearly  as  language  can,  that, 
so  far  from  being  led  into  error  by  Porter,  Patterson 
squarely  repelled  that  officer's  influence,  and  in  spite 
of  it  made  up  his  mind  "  to  fight  Jolmston  under  all 
circumstances.'1''  He,  however,  accepted  Porter's  sug- 
gestion to  consult  Colonels  Abercrombie  and  Thomas, 
as  to  the  best  manner  of  conducting  the  fight  he  had 
resolved  upon  and  in  that  consultation  "  they  "  —Aber- 
crombie and  Thomas — led  him  into  the  fatal  error  of 
not  fighting  at  all.  Who,  it  may  be  asked,  were  Aber- 
crombie and  Thomas  that  Patterson  should  have  been 
so  fatally  led  by  them  after  having  resisted  Porter's 
"  influence  "  ?  The  former  was  an  old  and  esteemed 


NICOLAY'S  "OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION."  355 

officer  of  the  Regular  Army  of  high  rank,  and  was  Pat- 
terson's life-long  friend  and  son-in-law.  The  Thomas 
mentioned  was  George  H.  Thomas,  whose  life  was 
spent  in  the  Regular  Army.  He  too  was  an  officer  of 
high  rank  and  known  ability  at  that  time.  His  career 
as  a  Major-General  in  the  Rebellion  was  brilliant  and 
successful.  It  is  not  strange  that  Patterson,  with  the 
character  that  Colonel  Nicolay  gives  him,  failed  to  fight 
if  these  two  men  advised  against  it ;  but  it  is  amazing 
that  Colonel  Nicolay  should  go  so  far  out  of  his  way 
in  a  fruitless  and  unnecessary  attempt  to  fasten  on 
Porter  the  responsibility  for  the  effects  of  advice, 
which  by  the  testimony  adduced  belongs  to  Abercrom- 
bie  and  Thomas.  But  strange  to  say  Colonel  Nicolay 
does  not  produce  all  the  testimony.  The  report  of  the 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  from  which  he 
quotes  to  prove  that  it  was  Porter's  influence  which 
prevented  Patterson  from  fighting,  contains  the  testi- 
mony of  Colonel  Craig  Biddle,  one  of  Patterson's  aides, 
showing  that  a  council  of  general  officers  unanimously 
opposed  the  advance.  It  is  as  follows  :  a  The  discus- 
sion at  Martinsburg  was  as  to  whether  or  not  General 
Patterson  should  go  on  to  Winchester.  General  Pat- 
terson was  very  full  of  that  himself.  He  was'  deter- 
mined to  go  to  Winchester,  but  the  opinions  of  all  the 
regular  officers  who  were  with  him  were  against  it. 
.  .  Ihe  opinions  of  all  the  men  in  whom  I  had  any 
confidence  were  against  it.  .  .  .  He  (Patterson) 
decided  upon  going  ahead  against  the  remonstrances  of 
General  Porter  who  advised  against  it.  He  (Porter) 
told  me  he  considered  he  had  done  his  duty,  and  said 
no  more.  The  movement  was  delayed  in  consequence 


356 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


of  General  Stone 's  command  not  being  able  to  move  right 
away.  It  was  then  evident  that  there  was  so  much 
opposition  to  it  that  the  General  was  induced  to  call 
a  council  of  the  general  officers  in  his  command  at 
which  I  was  present.  They  were  unanimously  opposed 
to  the  advance" 

Why  in  the  face  of  all  these  facts  Colonel  Nicolay 
should  assert  that  Patterson  "  was  led  into  his  fatal 
error  mainly  by  the  influence  of  his  Chief -of -Staff,  Fitz 
John  Porter,"  must  be  left  to  conjecture. 

If  we  look  up  instead  of  down  for  the  cause  of  the 
failure  of  the  campaign  of  1861  we  shall  probably  find 
that  General  Scott  is  not  entirely  free  from  responsi- 
bility. As  General-in-Chief  of  the  Army,  it  was  in 
his  power,  if  not  restrained  by  the  President,  to  unite 
the  armies  of  McDowell  and  Patterson  or  keep  them 
apart.  He  chose  the  latter  course,  giving  McDowell 
no  better  assurance  than  that  if  Johnston  joined  Beau- 
regard  he  should  have  "Patterson  on  his  heels"  It 
would  perhaps  have  been  better  to  put  Patterson  on 
Johnston's  toes  by  sending  him  in  due  time  to  the 
Manassas  field  of  operations  via  Leesburg. 

When  weighing  military  services  a  historian  should 
hold  the  scales  with  a  firm  grasp.  In  Patterson's  cam- 
paign there  appears  to  be  a  little  unsteadiness  in  our 
author's  hand,  but  that,  in  its  relations  to  the  general 
subject,  is  a  mere  blemish  on  a  meritorious  work;  and 
the  Scribners  have  a  right  to  feel  proud  of  the  intro- 
ductory volume  of  their  commendable  enterprise. 


ARTICLE  VI. 

The  First  Battle  of  Bull  Run.* 

Speaking  broadly,  the  South  had  political  control 
of  the  Government  until  1860.  The  election  of  Lin- 
coln to  the  Presidency  in  that  year  showed  that  South- 
ern domination  within  the  Union  had  probably  come 
to  an  end  and  that  the  anti-slavery  spirit  of  the  North 
was  growing.  But  it  was  from  no  fear  that  the  slaves 
would  be  liberated  that  secession  took  place.  Presi- 
dent Lincoln,  to  avoid  war,  was  at  the  beginning 
willing  that  slavery  should  be  continued  in  the  States 
where  it  existed.  Congress,  even  after  the  Battle  of 
Bull  Run,  almost  unanimously  resolved  with  the  most 
conciliatory  feeling,  that  the  War  was  "  not  waged  in 
any  spirit  of  oppresssion,  nor  from  any  purpose  of 
conquest  or  subjugation,  nor  for  the  purpose  of  over- 
throwing or  interfering  with  the  rights  or  established 
institutions  of  the  States,  but  to  defend  and  maintain 
the  permanency  of  the  Constitution  and  to  preserve 
the  Union  with  all  the  dignity  and  equal  rights  .of  the 
several  States  unimpaired." 

The  necessity  for  subjection  of  the  slave-masters7 
will  to  the  will  of  the  Union  after  political  control  had 
passed  to  the  North ;  the  unwillingness  of  the  North 
to  have  slavery  extended  and  a  violent  resentment  in 
the  South  of  abolitionism  in  the  abstract,  was  the 

*  Published  in  part  in  the  "  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War." 
Century  Company,  N.  Y. 

357 


358  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

cause  of  the  attempt  of  Southern  States  to  withdraw 
from  the  Union.  The  Confederate  Commissioners, 
Yancey,  Munn  and  Rust,  in  their  letter  to  Earl  Rus- 
sell said  :  "  It  was  from  no  fear  that  the  slaves  would 
be  liberated  that  secession  took  place.  The  very  party 
in  power  has  proposed  to  guarantee  slavery  forever  in 
the  States  if  the  South  would  but  remain  in  the  Union." 

Secession,  which  had  long  been  ripening  in  South 
Carolina,  was  actually  inaugurated  there  in  October 
prior  to  the  election,  and  was  formally  declared  De- 
cember 20,  1860.  Through  the  activito  of  political 
leaders,  but  much  against  the  will  of  many  of  the 
people,  it  spread  rapidly  among  other  States  and  the 
South  was  soon  in  rebellion. 

As  President  Buchanan's  administration  was  draw- 
ing to  a  close  he  was  forced  by  the  action  of  the  South 
to  decide  whether  the  power  of  the  General  Govern- 
ment should  be  used  to  coerce,  into  submission,  States 
that  had  attempted  to  secede  from  the  Union.  His 
opinion  was  that  the  contingency  was  not  provided 
for,  that  while  a  State  had  no  right  to  secede,  the 
Constitution  gave  no  authority  to  coerce,  and  that  he 
had  no  right  to  do  anything  except  hold  the  property 
and  enforce  the  laws  of  the  United  States. 

Before  President  Buchanan  went  out  of  uffice,  a 
spirit  not  only  of  secession  but  of  war  and  aggression 
was  rampant  in  the  South,  and  the  capital  of  the  na- 
tion seemed  to  be  in  danger  of  seizure  by  the  reckless 
and  daring  spirits  of  the  fostering  rebellion.  For  its 
protection  and  in  order  to  consult  about  holding 
Southern  forts  and  arsenals,  General  Scott  was  in 
December  called  to  Washington,  from  which  he  had 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  BUN.  359 

been  absent  since  the  inauguration  of  Pierce,  who  had 
defeated  him  for  the  Presidency.  Jefferson  Davis, 
Pierce's  Secretary  of  War,  and  General  Scott  had 
quarrelled  and  the  genius  of  acrimony  controlled  the 
correspondence  which  took  place  between  them."" 
Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  on  account  of  his  age 
and  infirmities  he  was  soon  overwhelmed  by  the  rush 
of  events,  General  Scott's  laurels  had  not  withered  at 
the  outbreak  of  the  War,  and  he  brought  to  the  emer- 
gency, ability,  experience  and  prestige.  A  high  light 
in  the  whole  military  world,  he  towered  above  the  rest 
of  our  Army,  at  that  time,  professionally  as  he  did 
physically.  As  the  effect  of  his  immense  stature  was 
increased  by  contrast  with  a  short  Aide-de-Camp,  pur- 
posely chosen  as  it  was  suspected,  so  was  his  exalted 
character  marked  by  one  or  two  conspicuous  but  not 
very  harmful  foibles.  With  much  learning,  great 

*  The  last  letter  of  that  correspondence  is  as  follows : 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
"WASHINGTON,  May  27,  1856. 

u  SIR: — I  have  received  your  letter  of  the  21st  instant.  The  delay 
for  which  you  make  a  hypocritical  apology  has  strengthened  you  to  re- 
sume the  labor  of  vituperation  ;  but  having  early  in  this  correspondence 
stamped  you  with  falsehood,  and  whenever  you  presented  a  tangible 
point  convicted  you  by  conclusive  proof,  I  have  ceased  to  regard  your 
abuse  ;  and  as  you  present  nothing  in  this  letter  which  requires  remark, 
I  am  gratified  to  be  relieved  from  the  necessity  of  further  exposing  your 
malignity  and  depravity.  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  JEFFERSON  DAVIS,  Secretary  of  War. 

"  Brevet  Lieut. -General  Winfield  Scott,  U.S.  Army,  New  York  City." 
To  mark  the  difference  between  precept  and  example,  it  may  be 
noted  that  upon  the  heels  of  the  foregoing  abusive  letter  to  Genera 
Scott,  Davis,  as  Secretary  of  War,  issued  in  1857,  a  new  code  of  Army 
Regulations,  the  first  Article  of  which  says :  "  Superiors  of  every  grade 
are  forbid  to  injure  those  under  them,  by  tyrannical  or  capricious  con- 
duct or  by  abusive  language." 


360  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

military  ability,  a  strict  sense  of  justice,  and  a  kind 
heart,  lie  was  vain  and  somewhat  petulant.  He  loved 
the  Union  and  hated  Jefferson  Davis. 

By  authority  of  the  President,  General  Scott  assem- 
bled a  small  force  of  regulars  in  the  capital  and  for 
the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  country,  the  elec- 
toral count  was  made  and  a  President  was  inaugurated 
under  the  protection  of  soldiery.  But  before  the  in- 
auguration of  Lincoln,  March  4,  the  secession  move- 
ment had  spread  through  the  "  cotton-belt  "  and  dele- 
gates from  the  secession  States  had  met  as  a  congress 
at  Montgomery,  Alabama,  February  4.  On  the  8th, 
they  had  organized  the  "  Provisional  Government  of 
the  Confederate  States  of  America,"  and  on  the  9th 
had  elected  Jefferson  Davis  President  and  Alexander 
H.  Stephens  Vice-President.  On  the  llth  of  March 
the  Confederate  Congress  adopted  a  constitution  con- 
taining a  clause  saying,  "The  institution  of  Negro 
slavery  as  it  now  exists  in  the  Confederate  States  shall 
be  recognized  and  protected." 

In  his  Inaugural  Address,  February  18,  Jefferson 
Davis  expressed  it  as  the  judgment  and  will  of  the 
Southern  people  that  a  reunion  with  the  North  was 
"  neither  practicable  nor  desirable."  Stephens  in  his 
speech,  March  21,  1861,  said  of  the  new  Southern 
government,  "  Its  foundations  are  laid,  its  corner-stone 
rests  upon  the  great  truth  that  the  Negro  is  not  equal 
to  the  white  man,  that  slavery  subordination  to  the 
superior  race  is  his  natural  and  normal  condition.  This 
our  new  government  is  the  first  in  the  history  of  the 
world  based  upon  this  great  physiological  and  moral 
truth." 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  KUN.  361 

In  his  Inaugural  Address,  Lincoln  avowed  that  he 
had  no  purpose  to  interfere,  directly  or  indirectly,  with 
slavery  in  the  States  where  it  existed,  but  he  pro- 
nounced ordinances  of  secession  legally  void  ;  asserted 
that  the  Union  was  perpetual ;  that  it  would  defend 
itself  and  hold  its  property  and  offices  and  collect  its 
duties  and  imports. 

That  is  the  issue  that  was  joined  at  the  time.  The 
South,  believing  in  the  doctrine  of  State  rights,  main- 
tained that  a  State  had  the  right  to  withdraw  from  the 
Union,  and  the  Southern  States  proceeded  to  withdraw 
from  the  Government  of  the  United  States  and  set  up 
a  government  of  their  own,  based  upon  slavery.  The 
Government  of  the  United  States,  without  then  passing 
upon  the  principle  of  slavery  and  without  any  purpose 
of  interfering  with  it  where  it  existed,  denied  the  right 
of  secession  and  asserted  the  perpetuity  of  the  Union 
and  the  right  and  duty  of  the  General  Government  to 
enforce  the  laws  of  the  United  States  over  the  whole 
country. 

Actual  hostilities  were  not  long  delayed.  Major 
Anderson,  commanding  a  small  Union  force  in  Fort 
Moultrie,  a  weak  post  in  Charleston  harbor,  finding 
himself  threatened  by  the  gathering  and  angry,  troops 
of  South  Carolina,  while  commissioners  of  that  State 
were  in  Washington  to  treat  for  the  surrender  of  the 
forts,  escaped  the  danger  of  capture  by  transferring 
his  command  to  Fort  Sumter  on  the  night  of  December 
26,  1860. 

Governor  Pickens,  of  South  Carolina,  promptly 
seized  Fort  Moultrie,  Castle  Pinckney,  the  Arsenal, 
Custom  House  and  Post  Office  in  Charleston,  raised 


362  MILITAEY  MISCELLANIES. 

the  Palmetto  flag  over  them  and  began  the  construc- 
tion of  batteries  to  bombard  Fort  Sumter.  On  the 
9th  of  January  he  fired  upon  and  drove  away  the 
steamship  "  Star  of  the  West,"  sent  by  the  Government 
with  recruits  and  supplies  for  Major  Anderson.  The 
siege  of  Fort  Sumter  was  assumed  by  the  Confederate 
government  on  the  1st  of  March,  with  General  Beaure- 
gard  in  command.  Learning  on  the  8th  of  April  that 
a  naval  expedition  was  about  to  approach  with  succor 
for  the  garrison,  Beauregard  on  the  12th  opened  fire 
upon  the  fort,  which  surrendered  on  the  13th,  and  its 
Union  flag  was  lowered  to  be  raised  only  on  the  fourth 
anniversary  thereafter.  For  many  months  the  Govern- 
ment had  borne  insults  and  wrongs  with  amazing 
patience.  Diplomacy  and  forbearance  were  at  an 
end. 

The  morning  that  the  news  of  the  firing  upon  Sum- 
ter reached  Washington,  President  Lincoln  issued  a 
proclamation  dated  April  15,  convening  Congress  and 
calling  forth  75,000  three  months'  militia  to  suppress 
combinations  against  the  Government,  to  cause  the  laws 
to  be  executed  and  to  maintain  the  honor,  the  integrity 
and  existence  of  the  Union  and  the  perpetuity  of  pop- 
ular government. 

The  war  spirit  was  aroused  to  the  highest  pitch  in 
the  North  as  well  as  in  the  South.  The  people  in 
arms  prepared  to  flock  to  their  respective  standards, 
those  of  the  South  to  establish  a  new  government  based 
upon  slavery;  those  of  the  North  to  preserve  the  Union 
as  it  was.  Upon  the  issue  of  abolishing  slavery  as  it 
then  existed,  indeed  upon  any  other  issue  than  the  one 
plainly  and  forcibly  announced  by  President  Lincoln, 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  363 

the  General  Government  would  have  failed  to  raise  an 
a,rnry  for  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion. 

The  Federal  situation  was  alarming.  Sumter  fell 
on  the  13th  of  April;  Virginia  seceded  on  the  17th. 
She  seized  Harper's  Ferry  on  the  18th  and  the  Norfolk 
Navy  Yard  on  the  20th.  On  the  19th  a  mob  in  Balti- 
more assaulted  the  6th  Massachusetts  Volunteers  as  it 
passed  through  to  Washington,  and  soon  the  bridges 
were  burned  and  railroad  communication  was  cut  off 
between  Washington  and  the  North.  The  national 
capital,  a  slave-holding  city,  lying  between  the  slave- 
holding  States  of  Virginia  and  Maryland,  was  in  peril. 
But  General  Scott  was  there  with  two  light  batteries, 
the  Marine  Corps  and  a  few  foot  companies  of  the  Reg- 
ular Army.  On  the  9th  of  April,  President  Lincoln 
called  upon  the  District  of  Columbia  for  militia,  but 
the  response  increased  for  the  moment  the  alarm  of 
the  situation.  Some  of  the  men  refused  to  be  mustered 
into  service,  being  disloyal,  and  others  exacted  the 
-condition  that  they  should  not  be  required  to  serve 
beyond  the  limits  of  the  District.  Thirty-eight  com- 
panies were,  however,  finally  obtained,  thirty-five  of 
them  with  the  condition  just  mentioned,  and  being 
placed  under  the  command  of  their  Inspector-General, 
that  able  and  indefatigable  soldier,  General  Charles  P. 
Stone,  contributed  to  avert  the  shame  that  threatened 
the  nation  in  the  loss  of  its  capital  before  the  Northern 
people  could  reach  it.  After  April  12,  both  sides 
began  to  prepare  in  earnest  for  the  gigantic  struggle, 
which  lasted  until  four  years  of  bloody  war  had  worn 
out  the  South. 

The  North  had  a  regular  army  composed  on  January 


384 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


1st,  1862,  of  1,098  officers,  and  15,304  enlisted  men. 
Of  this  force,  some  four  or  five  hundred  men  were  in 
Washington.  The  remainder  were  scattered  from  the 
British  boundary  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  from  the 
Atlantic  to  the  Pacific  Ocean.  After  January  1st,  the 
Army  in  addition  to  ordinary  casualties,  was  reduced 
by  the  surrender  of  a  considerable  part  of  its  own 
oificers  to  the  Confederates,  and  by  the  resignation 
and  desertion  of  313  commissioned  officers,  who  joined 
the  South.  No  addition  was  made  to  the  government 
forces  prior  to  April,  1861.  The  Southerners,,  daring, 
fiery,  full  of  confidence  in  their  own  prowess  and  of 
contempt  for  the  courage  and  manhood  of  the  North, 
having  through  their  leaders  resolved  upon  secession 
as  soon  as  they  were  voted  down  by  the  election  of 
Lincoln, — before  that  even  in  South  Carolina, — had 
taken  up  arms  and  spent  the  winter  of  their  favoring 
clime  in  military  exercises.  The  Northerners,  on  the 
other  hand,  deprecating  war  and  hoping  that  patience 
and  forbearance  would  prevent  it,  made  no  preparation 
for  the  hostilities  that  were  forced  upon  them. 

Lincoln,  who  was  at  the  head  of  the  Union,  had  had 
no  experience  as  a  party  leader  or  executive  officer 
and  was  without  knowledge  of  military  affairs  or 
acquaintance  with  military  men.  Davis,  at  the  head 
of  the  Confederacy,  was  an  experienced  and  acknowl- 
edged Southern  leader;  was  a  graduate  of  the  Military 
Academy ;  had  commanded  a  regiment  in  the  Mexican 
War;  had  been  Secretary  of  War  under  President 
Pierce,  and  was  chairman  of  the  military  committee  in 
the  United  States  Senate  at  the  time  he  left  Congress 
to  take  part  with  the  South.  He  was  not  only  well 


THE  FIKST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  BUN.  365 

versed  in  everything  relating  to  war,  but  was  thor- 
oughly informed  concerning  the  character  and  capacity 
of  prominent  and  promising  officers  of  the  Army. 
There  was  nothing  experimental  in  his  choice  of  his 
high  military  commanders.  Those  appointed  at  the 
beginning  retained  command  with  but  few  exceptions, 
until  they  lost  their  lives  or  the  War  closed. 

The  Southern  States,  all  claiming  to  be  independent 
republics  after  secession,  with  all  their  governmental 
machinery  including  militia  and  volunteer  organiza- 
tions in  complete  working  order,  transferred  them- 
selves as  States  from  the  Union  to  the  Confederacy  in 
cheerful  obedience  to  the  command  of  State  rights  and 
slavery.  The  organization  of  a  general  government 
from  such  elements,  with  war  as  its  immediate  pur- 
pose, was  a  simple  matter.  Davis  had  only  to  accept 
and  arrange  according  to  his  ample  information  and 
well-matured  judgment,  the  abundant  and  ambitious 
material  at  hand  in  the  way  that  he  thought  would 
best  secure  the  purposes  of  the  Rebellion.  Lincoln  had 
to  adapt  the  machinery  of  a  conservative  old  govern- 
ment, some  of  it  unsuitable,  some  unsound,  to  sudden 
demands  for  which  it  was  not  designed. 

Officers  from  all  departments  of  the  Federal  civil 
service  and  from  all  the  corps  of  the  Regular  Army, 
most  of  them  full  of  vigor,  with  the  same  education 
and  experience  as  those  who  remained,  went  South 
and  awaited  assignment  to  the  duties  for  which  Davis 
might  regard  them  as  best  qualified.  All  Confederate 
offices  were  vacant  and  the  Confederate  President  had 
large  if  not  absolute  power  in  filling  them.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  civil  offices  under  Lincoln  were  occu- 


366 


MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 


pied  or  controlled  by  party  and  in  the  small  Regular 
Army  of  the  Union  the  law  required  that  vacancies  as 
they  occurred  should  as  a  rule  be  filled  by  seniority. 
There  was  no  retired  list  for  the  disabled,  and  the 
Army  was  weighed  down  by  longevity ;  by  venerated 
traditions ;  by  prerogatives  of  service  rendered  in  for- 
mer wars;  by  the  firmly  tied  red  tape  of  military 
bureauism  and  by  the  deep-seated  and  well-founded 
fear  of  the  auditors  and  comptrollers  of  the  Treasury. 
Nothing  but  time  and  experience — possibly  nothing 
but  disaster — could  remove  from  the  path  of  the  Union 
President  difficulties  from  which  the  Confederate 
President  was,  by  the  situation,  quite  free.  So,  too, 
Davis  was  free  from  the  disloyalty  which  surrounded 
Lincoln  at  that  period  and  which  was  injurious  not 
only  through  its  reality  but  through  the  apprehension 
and  suspicion  that  lingered  after  it  had  ceased  in  fact. 

The  talents  of  Simon  Cameron,  his  first  Secretary  of 
War,  were  political,  not  military.  He  was  a  kind, 
gentle,  placid  man,  gifted  with  powers  to  persuade, 
not  to  command.  Shrewd  and  skilled  in  the  manage- 
ment of  business  and  personal  matters,  he  had  no 
knowledge  of  military  affairs,  and  could  not  give  the 
President  much  assistance  in  assembling  and  organ- 
izing for  war  the  earnest  and  impatient,  but  unmilitary 
people  of  the  North. 

In  the  beginning  of  the  War,  therefore,  the  military 
advantage  was  on  the  side  of  the  Confederates,  not- 
withstanding the  greater  resources  of  the  North,  which 
produced  their  effect  only  as  the  contest  was  prolonged. 

After  the  firing  of  the  first  gun  upon  Sumter,  the 
two  sides  were  equally  active  in  marshalling  their 


THE  FIRST  BA.T1LE  OF  BULL  RUN.  367 

forces  on  a  line  along  the  border  States  from  the  At- 
lantic coast  of  Virginia  in  the  east  to  Kansas  in  the 

o 

west.  Many  of  the  earlier  collisions  along  this  line 
were  due  rather  to  special  causes  or  local  feeling  than 
to  general  military  considerations.  The  prompt  ad- 
vance of  the  Union  forces  under  McClellan  to  West 
Virginia  was  to  protect  that  new-born  free  State. 
Patterson's  movement  to  Hagerstown  and  thence  to 
Harper's  Ferry  was  to  prevent  Maryland  from  joining 
or  aiding  the  Rebellion,  to  re-open  the  Baltimore  and 
Ohio  railroad,  and  prevent  invasion  from  the  Shenan- 
cloah  Valley.  The  Southerners  having  left  the  Union 
and  set  up  the  Confederacy  upon  the  principle  of 
State  rights,  in  violation  of  that  principle  invaded  the 
State  of  Kentucky  in  opposition  to  her  apparent  pur- 
pose of  armed  neutrality.  That  made  Kentucky  a 
field  of  early  hostilities  and  helped  to  anchor  her  to 
the  Union.  Missouri  was  rescued  from  secession 
through  the  energy  of  General  F.  P.  Blair  and  her 
other  Union  men,  and  by  the  indomitable  will  of  Cap- 
tain Lyon  of  the  Regular  Army,  whose  great  work 
was  accomplished  under  many  disadvantages.  In 
illustration  of  the  difficulty  with  which  the  new  con- 
dition of  affairs  penetrated  the  case-hardened  bureauism 
of  long  peace,  it  may  be  mentioned  that  the  venerable 
Adjutant-General  of  the  Army,  when  a  crisis  was  at 
hand  in  Missouri,  came  from  a  consultation  with  the 
President  and  Secretary  Cameron,  and  with  a  sorry 
expression  of  countenance  and  an  ominous  shake  of 
the  head  exclaimed,  "  It's  bad,  very  bad ;  we're  giving 
that  young  man  Lyon  a  great  deal  too  much  power  in 
Missouri." 


368 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


Early  in  the  contest  another  young  Union  officer 
came  to  the  front.  Major  Irvin  McDowell  was  ap- 
pointed Brigadier-General  May  14.  He  was  forty- 
three  years  of  age,  of  unexceptionable  habits  and 
great  physical  powers.  His  education,  begun  in 
France,  was  continued  at  the  United  States  Military 
Academy,  from  which  he  was  graduated  in  1838. 
Always  a  close  student,  he  was  well  informed  outside 
as  well  as  inside  his  profession.  Distinguished  in  the 
Mexican  war,  intensely  Union  in  his  sentiments,  full 
of  energy  and  patriotism,  outspoken  in  his  opinions, 
highly  esteemed  by  General  Scott,  on  whose  staff  he 
had  served,  he  at  once  secured  the  confidence  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  War,  under  whose  ob- 
servation lie  was  serving  in  Washington.  Without 
political  antecedents  or  acquaintances,  he  was  chosen 
for  advancement  on  account  of  his  record,  his  ability, 
and  his  vigor. 

Northern  forces  had  hastened  to  Washington  upon 
the  call  of  President  Lincoln,*  but  prior  to  May  24 
they  had  been  held  rigidly  on  the  north  side  of  the 
Potomac.  On  the  night  of  May  23-24,  the  Confederate 
pickets  being  then  in  sight  of  the  Capitol,  three  col- 
umns were  thrown  across  the  river  by  General  J.  K. 
F.  Mansfield,  then  commanding  the  Department  of 
Washington,  and  a  line  from  Alexandria  below  to 

*  The  aspect  of  affairs  was  so  threatening  after  President  Lincoln's 
call  of  April  15  for  75,000  three-months'  militia,  and  General  Scott  was 
so  averse  to  undertaking  any  active  operations  with  such  short-term 
troops,  that,  as  early  as  May  3,  and  without  waiting  for  the  meeting  of 
Congress,  the  President  entered  upon  the  creation  of  an  additional  vol- 
unteer army  to  be  composed  of  42,034  three-years'  men,  together  with 
an  increase  of  22,714  regulars  and  18,000  seamen. 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  BUN.  369 

chain-bridge  above  Washington  was  intrenched  under 
guidance  of  able  engineers.  On  the  27th  Brigadier- 
General  Irvin  McDowell  was  placed  in  command  south 
of  the  Potomac. 

By  the  1st  of  June  the  Southern  government  had 
been  transferred  from  Montgomery  to  Richmond,  and 
the  capitals  of  the  Union  and  of  the  Confederacy 
stood  defiantly  confronting  each  other.  General  Scott 
was  in  chief  command  of  the  Union  forces,  with  Mc- 
Dowell south  of  the  Potomac,  confronted  by  his  old 
classmate,  Beauregard,  hot  from  the  capture  of  Fort 
Sumter. 

General  Patterson,  of  Pennsylvania,  a  veteran  of 
the  War  of  1812  and  the  War  with  Mexico,  was  in 
command  near  Harper's  Ferry,  opposed  by  General 
Joseph  E.  Johnston.  The  Confederate  President, 
Davis,  then  in  Richmond,  with  General  R.  E.  Lee  as 
military  adviser,  exercised  in  person  general  military 
control  of  the  Southern  forces.  The  enemy  to  be  en- 
gaged by  McDowell  occupied  what  was  called  the 
"  Alexandria  line,"  with  headquarters  at  Manassas, 
the  junction  of  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  with  the 
Mannassas  Gap  railroad.  The  stream  known  as  Bull 
Run,  some  three  miles  in  front  of  Manassas,  was  the 
line  of  defense.  On  Beauregard's  right,  thirty  miles 
away,  at  the  mouth  of  Aquia  Creek,  there  was  a  Con- 
federate brigade  of  3,000  men  and  6  guns  under  Gen- 
eral Holmes.  The  approach  to  Richmond  from  the 
Lower  Chesapeake,  threatened  by  General.  B.  F.  But- 
ler, was  guarded  by  Confederates  under  Generals 
Huger  and  Magruder.  On  Beauregard's  left,  sixty 
miles  distant,  in  the  Lower  Shenandoah  Valley  and 


370 


MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 


separated  from  him  by  the  Blue  Ridge  Mountains, 
was  the  Confederate  army  of  the  Shenandoah  under 
command  of  General  Johnston.  Beauregard's  author- 
ity did  not  extend  over  the  forces  of  Johnston,  Huger, 
Magruder,  or  Holmes,  but  Holmes  was  with  him  be- 
fore the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  and  so  was  Johnston, 
who,  as  will  appear  more  fully  hereafter,  joined  at  a 
decisive  moment. 

Early  in  June  Patterson  was  pushing  his  column 
against  Harper's  Ferry,  and  on  the  3d  of  that  month 
McDowell  was  called  upon  by  General  Scott  to  submit 
"  an  estimate  of  the  number  and  composition  of  a 
column  to  be  pushed  toward  Manassas  Junction  and 
perhaps  the  Gap,  say  in  4  or  5  days,  to  favor  Patter- 
son's attack  upon  Harper's  Ferry."  McDowell  had 
then  been  in  command  at  Arlington  less  than  a  week, 
his  raw  regiments  south  of  the  Potomac  were  not  yet 
brigaded,  and  this  was  the  first  intimation  he  had  of 
offensive  operations.  He  reported,  June  4th,  that 
]  2,000  infantry,  2  batteries,  6  or  8  companies  of  cav- 
alry, and  a  reserve  of  5,000  ready  to  move  from  Alex- 
andria would  be  required.  Johnston,  however,  gave 
up  Harper's  Ferry  to  Patterson,  and  the  diversion  by 
McDowell  was  not  ordered.  But  the  public  demand 
for  an  advance  became  imperative — stimulated  perhaps 
by  the  successful  dash  of  fifty  men  of  the  2d  United 
States  Cavalry,  under  Lieutenant  C.  H.  Tompkins, 
through  the  enemy's  outposts  at  Fairfax  Court  House 
on  the  night  of  June  1st,  and  by  the  unfortunate  re- 
sult of  the  movement  of  a  regiment  under  General 
Schenck  toward  Vienna,  June  9,  as  well  as  by  a  dis- 
aster to  some  of  General  Butler's  troops  on  the  10th 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  BUN.  371 

at  Big  Bethel,  near  Fort  Monroe.  On  the  24th  of 
June,  in  compliance  with  verbal  instructions  from 
General  Scott,  McDowell  submitted  a  "  plan  of  opera- 
tions and  the  composition  of  the  force  required  to 
carry  it  into  effect."  He  estimated  the  Confederate 
force  at  Manassas  Junction  and  its  dependencies  at 
25,000  men,  assumed  that  his  movements  could  not  be 
kept  secret  and  that  the  enemy  would  call  up  addi- 
tional forces  from  all  quarters,  and  added :  "  If  Gen- 
eral J.  E.  Johnston's  force  is  kept  engaged  by  Major- 
General  Patterson,  and  Major-General  Butler  occupies 
the  force  now  in  his  vicinity,  I  think  they  will  not  be 
able  to  bring  up  more  than  10,000  men,  so  we  may 
calculate  upon  having  to  do  with  about  35,000  men." 
And  as  it  turned  out,  that  was  about  the  number  he 
"  had  to  do  with."  For  the  advance,  McDowell  asked 
"  a  force  of  30,000  of  all  arms,  with  a  reserve  of  10,- 
000."  He  knew  that  Beauregard  had  batteries  in 
position  at  several  places  in  front  of  Bull  Run  and 
defensive  works  behind  the  Run  and  at  Manassas 
Junction.  The  stream  being  fordable  at  many  places, 
McDowell  proposed  in  his  plan  of  operations  to  turn 
the  enemy's  position  and  force  him  out  of  it  by  seizing 
or  threatening  his  communications.  Nevertheless,  he 
said  in  his  report : 

"  Believing  the  chances  are  greatly  in  favor  of  the 
enemy's  accepting  battle  between  this  and  the  Junction 
and  that  the  consequences  of  that  battle  will  be  of  the 
greatest  importance  to  the  country,  as  establishing  the 
prestige  in  this  contest,  on  the  one  side  or  the  other, — 
the  more  so  as  the  two  sections  will  be  fairly  repre- 
sented by  regiments  from  almost  every  State, — I 


372 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


think  it  of  great  consequence  that,  as  for  the  most  part 
our  regiments  are  exceedingly  raw  and  the  best  of 
them,  with  few  exceptions,  not  over  steady  in  line, 
they  be  organized  into  as  many  small  fixed  brigades  as 
the  number  of  regular  Colonels  may  admit,  .  . 
so  that  the  men  may  have  as  fair  a  chance  as  the  na- 
ture of  things  and  the  comparative  inexperience  of  most 
will  allow." 

This  remarkably  sound  report  was  approved,  and 
McDowell  was  directed  to  carry  his  plan  into  effect 
July  8.  But  the  government  machinery  worked 
slowly  and  there  was  jealousy  in  the  way,  so  that  the 
troops  to  bring  his  army  up  to  the  strength  agreed  upon 
did  not  reach  him  until  the  16th. 

Beau  regard's  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  Manassas 
consisted  of  the  brigades  of  Holmes,  Bonham,  Ewell, 
D.  R.  Jones,  Longstreet,  Cocke  and  Early,  and  of  3 
regiments  of  infantry,  1  regiment  and  3  battalions  of 
cavalry,  and  6  batteries  of  artillery,  containing  in  all 
27  guns,  making  an  aggregate  available  force  on  the 
field  of  Bull  Run  of  about  23,000  men.*  Johnston's 
army  from  the  Shenandoah  consisted  of  the  brigades 

*  Beauregard  himself  has  said  that  on  the  18th  of  July  he  had  "along 
the  line  of  Bull  Run  about  17,000  men ;  that  on  the  19th  General 
Holmes  joined  him  with  about  3,000  men  "  ;  and  that  he  "  received 
from  Richmond  between  the  18th  and  21st  about  2,000  more  "  ;  and 
that  Johnston  brought  about  8,000  more,  the  advance  arriving  "on  the 
morning  of  the  20th  and  the  remainder  about  noon  of  the  21st, ' '  mak- 
ing his  whole  force,  as  he  states  it,  "  nearly  30,000  men  of  all  arms." 
The  figures  are  probably  under  the  mark,  as  Hampton's  Legion,  Mc- 
Rea's  Regiment,  a  North  Carolina  "regiment  and  two  battalions  of 
Mississippi  and  Alabama"  joined  between  the  17th  and  21st.  Beaure- 
gard's  force  may  fairly  be  placed  at  32,000  ;  and  the  opposing  armies, 
both  in  the  aggregate  and  in  the  parts  engaged,  were  nearer  equal  in 
that  than  in  any  other  battle  in  Virginia. 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  KUN.  373 

of  Jackson,  Bee,  Bartow,  and  Kirby  Smith,  2  regi- 
ments of  infantry  not  brigaded,  1  regiment  of  cavalry 
(12  companies),  and  5  batteries  (20  guns),  making  an 
aggregate  at  Bull  Run  of  8,340. 

McDowell's  army  consisted  of  5  divisions,  Tyler's 
First  Division,  containing  4  brigades  (Keyes's, 
Schenck's,  W.  T.  Sherman's,  and  Richardson's);  Hun- 
ter's Second  Division,  containing  2  brigades  (Andrew 
Porter's  and  Burnside's);  Heintzelman's  Third  Divi- 
sion, containing  3  Brigades  (Franklin's,  Willcox's,  and 
Howard's) ;  Runyon's  Fourth  Division  (9  regiments 
not  brigaded)  ;  and  Miles's  Fifth  Division,  containing 
2  brigades  (Blenker's  and  Davies's), — 10  batteries  of 
artillery,  besides  two  guns  attached  to  infantry  regi- 
ments, 49  guns  in  all,  and  7  companies  of  regular  cav- 
alry. Of  the  foregoing  forces,  9  of  the  batteries  and 
8  companies  of  infantry  were  regulars,  and  1  small 
battalion  was  marines.  The  aggregate  force  was  about 
35,000  men.  Runyon's  Fourth  Division  was  6  or  7 
miles  in  the  rear  guarding  the  road  to  Alexandria,  and, 
though  counted  in  the  aggregate,  was  not  embraced  in 
McDowell's  order  for  battle.* 

There  was  an  ill-suppressed  feeling  of  sympathy 
with  the  Confederacy  in  the  Southern  element  of 
Washington  society;  but  the  halls  of  Congress  re- 
sounded with  the  eloquence  of  Union  speakers.  Mar- 
tial music  filled  the  air,  and  war  was  the  topic  wher- 
ever men  met.  By  day  and  night  the  tramp  of  sol- 
diers was  heard,  and  staff-officers  and  orderlies  galloped 

*  The  average  leDgth  of  service  of  McDowell's  men  prior  to  the  bat- 
tle was  about  sixty  days.~*The  longest  in  service  were  the  three-months' 
men,  and  of  these  he  had  fourteen  regiments. 


374 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


through  the  streets  between  the  headquarters  of  Gen- 
erals Scott  and  McDowell.  Northern  enthusiasm  was 
unbounded.  "On  to  Richmond"  was  the  war-cry. 
Public  sentiment  was  irresistible,  and  in  response  to  it 
the  army  advanced.  It  was  a  glorious  spectacle.  The 
various  regiments  were  brilliantly  uniformed  according 
to  the  aesthetic  taste  of  peace,  and  the  silken  banners 
they  flung  to  the  breeze  were  unsoiled  and  untorn. 
The  bitter  realities  of  war  were  nearer  than  we  knew. 
McDowell  marched  on  the  afternoon  of  July  16, 
the  men  carrying  three  days'  rations  in  their  haver- 
sacks ;  provision  wagons  were  to  follow  from  Alexan- 
dria the  next  day.  On  the  morning  of  the  18th  his 
forces  were  concentrated  at  Centreville,  a  point  about 
20  miles  west  of  the  Potomac  and  6  or  7  miles  east  of 
Manassas  Junction.  Beauregard's  outposts  fell  back 
without  resistance.  Bull  Run,  flowing  south-easterly, 
is  about  half-way  between  Centreville  and  Manassas 
Junction,  and,  owing  to  its  abrupt  banks,  the  timber 
with  which  it  was  fringed,  and  some  artificial  de- 
fenses at  the  fords,  was  a  formidable  obstacle. 
The  stream  was  fordable,  but  all  the  crossings  for 
eight  miles,  from  Union  Mills  on  the  south  to  the 
Stone  Bridge  on  the  north,  were  defended  by  Beau- 
regard's  forces.  The  Warrenton  Turnpike,  passing 
through  Centreville,  leads  nearly  due  west,  crossing 
Bull  Run  at  the  Stone  Bridge.  The  direct  road  from 
Centreville  to  Manassas  crosses  Bull  Run  at  Mitchell's 
Ford,  half  a  mile  or  so  above  another  crossing  known 
as  Blackburn's  Ford.  Union  Mills  was  covered  by 
Swell's  brigade,  supported  after  the  18th  by  Holmes's 
brigade  ;  McLean's  Ford,  next  to  the  north,  was  cov- 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  EUN.  375 

ered  by  D.  R.  Jones's  brigade ;  Blackburn's  Ford  was 
defended  by  Longstreet's  brigade,  supported  by  Early's 
brigade;  Mitchell's  Ford  was  held  by  Bonham's  bri- 
gade, with  an  outpost  of  two  guns  and  an  infantry 
support  east  of  Bull  Run  ;  the  stream  between  Mitch- 
ell's Ford  and  the  Stone  Bridge  was  covered  by 
Cocke's  brigade ;  the  Stone  Bridge  on  the  Confederate 
left  was  held  by  Evans  with  1  regiment  and  Wheat's 
special  battalion  of  infantry,  1  battery  of  4  guns,  and 
2  companies  of  cavalry.* 

McDowell  was  compelled  to  wait  at  Centreville  un- 
til his  provision  wagons  arrived  and  he  could  issue 
rations.  His  orders  having  carried  his  leading  divi- 
sion under  Tyler  no  farther  than  Centreville,  he  wrote 
that  officer  at  8.15  A.M.  on  the  18th,  "  Observe  well 
the  roads  to  Bull  Run  and  to  Warrenton.  Do  not 
bring  on  an  engagement,  but  keep  up  the  impression 
that  we  are  moving  on  Manassas."  McDowell  then 

o 

went  to  the  extreme  left  of  his  line  to  examine  the 
country  with  reference  to  a  sudden  movement  of  the 
army  to  turn  the  enemy's  right  flank.  The  recon- 

*  The  state  of  General  Beauregard's  mind  at  the  time  is  indicated 
by  the  following  telegram  on  the  17th  of  July  from  him  to  Jefferson 
Davis :  ' '  The  enemy  has  assaulted  my  outposts  in  heavy  force.  .  I  have 
fallen  back  on  the  line  of  Bull  Run  and  will  make  a  stand  at  Mitchell's 
Ford.  If  his  force  is  overwhelming,  I  shall  retire  to  Rappahannock 
railroad  bridge,  saving  my  command  for  defence  there  and  future  oper- 
ations. Please  inform  Johnston  of  this  via  Staunton,  and  also  Holmes. 
Send  forward  any  re-enforcements  at  the  earliest  possible  instant  and  by 
every  possible  means."  The  alarm  in  this  dispatch  and  the  apprehen- 
sion it  shows  of  McDowell's  "  overwhelming  "  strength  are  not  in  har- 
mony with  the  more  recent  assurance  of  the  Confederate  commander, 
that  through  sources  in  Washington  treasonable  to  the  Union,  and  in 
other  ways,  he  "  was  almost  as  well  informed  of  the  strength  of  the  hos- 
tile army  in  my  [his]  front  as  its  commander." 


376 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES 


noissance  showed  him  that  the  country  was  unfavor- 
able to  the  movement,  and  he  abandoned  it.  While 
he  was  gone  to  the  left,  Tyler,  presumably  to  "  keep 
up  the  impression  that  we  were  moving  on  Manassas," 
went  forward  from  Centreville  with  a  squadron  of 
cavalry  and  two  companies  of  infantry  for  the  purpose 
of  making  a  reconnoissance  of  Mitchell's  and  Black- 
burn's fords  along  the  direct  road  to  Manassas.  The 
force  of  the  enemy  at  these  fords  has  just  been  given. 
Eeaching  the  crest  of  the  ridge  overlooking  the  valley 
of  Bull  Run  and  a  mile  or  so  from  the  stream,  the 
enemy  was  seen  on  the  opposite  bank,  and  Tyler 
brought  up  Benjamin's  artillery,  2  20-pounder  rifled 
guns,  Ayres's  field  battery  of  6  guns,  and  Richardson's 
brigade  of  infantry.  The  20-pounders  opened  from 
the  ridge  and  a  few  shots  were  exchanged  with  the 
enemy's  batteries.  Desiring  more  information  than, 
the  long-range  cannonade  afforded,  Tyler  ordered 
Richardson's  brigade  and  a  section  of  Ayres's  battery, 
supported  by  a  squadron  of  cavalry,  to  move  from  the 
ridge  across  the  open  bottom  of  Bull  Run  and  take 
position  near  the  stream  and  have  skirmishers  "  scour 
the  thick  woods  "  which  skirted  it.  Two  regiments 
of  infantry,  2  pieces  of  artillery,  and  a  squadron  of 
cavalry  moved  down  the  slope  into  the  woods  and 
opened  fire,  driving  Bonham's  outpost  to  the  cover  of 
in  trench  ments  across  the  stream.  The  brigades  of 
Bonham  and  Longstreet,  the  latter  being  re-enforced 
for  the  occasion  by  Early's  brigade,  responded  at  short 
range  to  the  fire  of  the  Federal  reconnoitering  force 
and  drove  it  back  in  disorder.  Tyler  reported  that 
having  satisfied  himself  "  that  the  enemy  was  in  force," 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  EUN. 


377 


and  ascertained  "  the  position  of  his  batteries,"  he 
withdrew.  This  unauthorized  reconnoissance,  called 
by  the  Federals  the  affair  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  was 
regarded  at  the  time  by  the  Confederates  as  a  serious 
attack,  and  was  dignified  by  the  name  of  the  "  battle 
of  Bull  Run,"  the  engagement  of  the  21st  being  called 
by  them  the  battle  of  Manassas.  The  Confederates, 
feeling  that  they  had  repulsed  a  heavy  and  real  attack, 
were  encouraged  by  the  result.  The  Federal  troops, 
on  the  other  hand,  were  greatly  depressed.  The  regi- 
ment which  suffered  most  was  completely  demoralized, 
and  McDowell  thought  that  the  depression  of  the  re. 
pulse  was  felt  throughout  his  army  and  produced  its 
effect  upon  the  Pennsylvania  regiment  and  the  New 
York  battery  which  insisted  (their  terms  having  ex- 
pired) upon  their  discharge,  and  on  the  21st,  as  he  ex- 
pressed it,  "  marched  to  the  rear  to  the  sound  of  the 
enemy's  cannon."  Even  Tyler  himself  felt  the  de- 
pressing effect  of  his  repulse,  if  we  may  judge  by  his 
cautious  and  feeble  action  on  the  21st  when  dash  was 
required. 

The  operations  of  the  18th  confirmed  McDowell  in 
his  opinion  that  with  his  raw  troops  the  Confederate 
position  should  be  turned  instead  of  attacked  in  front. 
Careful  examination  had  satisfied  him  that  the  country 
did  not  favor  a  movement  to  turn  the  enemy's  right. 
On  the  night  of  the  18th  the  haversacks  of  his  men 
were  empty,  and  had  to  be  replenished  from  the  pro- 
vision wagons,  which  were  late  in  getting  up.  Nor 
had  he  yet  determined  upon  his  point  or  plan  of  attack. 
While  resting  and  provisioning  his  men,  he  devoted 
the  19th  and  20th  to  a  careful  examination  by  his  en- 


378  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

gineers  of  the  enemy's  position  and  the  intervening 
country.  His  men,  not  soldiers,  but  civilians  in  uni- 
form, unused  to  marching,  hot,  weary,  and  footsore, 
dropped  down  as  they  had  halted  and  bivouacked  on 
the  roads  about  Centreville.  Notwithstanding  Beau- 
regard's  elation  over  the  affair  at  Blackburn's  Ford  on 
the  18th,  he  permitted  the  19th  and  20th  to  pass 
without  a  movement  to  follow  up  the  advantage  he 
had  gained.  During  these  two  days,  McDowell  care- 
fully examined  the  Confederate  position,  and  made 
his  plan  to  manoeuvre  the  enemy  out  of  it.  Beaure- 
gard  ordered  no  aggressive  movement  until  the  21st, 
and  then,  as  appears  from  his  own  statement,  through 
miscarriage  of  orders  and  lack  of  apprehension  on  the 
part  of  subordinates,  the  effort  was  a  complete  fiasco, 
with  the  comical  result  of  frightening  his  own  troops, 
who,  late  in  the  afternoon,  mistook  the  return  of  one 
of  their  brigades  for  an  attack  by  McDowell's  left, 
and  the  serious  result  of  interfering  with  the  pursuit 
after  he  had  gained  the  battle  of  the  21st. 

But  Beauregard,  though  not  aggressive  on  the  19th 
and  20th,  was  riot  idle  within  his  own  lines.  The 
Confederate  President  had  authorized  Johnston,  Beau- 
regard's  senior,  to  use  his  discretion  in  moving  to  the 
support  of  Manassas,  and  Beauregard,  urging  John- 
ston to  do  so,  sent  railway  transportation  for  the 
Shenandoah  forces.  But,  as  he  states,  "  he  at  the 
same  time  submitted  the  alternative  proposition  to 
Johnston  that,  having  passed  the  Blue  Eidge,  he 
should  assemble  his  forces,  press  forward  by  way  of 
Aldie,  north- west  of  Manassas,  and  fall  upon  Mc- 
Dowell's right  rear,"  while  he,  Beauregard,  "prepared 


THE  FIKST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  KUN.  379 

for  the  operation  at  the  first  sound  of  the  conflict, 
should  strenuously  assume  the  offensive  in  front." 
"  The  situation  and  circumstances  specially  favored 
the  signal  success  of  such  an  operation,"  says  Beaure- 
gard.  An  attack  by  two  armies  moving  from  opposite 
points  upon  an  enemy,  with  the  time  of  attack  for  one 
depending  upon  the  sound  of  the  other's  cannon,  is 
hazardous  even  with  well-disciplined  and  well-seasoned 
troops,  and  is  next  to  fatal  with  raw  levies.  Johnston 
chose  the  wiser  course  of  moving  by  rail  to  Manassas, 
thus  preserving  the  benefit  of  "  interior  lines,"  which, 
Beauregard  says,  was  the  "  sole  military  advantage  at 
the  moment  that  the  Confederates  possessed." 

The  campaign  which  General  Scott  required  Mc- 
Dowell to  make  was  undertaken  with  the  understand- 
ing that  Johnston  should  be  prevented  from  joining 
Beauresrard.  With  no  lack  of  confidence  in  himself. 

O  7 

McDowell  was  dominated  by  the  feeling  of  subordi- 
nation and  deference  to  General  Scott  which  at  that 
time  pervaded  the  whole  Army,  and  General  Scott, 
who  controlled  both  McDowell  and  Patterson,  assured 
McDowell  that  Johnston  should  not  join  Beauregard 
without  having  "  Patterson  on  his  heels."  Yet  John- 
ston's army,  nearly  nine  thousand  strong,  joined  Beau- 
regard;  Bee's  brigade  and  Johnston  in  person  arriving 
on  the  morning  of  the  20th,  the  remainder  about  noon 
on  the  21st.  Although  the  enforced  delay  at  Centre- 
ville  enabled  McDowell  to  provision  his  troops  and 
gain  information  upon  which  to  base  an  excellent  plan 
of  attack,  it  proved  fatal  by  affording  time  for  a  junc- 
tion of  the  opposing  forces.  On  the  21st  of  July 
General  Scott  addressed  a  dispatch  to  McDowell,  say- 


380  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

ing :  "  It  is  known  that  a  strong  re-enforcement  left 
Winchester  on  the  afternoon  of  the  18th,  which  you 
wrill  also  have  to  beat.  Four  new  regiments  will  leave 
to-day  to  be  at  Fairfax  Station  to-night.  Others  shall 
follow  to-morrow — twice  the  number  if  necessary." 
When  this  dispatch  was  penned,  McDowell  was  fight- 
ing the  "  strong  re-enforcement"  which  left  Winchester 
on  the  18th.  General  Scott's  report  that  Beauregard 
had  been  re-enforced,  the  information  that  four  regi- 
ments had  been  sent  to  McDowell,  and  the  promise 
that  twice  the  number  would  be  sent  if  necessary,  all 
came  too  late — and  Patterson  came  not  at  all.* 

*  On  the  17th  of  July  Patterson,  with  some  16,000  three-months'  men, 
whose  terms  began  to  expire  on  the  24th,  was  at  Charlestown,  and  John- 
ston, with  about  the  same  number,  was  at  Winchester.  On  that  day 
General  Scott  telegraphed  Patterson,  "  McDowell's  first  day's  work  has 
driven  the  enemy  behind  Fairfax  Court  House.  Do  not  let  the  enemy 
amuse  and  delay  you  with  a  small  force  in  front  while  he  re-enforces 
the  Junction  with  his  main  body."  To  this  Patterson  replied  at  half- 
past  one  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  18th,  stating  his  difficulties  and 
asking,  ' '  Shall  I  attack  ?  ' '  General  Scott  answered  on  the  same  day : 
"  I  have  certainly  been  expecting  you  to  beat  the  enemy,  or  that  you 
at  least  had  occupied  him  by  threats  and  demonstrations.  You  have 
been  at  least  his  equal  and  I  suppose  superior  in  numbers.  Has  he  not 
stolen  a  march  and  sent  re-enforcements  toward  Manassas  Junction?  " 
Patterson  replied  on  the  same  day  (18th),  "  The  enemy  has  stolen  no 
march  upon  me.  I  have  caused  him  to  be  re-enforced  ;  ' '  and  at  one 
o'clock  P.M.  on  that  day  he  added:  "  I  have  succeeded,  in  accordance 
with  the  wishes  of  the  General-in-Chief,  in  keeping  General  Johnston's 
force  at  Winchester. "  At  the  very  hour  that  Patterson  was  writing 
this  dispatch  Johnston's  advance  was  leaving  Winchester.  On  the  18th 
Johnston  telegraphed  to  Richmond  that  Patterson  was  at  Charlestown, 
and  said :  ' '  Unless  he  prevents  it,  we  shall  move  toward  General  Beau- 
regard  to-day."  He  moved  accordingly,  and  the  Confederate  armies 
were  united  for  battle.  It  rested,  however,  with  higher  authority  than 
Patterson  to  establish  between  his  army  and  McDowell's  the  relations 
that  the  occasion  called  for.  In  considering  the  requirements  for  Mc- 
Dowell's movement  against  Manassas,  General  Scott  gave  great  weight 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  381 

During  the  19th  and  20th  the  bivouacs  of  McDow- 
ell's army  at  Centreville,  almost  within  cannon  range 
of  the  enemy,  were  thronged  by  visitors,  official  and 
unofficial,  who  came  in  carriages  from  Washington, 
bringing  their  own  supplies.  They  were  under  no 
military  restraint,  and  passed  to  and  fro  among  the 
troops  as  they  pleased,  giving  the  scene  the  appear- 
ance of  a  monster  military  picnic.*  Among  others, 

to  the  general  and  irresistible  fear  then  prevailing  in  Washington  that 
the  capital  might  be  seized  by  a  dash.  Its  direct  defence  was  the  first 
purpose  of  the  three-months'  militia.  The  Potomac  at  Washington  was 
itself  a  strong  barrier,  and  with  the  field-works  on  its  south  bank  af- 
forded security  in  that  quarter.  The  danger  was  thought  to  be  from 
the  Shenandoah,  and  that  induced  the  Government  to  keep  Patterson 
in  the  valley.  Indeed,  on  the  30th  of  June  Colonel  C.  P.  Stone's  com- 
mand was  ordered  from  Point  of  Rocks  to  Patterson  at  Martinsburg, 
where  it  arrived  on  the  8th  of  July ;  whereas  the  offensive  campaign 
against  Manassas,  ordered  soon  after,  required  Patterson  to  go  to  Stone, 
as  he  proposed  to  do  June  21,  instead  of  Stone  to  Patterson.  The  cam- 
paign of  McDowell  was  forced  upon  General  Scott  by  public  opinion, 
but  did  not  relieve  the  authorities  from  the  fear  that  Johnston  might 
rush  down  and  seize  Washington.  General  Scott,  under  the  pressure  of 
the  offensive  in  one  quarter  and  the  defensive  in  another,  imposed  up- 
on Patterson  the  double  task,  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  of  preventing 
Johnston  from  moving  on  the  capital  and  from  joining  Beauregard. 
If  that  task  was  possible,  it  could  have  been  accomplished  only  by  per- 
sistent fighting,  and  that  General  Scott  was  unwilling  to  order :  though 
in  his  dispatch  of  the  18th  in 'reply  to  Patterson's  question,  "  Shall  I 
attack?  "  he  said,  u  I  have  certainly  been  expecting  you  to  beat  the 
enemy."  Prior  to  that,  his  instructions  to  Patterson  had  enjoined  cau- 
tion. As  soon  as  McDowell  advanced,  Patterson  was  upon  an  exterior 
line  and  in  a  false  military  position.  Admitting  that  he  might  have 
done  more  to  detain  Johnston,  bad  strategy  was  probably  more  to  blame 
for  the  result  than  any  action  or  lack  of  action  on  Patterson's  part. 

*  The  presence  of  senators,  congressmen,  and  other  civilians  upon  the 
field  on  the  21st  gave  rise  to  extravagant  and  absurd  stories,  in  which 
alleged  forethought  and  valor  among  them  are  contrasted  with  a  lack 
of  these  qualities  in  the  troops.  The  plain  truth  is  that  the  non-com- 
batants and  their  vehicles  merely  increased  the  confusion  and  demorali- 
zation of  the  retreat. 


382 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


the  venerable  Secretary  of  War,  Cameron,  called  upon 
McDowell.  Whether  due  to  a  naturally  serious  ex- 
pression, to  a  sense  of  responsibility,  to  a  premonition 
of  the  fate  of  his  brother  who  fell  upon  the  field  on 
the  21st,  or  to  other  cause,  his  countenance  showed 
apprehension  of  evil;  but  men  generally  were  confi- 
dent and  jovial. 

McDowell's  plan  of  battle  promulgated  on  the  20th, 
was  to  turn  the  enemy's  left,  force  him  from  his  de- 
fensive position,  and,  "if  possible,  destroy  the  railroad 
leading  from  Manassas  to  the  Valley  of  Virginia, 
where  the  enemy  has  a  large  force."  He  did  not 
know  when  he  issued  this  order  that  Johnston  had 
joined  Beauregard,  though  he  suspected  it,  Miles's 
Fifth  Division,  with  Richardson's  brigade  of  Tyler's 
division,  and  a  strong  force  of  artillery  was  to  remain 
in  reserve  at  Centreville,  prepare  defensive  works 
there  and  threaten  Blackburn's  Ford.  Tyler's  First 
Division  which  was  on  the  turnpike  in  advance,  was 
to  move  at  2.30  A.M.,  threaten  the  Stone  Bridge  and 
open  fire  upon  it  at  daybreak.  This  demonstration 
was  to  be  vigorous,  its  first  purpose  being  to  divert 
attention  from  the  movements  of  the  turning  column. 
As  soon  as  Tyler's  troops  cleared  the  way,  Hunter's 
Second  Division,  followed  by  Heintzelman's  Third 
Division,  was  to  move  to  a  point  on  the  Warren  ton 
Turnpike  about  one  or  two  miles  east  of  Centreville 
and  there  take  a  country  road  to  the  right,  cross  the 
Run  at  Sudley  Springs,  come  down  upon  the  flank 
and  rear  of  the  enemy  at  the  Stone  Bridge,  and  foice 
him  to  open  the  way  for  Tyler's  division  to  cross  there 
and  attack,  fresh  and  in  full  force. 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  KUN. 


383 


Tyler's  start  was  so  late  and  his  advance  was  so 
slow  as  to  hold  Hunter  and  Heintzelman  two  or  three 
hours  on  the  mile  or  two  of  the  turnpike  between 
their  camps  and  the  point  at  which  they  were  to  turn 
off  for  the  flank  inarch.  This  delay,  and  the  fact  that 
the  flank  march  proved  difficult  and  some  twelve 
miles  instead  of  about  six  as  was  expected,  were  of 
serious  moment.  The  flanking  column  did  not  cross 
at  Sudley  Springs  until  9.30  instead  of  7,  the  long 
march,  with  its  many  interruptions,  tired  out  the  men, 
and  the  delay  gave  the  enemy  time  to  discover  the 
turning  movement.  Tyler's  operations  against  the 
Stone  Bridge  were  feeble  and  ineffective.  By  8  o'clock 
Evans  was  satisfied  that  he  was  in  no  danger  in  front, 
and  perceived  the  movement  to  turn  his  position. 
He  was  on  the  left  of  the  Confederate  line,  guarding 
the  point  where  the  Warrenton  Turnpike,  the  great 
highway  to  the  field,  crossed  Bull  Run,  the  Confeder- 
ate line  of  defence.  He  had  no  instructions  to  guide 
him  in  the  emergency  that  had  arisen.  But  he  did 
not  hesitate.  Reporting  his  information  and  purpose 
to  the  adjoining  commander,  Cocke,  and  leaving  four 
companies  of  infantry  to  deceive  and  hold  Tyler  at 
the  bridge,  Evans  before  9  o'clock  turned  his  back 
upon  the  point  he  was  set  to  guard,  marched  a  mile 
away,  and,  seizing  the  high  ground  to  the  north  of 
Young's  Branch  of  Bull  Run,  formed  line  of  battle  at 
right  angles  to  his  former  line,  his  left  resting  near 
the  Sudley  Springs  road,  by  which  Burnside  with  the 
head  of  the  turning  column  was  approaching,  thus 
covering  the  Warrenton  Turnpike  and  opposing  a 
determined  front  to  the  Federal  advance  upon  the 


384  MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 

Confederate  left  and  rear.*  In  his  rear  to  the  south 
lay  the  valley  of  Young's  Branch,  and  rising  from 
that  was  the  higher  ridge  or  plateau  on  which  the 
Robinson  house  and  the  Henry  house  were  situated, 
and  on  which  the  main  action  took  place  in  the 
afternoon.  Burnside,  finding  Evans  across  his  path, 
promptly  formed  line  of  battle  and  attacked  about 
9.45  A.M.  Hunter,  the  division  commander,  who  was 
at  the  head  of  Burnside's  brigade  directing  the  forma- 
tion of  the  first  skirmish  line,  was  severely  wounded 
and  taken  to  the  rear  at  the  opening  of  the  action. 
Evans  not  only  repulsed  but  pursued  the  troops  that 
made  the  attack  upon  him.  Andrew  Porter's  brigade 
of  Hunter's  division  followed  Burnside  closely  and 
came  to  his  support.  In  the  meantime  Bee  had 
formed  a  Confederate  line  of  battle  with  his  and  Bar- 
tow's  brigades  of  Johnston's  army  on  the  Henry  house 
plateau,  a  stronger  position  than  the  one  held  by 
Evans,  and  desired  Evans  to  fall  back  to  that  line ; 
but  Evans,  probably  feeling  bound  to  cover  the  War- 
rantor! Turnpike  and  hold  it  against  Tyler  as  well 
as  against  the  flanking  column,  insisted  that  Bee 
should  move  across  the  valley  to  his  support,  which 
was  done. 

After  Bee  joined  Evans,  the  preliminary  battle  con- 
tinued to  rage  upon  the  ground  chosen  by  the  latter. 
The  opposing  forces  were  Burnside's  and  Porter's  bri- 
gades, with  one  regiment  of  Heintzelman's  division  on 
the  Federal  side,  and  Evans's,  Bee's,  and  Bartow's 

*  Evans's  action  was  probably  one  of  the  best  pieces  of  soldiership  on 
either  side  during  the  campaign,  but  it  seems  to  have  received  no  spe- 
cial commendation  from  his  superiors. 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  BUN.  385 

brigades  on  the  Confederate  side.  The  Confederates 
were  dislodged  and  driven  back  to  the  Henry  house 
plateau,  where  Bee  had  previously  formed  line  and 
where  what  Beauregard  called  "  the  mingled  remnants 
of  Bee's,  Bartow's,  and  Evans's  commands  r  were  re- 
formed under  cover  of  Stonewall  Jackson's  brigade  of 
Johnston's  army. 

The  time  of  this  repulse,  as  proved  by  so  accurate 
an  authority  as  Stonewall  Jackson,  was  before  11.30 
A.M.,  and  this  is  substantially  confirmed  by  Beaure- 
gard's  official  report  made  at  the  time.  Sherman  and 
Keyes  had  nothing  to  do  with  it.  They  did  not  begin 
to  cross  Bull  Run  until  noon.  Thus,  after  nearly  two 
hours'  stubborn  fighting  with  the  forces  of  Johnston, 
which  General  Scott  had  promised  should  be  kept 
away,  McDowell  won  the  first  advantage ;  but  Johns 
ton  had  cost  him  dearly. 

During  all  this  time  Johnston  and  Beauregard  had 
been  waiting  near  Mitchell's  Ford  for  the  development 
of  the  attack  they  had  ordered  by  their  right  upon 
McDowell  at  Centreville.  The  gravity  of  the  situa- 
tion upon  their  left  had  not  yet  dawned  upon  them. 
What  might  the  result  have  been  if  the  Union  column 
had  not  been  detained  by  Tyler's  delay  in  moving  out 
in  the  early  morning,  or  if  Johnston's  army,  to  which 
Bee,  Bartow,  and  Jackson  belonged,  had  not  arrived  ? 

But  the  heavy  firing  on  the  left  soon  diverted 
Johnston  and  Beauregard  from  all  thought  of  an 
offensive  movement  with  their  right,  and  decided 
them,  as  Beauregard  has  said,  "  to  hurry  up  all  avail- 
able re-enforcements,  including  the  reserves  that  were 
to  have  moved  upon  Centreville,  to  our  left,  and  fight 


386  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

the  battle  out  in  that  quarter."  Thereupon  Beaure- 
gard  ordered  "  Ewell,  Jones,  and  Longstreet  to  make 
a  strong  demonstration  all  along  their  front  on  the 
other  side  of  Bull  Run,  and  ordered  the  reserves, 
Holmes's  brigade  with  six  guns,  and  Early's  brigade 
to  move  swiftly  to  the  left,"  and  he  and  Johnston  set 
out  at  full  speed  for  the  point  of  conflict,  which  they 
reached  while  Bee  was  attempting  to  rally  his  men 
about  Jackson's  brigade  on  the  Henry  house  plateau. 
McDowell  had  waited  in  the  morning  at  the  point  on 
the  Warren  ton  Turnpike  where  his  flanking  column 
turned  to  the  right,  until  the  troops,  except  Howard's 
brigade,  which  he  halted  at  that  point,  had  passed. 
He  gazed  silently  and  with  evident  pride  upon  the 
gay  regiments  as  they  filed  briskly  but  quietly  past  in 
the  freshness  of  the  early  morning,  and  then,  remark- 
ing to  his  staff,  u  Gentlemen,  that  is  a  big  force,"  he 
mounted  arid  moved  forward  to  the  field  by  way  of 
Sudley  Springs.  He  reached  the  scene  of  actual  con- 
flict somewhat  earlier  than  Johnston  and  Beauregard 
did,  and,  seeing  the  enemy  driven  across  the  valley  of 
Young's  Branch  and  behind  the  Warrenton  Turnpike, 
at  once  sent  a  swift  aide-de-camp  to  Tyler  with  orders 
to  "  press  the  attack "  at  the  Stone  Bridge.  Tyler 
acknowledged  that  he  received  this  order  by  11 
o'clock.  It  was  Tyler's  division  upon  which  Mc- 
Dowell relied  for  the  decisive  fighting  of  the  day.  He 
knew  that  the  march  of  the  turning  column  would  be 
fatiguing,  and  when  by  a  sturdy  fight  it  had  cleared 
the  Warrenton  Turnpike  for  the  advance  of  Tyler's 
division,  it  had,  in  fact,  done  more  than  its  fair  pro- 
portion of  the  work.  But  Tyler  did  not  attempt  to 


THE  FIEST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN.  387 

force  the  passage  of  the  Stone  Bridge,  which,  after 
about  8  o'clock,  was  defended  by  only  four  companies 
of  infantry,  though  he  admitted  that  by  the  plan  of 
battle,  when  Hunter  and  Heintzelman  had  attacked 
the  enemy  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Stone  Bridge,  "  he  was 
to  force  the  passage  of  Bull  Run  at  that  point  and 
attack  the  enemy  in  flank."  Soon  after  McDowell's 
arrival  at  the  front,  Burnside  rode  up  to  him  and  said 
that  his  brigade  had  borne  the  brunt  of  the  battle, 
that  it  was  out  of  ammunition,  and  that  he  wanted  per- 
mission to  withdraw,  refit  and  fill  cartridge-boxes.  Mc- 
Dowell in  the  excitement  of  the  occasion  gave  reluct- 
ant consent,  and  the  brigade,  which  certainly  had  done 
nobly,  marched  to  the  rear,  stacked  arms,  and  took  no 
further  part  in  the  fight.  Having  sent  the  order  to 
Tyler  to  press  his  attack  and  orders  to  the  rear  of  the 
turning  column  to  hurry  forward,  McDowell,  like 
Beauregard,  rushed  in  person  into  the  conflict,  and  by 
the  force  of  circumstances  became  for  the  time  the 
commander  of  the  turning  column  and  the  force  actu- 
ally engaged,  rather  than  the  commander  of  his  whole 
army.  With  the  exception  of  sending  his  Adjutant- 
General  to  find  and  hurry  Tyler  forward,  his  subse- 
quent orders  were  mainly  or  wholly  to  the  troops  un- 
der his  own  observation.  Unlike  Beauregard,  he  had 
no  Johnston  in  rear  with  full  authority  and  knowl- 

*  After  the  affair  at  Blackburn's  Ford  on  the  18th  and  Tyler's  action 
in  the  battle  of  the  21st,  a  bitterness  between  Tyler  and  McDowell  grew 
up  which  lasted  till  they  died.  As  late  as  1884,  McDowell,  writing  to 
me  of  Tyler's  criticism  of  him  after  the  war,  said,  "  How  I  have  been 
punished  for  my  leniency  to  that  man !  If  there  is  anything  clearer  to 
me  than  anything  else  with  reference  to  our  operations  in  that  cam- 
paign, it  is  that  if  we  had  had  another  commander  for  our  right  we 
should  have  had  a  complete  and  brilliant  success." 


388 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


edge  of  the  situation  to  throw  forward  reserves  and 
re-enforcements.  It  was  not  until  12  o'clock  that 
Sherman  received  orders  from  Tyler  to  cross  the 
stream,  which  he  did  at  a  ford  above  the  Stone  Bridge, 
going  to  the  assistance  of  Hunter.  Sherman  reported 
to  McDowell  on  the  field  and  joined  in  the  pursuit  of 
Bee's  forces  across  the  valley  of  Young's  Branch. 
Reyes's  brigade,  accompanied  by  Tyler  in  person,  fol- 
lowed across  the  stream  where  Sherman  forded,  but 
without  uniting  with  the  other  forces  on  the  field, 
made  a  feeble  advance  upon  the  slope  of  the  plateau 
toward  the  Robinson  house,  and  then  about  2  o'clock 
filed  off  by  flank  to  its  left  and,  sheltered  by  the  east 
front  of  the  bluff  that  forms  the  plateau,  marched 
down  Young's  Branch  out  of  sight  of  the  enemy  and 
took  no  further  part  in  the  engagement.  McDowell 
did  not  know  where  it  was,  nor  did  he  then  know 
that  Sclienck's  brigade  of  Tyler's  division  did  not  cross 
the  Run  at  all. 

The  line  taken  up  by  Stonewall  Jackson  upon 
which  Bee,  Bartow,  and  Evans  rallied  on  the  southern 
part  of  the  plateau  was  a  very  strong  one.  The 
ground  was  high  and  afforded  the  cover  of  a  curvi- 
linear wood  with  the  concave  side  toward  the  Federal 
line  of  attack.  According  to  Beauregard's  official  re- 
port  made  at  the  time,  he  had  upon  this  part  of  the 
field,  at  the  beginning,  6,500  infantry,  13  pieces  of 
artillery,  and  2  companies  of  cavalry,  and  this  line 
was  continuously  re-enforced  from  Beauregard's  own 
reserves  and  by  the  arrival  of  the  troops  from  the  She- 
nandoah  Valley. 

To  carry  this  formidable  position,  McDowell  had  at 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  KUN.  389 

hand  the  brigades  of  Franklin,  Willcox,  Sherman,  and 
Porter,  Palmer's  battalion  of  regular  cavalry,  and 
Ricketts's  and  Griffin's  regular  batteries.  Porter's 
brigade  had  been  reduced  and  shaken  by  the  morning 
fight.  Howard's  brigade  was  in  reserve  and  only 
came  into  action  late  in  the  afternoon.  The  men,  un- 
used to  field  service,  and  not  yet  over  the  hot  and 
dusty  march  from  the  Potomac,  had  been  under  arms 
since  midnight.  The  plateau,  however,  was  promptly 
assaulted,  the  northern  part  of  it  was  carried,  the  bat- 
teries of  Ricketts  and  Griffin  were  planted  near  the 
Henry  house,  and  McDowell  clambered  to  the  upper 
story  of  that  structure  to  get  a  glance  at  the  whole 
field.  Upon  the  Henry  house  plateau,  of  which  the 
Confederates  held  the  southern  and  the  Federals  the 
northern  part,  the  tide  of  battle  ebbed  and  flowed  as 
McDowell  pushed  in  Franklin's,  Willcox's,  Sherman's, 
Porter's,  and  at  last  Howard's  brigades,  and  as  Beau- 
regard  put  into  action  reserves  which  Johnston  sent 
from  the  right  and  re-enforcements  which  he  hurried 
forward  from  the  Shenandoah  Valley  as  they  arrived 
by  cars.  On  the  plateau,  Beauregard  says,  the  disad- 
vantage of  his  "  smooth-bore  guns  was  reduced  by  the 
shortness  of  range."  The  short  range  was  due  to  the 
Federal  advance,  and  the  several  struggles  for  the 
plateau  were  at  close  quarters  and  gallant  on  both 
sides.  The  batteries  of  Ricketts  and  Griffin,  by  their 
fine  discipline,  wonderful  daring,  and  matchless  skill, 
were  the  prime  features  in  the  fight.  The  battle  was 
not  lost  till  they  were  lost.  When  in  their  advanced 
and  perilous  position,  and  just  after  their  infantry 
supports  had  been  driven  over  the  slopes,  a  fatal  mis- 


390  MILITAEY  MISCELLANIES. 

take  occurred.  A  regiment  of  infantry  came  out  of 
the  woods  on  Griffin's  right,  and  as  he  was  in  the  act 
of  opening  upon  it  with  canister,  he  was  deterred  by 
the  assurance  of  Major  Barry,  the  chief  of  artillery, 
that  it  u  was  a  regiment  sent  by  Colonel  Heintzelman 
to  support  the  battery."*  A  moment  more  and  the 
doubtful  regiment  proved  its  identity  by  a  deadly  vol- 
ley, and,  as  Griffin  states  in  his  official  report,  a  every 
cannoneer  was  cut  down  and  a  large  number  of  horses 
killed,  leaving  the  battery  (which  was  without  sup- 
port excepting  in  name)  perfectly  helpless."  The 
effect  upon  Ricketts  was  equally  fatal.  He,  desper- 
ately wounded,  and  Ramsay,  his  lieutenant,  killed,  lay 
in  the  wreck  of  the  battery.  Beauregard  speaks  of 
his  last  advance  on  the  plateau  as  "leaving  in  our 
final  possession  the  Robinson  and  Henry  houses,  with 
most  of  Ricketts's  and  Griffin's  batteries,  the  men  of 
which  were  mostly  shot  down  where  they  bravely 
stood  by  their  guns."  Having  become  separated  from 
McDowell,  I  fell  in  with  Barnard,  his  chief  engineer, 
and  while  together  we  observed  the  New  York  Fire 
Zouaves,  who  had  been  supporting  Griffin's  battery, 
fleeing  to  the  rear  in  their  gaudy  uniforms,  in  utter 
confusion.  Thereupon  I  rode  back  to  where  I  knew 
Burnside's  brigade  was  at  rest,  and  stated  to  Burnside 
the  condition  of  affairs,  with  the  suggestion  that  he 
form  and  move  his  brigade  to  the  front.  Returning, 
I  again  met  Barnard,  and  as  the  battle  seemed  to  him 
and  me  to  be  going  against  us,  and  not  knowing  where 
McDowell  was,  with  the  concurrence  of  Barnard,  as 

*  Griffin  himself  told  me  so  as  we  rode  together  after  leaving  Cen- 
treville.     He  and  I  were  classmates  and  warm  friends. 


THE  FIRST  BA.TTLE  OF  BULL  KUN.  391 

stated  in  his  official  report,  I  immediately  sent  a  note 
to  Miles,  telling  him  to  move  two  brigades  of  his  re- 
serves tip  to  the  Stone  Bridgeand  telegraphed  to 
Washington  to  send  forward  all  the  troops  that  could 
be  spared. 

After  the  arrival  of  Howard's  brigade,  McDowell 
for  the  last  time  pressed  up  the  slope  to  the  plateau, 
forced  back  the  Confederate  line,  and  regained  posses- 
sion of  the  Henry  and  Robinson  houses  and  of  the 
lost  batteries.  But  there  were  no  longer  cannoneers 
to  man  or  horses  to  move  these  guns  that  had  done  so 
much.  By  the  arrival  upon  this  part  of  the  field  of 
his  own  reserves  and  Kirby  Smith's  brigade  of  John- 
ston's army  about  half -past  three,  Beauregard  extend- 
ed his  left  to  outflank  McDowell's  shattered,  shortened 
and  disconnected  line,  and  the  Federals  left  the  field 
about  half-past  four.  Until  then  they  had  fought 
wonderfully  well  for  raw  troops.  There  were  no 
fresh  forces  on  the  field  to  support  or  encourage  them, 
and  the  men  seemed  to  be  seized  simultaneously  by 
the  conviction  that  it  was  no  use  to  do  anything  more 
and  they  might  as  well  start  home.  Cohesion  was 
lost,  the  organizations  with  some  exceptions  being 
disintegrated,  and  the  men  quietly  walked  off.  There 
was  no  special  excitement  except  that  arising  from 
the  frantic  efforts  of  officers  to  stop  men  who  paid 
little  or  no  attention  to  anything  that  was  said.  On 
the  high  ground  by  the  Matthews  house,  about  where 
Evans  had  taken  position  in  the  morning  to  check  Burn- 
side,  McDowell  and  his  staff,  aided  by  other  officers, 
made  a  desperate  but  futile  effort  to  arrest  the  masses 
and  form  them  into  line.  There,  I  went  to  Arnold's 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

battery  as  it  came  by,  and  advised  that  he  unlimber 
and  make  a  stand  as  a  rally  ing-point,  which  he  did, 
saying  he  was  in  fair  condition  and  ready  to  fight  as 
long  as  there  was  any  fighting  to  be  done.  But  all 
efforts  failed.  The  stragglers  moved  past  the  guns, 
in  spite  of  all  that  could  be  done,  and  as  stated  in  his 
report,  Arnold  at  my  direction  joined  Sykes's  battalion 
of  infantry  of  Porter's  brigade  and  Palmer's  battalion 
of  cavalry,  all  of  the  Regular  Army,  to  cover  the  rear, 
as  the  men  trooped  back  in  great  disorder  across  Bull 
Run.  There  were  some  hours  of  daylight  for  the 
Confederates  to  gather  the  fruits  of  victory,  but  a  few 
rounds  of  shell  and  canister  checked  all  the  pursuit 
that  was  attempted,  and  the  occasion  called  for  no 
sacrifices  or  valorous  deeds  by  the  stanch  regulars  of 
the  rear-guard.  There  was  no  panic,  in  the  ordinary 
meaning  of  the  word,  until  the  retiring  soldiers,  guns, 
wagons,  congressmen  and  carriages  were  fired  upon, 
on  the  road  east  of  Bull  Run.  Then  the  panic  began, 
and  the  bridge  over  Cub  Run  being  rendered  impass- 
able for  vehicles  by  a  wagon  that  was  upset  upon  it, 
utter  confusion  set  in  :  pleasure-carriages,  gun-carriages 
and  ammunition  wagons  which  could  not  be  put 
across  the  Run  were  abandoned  and  blocked  the 
way,  and  stragglers  broke  and  threw  aside  their  mus- 
kets and  cut  horses  from  their  harness  and  rode  off 
upon  them.  In  leaving  the  field  the  men  took  the 
same  routes,  in  a  general  way,  by  which  they  had 
reached  it.  Hence  when  the  men  of  Hunter's  and 
Heintzelman's  divisions  got  back  to  Centreville,  they 
had  covered  about  twenty-five  miles.  That  night  they 
walked  back  to  the  Potomac,  an  additional  distance 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  BUN.  393 

of  twenty  miles ;  so  that  these  undisciplined  and  un- 
seasoned men  within  thirty-six  hours  walked  fully 
forty -five  miles,  besides  fighting  from  about  10  A.M. 
until  4  P.M.  on  a  hot  and  dusty  day  in  July.  Mc- 
Dowell in  person  reached  Centreville  before  sunset,* 
and  found  there  Miles's  division  with  Richardson's 
brigade  and  three  regiments  of  Runyon's  division,  and 
Hunt's,  Tidball's,  Ayres's,  and  Greene's  batteries  and 
one  or  two  fragments  of  batteries,  making  about  twenty 
guns.  It  was  a  formidable  force,  but  there  was  a  lack 
of  food  and  the  mass  of  the  army  was  completely  de- 
moralized. Beauregard  had  about  an  equal  force  which 
had  not  been  in  the  fight,  consisting  of  Ewell's,  Jones's? 
and  Longstreet's  brigades  and  some  troops  of  other 
brigades.  McDowell  consulted  the  division  and  brigade 
commanders  who  were  at  hand  upon  the  question  of 
making  a  stand  or  retreating.  The  verdict  was  in  favor 
of  the  latter,  but  a  decision  of  officers  one  way  or  the 
other  was  of  no  moment ;  the  men  had  already  decided 
for  themselves  and  were  streaming  away  to  the  rear,  in 
spite  of  all  that  could  be  done.  They  had  no  interest 
or  treasure  in  Centreville,  and  their  hearts  were  not 
there.  Their  tents,  provisions,  baggage,  and  letters 
from  home  were  upon  the  banks  of  the  Potomac,  and 
no  power  could  have  stopped  them  short  of  the  camps 
they  had  left  less  than  a  week  before.  As  before 
stated,  most  of  them  were  sovereigns  in  uniform,  not 

*  I  left  the  field  with  General  Franklin.  His  brigade  had  dissolved. 
We  moved  first  northerly,  crossed  Bull  Run  below  the  Sudley  Spring 
Ford,  and  then  bore  south  and  east.  Learning  by  inquiries  of  the  men 
I  passed  that  McDowell  was  ahead  of  me,  I  left  Franklin  and  hurried 
on  to  Centreville,  where  I  found  McDowell,  just  after  sunset,  rearrang- 
ng  the  positions  of  his  reserves. 


394  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

soldiers.  McDowell  accepted  the  situation,  detailed 
Richardson's  and  Blenker's  brigades  to  cover  the  re- 
treat, and  the  army,  a  disorganized  mass,  with  some 
creditable  exceptions,  drifted  as  the  men  pleased  away 
from  the  scene  of  action.  There  was  no  pursuit,  and 
the  march  from  Centreville  was  as  barren  of  oppor- 
tunities for  the  rear-guard  as  the  withdrawal  from  the 
field  of  battle  had  been.*  When  McDowell  reached 
Fairfax  Court-House  in  the  night,  he  was  in  communi- 
cation with  Washington  and  exchanged  telegrams 
with  General  Scott,  in  one  of  which  the  old  hero  said, 
"  We  are  not  discouraged  " ;  but  that  dispatch  did  not 
lighten  the  gloom  in  which  it  was  received.  McDow- 
ell was  so  tired  that  while  sitting  on  the  ground  writ- 
ing a  dispatch  he  fell  asleep,  pencil  in  hand,  in  the 
middle  of  a  sentence.  His  Adjutant-General  aroused 
him  ;  the  dispatch  was  finished,  and  the  weary  ride 
to  the  Potomac  resumed.  When  the  unfortunate  com- 
mander dismounted  at  Arlington  next  forenoon  in  a 
soaking  rain,  after  thirty-two  hours  in  the  saddle,  his 
disastrous  campaign  of  six  days  was  closed. 

The  first  martial  effervescence  of  the  country  was 
over.  The  three-months'  men  went  home,  and  the 
three-months'  chapter  of  the  War  ended — with  the 
South  triumphant  and  confident ;  the  North  disap- 
pointed but  determined. 

*  The  revised  losses  are  as  follows:  Federal,  16  officers  and  444  en- 
listed men  killed  ;  78  officers  and  1,046  enlisted  men  wounded ;  50  of- 
ficers and  1,262  enlisted  men  missing  ;  25  pieces  of  artillery  and  a  large 
quantity  of  small  arms.  Confederate,  25  officers  and  362  enlisted  men 
killed;  63  officers  and  1,519  enlisted  men  wounded ;  1  officer  and  12 
enlisted  men  missing. 


THE     OPPOSING    ARMIES    AT    THE    FIRST 

BULL  RUN  AS  GIVEN  BY  "CENTURY 

MAGAZINE." 

[The  composition  and  losses  of  each  army  as  here  stated  give  the 
gist  of  all  the  data  obtainable  in  the  Official  Records.  K  stands  for 
killed ;  w  for  wounded  ;  m  for  captured  or  missing  ;  c  for  captured.] 

COMPOSITION  AND  LOSSES  OF  THE  UNION  ARMY. 

Brig. -Gen.  Irvin  McDowell.  Staff  loss:  w,  1.  (Capt.  O.  H.  Tilling- 
hast,  mortally  wounded.) 

FIRST  DIVISION,  Brig. -Gen.  Daniel  Tyler.  Staff  loss,  w,  2.  First 
Brigade,  Col.  Erasmus  D.  Keyes :  3d  Me.,  Col.  C.  D.  Jameson,  1st  Conn., 
Col.  G.  S.  Burnham;  3d  Conn.,  Col.  A.  H.  Terry;  3d  Conn.,  Col. 
John  L.  Chatfield.  Brigade  loss:  k,  19;  w,  50;  m,  154=223.  Second 
Brigade,  Brig.-Gen.  Robert  C.  Schenck :  2d  N.  Y.  (militia),  Col.  G.  W. 
B.  Tompkins;  1st  Ohio,  Col.  A.  McD.  McCook ;  2d  Ohio,  Lieut. -Col. 
Rodney  Mason ;  E,  2d  U.  S.  Arty.,  Capt.  J.  H.  Carlisle.  Brigade  loss: 
k,  21;  w,  25;  m,  52=98.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  W.  T.  Sherman:  13th 
N.  Y.,  Col.  I.  F.  Quinby;  69th  N.  Y.,  Col.  M.  Corcoran  (w  and  c), 
Capt.  James  Kelly;  79th  N.  Y.,  Col.  James  Cameron  (k) ;  2d  Wis., 
Lieut. -Col.  H.  W.  Peck ;  E,  3d  U.  S.  Arty.,  Capt.  R.  B.  Ayres.  Brigade 
loss :  k,  107 ;  w,  205 ;  m,  293=605.  Fourth  Brigade,  Col.  Israel  B. 
Richardson:  1st  Mass.,  Col.  Robert  Cowdin;  12th  N.  Y.,  Col.  Ezra  L. 
Walrath;  2d  Mich.,  Major  A.  W.  Williams;  3d  Mich.,  Col.  Daniel  Mc- 
Connell;  G,  1st  U.  S.  Arty.,  Lieut.  John  Edwards;  M,  2d  U.  S.  Arty., 
Capt.  Henry  J.  Hunt.  This  brigade  was  only  slightly  engaged  in  front 
of  Blackburn's  Ford,  with  the  loss  of  one  officerjdlled. 

SECOND  DIVISION,  Col.  D.  Hunter  (w),  Col.  Andrew  Porter.  Staff 
loss:  w,  1 ;  m,  1=2.  First  Brigade,  Col.  Andrew^Porter :  8th  N.  Y. 
(militia),  Col.  Geo.  Lyons;  14th  N.  Y.  (militia),  Col.  A.  M.  Wood  (w 
and  c),  Lieut.-Col.  E.  B.  Fowler;  27th  N.  Y.,  Col.  H.  W.  Slocum  (w), 
Major  J.  J.  Bartlett;  Battalion  U.  S.  Infantry,*Major  George  Sykes; 
Battalion  U.  S.  Marines,  Major  J.  G.  Reynolds  ;  JBattalion  U.  S.  Cavalry, 
Major  I.  N.  Palmer ;  D,  5th  U.  S.  Arty.,  Capt.  Charles  Griffin.  Brigade 
loss:  k,  86;  w,  177;  m,  201=464.  Second ^Brigade,  Col.  Ambrose  E. 
Burnside:  2d  N.  H.,  Col.  Gilman  Marston  (w),  Lieut.-Col.  F.  S.  Fiske ; 
1st  R.  L,  Major  J.  P.  Balch ;  2d  R.  I.  (with  battery),  Col.  John  S.  Slo- 

395 


- 


396  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

cum  (k),  Lieut. -Col.  Frank  Wheaton  ;  71st  N.  Y.  (with  two  howitzers). 
Col.  H.  P.  Martin.     Brigade  loss:  k,  58;  w,  171 ;  m,  134=363. 

THIRD  DIVISION,  Col.  Samuel  P.  Heintzelman.  First  Brigade,  CoL 
W.  B.  Franklin:  5th  Mass.,  Col.  S.  C.  Lawrence;  llth  Mass.,  Col. 
George  Clark,  Jr.  ;  1st  Minn.,  Col.  W.  A.  Gorman;  I,  1st  U.  S.  Arty., 
Capt.  J.  B.  Ricketts  (w  and  c),  Lieut.  Edmund  Kirby.  Brigade  loss : 
k,  70;  w,  197;  m,  92=359.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  Orlando  B.  Willcox 
(w  and  c),  Col.  J.  H.  H.  Ward  ;  llth  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  N.  L.  Farnham  ; 
38th  N.  Y.,  Col.  J.  H.  H.  Ward,  Lieut,-Col.  A.  Farnsworth ;  1st  Mich., 
Major  A.  F.  Bidwell ;  4th  Mich.,  Col.  D.  A.  Woodbury ;  D,  2d  U.S. 
Arty.,  Capt.  Richard  Arnold.  Brigade  loss:  k,  65;  w,  177;  m,  190= 
432.  Third  Brigade,  Col.  Oliver  O.  Howard:  3d  Me.,  Major  H.  G. 
Staples;  4th  Me.,  Col.  H.  G.  Berry;  5th  Me.,  Col.  M.  H.  Dunnell ;  2d 
Vt.,  Col.  Henry  Whiting.  Brigade  loss:  k,  27;  w,  100;  m,  98=225. 

FOURTH  (RESERVE)  DIVISION.  [Not  on  the  field  of  battle.]  Brig.- 
Gen."  Theodore  Runyon.  Militia:  1st  N.  J.,  Col.  A.  J.  Johnson;  2d  N. 
J.,  Col.  H.  M.  Baker;  3d  N.  J.,  Col.  Wm.  Napton ;  4th  N.  J.,  CoL 
Matthew  Miller,  Jr.  Volunteers:  1st  N.  J.,  CoL  W.  R.  Montgomery; 
2d  N.  J.,  Col.  Geo.  W.  McLean;  3d  N.  J.,  Col.  George  W.  Taylor;  41st 
N.  Y.,  Col.  Leopold  von  Gilsa. 

FIFTH  DIVISION.  [In  reserve  at  Centreville  and  not  engaged  in  the 
battle  proper.  It  had  some  skirmishing  during  the  day  and  while  cov- 
ering the  retreat  of  the  army.]  Col.  Dixon  S.  Miles.  First  Brigade, 
Col.  Louis  Blenker;  8th  N.  Y.  (Vols.),  Lieut.-Col.  Julius  Stahel;  29th 
N.  Y.,  Col.  Adolph  von  Steinwehr ;  39th  N.  Y.  (Garibaldi  Guards),  Col. 
F.  G.  D'Utassy;  27thJPenna.,  Col.  Max  Einstein;  A,  2d  U.  S.  Arty., 
Capt.  John  C.  Tidball ;  Bookwood's  N.  Y.  battery,  Capt.  Charles  Book- 
wood.  Brigade  loss:  k,  6 ;  w,  16  ;  m,  96=118.  Second  Brigade,  Col. 
Thomas  A.  Davies:  16th  N.  Y.,  Lieut.-Col.  Samuel  Marsh;  18th  N.  Y., 
Col.  W.  A.  Jackson;  31st  N.  Y.,  Col.  C.  E.  Pratt;  32d  N.  Y.,  Col.  R. 
Matheson;  G,  2d  U.  S.  Arty.,  Lieut.  O.  D.  Greene.  Brigade  loss:  w, 
2;  m,  1=3. 

Total  loss  of  the  Union  Army:  killed,  460;  wounded,  1,124;  cap- 
tured or  missing,  1,312,— grand  total,  2,896.  / 
STRENGTH   OF  THE   UNION  ARMY. 

General  James  B.  Fry,  who  was  General  McDowell's  Adjutant-Gen- 
eral, prepared,  in  October,  1884,  a  statement  of  the  strength  of  the 
army,  in  brief  as  follows : 

u  It  was  not  practicable  at  the  time  to  ascertain  the  strength  of  the 
army  with  accuracy ;  and  it  is  impossible  now  to  make  a  return  which 
can  be  pronounced  absolutely  correct. 

u  The  abstract  which  appears  on  page  309,  vol.  ii.,  '  Official  Rec- 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  BULL  RUN. 


397 


ords,'  is  not  a  return  of  McDowell's  army  at  the  Battle  of  Bull  Run, 
and  was  not  prepared  by  me,  but,  as  I  understand,  has  been  compiled 
since  the  war.  It  purports  to  give  the  strength  of  the  '  Department  of 
Northeastern  Virginia,'  July  16  and  17,  not  of  McDowell's  army,  July 
21.  It  does  not  show  the  losses  resulting  from  the  discharge  of  the 
4th  Pennsylvania  Infantry  and  Varian's  New  York  battery,  which 
marched  to  the  rear  on  the  morning  of  the  21st,  nor  the  heavy  losses 
incident  to  the  march  of  the  army  from  the  Potomac  ;  it  embraces  two 
regiments — the  21st  and  25th  New  York  Infantry — which  were  not 
with  the  army  in  the  field ;  and  it  contains  the  strength  of  Company 
E,  Second  United  States  Cavalry,  as  a  special  item,  whereas  that  com- 
pany is  embraced  in  the  strength  of  the  Second  (Hunter's)  Division,  to 
which  it,  with  the  rest  of  the  cavalry  belonged. 

4kln  his  report  of  the  battle  (p.  324,  vol.  ii.,  'Official  Records') 
General  McDowell  says  he  crossed  Bull  Run  '  with  about  eighteen  thou- 
sand men.'  I  collected  information  to  that  effect  for  him  at  the  time. 
His  statement  is  substantially  correct.  The  following  is  an  exhibit  in 
detail  of  the  forces  actually  engaged : 


COMMANDS. 

Officers. 

Enlisted 
men. 

General  staff  .    .         .... 

19 

First  Division,  two  brigades         .   .                     .... 

284 

5,068 

Second  Division,  two  brigades      

252 

5,717 

Third  Division,  three  brigades  

341 

6,891 

Total  —  seven  brigades  .  . 

896 

17,676 

"  Only  Reyes's  and  Sherman's  brigades  of  the  four  brigades  of  the 
First  Division  crossed  Bull  Run. 

"  The  Fifth  Division,  with  Richardson's  brigade  of  the  First  Division 
attached,  was  in  reserve  at  and  in  front  of  Centreville.  Some  of  it  was 
lightly  engaged  on  our  side  of  Bull  Run  in  repelling  a  feeble  advance  of 
the  enemy.  The  Fourth  (Reserve)  Division  was  left  to  guard  our  com- 
munications with  the  Potomac,  its  advance  being  seven  miles  in  rear  of 
Centre  ville. 

"  That  is  to  say,  McDowell  crossed  Bull  Run  with  896  officers,  17,676 
rank  and  file,  and  24  pieces  of  artillery. 

"  The  artillerymen  who  crossed  Bull  Run  are  embraced  in  the  figures 
of  the  foregoing  table.  The  guns  were  as  follows :  Ricketts's  Battery, 
6  10-pounder  rifle  guns ;  Griffin's  Battery,  4  10-pounder  rifle  guns,  2 
12-pounder  howitzers;  Arnold's  Battery,  2  13-pounder  rifle  guns,  2 
6-pounder  smooth-bores ;  R.  I.  Battery,  6  13-pounder  rifles ;  71st  N.  Y. 
Reg't's  Battery,  2  Dahlgren  howitzers. 


398 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


"  The  artillery  in  addition  to  that  which  crossed  Bull  Run,  was  as 
follows:  Hunt's  Battery,  4  12-pounder  rifle  guns;  Carlisle's  Battery,  2 
13-pounder  rifle  guns,  2  6-pounder  smooth-bore  guns  ;  TidbalPs  Battery, 
2  6-pounder  smooth-bore  guns,  2  12-pounder  howitzers;  Greene's  Bat- 
tery, 4  10-pounder rifle  guns;  Ayres's  Battery,  2  10-pounder  rifle  guns, 
2  6-pounder  smooth-bore  guns,  2  12-pounder  howitzers  ;  Ed  wards 's  Bat- 
tery, 2  20-pounder  rifle  guns,  1  30-pounder  rifle  gun." 

COMPOSITION  AND  LOSSES  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  ARMY. 
General  Joseph  E.  Johnston. 

ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  Brig. -Gen.  G.  T.  Beauregard.  First  Bri- 
gade, Brig. -Gen.  M.  L.  Bonham:  llth  N.  C.,  Col.  W.  W.  Kirkland ; 
2d  S.  C.,  Col.  J.  B.  Kershaw;  3d  S.  C.,  Col.  J.  H.  Williams;  7th  S.  C., 
Col.  Thomas  G.  Bacon;  8th  S.  C.,  Col.  E.  B.  C.  Cash.  Loss,  k,  10 ;  w, 
66=76.  Second  Brigade  [not  actively  engaged],  Brig. -Gen.  R.  S.  Ewell : 
5th  Ala.,  Col.  R.  E.  Rodes;  6th  Ala.,  Col.  J.  J.  Seibels;  6th  La.,  Col. 
J.  G.  Seymour.  Third  Brigade,  Brig. -Gen.  D.  R.  Jones:  17th  Miss., 
Col.  W.  S.  Featherston;  18th  Miss.,  Col.  E.  R.  Burt ;  5th  S.  C.,  Col.  M. 
Jenkins.  Loss;  k,  13;  w,  62=75.  Fourth  Brigade  [not  actively  en- 
gaged], Brig. -Gen.  James  Longstreet :  5th  N.  C.,  Lieut. -Col.  Jones;  1st 
Va.,  Major  F.  G.  Skinner;  llth  Va..  Col.  S.  Garland,  Jr.  ;  17th  Va., 
Col.  M.  D.  Corse.  Loss:  k,  2 ;  w,  12=14.  Fifth  Brigade,  Col.  P.  St. 
Geo.  Cocke :  8th  Va.,  Col.  Eppa  Hunton  ;  18th  Va.,  Col.  R.  E.  Withers ; 
19th  Va.,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  C.  Strange;  28th  Va..  Col.  R.  T.  Preston;  49th 
Va.  (3  cos.),  Col.  Wm.  Smith.  Loss :  k,  23  ;  w  79  ;  m,  2=104.  Sixth 
Brigade,  Col.  Jubal  A  Early:  7th  La.,  Col.  Harry  T.  Hays;  13th  Miss., 
Col.  Wm.  Barksdale;  7th  Va.,  Col.  J.  L.  Kemper ;  24th  Va.,  Lieut.- 
Col.  P.  Hairston,  Jr.  Loss :  k,  13 ;  w,  67=79.  Evans's  command 
(temporarily  organized),  Col.  N.  G.  Evans :  1st  La.  Battalion,  Major  C. 
R.  Wheat  (w)  ;  4th  S.  C.,  Col.  J.  B.  E.  Sloan;  Cavalry,  Capt.  W.  R. 
Terry;  Artillery,  Lieut.  G.  S.  Davidson.  Loss:  k,  20;  w,  118;  m,  8= 
146.  Reserve  Brigade  [not  actively  engaged],  Brig.-Gen.  T.  H.  Holmes  r 
1st  Arkansas  and  2d  Tennessee.  Unattached  Infantry,  8th  La. ;  Col. 
H.  B.  Kelly ;  Hampton's  (S.  C.)  Legion,  Col.  Wade  Hampton.  Loss : 
k,  19 ;  w,  100 ;  m,  2=121.  Cavalry:  30th  Virginia,  Col.  R.  C.  W. 
Radford  ;  Harrison's  Battalion  ;  Ten  independent  companies.  Loss :  k, 
5;  w,  8=13.  Artillery:  Battalion  Washington  Artillery  (La.),  Major 
J.  B.  Walton;  Alexandria  (Va.)  Battery,  Capt.  Del  Kemper:  Latham's 
(Va.)  Battery,  Capt.  H.  G.  Latham ;  Loudoun  (Va.)  Artillery,  Capt. 
Arthur  D.  Rogers ;  Shields's  (Va.)  Battery,  Capt.  J.  C.  Shields.  Loss : 
k,  2  ;  w,  8=10.  Total  loss  Army  of  the  Potomac :  k,  105  ;  w,  519  ;  m, 
12=636. 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OP  BULL  KUN.  399 

ARMY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH,  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston.  First 
Brigade,  Brig. -Gen.  T.  J.  Jackson:  2d  Va.,  Col.  J.  W.  Allen;  4th  Va., 
Col.  J.  F.  Preston;  5th  Va.,  Col.  Kenton  Harper;  27th  Va.,  Lieut. -Col. 
John  Echols;  33d  Va.,  Col.  A.  C.  Cummings.  Loss:  k,  119;  w,  442 
=561.  Second  Brigade,  Col.  F.  S.  Bartow  (k)  :  7th  Ga.,  Col.  Lucius  J. 
Gartrell;  8th  Ga.,  Lieut. -Col.  W.  M.  Gardner.  Loss:  k,  60;  w,  293 
=353.  Third  Brigade,  Brig. -Gen.  B.  E.  Bee  (k)  :  4th  Ala.,  Col.  Jones 
(k),  Col.  S.  R.  Gist:  2d  Miss.,  Col.  W.  C.  Falkner;  llth  Miss.  (2  cos.), 
Lieut.-Col.  P.  F.  Liddell;  6th  N.  C.,  Col.  C.  F.  Fisher  (k).  Loss:  k, 
95  ;  w,  309;  m,  1=405.  Fourth  Brigade,  Brig. -Gen.  E.  K.  Smith  (w). 
Col.  Arnold  Elzey:  1st  Md.  Battalion,  Lieut.-Col.  George  H.  Steuart ; 
3d  Tennessee,  Col.  John  C.  Vaughn;  10th  Va.,  Col.  S.  B.  Gibbons; 
13th  Va.,  Col.  A.  P.  Hill.  Loss:  k,  8 :  w,  19=27.  Artillery:  Imbo- 
den's,  Stanard's,  Pendleton's,  Alburtis's,  and  Beckham's  batteries. 
Cavalry:  1st  Va.,  Col.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart.  (Loss  not  specifically  reported.) 
Total  loss  Army  of  the  Shenandoah  :  k,  282  ;  w,  1,063  ;  m,  1=1,346. 

Total  loss  of  the  Confederate  Army :  killed,  387;  wounded,  1,582; 
captured  or  missing,  13, — grand  total,  1,982. 

STRENGTH  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  ARMY. 
In  October,  1884,  General  Thomas  Jordan,  who  was  General  Beaure- 
gard's  Adjutant-General,  prepared  a  statement  of  the  strength  of  the 
Confederate  Army  at  Bull  Run  or  Manassas,  of  which  the  following  is 
a  condensation : 

"  So  far  as  the  troops  of  Beauregard's  immediate  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac are  concerned,  this  statement  is  condensed  from  two  that  I  pre- 
pared with  the  sub-returns  of  all  the  commands  before  me  as  the  Adju- 
tant-General of  that  army,  September  25,  1861,  and  I  will  vouch  for 
its  exactness.  In  respect  to  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah,  I  have  been 
obliged  to  present  an  estimate  of  8,340  as  the  total  of  the  rank  and  file 
of  Johnston's  army,  my  authority  for  which  is  a  statement  written  by 
me  in  the  official  report  of  the  battle,  and  based,  as  I  distinctly  recol- 
lect, upon  official  documents  and  returns  in  my  hands  at  the  time,  of 
the  accuracy  of  which  I  was  and  am  satisfied.  The  totals  of  General 
Beauregard's  Army  of  the  Potomac  are  : 

ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  AVAILABLE  ON  THE  FIELD. 

Generals  and  Staff 37 

Infantry,  Rank  and  File 19,569 

Cavalry.                       "     1,468 

Artillery        "             "    '.  826 

21,900 
Field  Guns..  27 


400  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  ACTIVELY  ENGAGED. 

Generals  and  Staff 10 

Infantry,  Rank  and  File  8,415 

Cavalry,         "            "    1,000 

Artillery,       "             "    288 


9,713 
Field  Guns ,.  17 

RECAPITULATION. 

Infantry.    Cavalry.    Artillery.    Staff.     Total. 

Army  of  the  Potomac— Rank  and 

File  engaged 8,415      1,000        288       10       9,713 

Army  of  the  Shenandoah,  Rank 

and  File  engaged  (estimated) ..   7,684         300        350        6       8,340 

Total  Rank  and  File,  both  Confed- 
erate armies,  engaged 16,099       1,300        638       16     18,053" 


ARTICLE  VII. 

Smith's  "  Confederate  War  Papers." 

This  is  a  book  in  four  parts  by  General  G.  W. 
Smith,  late  Major-General  Confederate  Army.  It  is 
a  contribution  to  the  controversies  going  on  among 
ex-officers  of  the  Confederacy ;  but  its  real  value  is 
in  the  new  light  it  throws  upon  the  battle  of  Seven 
Pines,  or  Fair  Oaks. 

The  book  adds  one  more  to  the  proofs  that  the 
President  of  the  ex-Confederacy  had  to  contend  with 
formidable  opposition  inside  of  his  own  lines.  Never- 
theless, he  stood  from  beginning  to  end  at  the  head 
of  the  able  and  ambitious  generals  and  politicians 
turbulently  thrown  together  by  secession.  That  fact 
is  evidence  of  his  ability,  earnestness  of  purpose,  and 
force  of  character.  That  he  should  have  bitter  op- 
ponents was  inevitable.  The  author  of  this  book  ap- 
pears as  one  of  them  ;  but  he  says  something  on  both 
sides  of  the  subject  and  comments  with  moderation. 

When  General  Smith  reported  for  duty  at  Fairfax 
Court-House  in  September,  1861,  General  J.  E.  John- 
ston, commanding  the  army,  and  General  Beauregard, 
second  in  command,  were  on  bad  terms  with  Mr. 

*  ' '  Confederate  War  Papers :  Fairfax  Court-House,  New  Orleans, 
Seven  Pines,  Richmond  and  North  Carolina."  By  Gustavus  W.  Smith, 
late  Major-General,  Confederate  States  Army.  New  York:  Atlantic 
Publishing  and  Engraving  Co. 

Journal  Military  Service  Institute. 

401 


402 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


Davis,  the  Confederate  President.  General  Smith, 
the  third  in  rank,  was  on  friendly  terms  with  all  of 
them.  The  three  Generals  were  in  favor  of  having 
the  army  under  them  strengthened  and  authorized  to 
invade  the  North  that  fall,  by  turning  Washington. 
With  a  view  to  convincing  Mr.  Davis  of  the  wisdom 
of  this  course,  and  securing  the  necessary  re-enforce- 
ments, he  was  invited  to  visit  headquarters,  at  Fair- 
fax Court-House,  for  a  conference,  and  accepted,  think- 
ing the  conference  was  for  general  purposes.  The 
meeting  took  place  early  in  October — the  exact  date 
is  not  stated.  General  Smith  was  the  common  friend. 
The  Generals  wanted  "to  concentrate  in  that  vicinity, 
as  rapidly  as  possible,  all  the  available  forces  of  the 
Confederacy,  cross  the  Potomac  with  the  army  thus 
re-enforced,  and  by  pressing  the  fighting  in  the  enemy's 
country,  make  a  determined  effort  in  the  autumn  of 
1861  to  compel  the  Northern  States  to  recognize  our 
(the  Southern)  independence." 

Mr.  Davis,  on  the  other  hand,  said  that  "  the  whole 
country  was  demanding  protection  at  his  hands,  and 
praying  for  arms  and  troops  for  defence  " ;  that  he 
hoped  for  arms  from  abroad  before  spring ;  and  he 
advocated  minor  military  operations — some  of  which 
he  specified — to  occupy,  instruct,  and  encourage  the 
troops  during  the  winter.  The  Generals,  finding 
themselves  disappointed  in  the  one  grand  operation 
which  they  advocated,  failed  to  undertake  the  minor 
operations  pointed  out  by  their  President.  Bad  feel- 
ing between  the  two  parties  continued  to  grow ; 
questions  arose  among  the  people  as  to  the  war  policy 
of  Mr.  Davis  ;  and  it  seemed  that  the  President  might 


SMITH'S  "  CONFEDERATE  WAR  PAPERS  "       403 

be  credited  with  the  views  the  Generals  had  advocated 
and  he  had  opposed.  The  conference  held  in  October 
was  informal,  and  was  not  recorded.  But  in  January 
following  (1862)  General  Smith  wrote  out  his  recol- 
lection of  it,  signed  the  paper,  obtained  the  signatures 
of  Johnston  and  Beauregard,  and  filed  the  document 
away.  He  says  in  his  book  that  the  statement  was 
"  mildly  drawn,  care  being  taken  to  make  it  as  re- 
spectful as  possible,  consistent  with  the  facts."  He 
could  have  given  this  statement  a  better  character  by 
simply  asserting  that  it  was  a  true  record  of  what  oc- 
curred. He  adds  :  "  It  was  not  intended  to  publish 
it  unless  it  became  necessary  to  use  it  in  vindication 
of  the  truth."  That  is  to  say,  it  was  a  secret  docu- 
ment, prepared  by  the  Confederate  President's  subor- 
dinates, held  by  one  of  them  to  be  drawn  against  his 
superior  officer  if  the  holder  thought  best.  By  the 
time  General  Smith  drew  up  the  paper  in  January, 
1862,  he  had,  no  doubt,  joined  Johnston  and  Beaure- 
gard in  opposition  to  their  President.  Mr.  Davis  says 
in  his  book :  "  Twenty  years  after  the  event  I  learned 
of  this  secret  report  by  one  party — without  notice 
having  been  given  to  the  other — of  a  conversation 
said  to  have  lasted  two  hours.  I  have  noticed  the 
improbabilities  and  inconsistencies  of  the  paper,  and, 
without  remark,  I  submit  to  honorable  men,  the  con- 
cealment from  me  in  which  it  was  prepared,  where- 
by they  may  judge  of  the  chances  for  such  co-intel- 
ligence as  needs  must  exist  between  the  Executive 
and  the  commanders  of  armies  to  insure  attainable 


success." 


There  is  not  likely  to  be  much  difference  of  opinion 


404  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

upon  this  issue.     The  verdict  will  be  in  favor  of  the 
ex-President  of  the  "  lost  cause." 

A  word  as  to  the  merits  of  the  war  policy,  for  which 
the  Generals  were  anxious  to  secure  credit  at  the  ex- 
pense of  their  President.  The  author  says,  "  I  believed 
that  by  the  course  proposed  we  could,  before  winter 
set  in,  convince  the  people  of  the  Northern  States, 
that  it  was  unwise  for  them  to  persist  in  trying  to 
hold  the  Southern  people  in  the  Union  at  the  point 
of  the  bayonet.  By  pressing  the  fighting  in  the 
enemy's  country  we  expected  to  compel  the  Northern 
States  to  recognize  our  independence."  As  the  author 
anticipated  such  remarkable  results,  it  is  not  strange 
that  he  deems  it  important  to  fix  on  Mr.  Davis  the 
responsibility  for  "  the  failure  of  the  Confederate 
army  in  Virginia  to  make  an  active  campaign  of  inva- 
sion, fighting  on  Northern  soil,  in  the  autumn  of  1861." 
But  General  Smith  was  mistaken  in  his  premises. 
Bayonets  were  necessary  to  settle  the  questions  which 
were  open  at  the  time,  but  they  are  not  required  to 
"hold  the  Southern  people  in  the  Union."  Further- 
more, his  great  expectations  from  an  invasion  in  the 
fall  of  1861  would  not  have  been  realized.  It  would 
not  have  compelled  the  Northern  States  to  recognize 
the  independence  of  the  Southern  Confederacy.  Gen- 
eral Smith's  belief,  affected  no  doubt  by  his  hope,  may 
have  been  due  somewhat  to  the  fact  that  Northern 
valor  and  soldiership  were  at  that  time  underestimated 
in  the  South ;  Union  troops  were  looked  upon,  not  as 
earnest  men  contending  for  a  principle,  but  as  "  Lin- 
coln hirelings."  One  Southern  man,  some  people 
thought,  was  equal  in  war  to  five  or  six  Yankees. 


SMITH'S  "CONFEDERATE  WAR  PAPERS."  405 

The  truth  is,  that  in  addition  to  the  desire  for  human 
freedom,  as  an  independent  principle,  there  was  in  the 
North  a  determination  to  preserve  the  Government, 
and  a  deep-seated,  old-fashioned  patriotism  which  many 
prominent  Southerners  did  not  reckon  upon.  The 
war,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  could  not  be  decided 
by  a  dash.  It  had  to  be  a  trial  of  courage,  endurance, 
and  resources  combined.  But  there  were  more  direct 
considerations  which  also  tended  to  induce  Mr.  Davis 
to  reject  the  war  policy  presented  by  his  Generals  at 
Fairfax  Court  House.  He  saw,  no  doubt,  that  while 
the  proposed  policy  was  tempting  from  a  purely  mili- 
tary point  of  view,  it  took  small  account  of  political 
conditions  which  he  could  not  disregard.  "  The  whole 
country,"  as  he  told  the  Generals,  "  was  demanding 
protection  at  his  hands,  and  praying  for  arms  and 
troops  for  defence"  He  could  not  have  consolidated 
his  people  for  the  long  struggle  which  had  to  come,  if 
he  had  denied  defence  to  all,  for  the  sole  purpose  of 
an  invasion  from  Virginia.  General  Smith  admits  that 
there  "  was  the  hope  and  expectation  that,  before  the 
end  of  winter,  arms  would  be  introduced  into  the 
country  ;  and  all  were  confident  that  we  could  then  not 
only  protect  our  own  country,  but  successfully  invade 
that  of  the  enemy"  This  admission  alone  is  a  suffi- 
cient answer  for  Mr.  Davis  to  the  war  policy  of  his 
Generals. 

SEVEN  PINES. 

Part  III.  is  entitled  "  Notes  on  the  Battle  of  Seven 
Pines,  or  Fair  Oaks."  This  is  much  the  most  impor- 
tant part  of  the  work. 

During  that  action  Smith  was  next  in  rank  to  John- 


406  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

ston,  the  General-in-Chief,  and  commanded  the  left  wing 
of  the  Confederate  army  during  the  first  day,  and  the 
whole  army  from  7  P.M.  on  the  first  day,  when  John- 
ston was  wounded,  till  1  P.M.  on  the  second  day.  His- 
torians have  failed  to  commend  his  part  in  the  action. 
In  his  book,  Smith,  with  drawn  sabre,  boldly  charges 
upon  them  all ;  attacking  especially  the  accounts  given 
by  Jefferson  Davis  in  his  "  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Con- 
federacy," Joseph  E.  Johnston  in  his  "  Narrative,7' 
Richard  Taylor  in  his  "  Destruction  and  Reconstruc- 
tion," writers  on  the  Confederate  side ;  and  Swinton 
and  Webb,  Union  authors. 

To  weigh  the  points  General  Smith  makes,  it  is  nec- 
essary to  recall  the  main  features  of  the  situation  at 
the  time  the  battle  of  Seven  Pines  was  fought. 

As  McClellan  followed  the  retiring  Confederates  up 
the  Peninsula  from  Williamsburg,  in  May,  1861,  his 
main  line  of  advance,  nearly  due  west,  was  the  Rich- 
mond and  Williamsburg,  or  Old  Stage,  road.  About 
ten  miles  east  of  Richmond  this  road  crosses  the  Chick- 
ahominy  River  by  Bottom's  Bridge.  The  part  of  the 
Chickahorniny  with  which  we  are  concerned  runs  almost 
in  a  right  line  from  northwest  to  southeast.  At  the 
point  on  the  Williamsburg  road  where  it  is  spanned 
by  Bottom's  Bridge,  the  stream  is  about  forty  feet 
wide,  and  for  fifteen  or  twenty  miles  above  it  varies 
in  width  from  forty  to  seventy-five  or  eighty  feet.  It 
is  skirted  by  heavy  timber,  and  its  valley,  or  bottom- 
land, varying  from  half  a  mile  to  a  mile  in  width,  is 
low  and  marshy,  and  is  subject  to  overflow.  A  mile 
above  Bottom's  Bridge  the  stream  is  crossed  by  the 
bridge  of  the  Richmond  and  York  River  Railroad. 


SMITH'S  "CONFEDERATE  WAR  PAPERS.1 


407 


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the  head   of  York   River.     It  crosses  the   Pamunky 


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River  just  above  the  point  where  the  stream  empties 
into  the  York.     This  crossing,   called  White  House, 


408  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

only  about  twelve  miles  by  the  railroad  from  the 
Chicahominy,  was  the  Union  depot — York  and  Pa- 
munky  rivers  being  open  to  our  shipping. 

As  they  withdrew  from  Williamsburg,  the  Confed- 
erates crossed  to  the  Richmond  side  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy, and  destroyed  the  bridges  as  far  as  they  could, 
but  did  not  undertake  to  defend  the  crossings.  They 
did  not  appear  disposed  to  make  a  stand  until  they 
were  under  cover  of  the  entrenchments  around  Rich- 
mond. 

McClellan's  advance  (Keyes's  4th  Corps)  reached 
the  Chickahominy  at  Bottom's  Bridge  on  the  20th  of 
May,  forded  the  stream,  and  occupied  the  high  ground 
on  the  west  side.  Although  the  season  was  unusually 
wet,  the  Chickahominy  was  then  fordable  at  all  cross- 
ings above  Bottom's  Bridge.  Neither  the  river  nor 
the  enemy,  therefore  prevented  the  Union  army  from 
continuing  the  advance.  But  McClellan  threw  his 
army  forward  into  line  upon  his  leading  corps  as  his 
left,  and  established  the  centre  and  right  of  it  in  rear 
of  the  Chickahominy,  the  left  being  in  front  of  that 
stream.  He  deemed  this  disposition  of  his  centre  and 
right  necessary  to  guard  hie  line  of  communication 
(twelve  miles  long)  with  his  depot  at  the  White 
House,  and  to  protect  his  right  and  rear ;  although  he 
assumed  that,  as  a  final  result,  the  opposing  army 
would  take  shelter  behind  its  defences  near  Richmond, 
and  that  a  siege  would  ensue. 

As  the  Chickahominy  was  liable  to  rise  suddenly, 
become  impassable,  and  sweep  away  temporary  bridges, 
and  thus  cut  him  off  from  his  base  on  the  Pamunky, 
McClellan  was  not  willing  to  throw  all  of  his  army 


SMITH'S  "  CONFEDERATE  WAR  PAPERS."  409 

across  the  stream  until  he  had  built  bridges  which 
would  enable  him  to  pass  troops  and  supplies  with 
certainty  and  celerity.  While  constructing  these 
bridges  he  held  a  strong  position.  On  the  left  a 
stream  called  White  Oak  branch  rises  near  Richmond, 
flows  easterly  just  south  of  the  Williarnsburg  road, 
and  empties  in  the  Chickahominy  two  or  three  miles 
below  Bottom's  Bridge.  The  valley  of  this  creek, 
from  its  mouth  for  several  miles  toward  Richmond,  is 
a  difficult  and  in  most  places  an  impassable  morass, 
called  White-Oak  swamp.  The  left  wing  of  the 
army,  Keyes's  4th  Corps,  with  Heintzelman's  3d  Corps 
as  reserve,  was  thus  well  covered.  A  stream  called 
Beaver-Dam  creek  runs  nearly  due  south,  and  empties 
into  the  Chickahominy  at  a  point  north  of  Richmond. 
Upon  the  high  bank  of  this  creek,  at  right  angles  to 
his  main  line  along  the  Chickahominy,  the  Union  com- 
mander posted  his  right  flank.  His  line  thus  estab- 
lished, covered,  speaking  broadly,  the  northeastern 
quarter  of  a  circle  drawn  around  Richmond  with  a 
radius  of  about  twelve  miles,  and  extended  from  Bot- 
tom's Bridge,  east  of  Richmond,  along  the  Chickahom- 
iny to  Meadow  Bridge  north  of  that  city,  a  distance 
of  about  fifteen  miles.  The  weakness  of  the  position 
was  in  the  fact  that  the  army  was  astride  a  stream 
which  might,  and  did,  rise  so  as  to  prevent  one  wing 
from  supporting  the  other. 

The  Confederate  army  was  posted  between  the 
Chickahominy  and  Richmond,  and  was  necessarily  well 
concentrated  ;  but  the  entrenchments  around  the  city 
were  weak. 

In  addition  to  the  danger  he  was  in  from  McClel- 


410 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


Ian,  the  Confederate  commander  was  menaced  by 
McDowell,  who,  with  over  forty  thousand  men  and  a 
hundred  guns  (if  not  deterred  by  counter  movements 
against  Washington),  threatened  to  advance  on  McClel- 
lan's  right,  from  Fredericksburg,  some  sixty  miles 
north  of  Richmond. 

Johnston,  with  his  entire  army  well  in  hand,  had 
resolved  to  pursue  an  offensive-defensive  policy. 
While  he  was  deliberating  upon  striking  a  blow  at 
McClellan's  left  near  Bottom's  Bridge — or  waiting  an 
opportunity  to  do  so — he  heard  (May  27)  that  Mc- 
Dowell was  advancing  from  Fredericksburg.  There- 
upon he  resolved  to  cross  the  upper  Chickahominy  and 
(on  29th  May)  destroy  or  "double-up"  McClellan's 
right  before  McDowell  could  get  within  supporting 
distance  ;  and  for  this  purpose  he  strengthened  his 
left  and  placed  General  G.  W.  Smith  in  command  of 
his  left  wing.  Bat  learning  on  the  28th  that  McDow- 
ell had  abandoned  the  advance — had  in  fact  turned 
north — Johnston  countermanded  his  orders  for  attack- 
ing the  Union  right.* 

In  the  meantime  McClellan  had  been  pushing  his 
left  wing  forward.  On  the  24th  Casey's  division  (of 
Keyes's  4th  Corps)  occupied  and  entrenched  a  point 
called  Seven  Pines,  only  seven  miles  from  Richmond 
by  the  main  Williamsburg  road.  Couch's  division 
(the  other  part  of  Keyes's  corps)  was  not  far  in  rear ; 

*  General  Smith  repeats  with  a  little  sly  sarcasm  how  the  Confeder- 
ate President,  Davis,  hurried  through  his  office  work  on  the  morning 
of  the  29th,  and  rode  about  the  field  trying  to  find  the  performance, 
which  he  finally  learned  from  subordinates  that  Johnston — with  whom 
he  was  not  on  cordial  terms— had  countermanded,  without  notifying 
him. 


SMITH'S  "CONFEDERATE  WAR  PAPERS."       411 

and  Heintzelman's  3d  Corps  had  crossed  the  Chicka- 
hominy  at  Bottom's  Bridge,  and  was  guarding  the 
road  to  the  left  through  White-Oak  swamp,  and  ready 
to  support  the  troops  in  front. 

On  the  29th  Casey's  division  was  pushed  forward  a 
half  or  three  quarters  of  a  mile  to  the  front  of  Seven 
Pines,  and  began  to  entrench;  and  Couch  occupied 
the  position  vacated  by  Casey  at  Seven  Pines. 

By  the  30th  the  time  had  come  when  the  Confed- 
erate commander  felt  that  some  positive  move  must 
be  made  in  support  of  his  offensive-defensive  policy. 
The  season,  being  unusually  wet,  increased  actually 
and  relatively  the  difficulties  of  the  Union  army. 
The  Chickahominy  had  overflowed  the  bottom-lands, 
destroyed  some  of  the  new  bridges,  and  delayed  the 
completion  of  others.  The  elements  were  decidedly 
in  favor  of  the  Confederates. 

On  the  30th  Johnston,  encouraged  by  a  reconnois- 
sance  in  force,  decided  to  attack  McClellan's  left  next 
day,  the  31st,  and  the  battle  of  Seven  Pines,  or  Fair 
Oaks,  was  the  result. 

To  use  almost  literally  General  Smith's  description 
—which  agrees  generally  with  that  of  Union  writers 
—the  point  known  as  Seven  Pines  is  merely  the  junc- 
tion of  two  roads  ;  it  is  seven  miles  east  of  Richmond, 
on  the  Williamsburg  (or  Old  Stage)  road,  which  starts 
out  from  the  southern  part  of  the  city.  From  the 
northern  suburb  of  the  city  another  road  starts  out, 
and  runs  in  an  easterly  direction,  keeping  about  two 
miles  to  the  north  of  the  Williamsburg  road  for  a  dis- 
tance of  seven  miles  from  Richmond,  where  it  forks  at 
a  point  called  Old  Tavern.  The  fork  to  the  left  leads 


412 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


northerly  to  New  Bridge  on  the  Chickahominy,  oppo- 
site McClellan's  centre.  The  fork  to  the  right  runs 
southeasterly  two  miles,  where  it  intersects  the  Will- 
iamsburg  road  at  Seven  Pines.  This  fork  of  two  miles 
from  Old  Tavern  to  Seven  Pines,  with  the  main  road 
(seven  miles)  from  Old  Tavern  to  Richmond,  is  the 
"  Nine-Mile  Road."  The  Richmond  and  York  River 
Railroad  lies  between  the  Will  iamsburg  and  Nine- 
Mile  roads,  until  it  crosses  the  latter  at  a  point  called 
Fair  Oaks,  a  mile  northwest  from  Seven  Pines. 

The  Charles  City  road  branches  off  from  the  Will- 
iamsburg  road  at  a  point  three  miles  east  of  Richmond, 
and  leads  to  the  southwest,  below  White-Oak  swamp ; 
but  before  reaching  the  swamp,  going  by  that  road 
from  Richmond,  lateral  country  roads  lead  from  the 
Charles  City  to  the  Williamsburg  road 

The  country  about  Seven  Pines  is  generally  flat  and 
swampy,  with  farms  and  heavy  timber  interspersed. 
Although  there  are  many  country  roads  through  the 
neighborhood,  it  is  a  bad  region  for  army  movements 
in  rainy  weather,  even  on  the  roads. 

The  natural  features  of  the  battle-field  afforded  no- 
special  favor  either  to  attack  or  defence  ;  but  the  Con- 
federates had  some  advantage  in  the  fact  that  the  two- 
best  highways — the  Williamsburg  and  Nine-Mile  road& 
—lying  at  a  safe  and  convenient  distance  apart,  led 
from  their  camps  and  intersected  at  the  point  occupied 
by  the  Union  forces ;  thus  enabling  a  ready  concen- 
tration upon  the  field  of  battle. 

The  official  morning  report  made  at  the  time 
("  Records  of  Rebellion,"  vol.  xi.,  part  iii.,  p.  204) 
shows  that  on  the  31st  of  May,  McClellan's  Army  of 


SMITH'S  "CONFEDERATE  WAK  PAPERS."  413 

the  Potomac  in  the  Peninsula,  had  98,008  present  for 
duty,  not  including  McDowell's  arrny,  41,000  near 
Fredericksburg,  nor  Wool's  command  of  11,514  for 
duty,  at  Fort  Monroe. 

No  return  of  the  Confederate  forces  for  May  31  ap- 
pears;  but  a  return  for  May  21  (vol.  xi.,  part  iii.,  p. 
530)  gives  the  strength  of  Johnston's  army  (Smith's 
1st  Division,  Longstreet's  2d  Division,  Magruder's  3d 
Division,  D.  H.  Hill's  4th  Division,  Cavalry  Brigade, 
and  Artillery  Reserve)  as  53,688.  But  before  the 
battle  of  Seven  Pines  the  force  was  increased  by 
Huger's  division,  5,000,  and  by  other  re-enforcements, 
which  ran  it  up,  no  doubt,  to  the  figures  given  by 
General  Smith,  62,000  present  on  May  31. 

On  the  30th — when  Johnston  ordered  the  attack — 
although  the  Chickahominy  was  high,  McClellan  had 
several  bridges  by  which,  at  that  time,  he  could  cross 
to  support  his  left  wing.  But  during  the  night  of  the 
30th-31st  the  rain  fell  in  torrents,  and  raised  the 
already  swollen  stream,  so  as  almost  to  prove  the  ruin 
of  the  Union  left.  Surnner  got  to  its  relief  by  antici- 
pating orders.  Receiving  instructions  at  1  P.M.  to  "  be 
in  readiness  to  move  at  a  moment's  warning,"  he  did 
not  simply  prepare  his  command,  but,  hearing  the 
sound  of  battle  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river,  he 
formed  his  two  divisions,  and  marched  each  to  the 
bridge  it  had  built  across  the  Chickahominy,  and 
waited  with  "  the  heads  of  columns  on  the  bridges," 
holding  the  flooring  down  against  the  rising  waters, 
for  word  to  advance.  The  orders  came  at  two  o'clock. 
Just  before  that,  one  of  the  bridges  was  swept  from 
under  the  feet  of  the  men,  but  both  divisions  rushed 


414 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


across  the  other  bridge  before  it  became  impassabley 
and  reached  the  field  in  time  to  avert  the  impending 
disaster.  This  is  one  of  the  few  instances  in  which  a 
great  result  in  war  can  be  traced  directly  to  a  single 
exhibition  of  good  soldiership  by  a  subordinate.  In 
auditing  the  public  services  of  its  soldiers  this  Gov- 
ernment cannot  overestimate  its  debt  to  General  E.  V. 
Sumner  for  his  conduct  on  the  31st  of  May,  1862. 

Johnston's  purpose  of  attacking  Keyes  at  Seven 
Pines  was  adopted  before  the  heavy  rain  of  the  night 
of  the  30th— 31st,  and  was  not  suggested  by  the  advan- 
tage which  that  storm  gave  him  by  destroying  bridges. 
His  orders  were  based  upon  the  assumption  that  the 
Chickahominy  ,  as  he  said,  would  "  be  high — passable 
only  at  the  bridges."  In  fact,  the  battle  was  due 
rather  to  the  course  of  events  than  to  his  conception. 
Speaking  of  Casey's  advance  beyond  Seven  Pines,  and 
Longstreet's  desire  to  attack  him,  Johnston  said  in  a 
letter  to  Generals  Whiting  and  G.  W.  Smith  on  the 
29th :  "  Who  knows  but  in  the  course  of  the  morning 
Longstreet's  scheme  may  accomplish  itself.  If  we  get 
into  a  fight  here,  you  must  hurry  to  help  us."  Up  to 
that  time  certainly  Johnston  had  not  decided  to  attack. 
This  is  further  shown  by  his  instructions  of  the  30th 
to  Huger,  hereafter  quoted.  But  during  the  day— 
the  30th — Longstreet  was  with  him  in  person,  and  re- 
ceived verbal  instructions  for  next  day's  operations, 

Johnston's  orders  for  this  battle  constitute  one  of 
the  principal  topics  discussed  in  General  Smith's  book. 
They  do  not  show  a  well  defined  purpose  in  the  com- 
mander's mind. 

The  general  control  of  the  attack  was  entrusted  to 


SMITH'S  "CONFEDERATE  WAR  PAPERS."  415 

Longstreet,  who  had  his  own  division  14,000,  D.  H. 
Hill's  division  11,000,  and  Huger's  division  5,000,  a 
force  of  30,000  men  present.  In  addition  to  this, 
Hood's  brigade  of  Smith's  division  joined  Longstreet 
during  the  afternoon  of  the  battle.  Longstreet's 
orders  from  Johnston  were  verbal.  D.  H.  Hill  re- 
ceived orders  from  Longstreet  to  conduct  the  attack. 
Huger,  who  had  arrived  only  the  day  before  the  bat- 
tle, though  the  senior,  was  required  to  act  under  Long- 
street  ;  but,  nevertheless,  Johnston  gave  him  written 
orders  as  if  he  were  independent.  Huger  was  blamed 
for  not  taking  an  earlier  and  more  active  part  than  he 
did,  but  he  appears  to  have  defended  himself  success- 
fully against  the  accusations.  His  orders  from  Johns- 
ton were  as  follows : 

"May  30,  1862,  8.40  P.M. 

" MAJOR- GENERAL  HUGER: — General:  The  reports 
of  Major-General  D.  H.  Hill  give  me  the  impression 
that  the  enemy  is  in  considerable  strength  in  his  front. 
It  seems  to  me  necessary  that  we  should  increase  our 
force  also.  For  that  object  I  wish  to  concentrate  the 
troops  of  your  division  on  the  Charles  City  road,  and 
concentrate  the  troops  of  Major- General  Hill  on  that  to 
Williamsourg.  To  do  this,  it  will  be  necessary  for 
you  to  move  as  early  in  the  morning  as  possible,  to  re- 
lieve the  brigade  of  General  Hill's  division  now  on  the 
Charles  City  road.  The  road  is  the  second  large  one 
diverging  to  the  right  from  the  Williamsburg  road ; 
the  first  turns  off  near  the  toll-gate.  On  reaching  your 
position  on  the  Charles  City  road,  learn  at  once  the 
routes  to  the  main  roads  to  Richmond  on  your  right 
and  left,  especially  those  to  the  left,  and  try  and  find 


416 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


guides.     Be  ready,  if  an  action  should  be  begun  on 
your  left,  to  fall  upon  the  enemy's  flank. 

"  Most  respectfully  your  obedient  servant, 

"J.  E.  JOHNSTON,  General. 
"  P.  S. — It  is  important  to  move  early." 

Certainly  under  such  orders,  clearly  expressing  a 
defensive  purpose,  and  telling  him  to  be  ready  if  an 
action  should  be  begun  on  his  left,  an  officer  could  not 
be  expected  to  begin  an  action  himself.  But  appar- 
ently, lest  he  might  do  something,  the  Confederate 
commander  sent  Huger  a  second  order  as  follows : 

"MAY  31. 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  HUGER: — General:  I  fear  that 
in  my  note  of  last  evening,  of  which  there  is  no  copy, 
I  was  too  positive  on  the  subject  of  YOUR  ATTACKING  the 
enemy's  left  flank*  It  will,  of  course,  be  necessary  for 
you  to  know  what  force  is  before  you  first.  I  hope  to 
be  able  to  have  that  ascertained  for  you  by  cavalry. 
As  our  main  force  will  be  on  your  left,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary for  your  progress  to  the  front  to  conform  at 
first  to  that  of  General  Hill.  If  you  find  no  strong 
body  in  your  front,  it  will  be  well  to  aid  General  Hill ; 
but  then,  a  strong  reserve  should  be  retained  to  cover 
our  right.  Yours  truly, 

"  J.  E.  JOHNSTON,  General" 

These  orders  are  in  "  Records  of  Rebellion,"  vol.  xi., 
part  i.,  page  938.  They  show  conclusively  that  John- 
ston did  not  expect  Huger  to  begin  an  attack,  which 
beginning  Longstreet  reported  that  he  lost  several 
hours  waiting  for.  In  fact,  the  most  that  these  orders 

*  Italics  by  the  reviewer  in  all  instances  in  this  review. 


SMITH'S  "CONFEDERATE  WAR  PAPERS."  417 

required  of  Huger  was  to  co- operate  in  a  battle  which 
was  to  be  begun  by  others.  If  he  found  no  strong 
body  in  his  front,  it  would  "  be  well  to  aid  General 
Hill " ;  but  even  in  that  case  he  was  to  retain  "  a 
strong  reserve  "  to  cover  the  right. 

Huger  claimed,  and  it  does  not  appear  to  have  been 
controverted,  that  though  he  was  the  senior,  he  was 
ready  to  take  Longstreet's  orders,  and  so  expressed 
himself  to  Longstreet  at  the  time,  but  that  he  received 
no  orders  from  that  officer. 

Yet,  in  the  face  of  these  facts,  Longstreet  said  in  a 
note  to  Johnston  dated  June  7  ("  Records  of  Rebel- 
lion," vol.  xi.,  part  iii.,  p.  580)  :  "  The  failure  of  com- 
plete success  on  Saturday,  May  31,  I  attribute  to  the 
slow  movements  of  General  Huger's  command.  This 
threw  perhaps  the  hardest  part  of  the  battle  upon  my 
own  poor  division.  ...  I  can't  help  but  think  a 
display  of  his  forces  on  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy  by 
General  Huger  would  have  completed  the  affair,  and 
given  Whiting  as  easy  and  pretty  a  game  as  was  ever 
had  upon  a  battle-field.  Slow  men  are  a  little  out  of 
place  upon  the  field."  The  Records  do  not  show  that 
Johnston  repelled  the  imputation  put  upon  Huger. 

Although  the  attack  was  entrusted  to  the  right 
wing,  some  30,000  men  under  Longstreet,  the  Con- 
federate commander  gave  orders  for  co-operation  by 
his  left  wing.  At  9.15  P.M.  on  the  30th  he  wrote 
General  G.  W.  Smith,  commanding  the  left  wing 
("  Records  of  Rebellion,"  vol.  xi.,  part  iii.,  p.  563)  : 
"  If  nothing  prevents  we  will  fall  upon  the  enemy  in 
front  of  Major- General  Hill  ...  as  early  as  pos- 
sible. The  Chickahominy  will  be  high,  and  passable 


418 


MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 


only  at  the  bridges, — a  great  advantage  to  us.  Please 
be  ready  to  move  by  the  Nine-Mile  road,  corning  as 
early  as  possible  to  the  point  at  which  the  road  to 
New  Bridge  turns  off.  Should  there  be  cause  of 
haste,*  General  McLaws  on  your  approach  will  be 
ordered  to  leave  his  ground  for  you,  that  he  may  re- 
inforce General  Longstreet." 

The  part  assigned  to  the  left  by  this  order  was  but 
little,  if  any,  more  aggressive  than  that  allotted  to 
Huger  oh  the  right.  Evidently  all  the  fighting  orders 
were  given  to  Longstreet  verbally.  Yet  both  Smith 
and  Huger  were  blamed  as  if  they  had  received  orders 
to  attack  ;  and  the  former  has  been  forced  to  defend 
himself  in  a  book  against  the  charge  of  having  failed 
to  do  what  there  is  nothing  to  show  he  was  ordered 
to  do,  or  ought  to  have  done.  General  Smith  shows 
quite  clearly  that  historians  of  the  battle  of  Seven 
Pines  have  wronged  him.  While  other  writers  may 
have  been  ignorant,  Johnston,  according  to  General 
Smith,  knew  the  truth,  but  did  not  divulge  it — in 
fact,  suppressed  it.  Smith,  the  second  in  command, 
was  on  intimate  terms  with  Johnston,  the  chief.  He 
shows  in  his  book  that  he  was  fully  informed  as  to 
Johnston's  plans  and  intentions.  When  the  move- 
ment was  ordered  on  the  30th,  Longstreet's  division 
was  on  the  Nine-Mile  road,f  and  Johnston  directed 
that  it  should  proceed  to  the  attack  by  that  road  ; 
while  D.  H.  Hill's  division  advanced  by  the  Williams- 
burg  road  on  which  it  was  lying ;  and  Huger's  by  the 

*  That  is  to  say,  should  Longstreet  need  assistance  before  you  reach 
McLaw's  position. 

t  See  map. 


SMITH'S  "  CONFEDERATE  WAR  PAPERS."  419 

Charles  City  road,  further  to  the  right — south.  That 
would  have  brought  Long-street's  division  upon  Keyes's 
right  flank,  the  weakness  of  which  is  shown  by  the 
following  remark  from  Keyes's  recent  book  ("  Fifty 
Years'  Observations,"  etc.,  p.  452)  :  "  The  left  of  my 
lines  was  all  protected  by  the  White-Oak  swamp,  but 
the  right  was  on  ground  so  favorable  to  the  approach 
of  the  enemy,  and  so  far  from  the  Chickahominy,  that 
if  Johnston  had  attacked  there  an  hour  or  two  earlier 
than  he  did,  I  could  have  made  but  a  feeble- defence 
comparatively,  and  every  man  of  us  would  have  been 
killed,  captured,  or  driven  into  the  swamp  or  river 
before  assistance  could  have  reached  us."  The  loss  of 
this  grand  opportunity,  the  existence  of  which  is  ad- 
mitted on  all  sides,  has  been  charged  by  most,  if  not 
all,  writers  on  the  subject  to  General  G.  W.  Smith. 
By  his  book  he  succeeds  in  transferring  the  responsi- 
bility to  Johnston  and  Longstreet.  He  proves,  using 
Johnston  as  principal  witness,  that  Johnston's  orders 
required  Long  street's  division  to  proceed  to  the  Nine- 
Mile  road  against  the  weak  point  of  Keyes's  line  de- 
scribed above  ;  but  that  on  the  morning  of  the  31st 
Smith  ascertained  and  informed  Johnston  that  Long- 
street's  division  had  left  that  road  and  gone  down  to 
the  Williamsburg  road  and  fallen  in  behind  Hill. 
Johnston  sent  orders  for  Longstreet,  if  not  too  late, 
to  send  at  least  part  of  his  division  back  to  proceed  as 
ordered  by  the  Nine-Mile  road.  But  it  was  too  late, 
or  was  thought  to  be.  Having  entrusted  the  manage- 
ment of  the  attack  to  Longstreet,  Johnston  left  him 
to  conduct  it  by  the  Williamsburg  road,  and  went 
himself  along  the  Nine-Mile  road  with  G.  W.  Smith's 


420  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

division,  and  held  that  division  until  late  in  the  after- 
noon, watching  the  north  side  of  the  Chickahominy. 
Smith  stated  these  particulars  in  his  official  report, 
dated  June  23,  1862,  but  they  were  stricken  out  by 
request  of  Johnston,  because  he  did  not  want  "  to 
make  generally  known  the  misunderstanding  between 
Longstreet  and  himself  in  regard  to  the  direction  in 
which  Longstreet's  division  was  to  move  into  action." 
Certainly  it  is  due  to  General  Smith,  as  well  as  to 
history,  -that  these  important  points  should  become 
generally  known  now. 

But  after  giving  due  weight  to  the  fact  that  Long- 
street,  not  Smith,  was  ordered  to  attack  Keyes's  ex- 
posed right  flank  by  the  Nine-Mile  road,  it  remains 
true  that  Smith's  division  and  Smith  in  person  early 
in  the  day  reached  the  position  on  that  road  from 
which  the  fatal  attack  could  and  should  have  been 
made.  The  question  is,  Who  was  to  blame  for  the 
failure  of  Smith's  division  to  make  it  at  the  right 
time  ?  The  answer  is,  Johnston,  as  proved  by  Smith's 
book.  The  same  conclusion  must  be  drawn  from 
Johnston's  official  report,  dated  June  24,  1862  (vol. 
xi.,  part  i.,  pp.  933,  934,  "  Records  of  Rebellion"). 
He  says :  "  General  Smith  was  to  march  to  the  junc- 
tion of  the  New  Bridge  road  and  the  Nine-Mile  road, 
to  be  in  readiness  either  to  fall  on  Keyes^s  flank  or  to 
cover  Longstreet s  left.  .  .  .  In  the  meantime  I 
had  placed  myself  on  the  left  of  the  force  employed  in 
his  (Longstreet's)  attack,  withthe  division  of  General 
Smith,  that  I  might  be  on  a  part  of  the  field  where  I 
could  observe  and  be  ready  to  meet  any  counter-move- 
ments which  the  enemtfs  General  might  make  against 


SMITH'S  "  CONFEDERATE  WAR  PAPERS."  421 

our  centre  or  left.  Owing  to  the  peculiar  condition  of 
the  atmosphere,  the  sound  of  the  musketry  did  not 
reach  us.*  I  consequently  deferred  giving  the  signal 
for  General  Smith's  advance  until  about  four  <f clock, 
at  which  time  Major  Jasper  S.  Whiting,  of  General 
Smith's  staff,  whom  I  had  sent  to  learn  the  state  of 
affairs  with  General  Longstreet's  column,  returned, 
reporting  that  it  was  pressing  on  with  vigor.  Smith's 
troops  were  at  once  moved  forward" 

This  proves  beyond  all  cavil  that  Smith's  attack 
was  made  at  the  very  time  and  place  that  Johnston 
himself  designated ;  and  there  does  not  appear  to  be 
any  charge  that  the  attack  was  not  well  conducted. 
But,  as  has  been  shown,  Johnston,  who  was  with  the 
division,  did  not  order  the  attack  until  four  o'clock, 
and  by  the  time  it  was  under  way  one  of  the  "counter- 
movements  of  the  enemy's  General,"  which  Johnston 
had  placed  himself  on  his  left  to  watch,  had  actually 
been  made.  Sumner,  with  Sedgwick's  division,  reached 
the  field  from  the  north  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  at 
4.30,  and  was  joined  later  by  Richardson's  division  ; 
so  that  no  sooner  had  Smith  commenced  his  attack 
upon  Couch,  of  Keyes's  corps,  than  he  was  compelled 
to  turn  and  defend  himself  against  Sumner,  who.  was 
on  his  flank  and  threatening  his  rear. 

*  This  is  precisely  what  occurred  at  the  battle  of  Perryville,  except 
that  Johnston  had  ordered  and  was  expecting  the  sound  of  the  mus- 
ketry fire  he  anxiously  listened  for,  but  failed  to  hear ;  whereas,  Bnell 
simply  failed  to  hear  musketry  fire  which  he  had  not  ordered,  and 
which  he  had  no  particular  reason  to  expect.  It  is  a  coincidence,  also, 
that  in  both  cases  notice  of  the  heavy  firing,  which  began  about  two 
o'clock,  reached  the  commanders  by  staff-officers  about  four  o'clock, 
and  thereupon  the  wing  not  engaged  was  immediately  ordered  into 
action. 


422 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


To  summarize:  Keyes's  4th  Corps,  about  9,000 
strong,  consisting  of  Casey's  and  Couch's  divisions,  the 
former  composed  mainly  of  raw  troops,  constituted  the 
advance  of  the  Union  left  wing,  and  was  the  force 
upon  which  the  Confederate  assault  was  made.  Mc- 
Clellan's  orders  to  Keyes  were  to  hold  Seven  Pines 
strongly.  Keyes  made  a  line  of  entrenchments  a  mile 
in  rear  (east)  of  Seven  Pines,  then  moved  forward  and 
occupied  the  forks  of  the  road  at  Seven  Pines,  and 
made  a  line  of  rifle  pits  a  mile  long  from  Seven  Pines 
to  Fair  Oaks.  On  the  29th,  Keyes  moved  Casey's  di- 
vision forward  a  half  a  mile  or  more  on  the  Williams- 
burg  road,  covering  a  point  where  a  country  road 
started  north  to  Old  Tavern,  on  the  Nine-Mile  road. 
Couch's  division,  at  the  same  time,  was  posted  in 
Casey's  old  position  at  Seven  Pines,  and  both  divisions 
set  to  work  to  strengthen  their  lines  by  rifle  pits  and  by 
slashing  the  timber  for  abatis.  Casey  made  a  redoubt 
for  artillery  on  the  left,  his  line  extending  on  both 
sides  of  the  Williamsburg  road.  From  the  nature  of 
the  country,  Casey's  pickets  were  only  a  thousand 
yards  in  advance  of  his  line. 

Heintzelman's  3d  Corps  had  taken  position  between 
Seven  Pines  and  Bottom's  Bridge  ;  Hooker's  division 
on  the  left,  watching  the  road  through  White-Oak 
swamp,  and  Kearney's  division  on  the  right  and  front, 
near  Savage  Station.  On  the  25th,  Heintzelman  was 
placed  in  general  command  of  the  two  corps — his  own 
and  Keyes's. 

On  the  31st,  Keyes's  forces  occupied  two  weakly- 
entrenched  lines — to  wit :  the  line  of  Casey's  division, 
about  half  a  mile  in  front  of  Seven  Pines,  and  the  line 


SMITH'S  "CONFEDERATE  WAR  PAPERS."  423 

of  Couch's  division  at  Seven  Pines.  Besides  these, 
there  was  the  third  line  of  rifle  pits  a  mile  in  rear  of 
Seven  Pines.  The  left  flank  of  the  Union  forces  was 
well  covered  by  White-Oak  swamp,  watched  by 
Hooker ;  but  the  right  flank  of  Casey  and  Couch  rest- 
ing on  or  near  the  Nine-Mile  road,  by  which  the  enemy 
could  advance,  was  entirely  exposed.  Fortunately  for 
the  Union  cause,  the  attack  came  by  the  Williamsburg 
road  upon  the  strongest  point.  Nevertheless,  it  was 
successful,  due,  mainly,  to  its  inherent  strength — partly 
to  the  fact,  that  Casey's  division  was  composed  largely 
of  raw  troops,  and  partly  also  to  the  fact  that  the  ene- 
my, with  the  advantage  of  the  initiative,  had  quietly 
concentrated  for  the  attack  ;  whereas  Keyes,  though 
not  surprised,  had  to  call  his  troops  from  their  labors 
and  resist,  with  fragments  at  a  time,  the  heavy  on- 
slaught made  upon  him  by  a  solid  column.  He  was 
beaten  in  detail. 

When  convinced  that  the  attack  was  real,  Casey 
sent  one  regiment  forward  to  support  his  pickets— 
that,  of  course,  was  quickly  driven  back.  In  the 
meantime,  he  formed  a  line  of  one  battery  and  four 
regiments  of  infantry,  a  quarter  of  a  mile  in  front  of 
his  rifle  pits.  This  too  was  soon  swept  out  of  the 
fight,  and  his  main  line  in  the  rifle  pits  was  that  much 
the  weaker.  Soon  the  rifle  pits,  but  thinly  manned, 
were  attacked,  outflanked,  and  carried,  and  the  last  of 
Casey's  division  was  driven  to  the  rear.  The  full 
weight  of  the  Confederate  assault  then  fell  upon 
Couch,  who  had  already  been  weakened  by  efforts  to 
sustain  Casey,  and  cut  his  line  in  two  between  Seven 
Pines  and  Fair  Oaks,  driving  him  in  person,  with 


424  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES 

Abercrombie's  brigade,  to  the  northeast,  where,  at 
4.30  P.M.,  Sumner  succored  him  in  the  desperate  resist- 
ance he  was  making  against  G.  W.  Smith's  attack  by 
the  Nine-Mile  road. 

In  due  time  Heintzelman's  troops  aided  in  checking 
the  Confederate  advance  on  the  left  and  centre,  as 
Sumner  did  on  the  right ;  but  night  closed  in  with  the 
Confederates  in  possession  of  the  battle-field;  John- 
ston, the  Confederate  commander,  was  taken  to  the 
rear,  wounded,  about  7  P.M.,  and  the  command  de- 
volved upon  Major-General  G.  W.  Smith,  the  author 
of  the  book  under  review.  Smith  held  command  until 
1  P.M.  the  next  day,  June  1st,  when,  by  Jefferson 
Davis'  order,  he  was  superseded  on  the  field  by  Gen- 
eral R.  E.  Lee,  and,  naturally  enough,  his  feelings  have 
been  on  edge  ever  since.  During  the  night  both 
sides  re-formed  their  shattered  ranks,  rectified  their 
lines,  and  prepared  to  attack  next  morning. 

There  were  three  Union  corps  in  the  field,  but  they 
were  beyond  support ;  the  rise  in  the  Chickahominy 
having  swept  away  the  bridges.  Their  situation  was 
perilous,  but  they  were  equal  to  the  emergency.  Seiz- 
ing the  initiative,  they  attacked  with  vigor  at  day- 
light, recovered  their  lost  ground,  and,  after  a  severe 
contest,  re-occupied  the  position  from  which  they  had 
been  driven,  and  the  status  before  the  battle  was 
resumed. 

The  result,  as  so  often  happened  during  the  warr 
was  not  satisfactory  to  either  side — less  satisfactory,, 
no  doubt,  to  the  Confederate  than  the  Union  side, 
because  they  started  with  several  advantages,  among 
them  the  initiative  and  an  overpowering  force  at  the 


SMITH'S  "CONFEDERATE  WAR  PAPERS."  425 

point  of  attack,  and  because  also  the  victory  which 
they  ought  to  have  gained  promised  great  fruits. 
They  lost  one  of  the  best  opportunities  they  had  in 
the  war. 

In  judging  the  principal  actors  in  this  battle,  it 
should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  war  was  young  at 
that  time.  These  opposing  armies  had  done  a  good 
deal  of  digging,  and  some  fighting  about  Yorktown 
and  Williamsburg,  and  had  floundered  through  the 
mud  from  the  lower  Peninsula  up  to  the  Chickahominy, 
but,  except  the  few  officers  and  men  who  may  have 
been  in  the  battle  of  Bull  Eun,  they  had  not  had  a 
serious  engagement.  Both  sides  were  astounded,  pos- 
sibly a  little  dazed,  by  the  realities  of  battle,  which 
they  experienced  for  the  first  time  at  Seven  Pines. 
Casey  says  in  his  report,  it  was  "  the  most  terrible  fire 
of  musketry  I  have  ever  witnessed  " ;  and  when  Long- 
street  had  fought  only  five  or  six  of  his  thirteen  brig- 
ades he  called  for  help  on  the  31st,  and  actually  beg- 
ged for  it  during  next  day's  fight. 

The  Confederate  commander's  reason  for  not  con- 
centrating his  force  on  the  three  isolated  Union  corps 
about  Seven  Pines,  east  of  Richmond  on  June  1,  prob- 
ably was  that,  not  knowing  the  exact  state  of  the 
Chickahominy,  he  feared  he  might  expose  Richmond 
and  the  rear  of  his  army  to  the  Union  corps,  which 
threatened  him  from  their  positions  only  six  or  seven 
miles  north  of  the  city. 

In  relation  to  his  failure  to  advance  upon  Rich- 
mond after  the  success  of  June  1,  the  Union  com- 
mander says  in  his  official  report :  "  The  only  availa- 
ble means  for  uniting  our  forces  at  Fair  Oaks,  for  an 


426  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

advance  upon  Richmond  after  the  battle,  was  to  march 
the  troops  from  Mechanicsville  and  other  points  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Chickahominy  down  to  Bottom's 
Bridge,  and  thence  over  the  Williamsburg  road  to 
Fair  Oaks,  a  distance  of  about  twenty-three  miles. 
In  the  condition  of  the  roads  at  that  time,  this  march 
could  not  have  been  made  with  artillery  in  less  than 
two  days ;  within  which  time  the  enemy  would  have 
been  secure  within  his  entrenchments  around  Rich- 
mond. .  .  .  Therefore  I  held  the  positions  already 
gained,  and  completed  our  crossings  as  rapidly  as  pos- 
sible." 

On  the  26th  of  June,  nearly  a  month  after  the  bat- 
tle of  Seven  Pines,  the  Confederates  assumed  the  offen- 
sive, attacked  the  Union  right  flank  north  of  the 
Chickahominy,  and  the  "seven  days'"  battle,  and 
Union  withdrawal  to  James  River,  began,  and  the 
campaign  of  the  Peninsula  ended. 


ARTICLE  VIII. 

Dodge's  "  Campaign  of  Chancel- 
lorsville." 

Colonel  Theodore  A.  Dodge,  U.  S.  Army  (retired), 
has  made  a  rich  contribution  to  military  literature  by 
his  work  entitled  "The  Campaign  of  Chancellorsville," 
published  recently  by  Osgood  &  Co.,  of  Boston.  Col- 
onel Dodge  has  evidently  consulted  authorities  with 
great  care  and  good  judgment,  but  he  appears  to  have 
leaned  rather  too  heavily  upon  the  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War. 

The  proceedings  of  that  anomalous  tribunal  were 
ex-parte  and  irregular.  It  did  not  observe  sufficiently 
either  the  rules  of  evidence  or  the  principles  of  fair 
dealing.  Officers  before  it  were  induced,  or  permitted, 
to  boast  and  growl  under  oath  ;  to  criticise  their  absent 
companions  in  arms,  and  to  express  opinions  concerning 
the  qualifications  and  services  of  others,  including 
even  their  military  superiors.  Its  record  has  value  as 
secondary  or  corroborative  testimony.  Standing  alone, 
it  is  not  sound  evidence,  especially  when  the  witnesses 
are  speaking  of  others ;  and  when  they  testify  con- 
cerning themselves,  of  course  their  statements  must  be 
tested  by  the  rules  especially  applicable  to  such  cases. 
*  *  #  *  #  # 

Notwithstanding  conflicting  claims  and  statements, 

*  Journal  of  Military  Service  Institution. 

427 


428  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

there  is  not  much  room  left  for  difference  of  opinion 
about  the  main  features  of  the  campaign  of  Chancel- 
lorsville.  Hooker  with  about  113,000  men,  not  in- 
cluding a  cavalry  corps  of  1 1 ,000 — which  was  detailed 
to  cut  the  enemy's  line  of  communications — occupied 
the  north  side  of  the  Rappahannock,  confronted  by 
Lee  with  about  55,000,  strongly  entrenched  on  the 
heights  behind  Fredericksburg,  on  the  south  side. 
Hooker  was  fully  justifiable  by  his  superiority  in 
numbers  and  other  attending  circumstances,  in  divid- 
ing his  force  for  an  offensive  campaign.  The  real  ob- 
ject of  the  left  wing  under  Sedgwick  was  to  make 
such  a  demonstration  in  front,  as  would  enable  the 
right  wing  under  Hooker  to  cross  the  river,  turn  Lee's 
left  flank,  and  place  itself  unopposed  at  Chancellors- 
ville,  to  the  west  and  south  of  Fredericksburg  and 
only  ten  miles  from  it.  Both  wings  performed  their 
parts  of  this  bold  plan  faultlessly,  and  on  the  evening 
of  Thursday,  April  30,  Hooker  in  person  with  four 
corps  was  at  Chancellorsville  and  was  joined  during 
the  night  by  Sickles's  corps  withdrawn  from  the  left 
wing.  Hooker  gave  instructions  for  an  advance  on 
the  following  (Friday)  morning,  and  issued  general 
orders  No.  47,  saying  "  that  the  operations  of  the  last 
three  days  have  determined  that  the  enemy  must  in- 
gloriously  fly,  or  come  out  from  behind  his  defences  and 
give  us  battle  on  our  own  ground  where  certain  des- 
truction awaits  him."  It  was  not  until  Thursday 
night  that  Lee  understood  what  was  going  on.  Then, 
instead  of  ingloriously  flying,  he  "  seized  the  masses  of 
his  force,  and  with  the  grasp  of  a  Titan  swung  them 
into  position  as  a  giant  might  fling  a  mighty  stone 


DODGE'S  "  CAMPAIGN  OF  OH ANCELLORSVILLE."    429 

from  a  sling."  (Swinton).  The  hostile  forces  advan- 
cing, the  one  from  Chancellorsville,  and  the  other  from 
Fredericksburg,  met  about  a  mile  from  the  former 
place,  where  the  Federal  troops  seized  a  strong  line  of 
battle,  and  needed  nothing  but  Hooker's  permission 
to  realize  the  predictions  of  his  boastful  order  of  the 
preceding  day.  But  that  permission  was  denied  them. 
They  were  required  to  give  up  the  good  position  they 
had  gained  in  front,  and  fall  back  to  a  bad  one  in  rear, 
and  were  kept  in  retreat  from  day  to  day  until  they 
had  recrossed  the  Rappahannock  on  the  night  of  May 
5  and  6.  From  the  moment  of  discovering  (Friday, 
May  1)  Lee's  determination  to  fight,  Hooker's  manage- 
ment of  the  campaign  was  beneath  criticism. 

He  abandoned  the  offensive  before  Jackson's  flank 
movement  of  Saturday  morning  was  begun  or  resolved 
upon,  so  that  he  had  not  even  the  poor  excuse  of  that 
move  of  the  enemy  for  retreating.  When  on  Saturday 
he  found  that  Lee  would  not  fall  back,  he  sent  to 
Sedgwick  for  Reynold's  corps,  which  reached  him  late 
that  night,  making  him  stronger  than  he  was  before 
Howard's  defeat  of  Saturday  evening.  Yet  he  stuck 
to  a  losing  defensive.  On  Friday  night,  May  1,  Lee, 
with  but  little  more  than  half  the  force  which-  Hooker 
had  under  his  immediate  command  on  the  field  of 
Chancellorsville,  divided  his  army  into  two  parts, 
sending  one  under  Jackson  on  a  march  of  fifteen  miles 
along  Hooker's  front  and  to  his  extreme  right  and  rear. 
After  that,  nothing  could  have  saved  Lee  from  de- 
struction if  Hooker  had  taken  advantage  of  the  oppor- 
tunity. But  lying,  as  he  did,  between  the  two  wings 
of  Lee's  army,  and  being  far  stronger  than  both  of 


430  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

them  combined,  instead  of  beating  them  in  detail,  he 
devoted  four  days  and  all  of  his  energy  to  slipping 
out  from  between  them  and  moving  back  to  his  own 
side  of  the  river,  doing  the  enemy  only  such  harm  as 
was  unavoidable  in  getting  away.  Saturday  night- 
having  withdrawn  Reynold's  corps  from  the  left  wing 
— and  knowing  that  the  Rebel  force  (commanded  by 
Lee  in  person),  which  for  two  days  had  been  attacking 
his  five  corps  from  the  east,  lay  directly  between  him 
and  Sedgwick,  and  that  Sedgwick  could  not  advance 
without  first  carrying  by  assault  the  defences  of  Fred- 
ericksburg  which  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  failed 
to  carry  in  December,  and  that,  besides  the  fighting,  a 
march  of  twelve  or  fourteen  miles  would  have  to  be 
made — he,  at  eleven  o'clock  at  night,  ordered  Sedgwick 
with  his  single  corps  of  22,000  men  to  carry  the 
heights  behind  Fred  ericksburg  and  be  in  the  vicinity 
of  the  Commanding  General  at  daylight  next  morning, 
destroying  en  route  any  force  lie  might  meet  with. 
Swinton  says  "  for  the  successful  execution  of  this  plan 
not  only  was  Sedgwick  bound  to  the  most  energetic 
action,  but  Hooker  also  was  engaged  by  every  consid- 
eration of  honor  and  duty  to  so  act  as  to  make  the 
dangerous  task  he  had  assigned  to  Sedgwick  possible." 
It  is  surprising  that  so  able  and  consistent  a  writer  as 
Swinton  should  dignify  this  wild  venture  by  calling 
it  a  "  plan  "  and  discussing  it.  He  admits  that  u  this 
move  would  under  the  circumstances  have  been  an 
impossibility  even  had  no  enemy  interposed." 

It  is  only  necessary  here  to  recall  the  fact  that  Sedg- 
wick carried  the  works  at  Fredericksburg  on  Sunday 
forenoon,  advanced  five  or  six  miles  to  Salem  Heights, 


DODGE'S  '  CAMPAIGN  OF  CHANCELLOKSVILLE."    43 1 

where,  single-handed,  at  4  or  5  P.M.,  he  fought  a  battle 
with  Lee,  and  not  a  thing  was  done  by  Hooker  to 
rescue  or  relieve  him.  On  the  contrary,  while  he 
was  fighting  Lee  with  the  remnant  of  his  corps  of 
22,000,  Hooker  with  "the  Union  right  wing,  80,000, 
retreated  to  a  place  where  it  could  not  be  hurt,  leav- 
ing Sedgwick  and  his  companions  to  take  care  of 
themselves."*  By  stubborn  fighting,  Sedgwick  held 
out  until  the  night  of  May  4  and  5,  when,  through 
skill,  bravery  and  good-fortune,  he  was  able  to  recross 
the  Rappahannock  at  Bank's  ford,  having  lost  5,000 
men — about  a  quarter  of  his  force,  and  nearly  a  third 
of  the  loss  of  the  whole  army.  Couch  thinks  that  the 
din  around  Hooker's  ears  at  the  Chancellor  House 
prevented  his  hearing  the  sound  of  Sedgwick's  guns 
at  Salem  Heights,  but  that  is  immaterial.  He  knew 
what  his  orders  required  Sedgwick  to  do,  and  about 
where  he  ought  to  be.  Furthermore,  high  officers  in 
Couch's  own  corps  heard  Sedgwick's  guns.  Yet 
Hooker  blamed  this  able  and  gallant  officer  for  the 
loss  of  the  campaign.  Sedgwick  did  wonders.  It 
was  almost  impossible  for  him  to  do  more.  But  if 
he  had  "  destroyed  "  Lee  and  pursued  Hooker  he  could 
not  have  stopped  him.  The  commander  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  was  in  such  a  state  that  he  probably 
would  have  continued  his  retreat.  His  movements 
were  dictated  by  personal  demoralization,  not  by  mili- 
tary conditions.  Stonewall  Jackson's  corps,  though 
badly  shattered,  would  have  remained  in  the  field, 
and  in  Hooker's  frame  of  mind  that  would  have  been 
enough  for  him  to  retreat  from.  Hooker  opened  the 

*  Couch. 


432 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


campaign  imbued  with  the  belief  that  Lee  would 
necessarily  retreat  as  soon  as  he  found  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  on  his  left  flank  and  rear.  Another  idea 
which  perhaps  unconsciously  found  a  lodgment  in  his 
mind  was  defending  himself  in  the  remote  contingency 
that  Lee  did  not  retire.  This  view  is  sustained  by 
the  second  part  of  his  order  of  April  30,  wherein  he 
says  Lee  must  "  ingloriously  fly  or  come  out  from  be- 
hind his  defences,  and  give  us  battle  on  our  own 
ground" — that  is,  behind  our  defences  ;  defence  being 
instinctively  his  purpose,  provided  Lee  came  out. 
He  went  to  Chancellorsville  not  for  a  fight,  but  for 
a  foot  race.  He  fully  expected  Lee  to  withdraw. 
But,  like  the  braggart  in  the  duel,  when  he  found  at 
the  last  moment  the  enemy  ivould  not  run,  he  deter- 
mined that  he  would.  His  subsequent  management 
was  quite  in  harmony  with  this  theory,  which  is  sub- 
stantially the  one  entertained  by  Swinton  and  Couch. 
The  thump  on  the  head  at  the  Chancellor  House 
counts  for  nothing,  because  he  did  not  receive  that 
until  Sunday,  which  was  after  his  gravest  blunders 
had  been  made.  Couch  says,  "  As  to  the  charge  that 
the  battle  was  lost  because  the  General  was  intoxi- 
cated, I  have  always  stated  that  he  probably  abstained 
from  the  use  of  ardent  spirits  when  it  would  have 
been  far  better  for  him  to  have  continued  in  Ms  usual 
habit  in  that  respect."  This  conveys  the  impression 
that  a  lack  of  whiskey  was  the  trouble.  Bad  as  it  is, 
that  is  as  good  an  explanation  of  Hooker's  extra- 
ordinary conduct  as  any  that  has  been  offered.  If 
his  habits  were  as  indicated,  Couch's  opinion  may  be 
correct,  for  a  sober  drunkard  is  not  unlikely  to  be 


DODGE'S  "  CAMPAIGN  OF  CHANCELLOKSVILLE."    433 

both  stupid  and  timid  in  action.  But  however  that 
may  be,  when  the  campaign  was  over,  instead  of  being 
permitted  to  attack  his  subordinates  before  the  Com- 
mittee on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  he  ought  to  have 
been  required  to  defend  himself  before  a  Court  of 
Inquiry.  As  heretofore  stated,  his  own  responsibili- 
ties were  heavy  enough  without  having  any  of  How- 
ard's transferred  to  him. 

It  can  be  said  of  Howard,  concerning  the  behavior 
of  the  llth  Corps  at  Chancellors ville,  that  he  had 
been  in  command  of  it  only  thirty  days,  that  subse- 
quently he  improved  its  discipline  and  instruction,  and 
it  won  the  special  commendation  of  Thomas  at  the 
battle  of  Lookout  Mountain. 


AETICLE   IX. 

Doubleday's  "  Chancellorsville  and 
Gettysburg." 

In  his  preface  General  Doubleday  says  that  he  has 
had  "  better  opportunities  to  judge  of  men  and  meas- 
ures than  usually  falls  to  the  lot  of  others  who  have 
written  on  the  subject ; "  that  he  has  "  always  felt  it 
to  be  the  duty  of  every  one  who  held  a  prominent 
position  in  the  great  war  to  give  to  posterity  the  bene- 
fit of  his  personal  recollections  "  at  the  risk  of  "  severe 
criticism  and  much  personal  feeling,"  announces  that 
he  cannot  "  consent  to  fulfil  his  (my)  allotted  task  by 
a  colorless  history  praising  everybody  and  attributing 
all  disasters  to  dispensations  of  Providence  for  which 
no  one  is  to  blame,"  and  adds,  that  "  where  great  dis- 
asters have  occurred  it  is  due  both  to  the  living  and 
the  dead  that  the  causes  and  circumstances  be  justly 
and  properly  stated."  A  belligerent  beginning  !  It  is 
the  opening  of  the  controversialist  rather  than  of  the 
historian,  and  suggests  a  purpose — which  perusal  of  the 
work  confirms — to  enhance  the  value  of  "  personal 
recollections "  as  compared  with  "  dry  official  state- 
ments,"' and  thus  settle  some  old  scores  with  both  the 
"  living  and  the  dead."  This  is  dangerous  ground  for 
history,  especially  as  affecting  the  dead. 

*  ' '  Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg, ' '  by  Abner  Doubleday,  Bvt. 
Maj.-Genl.  U.  S.  A.  Vol.  VI.  "  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War."  New 
York :  C.  Scribner's  Sons.  1882. 

Journal  of  Military  Service  Institution. 

434 


"  CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG."      435 

General  Doubleday  discusses  the  questions  of  Gen- 
eral Meade's  intention  and  behavior  at  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg,  but  there  is  nothing  in  his  personal  recol- 
lections which  will  be  likely  to  fasten  on  General 
Meade  the  accusations  of  which  he  was  long  ago  ac- 
quitted by  the  "  dry  official "  records  and  his  own  ex- 
planations. Nevertheless,  for  more  reasons  than  those 
given  by  General  Doubleday,  it  will  probably  be  the 
verdict  of  history  that  General  Meade  failed  to  gather 
the  legitimate  fruits  of  his  victory.  In  fact  he  did  not 
seem  to  appreciate  that  he  had  gained  a  victory.  Pre- 
sident Lincoln  was  bitterly  disappointed.  When  (in 
Meade's  congratulatory  order  which  was  telegraphed 
to  him)  he  read  the  sentence  about  driving  the  in- 
vaders from  our  soil,  he  dropped  his  hands,  and  in  sad 
and  measured  tones  repeated,  "Drive  the  invaders 
from  our  soil!  My  God!  is  that  all?"  Disheartened 
and  apprehensive,  he,  on  the  6th  of  July,  telegraphed 
from  the  Soldiers'  Home  to  General  Halleck  :  "  I  left 
the  telegraph  office  a  good  deal  disappointed.  You 
know  I  did  not  like  the  phrase  in  Order  No.  68,  I  be- 
lieve,— '  drive  the  invaders  from  our  soil.'  Since  that 
I  see  a  dispatch  from  General  French  saying  the  ene- 
my is  crossing  his  wounded  over  the  river  in .  flats, 
without  saying  why  he  does  not  stop  it,  or  even  inti- 
mating a  thought  it  ought  to  be  stopped.  Still  later, 
another  dispatch  from  General  Pleasanton,  by  direc- 
tion of  General  Meade,  to  General  French  stating  that 
the  main  army  is  halted  because  it  is  believed  the 
rebels  are  concentrating  'on  the  road  to  wards  Hagers- 
town  beyond  Fairfield,'  and  is  not  to  move  until  it  is 
ascertained  that  the  rebels  intend  to  evacuate  Cum- 


436 


MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 


berland  Valley.  These  things  all  appear  to  me  to  be 
connected  with  a  purpose  to  cover  Baltimore  and 
Washington,  and  to  get  the  enemy  across  the  river 
again  without  a  further  collision ;  and  they  do  not  ap- 
pear connected  with  a  purpose  to  prevent  his  crossing 
and  to  destroy  him.  I  do  fear  the  former  purpose  is 
acted  upon  and  the  latter  is  rejected.  If  you  are  satis- 
fied the  latter  purpose  is  entertained  and  is  judiciously 
pursued,  I  am  content.  If  you  are  not  so  satisfied, 
please  look  to  it. 

"  A.  LINCOLN." 

On  July  15th,  the  day  after  the  enemy  crossed  the 
Potomac,  President  Lincoln  used  the  following  re- 
markable language  in  a  telegram  to  Mr.  Cameron :  "  I 
would  give  much  to  be  relieved  of  the  impression  that 
Meade,  Couch,  Smith  and  all,  since  the  battle  of  Get- 
tysburg, have  striven  only  to  get  Lee  over  the  river 
without  another  fight."  Probably  President  Lincoln's 
famous  letter  of  October  16th  for  General  Meade,  pro- 
posing to  take  all  the  responsibility  in  case  of  defeat, 
and  none  of  the  credit  in  case  of  success,  was  inspired 
by  the  President's  disappointment  at  the  result  of  the 
operations  following  the  battle  of  Gettysburg.  A 
military  admirer  says  of  Mr.  Lincoln — "  He  was  the 
best  General  we  had,  and  it  is  a  wonder  the  other 
Generals  did  not  break  his  heart." 

It  is  a  pity  General  Doubleday,  going  beyond  the 
question  of  Meade's  generalship,  makes  statements 
which  may  be  understood  as  flings  at  that  high  offi- 
cer's personal  bearing  in  action.  On  page  177,  for- 
getting that  the  position  of  the  Commanding  General 
on  the  field  of  battle  is  not  a  proper  subject  for  impu- 


"  CHANCELLOBSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG."      437 

tation  or  criticism  by  his  subordinates,  he  says  that  an 
officer  who  rode  to  Meade's  Headquarters  during  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg  with  the  intelligence  that  Sickles' 
line  was  driven  in,  "found  the  General  walking  up 
and  down  the  room  apparently  quite  unconscious  of 
the  movements  which  might  have  been  discerned  by 
riding  to  the  top  of  the  hill"  etc. ;  and  again,  "  General 
Meade's  Headquarters  was  in  the  centre  of  this  cannon- 
ade, and  as  the  balls  were  flying  very  thickly  there, 
and  killing  the  horses  of  his  staff,  he  found  it  neces- 
sary, temporarily,  to  abandon  the  place."  "He  rode 
over  to  Power's  Hill,  made  his  Headquarters  with 
General  Slocum,  and  when  the  firing  ceased  rode  hack 
again.'1''  It  is  true  General  Doubleday  adds,  in  the 
way  of  apology  for  General  Meade,  that "  where  noth- 
ing is  to  be  gained  by  exposure,  it  is  sound  sense  to 
shelter  men  and  officers  as  much  as  possible."  The 
explanation  merely  tends  to  confirm  the  impression 
which  the  reader  may  fairly  entertain  of  the  author'a 
unfriendly  purpose  in  introducing  the  incident. 

There  is  rather  an  unkind  imputation  upon  two 
dead  officers — Halleck  and  Meade — where  the  au- 
thor says,  page  116,  "as  the  new  commander  of 
the  Union  Army  "  (Meade)  "  was  a  favorite  of  Gen- 
eral Halleck,  no  notice  was  taken  of  his  disregard 
of  instructions  in  detaching  the  garrison  of  Harper's 
Ferry."  In  fact,  General  Doubleday  appears  to  have 
a  poor  opinion  of  many  of  his  brother  officers,  especi- 
ally of  Howard,  who  lives  to  speak  for  himself.  He 
says  of  a  number  of  them  en  masse  (page  32,  speaking 
of  Chancellors ville),  "  the  subsequent  investigation  of 
this  sad  business  by  the  Congressional  Committee  on 


438 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


the  Conduct  of  the  War  was  very  much  of  a  farce  and 
necessarily  unreliable,  for  so  long  as  both  Hooker  and 
Howard  were  left  in  high  command,  it  was  absurd  to 
suppose  their  subordinates  would  testify  against 
them."  What  kind  of  officers  must  we  have  had  if  it 
is  "  absurd  to  suppose"  that  they  failed  to  tell  the 
truth  because  Hooker  and  Howard  were  left  in  high 
command  ?  General  Doubleday  himself  was  a  witness 
before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  and 
he  testified  not  only  in  plain  but  in  bitter  language 
against  his  superior  officer,  General  Meade,  while  he, 
Meade,  was  still  in  high  command.  There  is  nothing 
to  show  that  other  officers  did  not  speak  with  equal 
conscientiousness  if  not  with  equal  severity. 

The  main  features  in  the  campaigns  of  Chancellors- 
ville  and  Gettysburg  have  been  pretty  well  agreed  upon 
by  military  students  and  writers.  It  is  not  worth  while, 
therefore,  to  go  into  a  detailed  review  of  General  Double- 
day's  account  of  those  operations.  He  attaches  more 
importance  than  most  other  writers  have  done  fco  the 
part  taken  by  General  Sickles,  in  both  campaigns,  and 
to  the  operations  of  the  cavalry  force  under  General 
Pleasanton  at  Chancellorsville.  The  author  makes  an 
argument  and  presents  a  diagram  to  demonstrate 
mathematically  that  "  it  is  impossible  for  any  troops 
to  hold  their  ground  when  attacked  at  once  on  both 
fronts,"  if  posted  on  the  two  sides  of  a  right  angle  as 
General  Sickles  posted  his  corps  at  Gettysburg.  The 
attack  from  "  both  sides,"  which  the  author  here 
assumes,  would  be  a  marked  case  of  "  converging  col- 
umns "  (as  he  uses  that  term)  which  he  tells  us  always 
fail.  But  passing  that  over,  General  Doubleday  is 


"  CHANCELLOBSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG."      439 

correct  in  pronouncing  the  disposition  a  faulty  one  in 
theory.  Whether  or  not  it  is  so  in  practice  depends 
on  circumstances.  The  line  occupied  by  General 
Sickles'  corps  was  substantially  the  same  in  figure  as 
as  that  occupied  by  the  whole  Army  at  Gettysburg, 
and  that  position  was  so  good  that  a  dispute  is  yet 
going  on  about  the  credit  for  having  selected  it,  and 
our  Army  held  its  ground  there  though  attacked  on 
both  fronts  at  once. 

There  is  certainly  exaggeration  in  the  results  at- 
tributed by  the  author  to  some  of  the  minor  affairs  of 
the  cavalry.  For  example  (page  37)  he  says  that  a 
charge,  at  the  cost  of  his  life,  by  Major  Keenan  with 
four  hundred  of  the  Eighth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry, 
against  Stonewall  Jackson's  front  of  ten  thousand  men 
at  Chancellorsville,  " saved  the  army  from  capture" 
and  "  the  country  from  the  unutterable  degradation  of 
the  establishment  of  slavery  in  the  Northern  States." 
Without  disparaging  Major  Keenan's  gallantry  and 
sacrifice,  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  slavery  would 
not  have  been  established  in  the  Northern  States,  if 
he  had  never  charged  or  never  been  born.  The  author 
seems  to  concern  himself  more  than  necessary  in  such 
a  book  as  his,  with  the  objects  the  rebels  aimed-  to  ac- 
complish by  the  war.  Page  48,  that  object  was  "Ven- 
geance," page  188  it  was  "  Conquest  of  the  North,'' 
and  same  page  it  was  to  determine  "  whether  freedom 
or  slavery  was  to  rule  the  Northern  States";  page  195 
it  was  "  to  extend  the  area  of  slavery  over  the  free 
States";  but  after  all  by  page  197,  it  was  "the  ac- 
knowledgment of  the  independence  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy." 


440 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


It  was  worth  while  for  the  military  profession  to 
weigh  carefully  General  Doubleday's  sweeping  and 
unsparing  condemnation  of  "converging  columns,"  on 
the  field  of  battle  as  well  as  in  strategy.  Page  52  he 
says,  "  in  the  history  of  lost  empires  we  almost  inva- 
riably find  that  the  cause  of  their  final  overthrow  on 
the  battlefield  may  be  traced  to  the  violation  of  one 
military  principle,  which  is  that  the  attempt  to  over- 
power a  central  force  by  converging  columns  is  almost 
ahvays fatal  to  the  assailants"  "  Yet  this  is  the  first 
mistake  made  by  every  tyro  in  generalship."  Strength- 
ening the  broad  assertion  he  adds,  the  columns  "  never 
arrive  at  the  same  time,"  "  the  outer  army  is  always 
beaten  in  detail,"  "one  portion  is  sure  to  be  defeated 
before  the  other  arrives."  Page  67  he  says  of  Chan- 
cellorsville,  "Sedgwick's  movement,  in  my  opinion, 
added  another  example  to  the  evil  effect  of  converg- 
ing columns  against  a  central  force  "  ;  page  157,  "  uni- 
versal experience  demonstrates  that  columns  converg- 
ing on  a  central  force  almost  invariably  fail  in  their 
object  and  are  beaten  in  detail.  Gettysburg  seems  to 
be  a  striking  exemplification  of  this."  Page  159,  "Lee 
boldly  directed  that  each  flank  of  the  Union  Army 
should  be  assailed  at  the  same  time,  while  constant 
demonstrations  against  our  centre  were  to  be  kept  up 
to  prevent  either  wing  from  being  re-enforced."  It 
was  "  another  attempt  to  converge  columns,"  etc.  This 
is  repeated,  page  176.  Page  179,  "There  is  always 
some  reason  why  columns  never  converge  in  time." 
The  military  principle  for  which  General  Doubleday 
contends  so  stoutly  has  long  been  accepted  as  a  sound 
one  in  strategy,  but  his  claims  in  its  favor  are  prob- 


"  CHA.NOELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG."  441 

ably  more  absolute  and  comprehensive  than  any 
which  have  ever  before  been  made.  These  claims 
suggest  the  question  whether  the  principle  admits 
of  more  rigid  application  now  than  in  former  times. 
The  facilities  for  concentrating  columns  on  a  given 
point  at  a  designated  time  have  increased  with  the 
improvements  in  the  means  of  transportation,  and 
especially  with  the  means  of  communication  by  tele- 
graph and  signal.  That  being  so,  the  objection  to 
converging  columns  would  seem  to  be  less  than  in 
earlier  times.  Certainly  the  author  goes  too  far  in 
saying  the  columns  "  never "  arrive  in  time,  that  the 
outer  army  is  "  always "  beaten,  that  one  portion  is 
"sure"  to  be  defeated  before  the  other  arrives,  etc., 
etc.  A  few  cases  may  be  cited.  The  Prussians  in 
1866  marched  converging  columns  through  different 
passes  in  the  mountains,  formed  a  timely  junction  on 
the  field  of  Sadowa  and  gained  a  decisive  victory. 
The  Germans  were  victorious  at  Worth,  yet  their  staff 
account  says  of  the  final  attack  of  Froschwiller, 
"troops  from  the  southeast  and  north  reached  and 
stormed  the  common  goal  almost  simultaneously." 

There  was  a  striking  case  of  the  success  of  "  con- 
verging columns"  at  Aladja-Dagh,  near  Kars  (1877). 
The  Russian  plan  was  to  attack  the  position  in  front 
with  about  30,000  men,  and  in  rear  with  about  half 
that  number.  The  latter  force,  keeping  in  communi- 
cation with  the  main  body  by  field  telegraph,  marched 
some  forty  miles  around  the  enemy's  flank.  The  col- 
umns attacked  simultaneously  and  gained  a  decisive 
victory. 

McDowell's  converging  columns  at  our  first  Bull 


442 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


Run  were  successful,  and  he  lost  the  battle  only  be- 
cause the  enemy,  resorting  to  a  similar  manoeuvre, 
brought  Johnston's  converging  columns  on  our  central 
force  in  the  nick  of  time.  Hooker's  converging  of 
columns  at  Chancellorsville  was  successful,  but  he 
lost  the  benefit  of  it  through  his  sudden  and  unac- 
countable temporary  imbecility,  and  was  finally  over- 
thrown by  Lee's  resort  to  a  similar  operation  in  send- 
ing Jackson  to  converge  and  attack  the  central  force 
after  a  circuitous  and  difficult  march  of  fifteen  miles. 
Furthermore,  the  author  furnishes  evidence  against 
himself  on  this  point.  He  says  (page  181),  speaking 
of  the  second  day  at  Gettysburg,  "A  night  attack  on 
the  rear  of  our  army  in  conjunction  with  an  advance 
from  the  opposite  side  on  Hancock's  front  would  have 
thrown  us  into  great  confusion  and  must  have  suc- 
ceeded." Such  an  attack  which  the  author  says  "must 
have  succeeded,7'  would  have  been  a  marked  example 
of  converging  columns,  which  he  tells  us  always  fail. 

There  is  much  that  is  interesting  in  General  Double- 
day's  work,  but  he  indulges  too  freely  in  surmises,  and 
men's  intentions,  and  there  is  now  and  then  a  lack  of 
precision  as  to  events.  For  example,  he  tells  us  posi- 
tively, page  29,  of  "  Stonewall "  Jackson's  death,  that 
"his  own  troops  fired  into  him  with  fatal  effect," 
whereas,  on  the  following  page  he  says,  "  whether  the 
rebels  killed  him  or  whether  some  of  his  wounds  came 
from  our  own  troops  is  a  matter  of  doubt" 


ARTICLE  X. 

De  Trobriand's  "  Four  Years  with  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac." 

General  de  Trobriand  is  a  charming  writer.  With- 
out any  disparagement  to  his  soldiership,  which  is  of 
a  high  order,  it  might  be  said  that  his  pen  is  mightier 
than  his  sword. 

The  book  under  consideration  was  prepared  im- 
mediately after  the  close  of  our  Civil  War,  and  was 
written  in  the  French  language  and  for  the  French 
people. 

In  his  preface  to  the  French  edition,  dated  May, 
1867,  the  author  says:  "Everything  which  I  have 
here  related  which  I  have  not  myself  seen,  I  have  from 
the  evidence  of  the  actors  themselves,  and  by  a  minute 
comparison  with  the  official  documents  and  depositions 
in  extenso,  taken  before  the  Congressional  Committee 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War."  The  tripod  of  authority 
upon  which  the  work  stands  is,  therefore,  1st..  What 
the  author  saw  (and  he  kept  a  diary).  2d.  What  he 
calls  "  the  evidence  of  the  actors  themselves " ;  but 
how  that  was  obtained  does  not  appear.  3d.  The 

*  "  Four  Years  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,"  by  Regis  de  Trobri- 
and, Brevet  Major-General  U.  S.  Vols.  Translated  by  George  K. 
Dauchy,  late  Lieutenant  Commanding  12th  New  York  Battery  Light 
Artillery  U.  S.  Vols.  With  portrait  and  maps.  Boston :  Ticknor  & 
Co.  1889. 

Journal  Military  Service  Institution,  March  1,  1889. 

443 


444  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

official  documents  and  depositions  before  the  "  Com- 
mittee on  the  Conduct  of  the  War."  By  far  the  most 
interesting  and  valuable  part  of  the  work  is  that 
which  rests  upon  the  first  leg  of  the  tripod.  Neither 
the  evidence,  as  he  must  have  received  it,  from  "  the 
actors  themselves,"  nor  the  report  of  the  Committee 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  affords  a  substantial  foun- 
dation for  the  accounts  given  of  campaigns  and  battles 
which  the  author  did  not  witness.  The  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War  was  an  anomalous  tribunal, 
which  sprang  from  the  loyalty  and  zeal  of  a  free  and 
earnest  people.  It  was  composed  of  Congressmen,  not 
of  soldiers.  It  had  its  uses.  Its  report  furnishes 
some  bright  side-lights,  but  to  rely  upon  that  report 
as  a  basis  for  history  and  criticism  must  lead  to  error 
and  injustice.  When  General  de  Trobriand  wrote  his 
book,  the  compilation  of  the  War  Records  had  not 
been  commenced.  Indeed,  these  indispensable  vouch- 
ers for  historical  accounts  of  the  Civil  War  had  not 
been  assorted.  But  few  of  those  from  the  Confed- 
erate side  had  been  received  by  our  Government,  and 
all— Union  and  Confederate — were,  for  practicable 
purposes,  inaccessible. 

For  more  than  twenty  years  since  General  de  Tro- 
briand's  book  first  appeared,  the  Government  has 
been  preparing  and  publishing  the  official  records 
which  are  essential  to  correct  and  fair  accounts  of  the 
campaigns  and  battles  of  the  Civil  War.  It  is  not 
.possible  within  the  compass  of  a  book  review  to  point 
out  the  important  discrepancies  between  the  Records 
and  the  accounts  given  in  "  Four  Years  with  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,"  Discrepancies  were  un- 


DE  TROBRIAND'S  "ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC."  445 

avoidable  in  a  book  written  at  the  close  of  the  War, 
when,  if  the  memory  was  fresh  the  feelings  were 
strong.  It  would  not  be  necessary  to  make  note  of 
them  if  it  were  not  that,  in  the  broad  light  of  the 
present  day  the  work  is  translated  into  English  and 
published  in  this  country  without  revision.  Indeed, 
the  author,  without  making  or  authorizing  any  revi- 
sion of  the  historical  matter,  says  to  the  translator : 
"Leave  intact,  without  modification  or  extenuation, 
my  judgments  upon  men  and  things,  for,  whatever 
may  be  otherwise  their  value,  they  have  at  least  the 
recommendation  in  their  favor  that  they  are  the  hon- 
est expression  of  seasoned  convictions  based  upon 
factSj  and  which  I  did  not  find  cause  to  modify  since 
the  above  was  published."  The  "facts"  in  some 
instances  turn  out  to  be  like  the  fact  stated  by  the 
man  who  said  the  horse  was  sixteen  feet  high,  and 
then  stuck  to  it  because  he  had  said  sixteen  feet 
instead  of  sixteen  hands.  General  de  Trobriand  ad- 
heres to  his  conclusions  regardless  of  manifest  changes 
in  his  premises,  which  is  in  effect  saying  to  the  world : 
u  If  the  established  facts  of  the  present  day  do  not 
agree  with  what  I  said  twenty  years  ago,  so  much  the 
worse  for  the  facts."  It  is  a  pity  the  author  takes  this 
bourbonistic  view  of  the  subject.  It  is  not  meant 
that  the  historical  and  critical  parts  of  his  work  are 
wholly  wrong ;  far  from  it.  It  is  because  the  book  is 
good  that  the  American  edition  of  it  deserved  revision 
that  would  bring  it  up  to  the  enlightened  standard  of 
the  present  time.  In  so  far  as  it  conforms  to  the 
assurances  in  the  preface,  the  book  is  of  the  highest 
interest.  "  This  book,"  the  author  says,  "  is  a  narra- 


446 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


tive.  I  have  limited  myself  to  those  things  which  I 
have  seen.  I  tell  of  events  as  they  have  passed  under 
my  eyes,  and  as  I  wrote  them  down,  day  by  day,  in  a 
journal " ;  and  he  adds :  "  the  reader  can  follow  me  in 
perfect  security."  The  parts  of  the  book  which  con- 
form to  these  assurances  are  admirable  and  delightful. 
So,  too,  in  genera],  are  the  accounts  of  political  mat- 
ters, though  the  effect  of  political  interference  in 
military  affairs  during  the  War  is  overdrawn.  The 
first  chapter  of  the  book,  treating  of  the  causes  of  the 
War  is  particularly  good.  The  personal  sketches, 
though  not  free  from  the  appearance  of  bias,  are 
spirited  and  graphic.  The  criticisms  of  high  com- 
manders are  usually  severe,  in  some  cases  harsh. 

The  grave  defects  of  the  book  are  in  the  accounts 
of  events  of  which  the  author  knew  nothing  of  his 
own  knowledge,  and  in  the  judgments  he  bases  upon 
these  accounts,  and  still  adheres  to.  As  heretofore 
mentioned,  the  book  was  written  while  the  war  feel- 
ing remained  hot.  It  shows  some  strong  prejudices, 
but  that  was  to  be  expected.  Prejudice  is  a  natural 
outgrowth  from  those  human  organisms  in  which 
both  the  intellect  and  the  feelings  are  highly  devel- 
oped. Yet  it  is  an  unwholesome  fungus  that  ought 
not  to  be  swallowed  even  when  highly  seasoned  and 
daintily  served. 

A  brief  reference  may  be  made  to  some  question- 
able parts  of  the  work.  Undoubtedly,  President 
Buchanan's  part  in  public  affairs  between  the  election 
and  inauguration  of  his  successor  (November,  1860,  to 
March,  1861)  was  far  from  creditable,  but  there  were 
extenuating  circumstances  which  do  not  appear  in  the 


DE  TKOBRIAND'S  ''ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC."  447 

book.  After  the  new  President  was  elected,  the  old 
President  was  practically  powerless.  Congress  (which 
assembled  in  December,  1860)  did  not  heed  Buchan- 
an's recommendations.  He  submitted  several  meas- 
ures looking  to  coercion  of  the  South,  but  they  were 
not  acted  upon.  Everything  which  appeared  to  be  of 
national  importance  was  held  by  Congress  to  await 
the  incoming  administration.  In  fact,  Congress  was 
almost  as  uncertain  as  the  President  about  what  ought 
to  be  done.  At  that  time,  upon  the  question  of  the 
constitutional  powers  of  the  Government,  a  large  ma- 
jority of  the  Northern  people  shared  Mr.  Buchanan's 
views.  The  coercive  power  of  the  General  Govern- 
ment was  admitted  to  be  ample  within  certain  limits. 
That  is  to  say,  it  could  enforce  its  authority,  acting 
directly  upon  individual  citizens  within  a  State,  but  it 
could  not  make  war  upon  a  State  or  upon  the  whole 
people  of  a  State,  guilty  and  innocent  alike.  This 
belief  which  merely  embarrassed  citizens  in  general, 
completely  confused  and  confounded  the  citizen  who 
happened  to  occupy  the  Presidential  chair.  President 
Buchanan  knew  that  he  had  no  legal  power  to  raise 
armies  of  his  own  volition,  and  if  he  had  attempted 
to  call  out  the  Militia  and  increase  the  Regular  Army 
and  Navy  by  his  own  order  as  President  Lincoln  did, 
after  Fort  Sumter  was  tfred  upon,  it  is  quite  possible  he 
would  have  been  impeached. 

In  speaking  of  Pope's  campaign  the  author  says  : 
"  Finally  the  ill-will  and  disobedience  of  at  least  one 
of  his  corps  commanders  contributed  sensibly  to  defeat 
his  plans  and  paralyze  his  efforts."  The  corps  com- 
mander he  refers  to  is  Fitz  John  Porter ;  and  the 


448  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

author  adds,  "  in  regard  to  Porter's  conduct,  military 
justice  has  pronounced.  He  was  cashiered,  dismissed 
from  the  Army,  and  declared  incapable  of  occupying 
any  position  of  confidence,  honor  or  profit,  under  the 
Government  of  the  United  States." 

When  the  author  (December  14,  1886)  authorized 
the  American  edition  of  his  book,  Porter  had  been 
restored  to  the  Army  by  the  nomination  of  the  Presi- 
dent and  the  confirmation  of  the  Senate,  the  restora- 
tion being  specially  authorized  by  Act  of  Congress. 
The  restoration  was  the  result  of  an  impartial,  and 
searching  investigation  by  a  just  and  learned  tribunal, 
of  which  Major-General  Schofield,  now  General-in- 
Chief,  was  President.  This  tribunal,  with  essential  in- 
formation before  it  which  the  court-martial  did  not 
and  could  not  have,  said,  "The  judgment  of  the  court- 
martial  upon  General  Porter's  conduct  was  evidently 
based  upon  greatly  erroneous  impressions,"  and  after 
pointing  out  these  impressions,  the  tribunal  adds : 
"The  reports  of  the  29th  and  those  of  the  30th  of 
August,  have  somehow  been  strangely  confounded 
with  each  other.  Even  the  Confederate  reports  have, 
since  the  termination  of  the  War,  been  similarly  mis- 
construed. Those  of  the  30th  have  been  misquoted 
as  referring  to  the  29th,  thus  to  prove  that  a  furious 
battle  was  going  on  while  Porter  was  comparatively 
inactive  on  the  29th.  The  fierce  and  gallant  struggle 
of  his  own  troops  on  the  30th  has  thus  been  used  to 
sustain  the  original  error  under  which  he  was  con- 
demned. General  Porter  wTas,  in  effect,  condemned 
for  not  having  taken  any  part  in  his  own  battle.  Such 
was  the  error  upon  which  General  Porter  was  pro- 


DE  TROBKIAND'S  "ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC."     449 

nounced  guilty  of  the  most  shameful  crime  known 
among  soldiers.  We  believe  not  one  among  all  the 
gallant  soldiers  on  that  bloody  field  was  less  deserving 
of  such  condemnation  than  he. 

"  Having  thus  given  the  reasons  for  our  conclusions, 
we  have  the  honor  to  report,  in  accordance  with  the 
President's  order,  that,  in  our  opinion,  justice  requires 
at  his  hands  such  action  as  may  be  necessary  to  annul 
and  set  aside  the  findings  and  sentence  of  the  court- 
martial  in  the  case  of  Major-General  Fitz  John  Porter, 
and  to  restore  him  to  the  positions  of  which  that  sen- 
tence deprived  him.  Such  restoration  to  take  effect 
from  the  date  of  his  dismissal  from  service." 

In  the  face  of  these  facts  the  American  edition  of 
General  de  Trobriand's  book  appears  without  revision 
and  with  the  injunction  to  the  translator  "  to  leave  in- 
tact" the  author's  "judgments  upon  men  and  things." 

Of  the  defenders  of  Fort  Sumter,  the  author  says : 
"  They  had  done  their  duty — nothing  more.  Left  to 
themselves,  in  a  hopeless  position,  they  had  undergone 
a  bombardment  of  two  days,  which  injured  only  the 
walls,  though  they  wished  it  to  be  well-understood 
that  they  yielded  to  force  only ;  after  which  they  had 
packed  their  baggage  and  surrendered  the-  place. 
With  the  best  will  in  tlae  world,  it  seemed  impossible 
to  find  anything  heroic  in  it.  And  yet,  to  see  the 
ovations  given  to  them,  to  read  the  dithyrambs  com- 
posed in  their  honor,  it  would  appear  that  Anderson 
and  his  eighty  men  had  rendered  for  America,  at  Fort 
Sumter,  what  in  ancient  times  Leonidas  and  his  three 
hundred  had  done  for  Greece  at  Thermopylae."  This 
is  rather  a  narrow  view  of  Anderson's  part.  The 


450 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


strictly  military  defence  of  Fort  Sumter  was  but  a 
small  part  of  his  difficult  service.  Never  in  the  history 
of  this  country  has  a  public  officer  been  placed  and 
held  by  his  Government  in  such  a  responsible  and  dif- 
ficult position.  With  the  end  of  an  old  administra- 
tion and  the  beginning  of  a  new  one,  with  revolution 
and  civil  war  fomenting,  and  neither  administration 
knowing  whether  to  rely  upon  conciliation  or  coercion, 
whether  to  pocket  insults  or  resent  them,  whether  to 
apologize  or  fight,  Anderson,  besieged  by  armed 
enemies  for  nearly  five  months,  was  furnished  with  no 
other  instructions  than  equivocal  ones,  which  at  best 
fixed  upon  him  the  responsibility  of  submitting  to 
humiliation  and  starvation  in  the  cause  of  peace  and 
good  citizenship,  or  of  precipitating  civil  war  by  re- 
sponding to  the  dictates  of  military  duty  and  true 
soldiership. 

It  was  not  the  military  defence  of  Sumter,  but  his 
bearing  under  the  trying  circumstances  that  made 
Anderson's  conduct  heroic. 

Speaking  of  General  Scott,  the  author  says  (p.  49), 
"  Enfeebled  morally  and  physically  by  years,  the  old 
candidate  for  the  Presidency  saw  but  one  issue  to  the 
strife  already  entered  on,  the  division  of  the  Union 
into  four  confederations." 

This  is  entirely  wrong.  General  Scott  was  never 
enfeebled  "  morally,"  and  never  thought  the  one  issue 
of  the  strife  would  be  the  division  of  the  Union  into 
four  confederations. 

McClellan's  part  in  the  War  invites  adverse  criti- 
cism, but  the  author  seems  too  severe  upon  him.  Cer- 
tainly he  is  entitled  to  all  that  the  developments  of  the 


DE  TKOBRIAND'S  "AKMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC."  451 

last  twenty  years  have  produced  in  his  favor,  as  well 
as  to  the  softening  influence  of  time.  In  their  eulogis- 
tic "  Life  of  Lincoln,"  Nicolay  and  Hay  describe  M  c- 
Clellan  at  great  length  and  with  no  partiality  for  him. 
They  have  before  them  not  only  the  official  records, 
and  the  military  publications  to  date,  but  all  the 
papers  of  Mr.  Lincoln.  In  conclusion  they  say  in  the 
last  number  of  the  Century  Magazine  (Feb.,  1889)  : 

"  Thus  ended  the  military  career  of  George  Brinton 
McClellan.  Now,  that  the  fierce  passions  of  the  War, 
its  suspicions  and  its  animosities,  have  passed  away, 
we  are  able  to  judge  him  more  accurately  and  more 
justly  than  was  possible  amid  that  moral  and  material 
tumult  and  confusion.  He  was  as  far  from  being  the 
traitor  and  craven  that  many  thought  him  as  from 
being  the  martyr  and  hero  that  others  would  like  to 
have  him  appear.  It  would  be  unfair  to  deny  that  he 
rendered,  to  the  full  measure  of  his  capacity,  sincere 
and  honest  service  to  the  Republic.  His  technical 
knowledge  was  extensive,  his  industry  untiring;  his 
private  character  was  pure  and  upright,  his  integrity 
without  stain.  In  the  private  life  to  which  he  retired 
he  carried  with  him  the  general  respect  and  esteem 
and  the  affection  of  a  troop  of  friends ;  and  when  by 
their  partiality  he  was  afterwards  called  to  the  exer- 
cise of  important  official  functions,  every  office  he 
held  he  adorned  with  the  highest  civic  virtues  and  ac- 
complishments. No  one  now  can  doubt  his  patriotism 
or  his  honor,  and  the  fact  that  he  was  once  doubted 
illustrates  merely  the  part  which  the  blackest  suspi- 
cions play  in  a  great  civil  war,  and  the  stress  to  which 
the  public  mind  was  driven  in  the  effort  to  account 


452  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

for  the  lack  of  results  he  gave  the  country  in  return 
for  the  vast  resources  which  were  so  lavishly  placed 
in  his  hands." 

There  are,  of  course,  errors  and  omissions  in  the 
book,  some  of  which  may  be  noted.  In  his  able 
chapter  upon  the  causes  of  the  War,  the  author,  de- 
scribing the  growth  of  the  anti-slavery  feeling  in  the 
North,  says:  "In  1848  ex-President  Van  Buren  was 
the  anti-slavery  candidate.  This  fact  alone  is  enough 
to  show  the  great  progress  in  public  opinion  during 
the  administration  of  President  Polk.  General  Taylor 
was  elected,  it  is  true,  but  the  large  number  of  votes 
cast  for  Mr.  Van  Buren  gave  the  party  he  represented 
an  importance,  which,  increasing  from  day  to  day, 
already  presaged  the  part  it  would  play  in  the  near 
future." 

This  way  of  presenting  a  historical  matter  is  mis- 
leading. The  reader,  especially  a  foreign  reader, 
might  well  infer  from  the  foregoing  account  tljat  the 
Presidential  contest  in  1848  was  between  Taylor  and 
Van  Buren.  The  fact  is,  however,  that  the  contest 
was  between  Taylor,  the  candidate  of  the  Whig  party, 
and  Cass,  the  candidate  of  the  Democratic  party.  The 
entire  electoral  vote  was  divided  between  them.  Van 
Buren,  the  candidate  of  the  so-called  free-soil  party, 
did  not  receive  one  electoral  vote  and  polled  only 
about  two  hundred  and  ninety  thousand  of  the  popular 
vote. 

Speaking  of  the  assumption  of  the  Presidential 
functions  by  Mr.  Lincoln,  the  author  says  (p.  51)  : 
"Mr.  Lincoln  surrounded  himself  immediately  with 
men  devoted  to  the  Union  cause,  and  resolved  to  give 


DE  TROBRIAND'S  u  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC."  453 

force  to  the  will  of  the  people.  They  were :  Mr. 
Seward,  of  New  York,  .  .  .  for  Secretary  of 
State;  Salmon  P.  Chase,  of  Ohio,  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury ;  Simon  Cameron,  of  Pennsylvania,  Secretary 
of  War ;  Gideon  Welles,  of  Connecticut,  Secretary  of 
the  Navy ;  Caleb  D.  Smith,  Secretary  of  the  Interior." 
Two  very  active  and  important  functionaries  are 
omitted,  namely :  Bates,  the  Attorney-General,  and 
Montgomery  Blair,  the  Postmaster-General.  Blair  was 
a  graduate  of  the  Military  Academy  in  the  same  class 
as  Meade,  and  busied  himself  with  military  affairs  in 
Lincoln's  cabinet. 

It  would  seem  that  there  ought  not  to  be  any  reason 
for  mistakes  about  the  date  of  the  first  Bull  Run,  yet 
one  occurs  in  this  book,  due  no  doubt  to  misprint. 
We  are  told  (p.  72),  "  The  officers  (of  the  author's  regi- 
ment), were  called  together  to  choose  a  Colonel  on  the 
21st  of  July,  the  evening  before  the  battle  of  Bull  Run. 
I  was  elected.  On  the  23d,  the  morning  of  the  battle,. 
a  telegraphic  dispatch  announced  to  me  that  my  regi- 
ment was  accepted,  etc." 

The  translator  appears  to  have  given  accurately  the 
meaning  of  the  author,  and  to  have  preserved  faithfully 
the  force  of  the  French  idioms.  Some  parts  .of  the 
translation  are  perhaps  too  literal.  Page  48  affords 
an  example  :  "  Anderson  and  his  little  faithful  troop 
were  left,  abandoned  to  their  fate,  and,  under  the 
effect  of  such  an  insult  to  the  national  flag,  Mr.  Bu- 
chanan humiliated  himself  to  promise  to  send  no  more- 
men  nor  munitions  of  war  nor  provisions  to  that  hand- 
ful of  brave  men  who  had  displayed  and  defended  the 
flag  of  the  United  States  in  face  of  the  rebels  of  South 


454  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

Carolina."  If  one  happened  to  turn  from  contempla- 
tion of  the  excellent  portrait  of  the  author,  which 
forms  the  frontispiece,  to  page  48  of  the  text,  he  could 
hardly  read  that  page  without  a  French  accent. 


ARTICLE   XL 

Pittenger's  aCapturing  a  Locomotive." 

On  the  7th  of  April,  1862,  General  O.  M.  Mitchel, 
U.  S.  Volunteers,  commanding  in  Middle  Tennessee, 
organized  a  party  of  twenty- four  men  to  steal  into  the 
enemy's  lines,  assemble  at  Marietta,  Gra.,  capture  a 
locomotive  and  run  north,  destroying  en  route  the 
bridges  and  telegraph  between  the  place  of  capture 
and  Chattanooga.  The  expedition  was  suggested  and 
conducted  by  J.  J.  Andrews,  a  spy.  The  soldiers 
volunteered  for  the  service,  and  were  told  the  nature 
and  purpose  of  it.  They  were  armed  only  with  revol- 
vers, exchanged  their  uniforms  for  citizen's  dress,  and 
deceived  the  enemy's  troops  and  people.  Twenty- 
two  of  the  party  assembled  at  Marietta  on  Friday 
evening,  April  11,  took  passage  on  the  north-bound 
train  about  daylight  next  morning,  and  when  the 
train  stopped  for  breakfast  at  a  station  called  Big 
Shanty,  they  quietly  uncoupled  the  locomotive  and 
three  box  cars  and  started  at  full  speed  up  the  track. 
Pursuit  was  made  as  soon  as  possible.  The  adven- 
turers met  with  unexpected  difficulties  and  delays,  and 
after  running  about  a  hundred  miles  were  compelled 
to  abandon  the  train  and  scatter  in  the  woods.  The 
surrounding  country  was  aroused.  The  fugitives 
were  hunted  down  and  all  were  captured  and  thrown 
into  loathsome  prisons.  After  some  months  Andrews 

*  Journal  of  Military  Service  Institution. 

455 


456  MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 

the  leader  and  seven  others  were  tried  by  court-mar- 
tial and  hanged,  and  eight  made  their  escape.  The 
remaining  six  were  exchanged  in  the  following  March. 

The  absorbing  story  of  this  unparalleled  enterprise 
is  told  in  detail  by  the  Reverend  William  Pittenger, 
one  of  the  survivors,  in  a  volume  entitled  "  Capturing 
a  Locomotive,"  recently  published  by  J.  B.  Lippincott 
&Co. 

No  romance  contains  more  of  danger,  pluck,  resolu- 
tion, endurance,  suffering,  gloom  and  hope  than  this 
truthful  account  of  an  actual  occurrence  in  our  War 
of  Rebellion.  It  does  not  detract  from  the  interest  of 
the  story  that  the  author  is  not  fully  informed  as  to 
the  origin  of  the  enterprise,  and  is  not  strictly  correct 
as  to  its  purposes  and  their  importance.  The  adven- 
ture he  describes  wTas  the  second  that  was  planned, 
both  of  which  he  erroneously  assumes  were  inaugu- 
rated under  the  authority  of  General  Mitchel  for  the 
purpose  of  enabling  or  facilitating  the  capture  of 
Chattanooga  by  that  officer.  The  facts  are  about  as 
follows  :  The  rebel  line,  extending  in  the  winter  of 
1861-62  from  Columbus,  on  the  Mississippi  River,  to 
Bowling  Green,  Kentucky,  was  broken  in  the  centre 
by  the  capture  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  and  the 
enemy  was  forced  to  fall  back.  The  main  body  from 
Bowling  Green  retired  via  Nashville  through  Middle 
Tennessee  to  the  south  of  the  Tennessee  River.  Gen- 
eral Halleck,  adhering  to  his  interior  line,  moved  his 
troops  up  the  Tennessee  River  in  March,  with  a  view 
to  breaking  the  new  line  the  enemy  had  established, 
or  was  about  to  establish,  along  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  Railroad.  Buell7  who  with  the  army  of 


PITTENGEK'S  "  CAPTURING  A  LOCOMOTIVE.' 


457 


the  Ohio  had  seized  Nashville  in  the  latter  part  of 
February,  1862,  and  was  about  marching  westward  to 
join  Grant  at  Savanna  on  the  Tennessee,  was  not  un- 
mindful of  the  advantage  of  breaking  west  of  Chatta- 
nooga the  railroad  which  led  the  rebel  forces  from  the 
east  and  south  to  his  flank,  and  also  directly  connected 
them  with  Corinth  against  which  Halleck  was  moving. 
The  spy  Andrews,  who  was  in  Buell's  service,  repre- 
sented early  in  March,  1862,  that,  with  a  party  of  six 
trusty  men,  he  could  destroy  the  railroad  bridges  be- 
tween Chattanooga  and  Bridgeport,  and  also  the  im- 
portant bridge  over  the  Tennessee  at  the  latter  place, 
and  thus  effectually  prevent  the  enemy  from  using 
that  route  either  to  re-enforce  Corinth  or  retnrn  to 
Middle  Tennessee.  Buell  had  received  but  little  bene- 
fit from  Andrews's  services,  and  did  not  encourage  the 
proposition,  but,  in  consequence  mainly  of  the  confi- 
dence and  urgency  of  the  spy,  he  finally  directed  his 
Chief-of-Staff,  Colonel  James  B.  Fry,  to  confer  fully 
with  Andrews  and  use  his  discretion  as  to  authorizing 
and  organizing  the  enterprise.  The  Chief-of-Staff,  on 
the  strength  of  Andrews's  assurance  that  an  engineer 
running  a  regular  train  over  the  road  was  in  our  in- 
terest, and  would  use  his  locomotive  for  the  purpose, 
sanctioned  and  arranged  the  undertaking.  General 
Mitchel  was  directed  to  furnish  six  men  if  volunteers 
for  the  service  could  be  found.  That  is  all  General 
Mitchel  had  to  do  with  the  original  enterprise.*  It 

*  SARATOGA,  August  5,  1863. 
To  GENERAL  L.  THOMAS, 

Adjutant-General  U.  S.  A.,  Washington  City,  D.  C. 
SIR  : — In  the  "  Official  Gazette  "  of  the  21st  ultimo,  I  see  a  report 
of  Judge  Advocate-General  Holt,  dated  the  27th  of  March,  relative  to 


458  MILITAEY  MISCELLANIES. 

appears  from  Mr.  Pittenger's  book  that  the  party  as- 
sembled at  Atlanta,  but  failing  to  find  the  engineer 
on  whose  co-operation  the  enterprise  was  based  gave 
it  up,  and  all  the  men  made  their  way  safely  back 
to  our  lines.  This  terminated  the  effort  to  destroy 
bridges  west  of  Chattanooga  by  capturing  a  locomo- 
tive. In  relation  to  the  merits  of  this  scheme,  it  may 
be  said  that,  at  the  time,  perhaps  the  object  was  of 
sufficient  importance  to  cover  the  probabilities  of  fail- 
ure and  the  risk  to  the  men  engaged,  but  at  best  the 
undertaking  was  hardly  commendable.  Buell,  basing 
no  plans  on  the  success  of  it,  marched  with  the  main 
body  of  his  army  for  the  field  of  Shiloh  without 
knowing  the  result.  When  Andrews  returned  early 
in  April,  he  found  General  Mitchel  in  command  near 

"  an  expedition  set  on  foot  in  April,  1862,  under  the  authority  and 
direction,"  as  the  report  says,  "of  General  O.  M.  Mitchel,  the  object 
of  which  was  to  destroy  the  communication  on  the  Georgia  State  Rail- 
road between  Atlanta  and  Chattanooga."  The  expedition  was  "  set  on 
foot"  under  my  authority;  the  plan  was  arranged  between  Mr.  An- 
drews, whom  I  had  had  in  employment  from  shortly  after  assuming 
command  in  Kentucky,  and  my  Chief-of -Staff,  Colonel  James  B.  Fry  ; 
and  General  Mitchel  had  nothing  to  do  either  with  its  conception  or 
execution,  except  to  furnish  from  his  command  the  soldiers  who  took 
part  in  it.  He  was  directed  to  furnish  six ;  instead  of  that  he  sent 
twenty -two.  Had  he  conformed  to  the  instructions  given  him  it  would 
have  been  better ;  the  chances  of  success  would  have  been  greater,  and 
in  any  event  several  lives  would  have  been  saved.  The  report  speaks 
of  the  plan  as  an  emanation  of  genius ;  and  of  the  results  which  it 
promised  as  "absolutely  sublime."  It  may  be  proper  therefore  to 
say,  that  this  statement  is  made  for  the  sake  of  truth,  and  not  to  call 
attention  to  the  extravagant  colors  in  which  it  has  been  presented. 
Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

[Signed.]     D.  C.  BUELL,  Major-General. 

[NOTE. — General  Buell  knew  only  of  the  first  expedition — the  one 
he  authorized.  The  second,  sent  by  Mitchel,  without  Buell's  authority, 
was  never  reported.] 


PITTENGER'S  <;  CAPTURING  A  LOCOMOTIVE."  459 

Nashville,  and  reported  to  him  in  Buell's  absence. 
Mitchel,  with  no  enemy  to  oppose  him,  was  advanc- 
ing through  Middle  Tennessee,  and  occupied  Hunts- 
ville  on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad  on 
Friday,  April  11.  The  author  says  Mitchel's  purpose 
was  to  capture  Chattanooga.  Appropriating  the  idea  of 
bridge- burn  ing,  Mitchel  on  the  7th  of  April — the  last 
day  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh — started  a  party  of  twenty- 
four  men  under  Andrews  to  capture  a  locomotive  and 
destroy  bridges  south  of  Chattanooga,  between  that 
place  and  Marietta.  No  exception  can  fairly  be  taken 
to  the  author's  graphic  account  of  the  failure  of  that 
effort,  but  he  and  the  Judge  Advocate-General  of  the 
Army  and  the  Southern  newspapers  appear  to  have 
attached  undue  importance  to  the  object  of  it.  The 
destruction  of*  bridges  between  Marietta  and  Chatta- 
nooga would  not  have  enabled  General  Mitchel  to 
take  the  latter  place.  If  his  instructions  or  the  mili- 
tary conditions  had  justified  him  in  an  attempt  to 
capture  Chattanooga — which  they  did  not — the  pres- 
ervation of  the  bridge  over  the  Tennessee  would  have 
been  important  to  his  success.  The  enemy  had  only  to 
burn  that  structure,  as  they  did  when  Mitchel's  troops 
approached  it  April  29,  in  order  to  check  an  advance 
on  Chattanooga.  Furthermore,  if  Mitchel's  party  had 
succeeded  in  burning  bridges  between  Marietta  and 
Chattanooga,  that  would  not  have  prevented  the  re- 
enforcement  of  the  latter  place,  as  the  regular  railroad 
route  through  East  'Tennessee  was  open  and  in  the 
enemy's  possession,  and  it  was  from  the  east,  and  not 
from  the  south,  where  there  were  but  fe\v  if  any 
available  troops  until  Corinth  was  evacuated,  that  the 


460  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

place  was  most  likely  to  be  re-enforced.  Mitchel's 
bridge-burners,  therefore,  took  desperate  chances  to 
accomplish  objects  of  no  substantial  advantage.  Judge 
Advocate-General  Holt  probably  had  not  examined 
carefully  into  the  military  aspects  of  the  subject  when 
he  reported  of  this  enterprise  in  1863,  "  in  the  gigantic 
and  overwhelming  results  it  sought  and  was  likely  to 
accomplish,  it  was  absolutely  sublime."  General 
Mitchel  made  no  such  claim.  In  fact,  seeing  as  he 
no  doubt  finally  did,  the.  insufficiency  of  the  object, 
and  the  completeness  of  the  failure  and  its  deplorable 
consequences,  he  never  made  any  report  whatever  of 
the  operation. 

It  is  not  strange  that  when  the  men  engaged  in  this 
affair  were  captured,  they  endeavored  to  have  the  ene- 
my treat  them  as  prisoners  of  war,  but  it  is  rather 
remarkable  that  the  author  at  this  late  day  claims  that 
their  only  offence  "  was  that  of  accepting  a  dangerous 
service  proposed  by  their  own  officers,"  and  complains 
that  the  rebels  treated  them  as  spies.  They  were 
soldiers  who  stripped  off  their  uniforms  and  went  into 
the  enemy's  lines  to  war  against  Mm  in  disguise.  The 
author  maintains  that,  as  they  did  not  "  lurk  "  about 
the  enemy's  camps  for  the  purpose  of  getting  informa- 
tion they  were  not  spies.  That  plea  is  technical  and 
feeble ;  nor  is  the  argument  that  the  rebel  partisans 
and  guerillas  came  in  citizen's  dress  within  our  lines 
of  any  material  weight  in  this  connection.  We  are 
convicted  on  these  points  out  of  our  own  mouths. 
Our  authorities  say  "  a  spy  is  punishable  with  death." 
"  A  person  proved  to  be  a  regular  soldier  of  the  ene- 
my's army,  found  in  citizen's  dress  within  the  lines  of 


PITTENGER'S  "CAPTURING  A  LOCOMOTIVE."  461 

the  captor,  is  universally  dealt  with  as  a  spy." 
"Armed  prowlers  by  whatever  names  they  may  be 
called,  who  steal  within  the  lines  of  the  hostile  army 
for  the  purpose  of  robbing,  killing,  or  of  destroying 
bridges,  roads,  or  canals,  or  of  robbing  or  destroying 
the  mail,  or  of  cutting  the  telegraph  wires,  are  not  en- 
titled to  the  privileges  of  the  prisoner  of  war."  Mr. 
Pittenger  has  given  us  the  most  thrilling  story  of  the 
Rebellion,  but  his  heroes,  brilliant  and  daring,  were,  by 
the  rules  of  war,  marauders  and  spies,  who  knowingly 
and  voluntarily  bet  their  lives  on  a  desperate  game 
and  lost.  Only  eight  of  the  twenty -four  were  exe- 
cuted. Instead  of  blaming  the  winner  for  taking  one- 
third  of  the  stakes,  the  author  should  have  thanked 
him  for  not  enforcing  his  right  to  the  other  two-thirds. 


AKTICLE  XII. 

Keyes's  "  Fifty  Years'  Observation  of 
Men  and  Events."* 

This  is  one  of  the  most  entertaining  books  of  the 
period.  The  author's  characteristics,  so  well  known 
to  the  old  Army,  speak  f  1*0111  every  page.  He  never 
fail's  to  be  earnest  and  forcible.  If  his  opinions  are 
not  always  sound,  they  are  openly  and  honestly  enter- 
tained. His  observations  of  men  and  events  of  his 
time  are  perhaps  the  more  entertaining  from  the  fact 
that  while  his  convictions  are  strong  and  sincere,  his 
work  is  notional  rather  than  logical — spicy,  not  prosy. 
The  apothegms  in  his  book  will  please  the  cynic  more 
than  his  military  criticisms  will  instruct  the  soldier. 
The  flavor  of  the  former  may  be  found  in  the  follow- 
ing quotations  :  "  The  antics  of  military  and  political 
jealousy,  like  the  follies  of  love,  are  beyond  the  scope 
of  prose."  "Religion,  surgery,  chemistry,  and  engi- 
neering are  prosperous ;  and  if  a  man  is  more  to  be 
pitied  when  he  falls  into  the  clutches  of  the  law,  and 
his  property  is  converted  by  sharpers,  he  is  safer  when 

*  "  Fifty  Years'  Observation  of  Men  and  Events,  Civil  and  Military." 
By  E.  D.  Keyes,  Brevet  Brigadier-General  U.  S.  Army ;  Late  Major- 
General  U.  S.  Volunteers,  Commanding  the  Fourth  Corps.  Charles 
Scribner's  Sons.  New  York,  1884. 

Journal  of  Military  Service  Institution. 

462 


REYES'S  "  OBSERVATION  OF  MEN  AND  EVENTS."    463 

he  trusts  himself  with  a  doctor."  "The  directors  and 
stockholders  of  railroads  (in  early  times)  constituted 
the  meekest  and  most  sorrowful  class  of  our  citizens. 
They  were  palid,  meagre,  and  supplicating  men ;  but 
now  they  are  a  distinct  class,  to  which  all  the  world 
makes  obeisance,  and  they  have  become  ruddy,  surfeit- 
swelled,  and  dictatorial."  "The  most  surprising  of 
all  legal  contests  originate  in  the  vagaries  of  true  or 
simulated  love."  "The  practice  of  law  hardens  most 
men,  and  renders  them  insensible  to  the  torments 
of  litigation."  "  The  abuses  of  no  human  organiza- 
tion can  ever  be  corrected  by  those  who  profit  by 
them." 

As  an  example  of  General  Keyes's  military  criticism, 
the  following  is  cited  (p.  216):  "The  operations  of 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  under  its  new  leader  were 
full  of  vigor,  and  in  the  month  of  May,  1863,  General 
Grant  crossed  the  Mississippi  below  Vicksburg,  placed 
himself  between  Pemberton,  who  commanded  in  that 
city,  and  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  who  was  at  the  head  of 
an  army  in  the  interior.  From  the  moment  I  became 
acquainted  with  the  nature  of  that  movement,  I  have 
considered  Grant  as  one  of  the  great  captains  of 
history.  The  story  of  nearly  every  one  of  them  em- 
braces a  similar  history.  Alexander  of  Macedon 
crossed  the  Indus  to  capture  old  Porus.  Scipio  went 
over  the  Mediterranean  to  fight  and  vanquish  Han- 
nibal. Caesar,  already  as  great  as  any  man  in  the 
world,  crossed  the  Rubicon,  and  became  the  greatest. 
Tamerlane  passed  the  sea  on  the  ice  to  die  of  fatigue. 
Turenne  crossed  the  Rhine  to  drive  back  Monticuculi, 
and  to  be  killed.  Napoleon  fought  his  way  over  the 


464  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

Adige  to  enter  the  temple  of  fame,  and  at  a  later 
date,  when  success  had  turned  his  head,  he  ventured 
to  the  northern  side  of  the  Boristhenese  to  see  the 
lustre  of  his  star  pale  in  the  smoke  of  burning  Mos- 


cow." 


From  this  commingling  of  rivers,  seas,  mountains, 
generals,  victories,  defeats,  and  death,  Grant's  greatness 
is  deduced,  without  counting  the  campaign  of  kisses 
Leaiider  won  by  swimming  the  Hellespont.  The  mili- 
tary merit  of  Grant's  Vicksburg  campaign,  when  he 
decided  to  run  the  batteries,  and  pass  the  city,  is 
beyond  dispute.  He  crossed  the  dividing  waters  to 
get  at  the  enemy,  and  so  did  the  other  great  leaders 
mentioned  by  General  Keyes,  but  the  use  of  that 
coincidence  as  proof  in  itself  of  Grant's  generalship 
is  something  quite  new. 

With  all  its  amiability  and  frankness,  this  book 
shows  some  aversions,  and  Halleck  appears  to  be  one 
of  them.  The  author  says,  speaking  of  the  firm  of 
Halleck,  Peachy  &  Billings,  in  early  times  in  San 
Francisco  (p.  301)  :  "  Halleck  was  thrifty  and  perse- 
vering, but  his  distinctive  characteristics  were  obduracy 
and  laboriousness.  I  was  less  intimate  with  him  than 
with  the  other  two,  for  he  was  more  inclined  to  be  rny 
enemy  than  my  friend."  This  perhaps  accounts  for  a 
disposition  which  appears  in  the  book  to  misjudge 
Halleck.  Speaking  of  Thomas  (p.  168)  the  author 
says :  "  Not  long  before  the  battle  of  Nashville, 
which  gave  permanence  to  his  renown,  he  was  accused 
of  dilatoriness  and  inefficiency.  The  disadvantageous 
reports  were  credited,  arid  General-in-Chief  of  the 
Army  Halleck  issued  an  order  and  had  it  printed,  re- 


REYES'S  "  OBSERVATION  OF  MEN  AND  EVENTS."    465 

lieving  Thomas,  and  directing  General  Schofield  to 
assume  command  of  his  army.  For  some  reason  un- 
known to  me,  the  order  was  not  sent,"  etc.  The 
proposition  above  mentioned,  to  supersede  Thomas, 
has  been  under  public  and  private  discussion  ever 
since  the  close  of  the  War.  General  Keyes's  errors 
concerning  it  are  unaccountable.  When  the  battle 
of  Nashville  was  fought,  December  15-16,  1864, 
Lieutenant-General  Grant  was  General-in-Chief,  hav- 
ing (under  the  act  of  March,  1864),  superseded  Hal- 
leek  in  that  duty  nine  months  previously.  Major- 
General  Ilalleck  held  then,  and  for  the  preceding 
nine  months  had  held,  only  the  nominal  position  of 
Chief- of  Staff. 

The  further  facts  in  the  case  are  as  follows  : 
On  the  2d  of  December  Stan  toil  telegraphed  to 
Grant :  "  The  President  feels  solicitous  about  the 
disposition  of  General  Thomas  to  lay  in  fortifications 
for  an  indefinite  period,  until  Wilson  gets  equipments. 
This  looks  like  the  McClellan  and  Kosecrans  strategy, 
to  do  nothing  and  let  the  rebels  ride  the  country.  The 
President  wishes  you  to  consider  the  matter."  This 
telegram  was  followed  on  the  7th  of  December  by 
another  from  Stanton  to  Grant,  saying :  "  General 
Thomas  seems  unwilling  to  attack  because  it  is 
hazardous,  as  if  all  war  was  anything  but  hazardous. 
If  he  waits  for  Wilson  to  get  ready  Gabriel  will  be 
blowing  his  last  horn."  To  this  Grant  replied  on  the 
same  day  :  "  You  probably  saw  my  order  to  Thomas 
to  attack.  If  he  does  not  do  it  promptly,  I  would 
recommend  superseding  him  by  Schofield,  leaving 
Thomas  subordinate."  The  next  day  (the  8th)  Grant 


466 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


telegraphed  Halleck  :  "  If  Thomas  has  not  struck  yet, 
he  ought  to  be  ordered  to  hand  over  his  command. 
There  is  no  better  man  to  repel  an  attack  than  Thomas, 
but  I  fear  he  is  too  cautious  to  ever  take  the  initiative," 
to  which  Halleck,  at  nine  that  evening,  replied :  "  If 
you  wish  General  Thomas  relieved  from  command, 
give  the  order.  No  one  here  will,  I  think,  interfere. 
The  responsibility,  however,  will  be  yours,  as  no  one 
here,  so  far  as  I  am  informed,  wishes  General  Thomas's 
removal."  To  this  Grant  replied  immediately  (10  P.M. 
December  8)  :  "  Your  dispatch  of  9  P.M.  just  received. 
I  want  General  Thomas  reminded  of  the  importance 
of  immediate  action.  I  sent  him  a  dispatch  this 
evening  which  will  probably  urge  him  on.  I  would 
not  say  relieve  him  till  I  hear  further  from  him."  On 
the  morning  of  the  9th  of  December  Halleck  tele- 
graphed Thomas:  "General  Grant  expresses  much 
dissatisfaction  at  your  delay  in  attacking  the  enemy. 
If  you  wait  until  General  Wilson  mounts  all  his  cavalry 
you  will  wait  until  Doomsday,  for  the  waste  equals 
the  supply.  Moreover,  you  will  soon  be  in  the  same 
condition  that  Rosecrans  was  last  year,  with  so  many 
animals  that  you  cannot  feed  them.  Reports  already- 
come  in  of  a  scarcity  of  forage."  On  the  morning  of 
December  9,  Grant  telegraphed  Halleck  :  "  Dispatch 
of  8  P.M.  last  night  from  Nashville  shows  the  enemy 
scattered  for  more  than  seventy  miles  down  the  river, 
and  no  attack  yet  made  by  Thomas.  Please  telegraph 
order  relieving  him  at  once  and  placing  Schofield  in 
command.  Thomas  should  be  directed  to  turn  over 
all  orders  and  dispatches  received  since  the  battle  of 
Franklin  to  Schofield." 


REYES'S  "  OBSERVATION  OF  MEN  AND  EVENTS."    467 

In  pursuance  of  these  instructions,  Ilalleck  bad  an 
order  drawn  up  in  terms  as  follows : 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

GENERAL  ORDERS  |      WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,Dec.  9, 1864. 

No.  —          j 

In  accordance  with  the  following  dispatch  from 
Lieutenant-General  Grant,  viz. :  u  Please  telegraph 
order  relieving  him  (General  Thomas)  at  once  and 
placing  Schofield  in  command.  Thomas  should  be 
directed  to  turn  over  all  dispatches  received  since  the 
battle  of  Franklin  to  Schofield. 

" U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General" 

THE  PRESIDENT  ORDERS, 

I.  That  Major-General  Schofield  assume  command 
of  all   troops  in  the  Department  of  the  Cumberland, 
the  Ohio,  and  the  Tennessee. 

II.  That  Major-General  George  H.  Thomas  report 
to   General   Schofield  for  duty,  and  turn  over  to  him 
all  orders  and  dispatches  received  by  him  as  specified 
above. 

By  order  of  the  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

OFFICIAL:  J.  C.  KELTON,  A.  A.-G. 

Halleck,  however,  did  not  promulgate  the  order. 
While  he  was  holding  it  upon  his  sole  responsibility, 
he,  at  3.20  P.M.,  December  9,  received  the  following 
telegram  from  Thomas,  sent  at  2.15  P.M.  same  day: 
"Your  telegram  of  10.30  A.M.,  to-day  received.  I  re- 
gret General  Grant  should  feel  dissatisfaction  at  my 
delay  in  attacking  the  enemy.  I  feel  conscious  that  I 
have  done  everything  in  my  power  t0  prepare,  and 


468 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


that  troops  could  not  have  been  got  ready  before  this, 
and  if  he  should  order  me  to  be  relieved  I  will  sub- 
mit without  a  murmur.  A  terrible  storm,  freezing 
rain,  has  come  on  since  daylight,  which  will  render  an 
attack  impossible  until  it  breaks." 

Halleck  instantly — at  4.10  P.M.  same  day — tele- 
graphed Grant  as  follows  :  "  Orders  relieving  General 
Thomas  had  been  made  out  when  his  telegram  of  this 
P.M.  was  received.  If  you  still  wish  these  orders  tele- 
graphed to  Nashville  they  will  be  forwarded."  To 
which  Grant  replied  at  5.30  P.M.  on  the  same  day  : 
"General  Thomas  has  been  urged  in  every  way  possible 
to  attack  the  enemy,  even  to  giving  the  precise  order. 
He  did  say  he  thought  he  would  be  able  to  attack  on 
the  7th,  but  did  not  do  so,  nor  has  he  given  a  reason 
for  not  doing  it.  I  am  very  unwilling  to  do  injustice 
to  an  officer  who  has  done  so  much  good  service  as 
Thomas  has,  however.  You  will  therefore  suspend 
the  order  relieving  him  until  it  is  seen  whether  he 
will  do  any  thing." 

It  thus  appears  that  Stan  ton's  impatience  with 
Thomas  was  brought  to  bear  upon  Grant  as  early  as 
December  2,  and  that  Grant  shared  it  very  soon  after, 
if  not  at  the  time ;  that  the  President's  order  supersed- 
ing Thomas  by  Schofield  was  made  in  pursuance  of 
Grant's  advice,  and  that  it  was  drawn  up  by  Halleck 
as  Chief-of-Staff ;  that  instead  of  promulgating  it 
instantly  and  relieving  Thomas  by  telegraph,  as 
Grant  directed  on  the  morning  of  the  9th,  Halleck 
held  the  order  on  his  own  responsibility,  and  at  4.10 
in  the  afternoon  asked  Grant  by  telegraph  whether  he 
still  wished  the  order  concerning  Thomas  and  Scho- 


REYES'S  "  OBSERVATION  OF  MEN  AND  EVENTS."    469 

field  telegraphed  to  Nashville.  It  was  in  response  to 
this  that  Grant  suspended  the  order.  Clearly  Hal- 
leek's  action  was  in  Thomas's  interest,  and  comment 
upon  the  injustice  done  Halleck  by  General  Keyes  is 
unnecessary. 

But  notwithstanding  the  foregoing  order  was  sus- 
pended on  the  9th,  Thomas  had  not  attacked  by  the 
13th,  and  on  that  day  Grant  took  the  matter  of  super- 
seding him  into  his  own  hands  and  made  the  follow- 
ing order  from  the  field  : 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 

SPECIAL  ORDERS  |     CITY  POINT,  VA.,  Dec.  13,  1864. 
No.  149.         j 

I.  Major-General  John  A.  Logan,  U.  S.  Volunteers, 
will  proceed  immediately  to  Nashville,  Tenn.,  report- 
ing by  telegraph,  to  the  Lieutenant-General  Command- 
ing, his  arrival  at  Louisville,  Ky.,  and  also  his  arrival 
at  Nashville.  .  .  . 

By  command  of  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  GRANT, 

T.  L.  BOWERS,  A.  A.-G. 

Though  not  expressed  in  the  foregoing  order 
Grant's  intention  was  to  supersede  Thomas  by  Logan 
and  go  to  Nashville  himself  to  supervise  operations. 
But  before  Logan  arrived  at  Nashville  on  the  17th, 
Thomas  had  fought  the  battle  of  Nashville,  December 
15—16,  and  gained  his  crowning  victory.  Logan  tele- 
graphed Grant  from  Louisville  at  10  A.M.,  December 
17:  "I've  just  arrived,  weather  bad,  raining  since 
yesterday  morning.  People  here  jubilant  over  Thom- 
as's success ;  confidence  seems  to  be  restored.  I  will 
remain  here  to  hear  from  you.  All  things  going  light 


470  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

It  would  seem  best  that  I  return  soon  to  join  my  com- 
mand with  Sherman."  On  the  19th  of  December 
Grant  telegraphed  Logan,  who  was  still  at  Louisville : 
"  The  news  from  Thomas  so  far  is  in  the  highest  de- 
gree gratifying.  You  need  not  go  farther.  Before 
starting  to  join  Sherman  report  in  Washington." 
That  was  the  end  of  the  two  moves  to  supersede 
Thomas. 

On  the  14th  of  February,  1884,  Grant  addressed  to 
Logan  a  letter  in  explanation  of  the  purpose  and 
scope  of  the  orders  given  to  Logan,  making  it  clear 
that  Grant  was  dissatisfied  with  the  slowness  of  Gen- 
eral Thomas's  "  moving, "  and  on  that  account  sent 
Logan  "  out  with  orders  to  relieve  him  "  ;  though  he 
did  not  intend  Logan's  orders  to  settle  any  question 
which  might  arise  between  Logan  and  Schofield  as  to 
the  general  command  of  the  combined  armies  of  the 
Cumberland  and  Ohio. 

The  author  (p.  214),  in  speaking  of  Fort  Donelson, 
1862,  says:  "General  H.  W.  Halleck  was  a  man  of 
talent  and  a  patriot,  but  often  a  slave  to  prejudice. 
He  knew  nothing  about  Grant's  character,  and  he 
wished  to  know  nothing  good.  .  .  .  General  Hal- 
leck accused  him  of  neglect,  superseded  him  in  his 
command  by  General  C.  F.  Smith,  and  finally,  upon 
some  pretence,  placed  Grant  in  arrest."  This  is  unjust 
to  Halleck.  The  records  show  that  early  in  March, 
1862,  Halleck  subjected  Grant  to  some  unmerited  cen- 
sure, for  occurrences  subsequent  to  the  capture  of  Fort 
Donelson  (February  16,  1862),  and  that  in  reports  to 
Washington  he  alleged  that  Grant  left  his  command 
and  went  to  Nashville  without  authority  ;  that  he  failed 


REYES'S  "  OBSERVATION  OF  MEN  AND  EVENTS."    47 1 

to  make  reports  and  returns,  and  that  his  army  was 
badly  demoralized.  In  response  to  Halleck's  report 
concerning  Grant,  McClellan,  then  at  the  head  of  the 
Army,  telegraphed  Halleck  (March  3):  u  Do  not  hesi- 
tate to  arrest  him  at  once  if  the  good  of  the  service 
requires  it,  and  place  C.  F.  Smith  in  command.  You 
are  at  liberty  to  regard  this  as  a  positive  order, 
if  it  will  smooth  your  way."  On  the  next  day 
(March  4)  Halleck  replied  to  McClellan :  "  I  do  not 
deem  it  advisable  to  arrest  him  at  present,  but  have 
placed  General  Smith  in  command  of  the  expedition 
up  the  Tennessee."  On  the  10th  of  March  the  Presi- 
dent, through  the  Adjutant-General,  called  upon  Hal- 
leck for  an  official  statement  concerning  the  reports 
against  Grant ;  and  Halleck  stated  in  response  (March 
15)  :  "  General  Grant  and  several  officers  of  high  rank 
in  his  command  immediately  after  the  battle  of  Fort 
Donelson  went  to  Nashville  without  my  authority  or 
knowledge.  I  am  satisfied,  however,  from  investiga- 
tion that  General  Grant  did  this  from  good  intentions 
and  from  a  desire  to  subserve  the  public  interests. 
During  the  absence  of  General  Grant  and  part  of  his 
general  officers  numerous  irregularities  are  said  to  have 
occurred  at  Fort  Donelson.  These  were  in  violation 
of  the  orders  issued  by  General  Grant  before  his  de- 
parture, and  probably  under  the  circumstances  were 
unavoidable.  General  Grant  has  made  proper  explan- 
ations, and  has  been  directed  to  resume  command  in 
the  field.  As  he  acted  from  a  praiseworthy,  although 
mistaken  zeal  for  the  public  service  in  going  to  Nash- 
ville and  leaving  his  command,  I  respectfully  recom- 
mend that  no  further  notice  be  taken  of  it.  There 


472  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

never  has  been  any  want  of  military  subordination  on 
the  part  of  General  Grant,  and  his  failure  to  make  re- 
turns of  his  force  has  been  explained  as  resulting 
partly  from  the  failure  of  Colonels  of  regiments  to  re- 
port to  him  on  their  arrival,  and  partly  from  an  inter- 
ruption of  telegraphic  communication.  All  these 
irregularities  have  now  been  remedied."  The  fore- 
going documents  give  all  the  essential  facts  in  the 
case  afforded  by  the  official  records.  They  fail  to 
show  that  Halleck  "  placed  Grant  in  arrest."  They 
show,  on  the  contrary,  that  under  specific  authority 
from  the  General-in-Chief  to  place  Grant  in  arrest  Hal- 
leck declined  to  do  so ;  that  he  put  General  C.  F.  Smith 
in  immediate  command  of  an  expedition  up  the  Ten- 
nessee River,  leaving  Grant  on  duty  at  Fort  Henry.  As 
soon,  however,  as  Halleck  received  explanations  of 
what  he  had  supposed  to  be  irregularities,  he  sent 
Grant  forward  to  his  command,  and  in  a  formal  letter 
to  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  Army  explained  away 
what  had  been  reported  against  him. 

Another  criticism  is  in  relation  to  Halleck's  opera- 
tions against  Corinth.  The  author  says  :  "  Halleck 
continued  to  fortify  against  a  retreating  enemy,  gained 
nothing,  so  far  as  I  have  discovered,  but  disadvantages, 
until  the  month  of  July,  and  being  convinced  that  to 
command  an  army  in  the  field  was  not  his  vocation, 
he  recommended  Colonel  Robert  Allen  as  his  successor, 
and  departed  for  Washington  to  assume  command  of 
the  whole  Army,  vice  General  George  B.  McClel- 
lan.  Allen  declined  the  command  and  Grant  was  re- 
stored to  it." 

This  novel  bit  of  military  history  and  criticism  is 


REYES'S  "  OBSERVATION  OF  MEN  AND  EVENTS."    473 

full  of  errors.  Halleck's  operations  as  commander  in 
the  field,  from  April  to  July,  1862,  were  not  brilliant, 
but  it  cannot  correctly  be  said  that  he  gained  nothing 
but  disadvantages,  and  it  is  far  from  correct  to  say  he 
became  convinced  that  command  in  the  field  was  not 
his  vocation.  He  is  the  best  witness  as  to  what  he 
became  convinced  of  concerning  his  fitness  to  command 
in  the  field  ;  and  on  that  point  he  said  in  a  telegram 
to  Buell,  July  15:  "I  am  ordered  to  Washington  and 
shall  leave  day  after  to-morrow.  Very  sorry  J  for  I 
can  be  of  more  use  here  thaji  there."  He  left  the  field 
for  Washington  with  reluctance,  in  compliance  with 
the  President's  positive  order  of  July  11,  and  a  tele- 
gram of  the  14th,  saying  "  I  am  very  anxious,  almost 
impatient,  to  have  you  here."  General  Keyes  says 
Halleck  recommended  "  Colonel  Robert  Allen  as  his 
successor  and  departed  for  Washington,"  and  that 
"Allen  declined  the  command."  The  meaning  of  this 
must  be  not  simply  that  Halleck  recommended  Allen, 
but  that  the  command  was  offered,  otherwise  it  could 
not  have  been  "  declined." 

In  Badeau's  "  Life  of  Grant "  (vol.  i.,  p.  108,  note) 
there  is  a  letter  from  Allen  written  July  9,  1866,  more 
than  four  years  after  the  event,  in  which  Allen  -says : 
"  I  had  joined  General  Halleck  a  short  time  subsequent 
to  the  fall  of  Corinth,  and  was  attached  to  his  imme- 
diate command  when  he  received  his  appointment  of 
General-in-Chief,  with  orders  to  repair  at  once  to 
Washington.  Shortly  after  he  came  to  my  tent. 
After  a  somewhat  protracted  conversation  he  turned 
to  me  and  said,  i  Now  what  can  I  do  for  you  ? '  I  re- 
plied that  I  did  not  know  that  he  could  do  anything. 


474 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


1  Yes,'  he  rejoined,  '  I  can  give  you  command  of  this 
army.'  I  replied  *  I  have  not  rank.'  '  That,'  said  he, 
1  can  easily  be  obtained.'  I  do  not  remember  exactly 
what  my  reply  was  to  this,  but  it  was  to  the  effect 
that  I  doubted  the  expediency  of  such  a  measure. 
.  .  .  He  did  not  press  the  subject."  The  word  of 
General  Robert  Allen  is  not  to  be  questioned,  but 
even  if  his  recollection  is  correct,  it  is  probable  that 
undue  weight  has  been  attached  to  what  occurred. 
He  and  Halleck  were  warm  friends.  Whatever  Hal- 
leek  said  on  the  occasion,  probably,  was  "gush,"  aris- 
ing from  good-fellowship  and  the  exuberance  of  spirits 
so  common  around  the  camp-fires  of  successful  armies. 
Allen,  it  will  be  observed,  did  not  say  that  he  "  de- 
clined "  the  command,  but  only  that  he  "  doubted  the 
expediency  of  such  a  measure,"  and  Halleck  "did  not 
press  the  subject." 

There  is  nothing  in  the  official  records  to  prove  or 
indicate  that  the  command  was  offered  to  Allen,  or 
that  Allen  was  recommended  for  it,  or  that  Halleck 
had  any  other  purpose  than  to  turn  the  command  over 
to  Grant,  the  next  in  rank.  Halleck  had  no  power  to 
make  Allen  his  successor,  nor  was  there  any  custom 
of  war  or  statute  by  which  the  President  even  could 
have  given  the  command  to  Allen,  who  was  only  a 
Major  in  the  Quartermaster's  Department,  and  an  ad- 
ditional Aide-de-Camp  with  the  rank  of  Colonel.  Grant, 
who  was  on  duty  in  that  field,  was  a  Major-General. 
The  resolution  of  April  4,  1862,  then  in  force,  said: 
"Whenever  military  operations  may  require  the  pres- 
ence of  two  or  more  officers  of  the  same  grade  in  the 
same  field  or  department,  the  President  may  assign 


REYES'S  "  OBSERVATION  OF  MEN  AND  EVENTS."    475 

the  command  of  the  forces  in  such  field  or  department 
without  regard  to  seniority  of  rank " ;  but  that  did 
not,  and  was  never  construed  to,  permit  the  President 
to  disregard  grades,  and  assign  a  Colonel  to  the  com- 
mand of  Major- Generals. 

The  official  records  show  that  on  the  llth  of  July, 
1862,  the  President  "ordered  that  Major-General 
Henry  W.  Halleck  be  assigned  to  the  command  of  the 
whole  land-forces  of  the  United  States,  as  General-in- 
Chief,  and  that  he  repair  to  this  capital  as  soon  as  he 
can  with  safety  to  the  position  and  operations  within 
the  department  under  his  charge."  This  order  was 
telegraphed  to  Halleck  on  the  day  it  was  issued,  and 
the  Secretary  of  War  added  to  it :  "  State  when  you 
may  be  expected  here.  Your  presence  is  required 
by  many  circumstances."  Immediately  after  receiving 
the  foregoing  order,  Halleck  telegraphed  to  Grant, 
who  was  at  Memphis :  "  You  will  immediately  repair 
to  this  place,  and  report  to  these  headquarters,"  and 
July  11  he  telegraphed  the  President:  "Your  orders 
of  this  date  are  this  moment  received.  General  Grant, 
next  in  command,  is  at  Memphis.  I  have  telegraphed 
to  him  to  immediately  repair  to  this  place.  I  will 
start  for  Washington  the  moment  I  can  have  a  per- 
sonal interview  with  General  Grant."  On  the  15th  of 
July,  Halleck  telegraphed  the  Secretaiy  of  War  :  "  In 
leaving  this  department,  shall  I  relinquish  the  com- 
mand to  the  next  in  rank,  or  will  the  President  desig. 
nate  who  will  be  the  commander  ? "  and  receiving  no 
reply  he,  on  the  15th,  answered  as  follows  President 
Lincoln's  telegram  urging  him  to  hasten  to  Washing- 
ton :  "  General  Grant  has  just  arrived  from  Memphis. 


476 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


Hope  to  finally  arrange  distribution  of  troops,  and  to 
leave  here  Thursday  morning,  17th."  There  is  noth- 
ing in  the  official  records  to  indicate  any  other  plan  or 
wish  on  Halleck's  part  than  to  turn  over  the  command 
to  Grant,  the  next  in  rank.  In  fact,  in  the  absence  of 
other  evidence,  the  foregoing  telegrams  disprove  Gen- 
eral Keyes's  assertion  that  Halleck  recommended 
"  Colonel  Allen  as  his  successor,"  and  that  "Allen  de- 
clined the  command." 

Allen  wrote  August  6,  1862,  from  St.  Louis  to  Gen- 
eral Halleck  in  Washington  :  "  A  delegation  goes  from 
this  city  to  Washington  to-day  to  solicit  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  Military  Governor  for  this  State.  This  is 
an  office  I  think  I  could  fill,  and  since  I  am  one  of  the 
supernumerary  brigadiers  (now  no  brigadier  at  all),  I 
would  accept  this  office,  and  give  my  whole  ability  to 
it.  I  am  willing,  however,  to  abide  your  judgment, 
and  serve  you  where  I  may  be  most  useful.  Two  of 
the  four  delegates  are,  I  know,  in  favor  of  me."  But 
Halleck  declined  to  recommend  Allen  for  the  compar- 
atively unimportant  position  of  Military  Governor  of 
Missouri,  though  invited  to  do  so  by  the  foregoing 
letter,  written  but  a  few  days  after  Halleck  is  said  by 
the  author  to  have  recommended  Allen  as  his  successor 
in  command  of  all  the  West,  of  which  Missouri  was  a 
part. 

Notwithstanding  his  admiration  for  Grant,  the 
author,  in  some  instances,  does  not  do  that  great  cap- 
tain justice.  He  says  (p.  214),  in  relation  to  a  dispute 
between  Halleck  and  Grant  concerning  reports  and 
returns  after  the  capture  of  Fort  Donelson :  "  It  is 
possible  that  Grant's  stupendous  success  may  have 


REYES'S  ' '  OBSERVATION  OF  MEN  AND  EVENTS."    477 

over-excited  him,  and  caused  him  to  omit  making  cus- 
tomary reports  to  headquarters."  It  has  already  been 
shown  that  this  was  all  explained.  Grant  did  make, 
as  far  as  practicable,  the  reports  and  returns  he  was  at 
the  moment  censured  for  not  making,  but  through  the 
confusion  of  war  Halleck  did  not  receive  them.  Grant 
was  well  poised,  and  even  his  wonderful  success  never 
disturbed  his  equilibrium.  Again  the  author  says  of 
Grant:  "Lest  his  adversary  should  infer  he  was  in- 
fluenced by  fear,  he  assailed  the  almost  impregnable 
position  of  CoM  Harbor,  at  a  cost  of  7,000  men  at 
least,  while  he  inflicted  but  trifling  loss  on  the  Con- 
federates." Grant  gave  the  enemy  no  chance  to  think 
he  was  afraid  to  fight,  and  certainly  never  made  an 
attack  to  remove  an  opinion  which  the  enemy  could 
not  entertain. 

General  Keyes,  like  some  other  distinguished  sol- 
diers of  the  Rebellion,  makes  a  fling  at  the  officers  of 
our  Engineer  Corps.  He  says  :  "  At  the  beginning 
of  the  War  the  engineers  were  everywhere  in  the 
direction.  The  engineers  are  worthy  of  all  respect 
for  their  talents,  integrity,  and  devotion  to  duty,  but 
they  appeared  always  to  overlook  and  disregard  the 
necessity  of  service  with  troops  of  the  line,  as  a  prep- 
aration for  command  in  the  field.  At  West  Point  I 
had  McClellan  under  instruction.  I  knew  how  proud 
he  was  of  being  in  the  Engineer  Corps."  McClellan 
served  with  troops  in  the  principal  battles  of  the 
Mexican  War,  and  proud  as  he  may  have  been  of 
being  in  the  Engineer  Corps,  he  promptly  gave  up  his 
first  lieutenancy  in  that  corps  for  a  captaincy  of 
cavalry  in  1855.  In  choosing  officers  of  the  Regular 


478 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


Army  for  command  during  the  Rebellion,  the  Govern- 
ment gave  no  preference  to  corps,  and  General  Keyes's 
assertion  that  at  the  beginning  of  the  War  the  engi- 
neers were  everywhere  in  the  direction,  will  not  bear 
examination.  Anderson,  of  the  artillery,  commanded 
during  the  attack  upon  Fort  Sumter,  April  12-13  ; 
Lyon,  of  the  infantry,  was  in  command  at  Camp  Jack- 
sou,  Mo.,  May  10;  Benjamin  F.  Butler,  of  the  volun- 
teers, was  in  the  direction  at  Fort  Monroe,  Virginia, 
when  the  battle  of  Great  Bethel  was  fought  on  June 
10  ;  Patterson,  of  the  volunteers,  was  in  the  direction 
on  the  Upper  Potomac,  June  and  July  ;  and  McDowell 
was  in  the  direction  in  front  of  Washington  during 
the  same  time.  The  army  which  made  the  first  Bull 
Run  campaign,  July,  1861,  was  commanded  by 
McDowell.  His  division  commanders  were  Tyler, 
Hunter,  Heintzelnian,  Runyon,  and  Miles — not  one  of 
them  was  ever  in  the  Engineer  Corps.  McClellan's 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  as  organized  for  its  first  cam- 
paign, 1862,  contained  five  corps.  McDowell  com- 
manded the  1st,  Sumner  the  2d,  Heintzelnian  the  3d, 
Keyes  the  4th,  Banks  the  5th,  and  Marcy  was  Chief- 
of-Staff.  There  was  not  an  engineer  officer  among 
them,  unless  McClellan,  who  had  ceased  to  be  a  Lieu- 
tenant of  engineers  to  become  a  Captain  of  cavalry, 
can  be  called  one. 

The  truth  is,  General  Keyes  himself,  an  artillery 
officer,  was  the  earliest  in  direction,  and  possessed  the 
most  ample  authority.  He  and  Meigs  of  the  engineers, 
without  the  knowledge  of  General  Scott,  and  behind 
"  the  ambush  of  original  power,"  as  hereafter  explained, 
prepared  plans  for  the  defence  of  Fort  Pickens ; 


KEYES'S  "  OBSERVATION  OF  MEN  AND  EVENTS."    479 

whereupon  the  President  issued  the  following  compre- 
hensive and  extraordinary  document : 

"EXECUTIVE  MANSION,  April  3,  1§61. 
"  LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  E.   D.   KEYES,    United    States 

Army,  Military  Secretary  : 

u  You  will  proceed  forthwith  to  the  city  of  New 
York,  to  carry  out  the  instructions  which  you  have 
received  here.  All  requisitions  made  upon  officers  of 
the  staff  by  your  authority,  and  all  orders  given  by 
you  to  any  officer  of  the  Army  in  my  name,  will  be 
instantly  obeyed. 

[Signed]  "ABRAHAM  LINCOLN." 

Although  engineer  officers  were  not  in  the  direction 
at  the  beginning,  it  must  be  admitted  that  by  the 
time  the  War  closed,  the  Engineer  Corps,  in  propor- 
tion to  other  arms  of  Service,  had  furnished  at  least 
its  full  quota  of  high  commanders  ;  among  them  may 
be  mentioned  Meade,  Pope,  Humphreys,  Tower, 
Wright,  Newton,  Whipple,  Franklin,  W.  F.  Smith, 
Foster,  Parke,  McPherson,  Gillmore,  Warren,  and 
Weitzel. 

To  estimate  at  its  true  value  what  General  Keyes 
says  of  General  Scott,  the  reader  should  begin  at  the 
end  of  the  book.  He  will  there  find  the  feeling  under 
which  the  author  has  recalled  and  presented  the  inci- 
dents of  an  association  and  friendship  of  nearly  thirty 
years  with  his  old  chief.  In  1833,  only  sixteen 
months  after  Keyes  had  graduated,  General  Scott  took 
this  young  Lieutenant  on  his  staff,  kept  him  till  1838, 
when  he  was  appointed  Assistant  Adjutant-General, 
with  rank  of  Captain,  and  went  to  duty  elsewhere.  But 


480 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


he  remained  away  only  a  few  months.  By  December  1 
he  was  back  again.  How  glad  he  was  to  return  he 
shows  by  saying  :  "  I  sacrificed  actual  rank  to  gratify 
iny  desire  to  enjoy  New  York  and  Washington,  and 
to  be  for  a  limited  time  longer  with  my  old  com- 
mander." He  then  remained  on  Scott's  staff  two 
years,  till  promoted  to  a  captaincy  in  his  regiment. 
By  January  1,  1860,  he  for  the  third  time  joined 
General  Scott's  staff,  and  continued  upon  it  till  the 
General  discharged  him  April  19,  1861.  General 
Keyes  says  that  the  "  irritation  "  against  his  chief 
caused  by  this  discharge  "  continued  for  several  years, 
but  it  gradually  subsided  and  was  finally  extin- 
guished." His  book  does  not  sustain  his  conclusion. 
In  depicting  General  Scott  the  author  has,  unconsci- 
ously perhaps,  woven  through  his  work  from  begin- 
ning to  end  a  notion,  which  is  finally  used  instead  of 
the  real  cause,  to  account  for  his  dismissal  from  the 
staff.  The  error  referred  to  is  that  while  General 
Scott  was  a  sound  Union  man,  his  sentiments  were  so 
intensely  Southern  that  he  could  not  deal  justly  with 
Northern  officers;  that  his  treatment  of  them  was 
tyrannical,  and  General  Keyes  would  have  us  believe 
that  he,  the  trusted  friend  and  confidential  staff-officer, 
fell  a  victim  to  the  prejudices  of  his  chief.  Is  he  not 
mistaken  as  to  the  cause  of  his  removal  ?  Amidst  the 
turmoil  of  the  outbreak  of  the  Rebellion,  the  General 
in-Chief  found  that  his  confidential  military  secretary 
had  prepared  and  submitted  to  the  Secretary  of  State 
and  President  a  plan  for  re-enforcing  and  holding  Fort 
Pickens,  matters  which  belonged  to  General  Scott's 
province  as  General-in-Chief,  and  which  he  was  attend- 


REYES'S  "  OBSERVATION  OF  MEN  AND  EVENTS."    481 

ing  to.  The  plan  was  accepted.  Keyes  was  sent  to 
New  York  with  authority,  heretofore  quoted,  to  use 
the  President's  name  in  carrying  it  out.  The  fact  that 
General  Scott  was  the  ambitious,  jealous,  rigid,  punc- 
tilious soldier  which  General  Keyes  proves  him  to 
have  been,  is  enough  in  itself  to  account  for  his  dis- 
pleasure at  the  course  pursued  by  his  staff-officer.  That 
Keyes  realized  the  character  of  his  own  course  is 
shown  (pp.  381-2)  where  he  says,  in  an  interview  with 
the  President  and  Secretary  of  State  :  "  1 1  am  ready/ 
said  I,  i  but  I  have  not  had  time  to  see  General  Scott, 
who  is  entirely  ignorant  of  what  I  am  doing ;  as  I  am 
his  military  secretary,  he  will  be  angry  if  I  don't  let 
him  know.'  Notwithstanding  I  had  been  long  subject 
to  obey  military  commands  implicitly,  a  rebellious 
thought  arose  in  my  mind  when  I  received  from  Sec- 
retary Seward  such  clean-cut  orders.  Nevertheless  I 
reflected  that  he  could  speak  from  the  ambush  of 
original  power,  and  concluded  to  obey  him  with  alac- 
rity." The  book  shows  that  while  in  New  York  under 
the  Secretary  of  State,  General  Keyes  issued  orders 
not  only  in  the  name  of  the  President,  for  which  he 
had  authority,  but  in  the  name  of  General  Scott,  for 
which  lie  had  no  authority.  General  Keyes's  breach  of 
propriety,  as  he  claims,  was  not  so  great  as  some  offi- 
cers of  the  time  supposed  it  to  be.  But  the  fact  is 
well  established  that  Keyes  was  dismissed  from  the 
staff  for  the  reason  that  General  Scott  believed  his 
confidential  secretary  had  committed  a  grave  military 
impropriety,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  think  that  in 
reaching  that  conclusion  General  Scott  was  influenced 
by  hostility  toward  Northern  officers.  In  fact,  there 


482 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


is  no  evidence  that  General  Scott  was  ever  unjust  or 
unfair  to  Northern  officers.  Cullum,  who  was  ap- 
pointed to  Scott's  staff  just  before  Keyes  left  it,  was 
born  in  the  North,  had  as  strong  Northern  proclivities 
as  Keyes,  and  so  had  General  Townsend,  Scott's  Ad- 
jutant-General, and  Colonel  Schuyler  Hamilton, 
Keyes's  successor,  and  Colonels  Van  Rensselear  and 
Wright,  all  Northern  men,  who  remained  on  Scott's 
staff  until  he  retired.  If  General  Scott  had  treated 
Northern  officers  as  represented,  these  honorable  men 
would  not  have  remained  upon  his  staff,  nor  would 
General  Keyes  have  voluntarily  returned  to  it  twice, 
once  at  the  sacrifice  of  rank,  and  spent  a  large  part  of 
his  military  life  upon  it.  But  if  General  Scott  had 
entertained  any  prejudice  at  all  against  Northern  men, 
Keyes  should  have  escaped  the  effects  of  it.  Accord- 
ing to  his  own  account,  he  was  a  member  of  the  South 
Carolina  slaveocracy  in  good  standing.  He  says  (p. 
183):  "  Under  the  old  regime,  to  such  as  enjoyed  their 
confidence,  the  hospitality  of  the  South  Carolinian 
was  supremely  attractive.  My  initiation  to  it  was  due 
to  an  event,  the  relation  of  which  recalls  a  condition 
of  things  now  forever  past.  One  day,  when  my  wife 
found  it  difficult  to  hire  a  cook,  I  went  up  to  Charles- 
ton and  bought  a  female  slave.  As  she  stood  upon  a 
block  I  bid  her  off.  Then  I  went  to  a  desk,  and  re- 
ceived a  bill  of  sale  for  one  wench,  aged  twenty-three 
years,  price  $350.  I  had  already  experienced  the 
pride  of  ownership  in  its  various  gradations,  as  the 
proprietor  of  a  dog,  a  horse,  a  bit  of  land  ;  but  it  was 
only  when  I  could  call  a  human  being  my  property, 
that  I  enjoyed  the  self-importance  of  a  capitalist.  No 


REYES'S  "  OBSERVATION  OF  MEN  AND  EVENTS."    483 

sooner  was  iny  purchase  known  than  I  was  admitted 
to  the  society  of  Charleston,  with  a  stamp  of  merit 
above  my  value.  I  visited  the  plantations  in  winter," 
etc.  With  an  intense,  inborn  Northernisrn,  and  a 
hatred  of  the  curse  of  slavery,  so  uncontrollable  as  to 
arouse  General  Scott's  hostility  and  tyranny,  General 
Keyes  quite  joyously  bought  and  held  the  right  to  the 
fetters  and  the  lash.  It  is  hardly  credible  that  he  sold 
the  right  when  the  use  of  it  ceased  to  be  to  his  ad- 
vantage, but  on  this  point  he  says  nothing.  He 
accepted  and  enjoyed  the  pecuniary  and  social  benefits 
of  slavery.  If  General  Scott  entertained  the  overrul- 
ing Southern  sentiments  attributed  to  him  by  General 
Keyes,  surely  the  Southern  fellowship  into  which 
Keyes  was  admitted  by  becoming  a  slave-holder  would 
have  protected  him  from  their  direful  effects.  "  War," 
the  author  says  (p.  210),  "  was  the  only  means  to  get 
rid  of  the  curse  of  slavery."  Did  his  woman-slave  re- 
main in  bondage  till  released  by  the  Rebellion?  Her 
history  is  of  more  interest  than  that  of  General  Scott's 
negro  Tom ;  because  Tom  was  free. 

A  word  now  for  the  white  woman.  The  author 
says  (p.  20)  :  "  General  Scott  was  then  so  popular 
that  ...  he  was  frequently  beset  by  women'  who 
clustered  around  him  like  summer  flies."  If  the  ladies 
had  to  be  likened  unto  flies,  so  gallant  a  soldier  as 
General  Keyes  might  have  used  butterflies  instead  of 
summer  flies  for  the  comparison. 

One  of  General  Keyes's  jokes  is  that  old  Colonel 
Burke  having  signed  the  record  as  president  of  a 
council  of  administration,  returned  after  a  brown 
study  and  added  an  I  to  the  word  council.  If  the 


484  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

Colonel  were  alive  be  might  have  revenge  by  pointing 
out  that  after  having  spelled  correctly  the  name  of  his 
Adjutant,  Colonel  (then  Lieutenant)  Lawrence  Kip, 
General  Keyes  returns  to  p.  271  of  his  book,  and  puts 
the  debasing  extra  p  to  that  illustrious  name.  In  fact 
General  Keyes  or  the  printer's  devil  has  played  havoc 
with  names.  Even  the  veteran  General  Harney  in 
this  book  loses  his  middle  name  in  one  instance,  and 
is  simply  William  Harney.  The  distinguished  Gen- 
eral Birney,  having  lost  his  life,  now  loses  an  i,  and  is 
metamorphosed  into  Barney.  General  D.  McM.  Gregg 
becomes  D.  McGregg.  Colonel  Robert  N.  Scott,  who 
is  known  far  and  wide  as  engaged  in  the  herculean 
labor  of  compiling  the  records  of  the  Rebellion,  and 
correcting  and  pre venting  errors  in  war  literature, 
finds  (p.  465)  that  his  work  is  being  done  by  Colonel 
Thomas  Scott.  That  is  all  bad  enough,  but  not  the 
worst.  Of  the  services  rendered  to  the  Military  Acad- 
emy by  his  friend,  General  G.  W.  Cullum  (whop.  401, 
is  called  Callam,  as  aid  to  Scott),  the  author  speaks 
in  the  highest  terms,  and  justly  so,  for  of  all  gradu- 
ates not  one  has  made  more  direct  and  valuable  return 
to  his  Alma  Mater  for  her  fostering  care  than  General 
Cullum ;  and  greater  love  for  her  than  his  hath  no 
man  known.  Imagine  his  feelings  when  he  finds  Gen- 
eral Keyes  saying  of  the  Military  Academy  (p.  194): 
"  That  institution  accomplishes  all  that  finite  means 
can  perform  in  equal  space  of  time  to  increase  a 
man's  value  in  war  and  his  integrity  in  peace,  and 
among  those  whose  faithful  and  efficient  devotion  to 
it  entitles  them  to  honor,  I  place  the  name  of  Gen- 
eral George  W.  J/cCullum,  second  only  to  that  of 


KEYES'S  "  OBSERVATION  OF  MEN  AND  EVENTS."    485 

Sylvanus  Thayer."  McCullum  !  To  that  favor  comes 
the  man  who  has  performed  the  enormous  task  of 
making  a  correct  record  of  the  name  and  services  of 
every  graduate  of  the  Military  Academy. 

But  one  more  event  can  be  noticed  in  this  review. 
Speaking  of  the  successful  and  festive  winding  up  of 
Indian  operations  in  Oregon  in  1858,  the  author  says: 
"  The  feast  being  over,  I  went  away,  but  an  hour  later 
returned  by  the  tent,  and  saw  old  Moses  stretched  flat 
on  the  floor,  his  feet  in  the  shade,  his  face  in  the  sun, 
dead  drunk  and  asleep." 

"  I  doubt  if  in  the  history  of  our  country  there  has 
ever  been  an  Indian  campaign  in  which  so  much  was 
accomplished  at  an  equal  cost.  The  good  result  was 
due  to  three  causes  :  the  proper  instruction  of  the 
soldiers  at  the  commencement,  the  excellence  of  the 
Quartermaster's  Department,  and  the  admirable  fitness 
of  our  Commander,  Colonel  George  Wright."  Surely 
in  his  commendation  the  author  should  have  men- 
tioned the  Commissary  Department  which  furnished 
the  whiskey  that  laid  old  Moses  out. 

General  Keyes's  book,  written  mainly  from  memory, 
contains  errors,  some  of  which  have  been  pointed  out ; 
but  is  replete  with  information,  anecdotes  and  striking 
pen  pictures.  The  Army  will  enjoy  it. 

Whether  the  author  has  drawn  the  veil  from  more 
of  the  inner  life  of  his  dead  chief,  General  Scott,  than 
a  confidential  staff-officer  and  trusted  friend  should 
expose,  and  whether  the  light  he  has  thrown  upon 
that  life  is  white  or  colored,  are  open  questions. 


ARTICLE  XIII. 

Killed  by  a  Brother  Soldier.* 

"  General  Davis  has  just  sJiot  General  Nelson ! " 
said  John  J.  Crittenden,  as  he  walked  rapidly  up  to 
his  son,  General  T.  L.  Crittenden,  at  the  Gait  House 
breakfast- table,  on  the  29th  of  September,  1862.  This 
announcement,  in  the  clear  and  impressive  voice  pe- 
culiar to  the  great  Kentucky  orator  and  statesman, 
sent  a  thrill  of  horror  through  all  who  heard  it.  Men 
hurried  to  witness  or  hear  of  the  death-scene  in  the 
tragedy.  Nelson,  shot  through  the  heart,  laid  at  full 
length  upon  the  floor.  General  Crittenden  kneeled, 
took  his  hand,  and  said :  a  Nelson,  are  you  seriously 
hurt?7'  "Tom,  I  am  murdered,"  was  the  reply. 

When  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  under  Buell,  was  mov- 
ing on  Chattanooga,  in  the  summer  of  1862,  the  line 
of  railroad — some  three  hundred  miles  long — from 
Louisville,  Ky.,  upon  which  the  troops  were  depen- 
dent for  supplies,  was  so  frequently  broken  by  the 
enemy  that  Buell  detached  Nelson,  in  whom  he  had 
great  confidence,  and  sent  him  to  Kentucky  with 
orders  to  take  command  there  and  re-establish  and 
protect  the  line  of  supply.  Upon  reaching  his  desti- 
nation Nelson  found  himself  second  to  General  H.  G. 
Wright,  whom  the  President,  without  Buell's  knowl- 

Journal  Military  Service  Institution. 

486 


KILLED  BY  A  BROTHER  SOLDIER. 


487 


edge,  had  placed  in  command  of  a  military  depart- 
ment, embracing  the  State  of  Kentucky.  Wright's 
troops  under  the  immediate  command  of  Nelson,  and 
the  Confederate  forces,  under  Kirby  Smith,  fought  a 
battle  at  Richmond,  Ky.,  on  the  30th  of  August,  in 
which  the  former  were  defeated,  and  Nelson  was 
wounded.  The  Confederates  took  possession  of  Lex- 
ington and  Frankfort,  held  the  "  Blue-grass  "  region, 
and  threatened  Cincinnati  and  Louisville.  Wright 
looked  to  Cincinnati,  his  headquarters  being  there, 
and  entrusted  the  defence  of  Louisville  to  Nelson. 
Louisville,  threatened  by  both  Bragg  and  Kirby 
Smith,  was  in  great  peril.  Nelson,  able,  energetic, 
arbitrary,  was  straining  every  nerve  for  the  defence  of 
the  city.  Davis,  who  was  then  on  sick-leave  in  In- 
diana, appreciating  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Ken- 
tucky, and  hearing  that  general  officers  were  needed 
there,  volunteered  his  services,  reported  to  Nelson,  by 
order  of  Wright  and  was  charged  with  the  duty  of  or- 
ganizing and  arming  the  citizens  of  Louisville.  Nelson's 
quarters  and  offices  were  in  the  Gait  House,  at 
the  north  end  of  the  west  corridor,  on  the  first  or 
main  floor.  His  Adjutant-General's  office  was  in  room 
No.  12,  and  his  Medical  Director's  office  in  room  No. 
10.  After  Davis  had  been  for  a  day  or  two  on  the 
duty  to  which  he  had  been  assigned,  he  called  in  the 
afternoon  at  headquarters,  and  Nelson  said:  "Well, 
Davis,  how  are  you  getting  along  with  your  com. 
mand  ? "  Davis  replied  :  "  I  don't  know."  Nelson 
asked  :  "  How  many  regiments  have  you  organized  ?  " 
Davis  again  replied  :  "  I  don't  know."  Then  Nelson 
said :  "  How  many  companies  have  you  ? "  To  which 


488 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


Davis  responded  in  a  seemingly  careless  tone :  "  I 
don't  know."  Nelson  then  said,  testily :  "  But  you 
should  know,"  adding,  as  he  arose  from  his  seat,  "I  am 
disappointed  in  you,  General  Davis.  I  selected  you 
for  this  duty  because  you  are  an  officer  of  the  Regular 
Army,  but  I  find  I  made  a  mistake."  Davis  arose  and 
remarked,  in  a  cool,  deliberate  manner:  "  General 
Nelson,  I  am  a  regular  soldier,  and  I  demand  the 
treatment  due  to  me  as  a  general  officer."  Davis  then 
stepped  across  to  the  door  of  the  Medical  Director's 
room — both  doors  being  open,  as  the  weather  was  very 
warm — and  said  :  "Dr.  Irwin  I  wish  you  to  be  a  wit- 
ness to  this  conversation."  Nelson  said :  "  Yes, 
Doctor,  I  want  you  to  remember  this."  Davis 
then  said  to  Nelson :  "  I  demand  from  you  the 
courtesy  due  to  my  rank."  Nelson  replied :  "  I  will 
treat  you  as  you  deserve.  You  have  disappointed 
me ;  you  have  been  unfaithful  to  the  trust  which  I  re- 
posed in  you,  and  I  shall  relieve  you  at  once,"  adding, 
"  you  are  relieved  from  duty  here,  and  you  will  pro- 
ceed to  Cincinnati  and  report  to  General  Wright." 
Davis  said:  "You  have  no  authority  to  order  me." 
Nelson  turned  toward  the  Adjutant-General  and 
said  :  "  Captain,  if  General  Davis  does  not  leave  the 
city  by  nine  o'clock  to-night,  give  instructions  to  the 
Provost-Marshal  to  see  that  he  shall  be  put  across  the 
Ohio."  Upon  such  occasions  Nelson  was  overbear- 
ing and  his  manner  Avas  peculiarly  offensive.  Highly 
incensed  by  the  treatment  he  had  received,  Davis 
withdrew ;  and  that  night  went  to  Cincinnati  and  re- 

*As  given  by   Dr.  Irwin,  now   Surgeon,  with   rank   of  Major   and 
Brevet-Colonel  U.  S.  A. 


KILLED  BY  A  BROTHER  SOLDIEK  489 

ported  to  Wright,  who  assigned  him  to  command  in 
front  of  Covington  and  Newport,  Ky.  A  few  days 
thereafter  (Sept.  25)  Buell  reached  Louisville  and 
superseded  Nelson  in  command,  and  Wright  ordered 
Davis  to  return  to  Louisville  and  report  to  Buell.  In 
pursuance  of  Wright's  order,  Davis,  on  the  morning 
of  September  29,  1862,  appeared  at  the  Gait  House, 
Louisville,  the  headquarters  at  that  time  of  both  Buell 
and  Nelson.  When  Nelson  entered  the  grand  hall,  or 
office,  of  the  hotel,  just  after  breakfast,  there  were 
many  men  there,  among  them  Davis  and  Governor  O. 
P.  Morton,  of  Indiana.  Nelson  went  to  the  clerk's 
office,  asked  if  General  Buell  had  breakfasted,  and 
then  turned,  leaned  his  back  against  the  counter,  faced 
the  assembled  people,  and  glanced  over  the  hall  with 
his  clear  black  eye.  In  the  prime  of  life,  in  perfect 
health,  six  feet  two  inches  in  height,  weighing  three 
hundred  pounds,  his  great  body  covered  by  a  capacious 
white  vest,  his  coat  open  and  thrown  back,  he  was  the 
feature  of  the  grand  hall.  Davis,  a  small,  sallow, 
blue-eyed,  dyspeptic-looking  man,  less  than  five  feet 
nine  inches  high,  and  weighing  only  about  one  hun- 
dred and  twenty-five  pounds,  approached,  charged 
Nelson  with  having  insulted  him  at  their  last  meeting, 
and  said  he  must  have  satisfaction.  Nelson  told  him 
abruptly  to  go  away.  Davis,  however,  who  was  ac- 
companied by  Morton,  pressed  his  demand  till  Nelson 

said :  "  Go  away,  you  d d  puppy,  I   don't   want 

anything  to  do  with  you !  "  Davis  had  taken  from 
the  box  on  the  counter  one  of  the  visiting  cards  kept 
there  for  common  use,  and,  in  the  excitement  of  the 
interview,  had  squeezed  it  into  a  small  ball,  which, 


490  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

upon  hearing  the  insulting  words  just  quoted,  he 
nipped  into  Nelson's  face  with  his  forefinger  and 
thumb,  as  boys  shoot  marbles.  Thereupon,  Nelson, 
with  the  back  of  his  hand,  slapped  Davis  in  the  face. 
He  then  turned  to  Morton  and  said :  "Did  you  come 
here,  sir,  to  see  me  insulted  ? "  "  No,  sir,"  replied 
Morton,  and  Nelson  walked  away  toward  his  room, 
which,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  on  the  office  floor, 
and  at  the  north  end  of  the  hall  or  corridor  which  ex- 
tends along  the  west  side  of  the  building.  A  doorway 
connects  this  corridor  with  the  grand  or  office  hall,  and 
near  that  doorway  starts  a  staircase  which  leads  from 
the  hall  to  the  floor  above.  After  the  slap,  Davis 
turned  to  Captain  -  — ,  an  old  Mexican- War  friend 
from  Indiana,  and  asked  for  a  pistol.  Captain  - 
did  not  have  a  pistol,  but  he  immediately  obtained  one 
from  Thomas  W.  Gibson  and  gave  it  to  Davis.  Gib- 
son was  a  friend  of  Davis,  and  was  from  Indiana,  but 
at  the  time  of  this  occurrence  he  was  a  practising  law- 
yer in  Louisville.  In  the  meantime  Nelson  had  passed 
from  the  office  hall  into  the  corridor  which  led  to  his 
room,  had  walked  toward  his  room,  then  turned  back 
and  was  near  the  foot  of  the  staircase  and  in  front  of 
the  doorway  leading  to  the  office  hall  when  Davis 
reached  the  threshold  from  the  office.  They  were  face 
to  face  and  about  a  yard  apart,  the  one  with  pistol  in 
hand,  the  other  entirely  unarmed.  Davis  fired  and 
Nelson  walked  on  up  stairs.  Buell,  at  the  time,  was 
in  his  room,  which  was  near  the  head  of  the  stairs  on 
the  second  floor.  It  is  believed  that  Nelson  was  on 
his  way  to  report  to  Buell  what  had  occurred,  when 
he  was  confronted  and  shot  by  Davis.  Be  that  as  it 


KILLED  BY  A  BROTHER  SOLDIER.  491 

may,  he  walked  up  stairs  after  he  was  shot,  and  fell 
in  the  hall  between  the  head  of  the  stairs  and  Buell's 
apartment.  Those  who  had  gathered  around  carried 
him  into  the  room  nearest  the  spot  where  he  fell  and 
laid  him  on  the  floor.  He  said  to  Silas  F.  Miller,  pro- 
prietor of  the  hotel,  who  had  rushed  to  the  scene  when 
he  heard  the  pistol :  "  Send  for  a  clergyman ;  I  wish 
to  be  baptized.  I  have  been  basely  murdered."  The 
Rev.  J.  Talbot,  an  Episcopal  minister,  was  called.  All 
the  medical  aid  available  was  summoned.  Surgeon 
Robert  Murray,  Buell's  medical  director  at  the  time 
(afterward  Surgeon-General  of  the  Army),  says :  "  I 
was  summoned  from  the  Louisville  Hotel  to  the  Gait 
House  when  he  was  shot.  I  found  him  on  the  floor 
of  his  room  insensible,  with  stertorous  breathing,  and 
evidently  dying  from  hemorrhage.  The  ball,  a  small 
one,  entered  just  above  the  heart,  had  passed  through 
that  organ  or  the  large  vessels  connected  with  it.  I 
am  quite  sure  that  he  did  not  utter  an  intelligible 
word  after  I  saw  him."  Before  Surgeon  Murray 
arrived,  however,  a  number  of  persons  went  into  the 
room,  among  them  General  Crittenden,  mentioned  in 
the  opening  of  this  narrative,  the  Rev.  J.  Talbot,  and 
myself.  At  half-past  eight  A.M.,  within  less  than  an 
liour  from  the  time  Nelson  was  shot,  he  was  dead. 

I  was  in  the  grand  hall  of  the  Gait  House  when  the 
encounter  took  place,  but  I  did  not  know  Davis  was 
there ;  nor  had  I  heard  of  the  difficulty  that  had 
occurred  some  days  before  between  him  and  Nelson. 
They  were  both  my  warm  friends.  Davis  had  been 
2d  Lieutenant  in  the  company  of  which  I  was 
1st  Lieutenant,  and  part  of  the  time  commander. 


192  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

We  had.  been  companions  and  messmates.  Upon 
hearing  the  sound  of  the  pistol,  I  ascertained  what 
had  happened,  and  made  my  way  through  the  crowd 
that  had  gathered  around  Davis,  put  my  hand  upon 
his  shoulder,  and  told  him  that  I  placed  him  in  arrest 
by  order  of  General  Buell.  I  was  at  that  time  Buell's 
Chief-of-Staff.  Davis,  though  greatly  agitated,  showed 
no  signs  of  rage.  He  was  glad  to  be  taken  from  his 
surroundings,  and  placed  in  formal  military  custody 
by  a  friend  and  proper  military  official.  I  took  his 
arm,  and  we  immediately  went  together  to  his  room 
on  an  upper  floor  of  the  Gait  House.  No  policeman 
had  any  thing  to  do  with  his  arrest ;  nor  did  one  ap- 
pear so  far  as  I  know.  When  we  entered  the  room, 
and  closed  the  door,  Davis  said  he  wanted  to  tell  me 
the  facts  in  the  case  while  they  were  fresh.  He  then 
gave  me  details  of  the  affair,  including  the  decisive 
incident  of  flipping  the  paper  wad  into  Nelson's  face. 
I  remained  with  Davis  but  a  few  minutes.  I  am 
satisfied  that  he  had  not  anticipated  the  fatal  ending 
to  the  encounter  he  had  just  closed  with  Nelson.  He 
sought  the  interview  unarmed,  and  so  far  as  known 
none  of  his  friends  were  armed  except  Gibson,  and  it 
is  not  probable  that  he  had  provided  himself  for  this 
occasion  with  the  small  pistol  which  was  passed  from 
him  to  Davis.  It  seemed  to  be  Davis's  purpose  to 
confront  Nelson  in  a  public  place,  demand  satisfaction 
for  the  wrong  done  him  a  few  days  before,  and  if  he 
received  no  apology,  to  insult  Nelson  openly,  and  then 
leave  him  to  seek  satisfaction  in  any  way,  personally 
or  officially,  that  he  saw  fit.  It  was  to  fasten  upon 
Nelson  the  insult  of  a  blow  that  the  paper  wad  was. 


KILLED  BY  A  BROTHER  SOLDIER.  493 

flipped  into  his  face.  Nelson,  no  doubt,  had  that 
offensive  act  in  mind  when  he  said  to  .Morton  just 
after  it  was  committed  :  "  Did  you  come  here,  sir,  to 
see  me  insulted  ? "  But,  instead  of  waiting  to  send  a 
challenge,  or  take  official  action,  if  he  had  been  in- 
clined to  do  either,  for  the  insult  he  had  received 
through  the  paper  wad,  Nelson  avenged  himself  on 
the  spot  by  returning  the  blow.  Davis  then  carried 
on  the  fight,  and  it  reached  an  end  he  had  not  de- 
signed. Nelson  (as  well  as  Davis)  had  many  devoted 
friends  about  the  Gait  House  at  the  time,  and  there 
were  mutterings  of  vengeance  among  them.  But  wiser 
counsels  prevailed.  Generals  Jackson  and  Terrill  were 
the  most  difficult  to  appease.  They  both  found  sol- 
diers' graves  a  few  days  later  upon  the  battlefield  of 
Perryville. 

Buell  regarded  Davis's  action  not  only  as  a  high 
crime,  but  as  a  gross  violation  of  military  discipline. 
He  felt  that  the  case  called  for  prompt  and  vigorous 
treatment ;  but  he  could  not  administer  it.  The  cam- 
paign was  beginning.  A  new  commander  was  found 
for  Nelson's  corps,  and  the  army  marched  the  second 
day  after  his  death.  Buell  could  neither  spare  from 
his  forces  the  high  officers  necessary  to  constitute  a 
proper  court-martial,  nor  could  he  give  the  necessary 
attention  to  preparing  the  case  for  trial  in  Louisville, 
where  it  was  best,  if  not  necessary  to  try  it.  He 
therefore  reported  by  telegraph  as  follows : 

"  FLOYD'S  FORK,  KT. 

"  Via  Louisville,  Oct.  3, 1862.  (Received  6.20  P.M.) 
"  GENERAL  H.  W.  HALLECK  : 

"  Brigadier-General  Davis  is  under  arrest  at  Louis- 


494 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


ville  for  the  killing  of  General  Nelson.  His  trial  by  a 
court-martial  or  military  commission  should  take  place 
immediately,  but  I  can't  spare  officers  from  the  army 
now  in  motion  to  compose  a  court.  It  can  perhaps 
better  be  done  from  Washington. 

"The  circumstances  are,  that  on  a  previous  occasion 
Nelson  censured  Davis  for  what  he  considered  neglect 
of  duty,  ordered  him  to  report  to  General  Wright  at 
Cincinnati,  Ohio.  Davis  said  with  reference  to  that 
matter  that  if  he  could  not  get  satisfaction  or  justice 
lie  would  take  the  law  in  his  own  hands.  On  the  oc- 
casion of  the  killing  he  approached  Nelson  in  a  large 
company  and  introduced  the  subject.  Harsh  or  violent 
words  ensued,  and  Nelson  slapped  Davis  in  the  face 
and  walked  oif.  Davis  followed  him,  having  procured 
a  pistol  from  some  person  in  the  party,  and  met  Nelson 
in  the  hall  of  the  hotel.  Davis  fired.  The  ball  en- 
tered the  right  breast,  inflicting  a  mortal  wound,  and 
causing  death  in  a  few  minutes. 

"D.  C.  BUELL,  Major- General" 

The  military  authorities  did  not  institute  the  pro- 
ceedings suggested  in  the  foregoing  report  from 
Buell  to  Halleck ;  nor  was  Davis  taken  from  military 
custody  by  the  civil  authorities ;  but  in  a  few  days  he 
was  at  large.  Wright,  the  General  commanding  the 
Military  Department  in  which  the  offence  was  com- 
mitted, explains  Davis's  release  as  follows :  "  The 
period  during  which  an  officer  could  be  continued  in 
arrest  without  charges  (none  had  been  preferred)  hav- 
ing expired,  and  General  Buell  being  then  in  the  field, 
Davis  appealed  to  me,  and  I  notified  him  that  he 


KILLED  BY  A  BROTHER  SOLDIER.  495 

should  no  longer  consider  himself  in  arrest."  Wright 
adds  :  "  I  was  satisfied  that  Davis  acted  purely  on 
the  defensive  in  the  unfortunate  affair,  and  I  presumed 
that  Buell  held  very  similar  views,  as  he  took  no 
action  in  the  matter  after  placing  him  in  arrest."  I 
do  not  know  upon  what  Wright  based  his  opinion 
that  Davis  acted  purely  on  the  defensive,  but  he  is  in 
error  as  to  Buell's  views  in  the  matter.*  Da  vis's 
course  in  taking  the  law  into  his  own  hands,  and  the 
failure  to  bring  him  to  trial,  both  met  with  Buell's 
unqualified  disapprobation. 

The  case  is  without  a  parallel.  A  Brigadier-General 
in  the  highly  disciplined  army  of  a  law-abiding  people, 
reaching  the  headquarters  just  as  the  forces  were 
ready  to  march  to  the  battlefield,  instead  of  report- 
ing for  duty  against  the  common  enemy,  as  he  was 
under  orders  to  do,  sought  out  a  Major-General  com- 
manding a  corps  of  the  army  to  which  both  belonged, 
killed  him  on  the  spot,  and  then  went  to  duty  with- 
out punishment,  trial,  or  rebuke.  Though  officially  re- 
ported, as  already  shown,  no  military  trial  was  insti- 
tuted. 

It  appears  from  the  records  of  the  Jefferson  Circuit 
Court,  Louisville,  Ky.,  that  on  the  27th  of  October 
(1862),  Davis  was  indicted  by  the  Grand  Jury  for 
"manslaughter,"  and  admitted  to  bail  in  the  sum  of 
$5,000.  T.  W.  Gibson,  who  furnished  the  pistol  with 
which  Davis  killed  Nelson,  and  W.  P.  Thomasson 
were  sureties  on  his  bond.  The  case  was  continued 
from  time  to  time  until  the  24th  of  May,  1864,  when 
it  "  was  stricken  from  the  docket,  with  leave  to  rein- 

*  See  Buell' s  article  on  Shiloh  in  Century  Magazine. 


496  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

state  " ;  and  nothing  more  was  heard  of  it  in  the  halls 
of  justice.* 

It  has  been  said  that  Davis  was  pardoned  by  the 
Governor  of  Kentucky,  but  the  Secretary  of  State,  of 
the  Commonwealth,  contradicts  this  in  a  letter  dated 
April  8, 1885,  saying:  "There  is  nothing  on  the  Ex- 
ecutive Journal,  to  indicate  that  Governor  Robinson 
or  Governor  Bramlette  issued  a  pardon  to  General 
Jeff.  C.  Davis  for  the  killing  of  General  Nelson." 

There  is  good  reason  for  the  belief  that  Morton's 
influence  was  exerted  to  prevent  proceedings  against 
Davis.  An  able  and  influential  lawyer,  James  Speed, 
Esq.,  of  Louisville,  who  was  afterwards  appointed 
Attorney-General  in  President  Lincoln's  Cabinet,  was 
retained  as  Davis's  counsel,  and  succeeded  in  saving 
his  client  from  both  civil  and  military  prosecution. 

Davis  was  born  in  Clarke  County,  Indiana,  March 
2,  1828.  He  began  his  military  career,  June,  1846, 
by  volunteering  for  the  Mexican  War,  as  private  in 
the  3d  Indiana  Infantry.  He  took  part  in  the  battle 
of  Buena  Vista,  was  appointed  2d  Lieutenant  1st  U. 
S.  Artillery,  June  17,  1848  ;  1st  Lieutenant,  February 
29,  1852;  and  Captain,  May  14,  1861.  He  was  en- 
gaged in  Anderson's  defence  of  Fort  Sumter,  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  Civil  War,  April,  1861  ;  and  in 
August  of  that  year  became  Colonel  of  the  22d 
Regiment  of  Indiana  Volunteers.  Before  the  close  of 
the  War  he  had  reached  the  grade  of  Major-General 
of  volunteers,  and  the  command  of  the  14th  Army 
Corps ;  to  which  General  Sherman  says  he  had  "  fairly 

*  Collin'  s  History  of  Kentucky  is  in  error  in  stating  that  ' '  General 
Davis  was  never  indicted,  nor  tried  by  the  civil  authorities. ' '  Page 
581,  Vol.  II. 


KILLED  BY  A  BROTHER  SOLDIEE.  497 

risen  by  merit  and  hard  service."  u  He  threw  his 
whole  soul  into  the  contest/'  adds  General  Sherman, 
"  and  wherever  fighting  was  hardest  for  four  years,  we 
find  him  at  the  front.  .To  recount  his  deeds  would 
require  a  volume."  When  the  War  was  over,  he  was 
appointed  Colonel  of  the  23d  U.  S.  Infantry,  and  held 
that  office  until  his  death  from  pneumonia,  November 
30,1879. 

Davis  was  brave,  quiet,  obliging,  humorous  in  dis- 
position, and  full  of  ambition,  daring,  endurance,  and 
self-confidence.  He  felt  that  he  was  a  born  military 
chieftain.  As  early  as  1852,  w^hen  he  was  but  twenty- 
four  years  of  age,  and  only  a  2d  Lieutenant,  I  heard 
him  express  entire  confidence  in  his  ability  to  com- 
mand an  expedition  for  the  invasion  and  capture  of 
the  Island  of  Cuba.  The  last  years  of  his  life  were 
passed  in  broken  health,  and  were  somewhat  embit- 
tered by  disappointment  at  not  receiving  the  Brigadier- 
Oeneralcy,  for  which  he  felt  qualified,  and  which  he, 
as  well  as  others,  thought  he  had  earned  by  his  ser- 
vices in  the  Civil  War ;  but  I  never  heard  that  he  ex- 
pressed, and  I  do  not  believe  that  he  felt,  any  regret 
for  having  killed  Nelson. 

o 

Nelson  was  born  at  Maysville,  Ky.,  September  27, 
1824 ;  was  appointed  Acting  Midshipman  in  the  Navy, 
January  28,  1840;  Passed  Midshipman,  July  11,  1846; 
Lieutenant,  September  18,  1855;  and  Lieutenant- 
Commander,  August  5,  1862. 

In  the  Navy  he  acquired  the  principles  and  rules  of 
rigid  obedience  and  discipline,  which  he  applied  with 
marked  effect  to  the  volunteer  land  forces  that  came 
under  his  control  early  in  the  Civil  War.  He  was 


498  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

distinguished  for  gallant  and  meritorious  services  as  a 
Navy  officer  in  the  War  with  Mexico.  When  the  Ke- 
bellion  broke  out  in  1861,  Nelson  was  on  duty  at  the 
Washington  Navy-Yard.  His  pronounced  Unionism, 
and  his  clearness  and  vigor  in  discussing  existing 
affairs  and  forecasting  the  course  of  events,  at  once  at- 
tracted the  favorable  notice  of  the  Government.  In 
the  summer  of  1861,  his  native  State,  Kentucky,  was 
torn  by  contending  parties,  one  trying  to  drag  her  into 
rebellion,  another  seeking  her  distinct  action  in  favor 
of  the  Union  cause,  and  a  third  advocating  the  middle 
course  of  armed  neutrality.  At  that  critical  time,  Nel- 
son, an  officer  of  the  Navy,  was  directed  to  report  for 
special  duty  to  the  Secretary  of  War ;  and  under  date 
of  July  1, 1861,  was  "ordered  by  the  Adjutant-General 
of  the  Army  to  organize  and  muster  into  the  United 
States  Service,  volunteer  troops  from  East  Tennessee,. 
West  Tennessee,  and  South-East  Kentucky."  Under 
these  instructions,  but  left  to  rely  mainly  upon  his  own 
resources,  judgment,  and  discretion,  Nelson  went  to 
Kentucky  and  established  "Camp  Dick  Kobinson,"  a 
spot  that  is  now  historic  as  the  scene  of  the  early 
labors  by  which  he  began  an  active  defence  against 
the  invaders  and  the  internal  foes  of  his  native  State, 
and  anchored  her  to  the  cause  of  the  Union. 

On  the  16th  of  September,  1861,  he  was  appointed 
Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  Volunteers,  and  his  authority 
was  extended  to  the  command  of  troops  operating  in 
Eastern  Kentucky.  Buell  assumed  command  of  the 
Department  of  the  Ohio  (including  Kentucky)  Novem- 
ber 15,  1861,  and  Nelson  then  fell  under  his  control. 
When  Buell  organized  the  army  which  was  first  called 


KILLED  BY  A  BROTHER  SOLDIER.  499 

the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  and  later  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  he  assigned  Nelson  to  the  command  of 
the  4th  Division.  From  that  time  until  his  death  (Sep- 
tember 29,  1862)  Nelson's  career  grew  more  and  more 
brilliant  and  meritorious  ;  and  on  account  of  his  gal- 
lantry and  good  conduct  in  the  campaign  at  Shiloh 
(April,  1862),  he  was  promoted  to  the  grade  of  Major- 
General.  The  summary  of  services  and  character, 
made  in  Buell's  order  issued  upon  the  occasion  of  Nel- 
son's death,  is  enough  for  the  purpose  of  this  article. 
The  order  says : 

"  The  General  commanding  announces  with  inex- 
pressible regret,  the  death  of  Major-General  William 
Nelson,  which  occurred  in  this  city  at  half-past  eight 
o'clock  this  morning.  The  deceased  was  bred  a  sailor, 
and  was  an  officer  of  the  Navy  while  holding  a  com- 
mission in  the  military  service.  History  will  honor 
him  as  one  of  the  first  to  organize  by  his  individual 
exertion,  a  military  force  in  Kentucky,  his  native 
State,  to  rescue  her  from  the  vortex  of  rebellion  to- 
ward which  she  was  drifting. 

"  He  was  a  man  of  extensive  information,  compre- 
hensive views,  and  great  energy  and  force  of  character. 
By  his  nature  he  was  intolerant  of  disobedience,  or 
neglect  of  public  duty ;  but  no  man  was  more  prompt 
to  recognize  and  foster  merit  in  his  inferiors ;  and  in 
his  own  conduct  he  set  an  example  of  vigilance,  indus- 
try, and  prompt  attention  to  duty  which  he  exacted 
from  others.  In  battle  his  example  was  equally 
marked.  On  more  than  one  field,  at  Shiloh,  Rich- 
mond, and  Ivy  Mountain,  he  was  conspicuous  for  his 
gallant  bearing." 


500  MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 

Nelson's  remains  were  buried  at  Cave-Hill  Cemetery, 
Louisville,  October  2,  1862.  On  the  21st  of  August, 
1863,  they  were  transferred  to  Camp  Dick  Robinson, 
and  interred  there  with  appropriate  honors  ;  but  were 
subsequently  removed  by  his  relatives  to  his  native 
place,  Maysville,  Ky.,  where  they  now  rest. 

Erroneous  versions  of  the  encounter  between  Nelson 
and  Davis,  unfavorable  to  the  former,  were  scattered 
broadcast  at  the  time.  Nelson's  habitual  violence  of 
character  was  exaggerated,  the  idea  of  retribution  sup- 
planted the  demands  of  justice ;  and  public  attention 
became  fixed  upon  Nelson's  alleged  violent  conduct 
toward  men  generally,  and  not  upon  Davis's  specific  act 
of  violence  in  shooting  Nelson.  Though  Davis  was 
aggrieved,  it  is  difficult  to  see  now,  even  if  it  was  not 
then,  how  he  can  be  justified  in  provoking  the  final 
quarrel  and  committing  the  foul  deed  of  death.  The 
facts  will  not  sustain  the  theory  of  self-defence ;  and 
the  military  law,  as  he  well  knew,  offered  prompt  and 
ample  redress  for  all  the  wrong  Nelson  had  done  him 
at  their  first  meeting.  But  he  made  no  appeal  to  law. 
On  the  contrary  he  deliberately  took  all  law  into  his 
own  hands.  Whether  he  proceeded  solely  upon  his 
own  judgment,  or  was  advised  and  incited  by  others, 
is  not  positively  known ;  but  I  do  not  doubt  that 
Morton,  and  perhaps  others,  without  designing  or  fore- 
seeing the  fatal  consequences,  encouraged  Davis  to 
insult  Nelson  publicly  for  wrong  done  in  an  official 
interview.  One  step  led  to  another  in  the  attempt  to 
place  and  fix  the  insult,  until  the  end  was  Nelson's 
violent  death. 

It  was  a  cruel  fate  that  brought  about  a  collision 


KILLED  BY  A  BROTHER  SOLDIER.  501 

between  these  two  rash  men.  General  officers  whose 
country  needed  them,  great  soldiers,  brother  soldiers, 
the  one — bearing  an  unhealed  wound  received  in 
battle  for  the  cause  to  which  both  had  pledged  their 
lives — was  slain  by  the  other,  the  Union  arms,  at  a 
critical  juncture,  lost  services  of  incalculable  value,  and 
the  result  of  a  great  campaign  was  very  different  from 
what  it  would  have  been  if  these  men  had  not  pre- 
vented each  other  from  performing  their  proper  parts 
in  it. 

NOTE. 

Many  erroneous  accounts  of  this  tragic  encounter 
have  been  published.  One  of  the  latest  is  that  of  a 
correspondent  of  the  Philadelphia  Press,  who  wrote 
to  that  paper  from  Cleveland,  Ohio,  February  23, 1885, 
as  follows : 

"  General  James  B.  Steedman  was  an  eye-witness  to 
the  killing  of  General  Nelson,  the  bully,  by  General 
Jeff.  C.  Davis,  a  quiet,  little  man  whom  he  had  grossly 
insulted. 

"  There  was  a  lot  of  us  standing  at  the  Gait  House 
bar,"  said  he,  "  among  them  being  General  John  T. 
Croxton,  of  the  Kentucky  Infantry.  I  heard  voices 
down  the  long  hall  and  looked  that  way,  and  saw  a 
group  in  which  were  General  Nelson,  Governor  Mor- 
ton, and  General  Davis.  They  were  quite  excited 
and  talking  in  a  vehement  manner.  Almost  imme- 
diately Nelson  drew  back  his  right  hand  and  slapped 
Davis  in  the  face.  Davis  was  a  small  man,  while  Nel- 
son was  over  six  feet  tall,  weighed  well  on  to  three 
hundred  pounds,  and  was  as  strong  as  a  giant.  I 


502  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

turned  to  Croxton  and  said :  '  There  is  going  to  be 
trouble.  Nelson  has  struck  Davis.'  We  moved  toward 
the  group,  and  as  we  did  so  Nelson  moved  back  a  few 
steps  and  leaned  against  the  office  rail.  Morton  and 
Davis  moved  back  a  short  distance.  The  former  took 
a  pistol  from  his  hip-pocket  and  handed  it  to  Davis, 
who  stepped  forward,  levelled  it  and  fired.  Nelson 
threw  his  hand  up  to  his  breast  and  said  :  i  Jim,  I'm  a 
dead  man;  send  for  an  Episcopal  minister.'  We  all 
took  hold  of  him  and  carried  him  into  a  little  side 
room.  His  clothes  were  thrown  open,  and  near  the 
heart  was  found  a  small  blue  mark,  about  the  size  of 
a  tehot.  No  blood  was  seen,  and  the  wound  had  closed. 
A  clergyman  came  running  in,  and  as  he  entered  we 
withdrew  and  closed  the  door.  In  ten  minutes  Nel- 
son was  dead. 

"  Davis  remained  quietly  near  where  the  encounter 
had  taken  place.  .Among  those  who  first  appeared  in 
answer  to  the  shot  was  a  policeman,  who  placed  Davis 
under  arrest.  He  went  along  quietly,  but  was  soon 
released  on  the  demand  of  General  Buell  or  the 
Mayor.  He  was  never  called  to  account  in  any  way 
for  the  deed.  There  was  nothing  else  the  man  could 
have  done  under  the  circumstances.  He  would  have 
had  no  show  in  a  physical  contest.  To  have  received 
a  blow  in  that  manner  and  in  that  public  place,  and 
then  to  have  walked  away  with  his  hands  in  his 
pockets,  would  have  driven  him  from  the  Army  in 
disgrace.  There  have  been  questions  raised  as  to 
whether  Morton  furnished  the  weapon  or  not.  I  was 
not  near  enough  to  see  that  it  was  a  pistol  he  gave 
Davis,  but  I  do  know  he  took  something  from  his 


KILLED  BY  A  BROTHER  SOLDIER.  503 

pocket,  handed  it  over,  and  that  Davis  raised  his 
hand  and  immediately  fired.  The  homicide  did  not 
seem  to  change  Davis  in  the  least — he  was  always  a 
morose,  quiet  man." 

A  more  formal  and  more  erroneous  account,  as  well 
as  a  more  unjust  one  to  Nelson,  is  found  in  Shaler's 
"  History  of  Kentucky  "  (p.  319)  :  "Always  a  man  of 
passionate  nature,  the  defeat  of  his  forces  by  Kirby 
Smith  made  him  furious,  though  he  was  responsible 
for  the  condition  that  brought  it  about,  for  to  him 
more  than  to  any  one  else  must  be  attributed  the 
leaving  of  Morgan's  forces  at  Cumberland  Gap.  When 
organizing  the  forces  in  Louisville  under  Buell,  his 
rage  broke  forth  against  General  J.  C.  Davis.  Dur- 
ing a  trifling  dispute  concerning  some  unimportant 
matter,  he  insulted  his  opponent,  and  on  his  dignified 
remonstrance  struck  him  with  his  hand.  Davis  in- 
stantly killed  him.  Davis's  act  was  generally  ap- 
proved by  his  brother  soldiers."  In  a  foot-note  to 
this  the  author  says  in  justification  of  Davis  :  "  In 
war  the  personal  dignity  of  officers  and  men  must  be 
preserved.  It  cannot  be  kept  without  such  cruel 
customs." 

The  foregoing  statement  that  "he  insulted  his  op- 
ponent, and  on  his  dignified  remonstrance  struck  him 
with  his  hand,"  leaves  a  doubt  as  to  who  made  the 
dignified  remonstrance,  who  was  struck,  who  did  the 
striking,  and  whose  hand  was  used  for  the  blow ;  but 
there  can  be  no  doubt  about  the  general  inaccuracy  of 
Professor  Shaler's  account  of  the  affair. 

The  assertion  that  Nelson,  "  more  than  any  one 
else,"  was  responsible  for  leaving  Morgan's  forces  at 


504  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

Cumberland  Gap,  or  that  he  was  in  any  degree  re- 
sponsible for  it,  is  erroneous.  He  had  no  authority 
or  responsibility  in  the  matter.  He  was  subordinate 
to  Gen.  H.  G.Wright,  who,  as  Department  Commander 
assigned  by  the  President,  controlled  Morgan.  But 
Wright  even,  superior  as  he  was  to  Nelson,  was  not 
responsible  for  Morgan's  remaining  at  Cumberland 
Gap  after  the  position  had  been  turned  by  Kirby 
Smith's  advance  into  Kentucky.  On  the  22d  of 
August,  eight  days  before  the  defeat  which  according 
to  the  author  settled  Nelson  into  a  month's  "  rage," 
Halleck,  the  General-in-Chief  of  the  Army — pursuing 
a  precedent  determination  -  -  telegraphed  Morgan  : 
"  Hold  on  firmly.  I  will  see  that  you  are  very  soon 
supported  by  other  troops " ;  and  on  the  30th  of 
August  he  telegraphed  Wright :  "  The  relief  of  Mor- 
gan and  the  holding  of  Cumberland  Gap  are  deemed 
of  the  first  importance"  Halleck,  therefore,  held  Mor- 
gan at  Cumberland  Gap.  Nelson  had  nothing  to  do 
with  it. 

The  difficulty  between  Nelson  and  Davis  occurred, 
not  when  Nelson  "  was  organizing  the  forces  in  Louis- 
ville under  Buell"  but  when  he  was  organizing  them 
under  himself,  and  in  the  excitement  of  a  threatened 
attack  upon  the  city. 

In  the  author's  account,  the  two  interviews  between 
Nelson  and  Davis,  which  were  about  a  week  apart, 
are  merged  into  one ;  and  Nelson  is  represented  as 
first  insulting  Davis,  and  then  striking  him  when 
Davis  submitted  a  "  dignified  remonstrance."  This  is 
incorrect  and  unjust. 

In  his  attempt  to  justify  Davis  the  author  says  : 


KILLED  BY  A  BROTHER  SOLDIER.  505 

"  In  war  the  personal  dignity  of  officers  and  men  must 
be  preserved.  It  cannot  be  kept  without  maintaining 
such  cruel  practices."  The  duty  of  maintaining  per- 
sonal dignity  is  not  confined  to  war,  nor  to  soldiers, 
nor  does  it  depend  upon  "  cruel  practices  "  either  in 
peace  or  war.  No  men  have  so  little  excuse  for  re- 
sorting to  the  pistol  and  the  bowie-knife,  in  their 
dealings  with  one  another,  as  the  very  men  whom  the 
author  encourages  in  the  use  of  them.  Soldiers  are 
not  only  protected  by  the  civil  code,  but  by  the  more 
stringent  military  code,  to  which  they  are  pledged  by 
oath  of  office,  and  by  duty  to  their  country. 

NEW  YORK,  September  1,  1885. 


AETICLE   XIV. 

Ouster's  Defeat  by  Sitting  Bull/ 

Speaking  broadly,  battles,  as  public  events,  are 
always  sharp  and  conspicuous.  Their  results  are  im- 
mediate and  important.  These  are  reasons  why  we 
are  both  hasty  and  extravagant  in  criticising  the  parts 
played  in  them  by  the  principal  actors.  Before  we 
have  sufficient  information  to  deal  modestly  with 
praise  or  blame,  we  commence  an  arbitrary  and  lavish 
distribution  of  glory  and  shame.  The  erection  of 
monuments  to  the  dead,  and  the  sinking  of  bottomless 
pits  for  some  of  the  living,  are  begun  before  the  smoke 
has  sufficiently  cleared  away  to  permit  a  fair  view  of 
the  battlefield  ;  and  it  often  happens  that  information 
which  should  have  been  patiently  waited  for,  conies  in 
time  to  stop  both  the  monument  and  the  pit,  before 
the  one  has  risen  above,  or  the  other  sunk  below,  the 
surface  of  the  earth. 

As  will  be  seen  further  on,  it  is  not  our  purpose  to 
discourage  the  noble  sentiment  that  is  manifesting 
itself  in  subscriptions  for  a  monument  to  Ouster.  We 
aim  only  to  enjoin  moderation  in  judgment  and  action 
towards  all  concerned  in  the  recent  disaster  on  the 
Little  Big  Horn.  There  are  two  sides  to  every  case, 
but  in  this  instance  one  side  is  silenced  by  death. 
General  Terry  has  been  placed  in  a  somewhat  false 
position  by  the  relative  order  in  which  his  two  reports 

*  Army  and  Navy  Journal,  July  22,  1876. 

506 


OUSTER'S  DEFEAT  BY  SITTING  BULL.  507 

reached  the  public.  The  second  one,  marked  "  Confi- 
dential/' and  evidently  intended  only  as  an  explana- 
tion to  his  military  superior,  Sheridan,  was,  accident- 
ally, the  first  received,  and  was  evidently  published  in 
response  to  the  public  anxiety ;  whereas  the  official 
report  of  the  occurrence  was  not  received  at  Army 
Headquarters,  and  could  not  be  given  out,  nntil  an 
erroneous,  impression,  to  the  effect  that  Terry  had  been 
eager  to  seize  the  public  ear  in  his  own  defence — had 
been  created  by  the  confidential  explanation.  These 
two  reports  taken  in  connection  with  such  other  reliable 
information  as  has  come  to  hand,  justify  certain  gene- 
ral inferences  : 

1st.  The  enemy  was  underrated  by  Sherman,  Sheri- 
dan, Terry,  Crook,  and  Custer.  It  should  be  borne  in 
mind  that  when  Custer  left  Terry,  June  22,  both  were 
ignorant  of  the  fact  that  the  enemy  they  were  seeking 
had  defeated  Crook  on  the  17th  of  that  month. 

2d.  Ignorant  of  the  enemy's  real  strength  and 
prowess,  Terry,  as  wrell  as  Custer,  thought  that  the 
7th  Cavalry  (12  companies)  under  the  latter  officer, 
was  fully  able  to  defeat  the  Indians,  the  only  trouble 
apprehended  being  to  catch  them.  This  is  shown  by 
the  fact  that  Custer  did  not  want,  nor  did.  Terry 
require  him  to  take,  the  Gatling  battery,  which  would 
have  retarded  his  movements,  but  strengthened  his 
command,  and  the  fact  is  admitted  in  Terry's  confiden- 
tial explanation,  where  he  says,  ahe  expressed  the 
utmost  confidence  that  he  had  all  the  force  he  could 
need,  and  I  shared  his  confidence."  Under  this  impres- 
sion Terry,  the  commander,  being  fully  and  solely 
responsible  for  the  strength,  equipment,  and  orders  of 


508  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

Ouster's  force,  started  that  officer  on  the  expedition. 
That  Ouster  thought  he  was  strong  enough  does  not 
relieve  Terry  of  his  responsibility  on  that  point. 

3d.  As  to  the  instructions  from  Terry  under  which 
Ouster  moved.  They  are  dated  June  22.  Reno  had 
just  returned  from  a  scout  in  which  he  had  discovered 
the  Indian  trail,  but  had  turned  back  without  pursu- 
ing it  to  contact  with  the  Indians.  Terry  says  to 
Ouster — having  furnished  him  with  fifteen  days' 
rations — "  You  will  proceed  up  the  Rosebud  in  pur- 
suit of  the  Indians  whose  trail  was  discovered  by 
Major  Reno  a  few  days  since.  It  is  impossible  to  give 
any  definite  instructions  in  regard  to  this  movement^ 
and  were  it  not  impossible  to  do  so,  the  Department 
Commander  places  too  much  confidence  in  your  zealr 
energy  and  ability  to  wish  to  impose  upon  you  precise 
orders  which  might  hamper  your  action  when  nearly 
in  contact  with  the  enemy"  The  Department  Com- 
mander, however,  in  general  terms  indicated  his 
"  views,"  but  did  not  require  compliance  with,  if  Ous- 
ter saw  a  sufficient  reason  for  a  departure  from,  them. 
There  was  evidently  no  material  difference  of  under- 
standing between  the  two  officers.  In  Terry's  confi- 
dential explanation  of  July  2  to  Sheridan,  as  well  as 
in  his  letter  of  instructions  of  June  22  to  Custer,  the 
point  of  prime  importance  was  to  get  Custer  to  the 
south  of  the  enemy,  and  this  because  Terry  feared  the 
Indians  would  escape  if  they  had  the  least  opportunity 
^to  do  so.  It  was  not  in  Terry's  instructions,  and  it 
clearly  was  not  in  his  mind  that  Custer,  if  he  came 
"in  contact  with  the  enemy,"  should  defer  fighting 
him  until  the  infantry  came  up. 


OUSTER'S  DEFEAT  BY  SITTING  BULL.  509 

We  knew  but  little  of  the  country  except  that  it 
was  wild,  very  broken,  and  without  roads.  It  was 
surmised  that  the  enemy  was  on  the  Little  Big  Horn 
River,  but  his  position  was,  in  point  of  fact,  unknown. 
He  was  known,  however,  to  be  vigilant,  to  move  with 
celerity,  and  to  possess  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the 
country.  There  could  be  no  justification  for  any  plan 
of  operations  which  made  an  attack  dependent  upon  a 
junction  between  Ouster  and  Gibbon,  after  three  or  four 
days'  march  from  different  points,  in  the  wilderness. 

The  views  which  Terry  expressed  as  to  Ouster's 
best  line  of  march  would  probably  have  carried  the 
latter  farther  to  his  left — the  south — than  he  went. 
But  these  were  views  to  be  acted  upon  or  disregarded 
at  Ouster's  discretion,  and  they  were  evidently  ex- 
pressed with  no  eye  to  Ouster's  danger,  but  solely  to 
prevent  the  dreaded  escape  of  the  enemy. 

Admitting  for  the  moment  that  Ouster  had  gone 
quite  to  the  south  of  the  enemy,  and  that  Gibbon  was 
known  to  be  approaching  from  the  north,  there  were, 
still,  wide  doors  open  for  escape.  This  was  not  an 
enemy  to  be  leisurely  bagged,  and  if  Ouster  had  simply 
watched  him,  as  soon  as  the  Indian  vigilance  showed 
Gibbon  to  be  in  dangerous  proximity,  he  would  have 
escaped,  and  Ouster  would  have  suffered  disgrace  for 
not  attacking  with  a  force  the  sufficiency  of  which 
had  been  admitted  by  all  concerned.  Without  further 
argument  the  inference  is  fair  that,  finding  himself  in 
the  presence  of  the  enemy  whose  flight  was  to  be  ex- 
pected, with  its  well  known  serious  consequences  to 
our  side,  and  having  no  knowledge  of  Gibbon's  posi- 
tion, Ouster  was  right  in  attacking. 


510 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 


4th.  For  the  inarches  to  the  fatal  field,  the  prelim- 
inaries to  the  attack,  and  for  the  plan  of  battle,  Cus- 
ter  was  clearly  responsible.  Terry  says  that  Custer 
told  him  he  would  march  at  the  rate  of  about  thirty 
miles  a  day,  but  adds  that  "  on  the  22d  he  marched 
twelve  miles,  on  the  23d,  twenty-five  miles,  from  5 
A.M.  until  8  P.M.  of  the  24th,  forty-five  miles,  and  then, 
after  night,  ten  miles  further,  resting  but  without  un- 
saddling, and  then  twenty-three  miles  to  the  battle- 
field/' the  implication  being  that  some  blame  attached 
to  Custer  for  not  conforming  more  nearly  to  the  thirty 
miles  average.  It  is  easy  to  understand  that  through 
a  very  difficult  and  unknown  country,  no  great  regu- 
larity could  be  expected  in  the  marches  of  a  large 
military  force.  Water  and  grass  must  be  reached  at 
due  times,  unforeseen  obstacles  have  to  be  overcome. 

It  has  been  asserted  that,  smarting  under  the  wounds 
which  preceding  events  had  inflicted  upon  his  pride, 
Custer  dashed  recklessly  into  this  affair  for  the  pur- 
pose of  eclipsing  his  superior  officers  in  the  same  field, 
regardless  of  cost  or  consequences.  This  is  going  too 
far.  Custer  was  doubtless  glad  of  the  opportunity  to 
fight  the  battle  alone,  and  was  stimulated  by  the 
anticipation  of  a  victory  which,  illuminating  his 
already  brilliant  career,  would  make  him  outshine 
those  put  on  duty  over  him  in  that  campaign.  But 
his  management  of  the  affair  was  probably  about 
what  it  would  have  been  under  the  same  circum- 
stances, if  he  had  had  no  grievance.  His  mistake  was 
in  acting  in  mingled  ignorance  of,  and  contempt  for, 
his  enemy.  He  regarded  attack  and  victory  in  this 
instance  as  synonymous  terms,  the  only  point  being  to 


CUSTEK'S  DEFEAT  BY  SITTING  BULL.  511 

prevent  the  escape  of  the  foe.  Under  this  fatal  delu- 
sion he  opened  the  engagement,  with  his  command 
divided  into  four  parts,  with  no  certainty  of  co- 
operation or  support  between  any  two  of  them.  Three 
companies,  under  Benteen,  were  far  away  on  the  left, 
ordered  in,  it  is  true,  and  by  chance  they  arrived  in  time 
to  aid  Keno.  One  company,  under  MacDougal,  was  in 
rear  with  the  pack  train.  Reno  was  sent  to  the  left 
bank  of  the  river  to  attack  the  enemy  with  three 
companies,  while  Ouster  with  the  other  five  companies 
not  only  remained  on  the  opposite  bank  from  Reno, 
but  moved  back  of  the  bluff,  and  three  miles  lower 
down  the  stream,  thus  placing  mutual  support,  in 
case  of  necessity,  out  of  the  question,  and  fell  into  a 
complete  or  partial  ambuscade. 

Neither  ambition,  nor  wounded  vanity,  prompted 
these  fatal  dispositions,  nor  were  they  due  to  lack  of 
knowledge  of  the  principles  of  his  profession.  They 
proceeded,  as  heretofore  stated,  from  a  misconception, 
which  Ouster  shared  with  others,  in  relation  to  the 
numbers,  prowess,  and  sagacity  of  the  enemy. 


AKTICLE  XV. 

Farrer's  "  Military  Manners  and 
Customs." 

Under  the  misleading  title  of  "  Military  Manners 
and  Customs,"  James  Anson  Farrer  makes  an  earnest 
appeal  to  mankind  to  construct  a  temple  of  universal 
and  everlasting  peace.  But  in  place  of  beginning  by 
laying  a  solid  foundation  in  the  hearts  of  men,  and 
then  building  the  edifice  up  stone  by  stone,  the  plan 
is  to  commence  at  the  steeple  and  build  downward  by 
magic.  Soldiers,  whose  business  it  is  to  conduct  war, 
are  called  upon  to  prevent  it.  The  process  is  easy. 
All  soldiers  must  at  once  resolve  that  they  will  not 
fight  except  in  a  cause  that  is  just,  and  then  only  in 
defence  of  their  country.  Everybody  being  thus 
thrown  upon  a  permanent  defensive,  there  can  be  no 
offensive  ;  and  soldiers,  weapons  and  war  will  soon 
vanish  into  thin  air.  To  have  announced  this  end  in 
so  many  words  would  have  been  breaking  bad  news 
for  soldiers  too  suddenly  ;  but  it  follows  from  what  is 
disclosed.  With  soldiers  refusing  to  fight  except  on 
the  defensive,  nations  will  be  confined  within  their 
own  boundaries,  will  cease  to  want  what  they  do  not 
have,  and  will  be  quiet  and  contented  for  evermore. 

*  ' '  Military  Manners  and  Customs, ' '  by  James  Anson  Farrer.  author 
of  * '  Primitive  Manners  and  Customs,  "etc.  New  York :  Henry  Holt 
&Co.,  1885. 

Journal  of  Military  Service  Institution. 

512 


FARRER'S  "MILITARY  MANNERS.' 


513 


A  single  turn  of  one  wank  thus  throws  all  the  military 
machines  of  earth  out  of  gear,  and  blocks  the  game  of 
war  forever.  The  features  of  the  process  can  only  be 
described  here  in  general  terms.  Those  who  want  the 
details  should  read  the  book,  which  abounds  in  learn- 
ing and  information. 

Men  cannot  fight  without  courage  of  some  sort,  and 
"  the  soldier's  courage,"  we  are  told  (p.  7),  "  is  a  mi- 
racle of  which  discipline  is  the  simple  explanation." 
The  soldier  has  only  b}^  a  moral  effort  to  undo  the 
miracle  which  has  destroyed  his  moral  powers,  and 
fighting  must  cease.  The  plan  is  beautiful,  and  its 
execution  rests  with  the  man  of  war.  "The  soldier 
claims  to  be  a  non-moral  agent.  That  is  the  corner- 
stone of  the  whole  military  system  "  (p.  279).  Knock 
that  out,  "  and  the  custom  of  war  will  shake  to  its 
foundation,  and  in  time  go  the  way  that  other  evil 
customs  have  gone  before  it"  (p.  280). 

The  soldier's  part  in  the  demolition,  though  all-im- 
portant, is  quite  simple.  It  may  be  learned  in  two  or 
three  easy  lessons :  First,  he  must  evolve  from  his  in- 
ner consciousness  the  resolution  that  he  will  not  fight 
until  he  is  "  fully  satisfied  in  his  own  mind  of  the  jus- 
tice of  the  cause  he  fights  for"  (p.  277),  and  the  ob- 
ject must  be  (p.  264)  "  to  defend  his  country  in  case 
of  invasion."  Before  obeying  orders  to  fight  he  must, 
therefore,  ascertain  from  all  governments  concerned 
the  causes  of  quarrel,  and  render  judgment  upon  them. 
Secondly,  if  he  decides  that  the  war  is  to  be  offensive 
on  the  part  of  his  government,  he  must  discard  disci- 
pline and  refuse  to  fight.  But  if  he  finds  that  the  war 
is  to  be  defensive  and  just,  he  must  preserve  discipline 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

— the  miracle  that  makes  him  fight — and  proceed  to 
repel  the  enemy.  Thirdly,  he  should  be  vigilant  dur- 
ing the  progress  of  hostilities,  and  stop  fighting  when- 
ever the  war  in  his  judgment  assumes  an  offensive 
form. 

We  find  (p.  227)  that  "  fighting  is  only  possible  be- 
tween civilized  countries,  because  discipline  first  fits 
men  for  war  and  for  nothing  else,  and  then  war  again 
necessitates  discipline."  Thus,  an  evil  perpetual-mo- 
tion machine  is  running,  with  the  "  miracle  of  disci- 
pline "  as  its  main-spring.  The  soldier  who,  accord- 
ing  to  this  book,  has  always  been  the  worst  of  man- 
kind, and  gives  no  promise  of  improvement,  is  called 
upon  to  undo  the  miracle,  break  the  main-spring,  and 
wreck  the  machine  which  his  own  existence  depends 
upon  preserving  in  good  order. 

The  author  very  naturally  says  of  his  plan  (p.  277)  : 
"  The  objection  to  it,  that  its  adoption  would  mean 
the  ruin  of  military  discipline,  will  appear  the  great- 
est argument  of  all  in  its  favor,  when  we  reflect  that 
its  universal  adoption  would  make  war  itself,  which 
is  the  only  reason  for  discipline,  altogether  impos- 
sible." 

The  importance  of  destroying  discipline  and  war  is- 
shown  (p.  215)  where  it  is  said  that  war  is  an  "evil 
custom,  which  lies  at  the  root  of  almost  every  otherr 
and  is  the  main  cause  and  sustenance  of  crime  and 
pauperism  and  disease. "  War,  therefore,  not "  money,"' 
is  the  root  of  all  evil. 

If  the  principle  that  soldiers  should  pass  upon  the 
justness  of  the  decisions  and  orders  they  receive  from 
their  country  before  executing  them  is  sound,  it  must 


FARRER'S  ''MILITARY  MANNERS." 

apply  to  other  officers  and  agents  of  government  as 
well  as  to  soldiers,  because  individual  responsibility  is 
no  more  incumbent  upon  military  than  upon  non- 
military  men.  If  the  soldier  must  refuse  to  obey  duly 
constituted  authority  until  he  is  "  fully  satisfied  in  his 
own  mind  "  that  the  cause  in  which  he  is  ordered  to 
act  is  just,  so  must  the  marshal  or  the  sheriff  refuse  to 
obey  the  mandates  of  the  court  to  seize  person  or 
property  until  he  is  "  fully  satisfied  in  his  own  mind  " 
that  the  cause  in  which  he  is  to  make  the  arrest  or 
seizure  is  just.  In  short,  upon  the  principle  mentioned, 
every  man  would  have  to  disregard  constituted  author- 
ity whenever  he  differed  in  judgment  from  those  em- 
powered to  decide  ;  then  society  would  disintegrate, 
and  mankind  would  be  in  a  bad  way,  unless  by  a 
miracle  all  the  individual  elements  should  be  made 
perfect  at  the  same  time,  and  in  that  event  this  world 
would  be  of  no  further  use.  But  the  truth  is  that  sol- 
diers, marshals,  sheriffs,  and  men  generally  are  trying 
to  live  up  to  their  highest  lights.  As  Abraham  Lin- 
coln expressed  it,  they  are  trying  to  do  right  as  God 
gives  them  to  see  the  right.  Public  servants,  military 
as  well  as  civil,  are  sustained  by  judgment  and  con- 
science in  executing  the  legal  orders  of  the  duly  con- 
stituted authorities  of  their  country,  and  are  not  to 
blame  if  those  orders  are  not  abreast  with  the  morality 
preached  by  the  most  advanced  thinkers  of  the  age. 
Those  who  would  prevent  war  should  base  their  efforts 
upon  the  fact  that  war  results  from  the  character  and 
conduct  of  men,  not  from  the  existence  or  discipline  of 
the  few  called  soldiers.  If  every  soldier  and  weapon 
on  earth  should  be  destroyed  to-day,  and  men  left  as 


516  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

they  are,  they  might  be  fighting  to-morrow  or  next  day. 
Our  own  experience  supports  this  assertion.  We,  a 
peaceably  disposed  people,  have  several  times  resorted 
to  war ;  yet,  practically  speaking,  we  have  never  had  a 
standing  army — none,  certainly,  which  gave  the  mili- 
tary sentiment  any  power  among  us.  In  1861,  with  a 
population  of  some  thirty  millions,  we  had  only  about 
thirteen  thousand  soldiers.  The  great  war  that  broke 
out  that  year  was  caused  by  men  not  in  the  military  ser- 
vice, and  was  in  direct  opposition  to  such  military  senti- 
ment as  so  small  a  force  could  express.  Undisciplined 
and  unarmed  civilians  caused  the  war,  and  millions  of 
them  took  what  weapons  they  could  get  and  fought 
one  another,  until  one  side,  after  four  years  of  bloody 
strife,  established  what  it  thought  to  be  right.  They 
fought,  because  in  the  course  of  events  a  great  ques- 
tion arose  upon  which  civilized,  intelligent,  educated, 
honest  men  could  not  agree  ;  nor  could  they  agree  to 
disagree,  because  to  do  nothing  was,  as  they  saw  it,  to 
do  wrong.  They  thought  that  as  long  as  the  same 
God  that  gave  them  their  convictions  of  right  allowed 
them  strength  to  defend,  that  right,  the  cowardly 
abandonment  of  it  was  worse  than  war  and  devasta- 
tion and  death.  Soldiers  and  discipline  have  nothing 
to  do  with  causing  such  contests,  though  there  is  some 
variety  in  the  soldier's  manner  of  conducting  them. 
In  our  Civil  War  the  policy  of  some  commanders — 
prompted  by  a  public  sentiment  among  civilians  in  the 
North — was  to  impose  the  actual  horrors  of  war  not 
only  upon  the  men  in  arms  but  on  the  whole  people  of 
the  South.  On  the  other  hand,  of  all  the  prisoners 
taken  by  the  great  captain,  "  Unconditional  Surren- 


FAKKER'S  "MILITARY  MANNERS."  517 

cler  "  Grant,  not  one  was  ever,  with  his  consent,  treated 
with  the  least  cruelty;  and  the  kind  terms  which  this 
grini  soldier  granted  his  foes,  when  Lee  and  his  army 
surrendered  at  Appomattox,  created  wide-spread  and 
outspoken  indignation  in  the  so-called  moral  circles  of 
our  most  enlightened  civil  centres. 

The  disposition  of  the  author  to  attribute  war  to 
the  action  of  particular  individuals,  rather  than  to  the 
character  and  passions  of  men  generally,  is  shown  in 
his  statement  (p.  21)  that  "  writers  on  the  laws  of 
nations  have,  in  fact,  led  us  into  a  fools'  paradise  about 
war — which  has  done  more  than  anything  else  to  keep 
the  custom  in  existence — -by  representing  it  as  some- 
thing quite  mild  and  almost  refined  in  modern  times." 
It  is  hardly  fair  to  charge  great  and  learned  jurists 
with  deliberately  deceiving  men  into  the  sufferings  of 
war  by  misrepresenting  the  horrors  of  it ;  nor  does 
the  assertion  that  men  have  been  misled  in  that  way 
accord  with  our  e very-day  experience,  which  is  that 
the  horrors  of  war  are  known  by  all  men. 

Probably  to  remove  the  erroneous  impression  which 
he  says  writers  on  the  laws  of  nations  have  created, 
the  author  has  gleaned  history  from  the  dawn  of  time 
to  noon  of  the  present  for  examples  of  cruelty  and 
bad  faith  by  military  men  ;  but  he  does  not  compare 
them  with  the  cruelty  and  perfidy  of  non-military  men 
of  the  same  countries  and  periods.  He  omits  nothing 
that  could  tend  to  bring  the  profession  of  arms  into 
disrepute,  and  is  unsparing  in  his  denunciation  of 
military  men  and  measures.  "  The  soldier,  the  thief, 
the  murderer,"  he  says  (p.  119),  "are  seen  in  scarcely 
distinguishable  colors  "  ;  "  destruction  is  practised  for 


518  MILITAKY  MISCELLANIES. 

its  own  sake  " ;  "  the  burning  of  grain  and  villages  for 
the  mere  pleasure  of  the  flames,  forms  almost  inva- 
riably the  most  prominent  features  "  (p.  163)  ;  and 
humane  "arguments  hardly  ever  prevail  over  that 
passion  for  wanton  destruction,  and  for  often  quite 
unnecessary  slaughter,  which  finds  a  ready  and  com- 
prehensive shelter  under  the  wing  of  military  expe- 
diency." 

The  stratagems  of  war,  as  well  as  its  cruelties, 
receive  the  author's  severe  condemnation.  "What," 
he  asks  (p.  148),  "  is  the  moral  difference  between 
entering  a  town  as  a  spy  and  the  military  service  of 
winning  it  by  surprise  ? "  "  The  military  code  regard- 
ing the  fair  and  legitimate  use  of  fraud  and  deception 
has  nothing  whatever  in  common  with  the  ordinary 
moral  code  of  civil  life,  the  principle  openly  professed 
in  it  being  so  totally  foreign  to  our  simplest  rule  of 
upright  and  worthy  conduct,  that  in  any  other  than 
the  fighting  classes  of  our  civilized  societies  they 
would  not  be  advocated  for  very  shame,  nor  listened 
to  for  a  moment  without  resentment." 

After  looking  upon  these  highly  colored  pictures  we 
are  prepared  for  the  statement  (p.  153)  that,  uthe 
realism  of  war  threatens  to  become  more  repellent 
than  its  romance  was  once  attractive,  and  to  deter  men 
more  and  more  from  the  choice  of  a  profession  of 
which  similar  disgusting  scenes  are  the  common  and 
the  probable  episodes."  The  author's  wish  is  probably 
father  to  his  prediction,  and  is  no  doubt  due  to  his 
peace  principles,  which  are  so  strong  that  he  says 
(p.  139)  :  "  If  we  are  justified  in  contending  for  our 
rights  by  force,  it  is  hard  to  say  we  may  not  do  so  by 


FARRER'S  "MILITARY  MANNERS."  519 

fraud."  When,  in  contending  for  our  rights,  there  is 
no  difference  between  force  and  fraud,  when  men  be- 
come too  good  to  practise  stratagems  or  take  advantage 
of  one  another  in  war,  they  will  be  too  good  to  go  to 
war,  and  there  will  be  no  soldiers.  But  as  long  as 
the  individuals  constituting  nations  use  force  among 
themselves  in  contending  for  their  rights  ;  as  long  as 
societies  organized  for  the  common  good  of  their  con- 
stituent elements  have  governors,  marshals,  sheriffs, 
constables,  policemen,  jailors,  executioners  ;  as  long, 
in  fact,  as  men  need  government,  that  long  may  nations 
be  expected  to  contend  by  force  for  their  rights  as 
they  understand  them,  and  to  keep  armies  for  that 
purpose.  In  the  meantime  men  will  not  be  deterred 
from  entering  the  military  profession  by  the  horrors 
of  war,  the  defects  in  the  laws  of  nations,  orthe  pre- 
sumption that  force  is  as  bad  as  fraud  in  contending 
for  what  is  right.  Soldiers  who  continue  to  obey  the 
laws  of  their  country  and  the  laws  of  war,  need  not 
fear  being  mistaken  for  thieves  or  murderers,  even 
though  moralists  and  advanced  thinkers  see  grave 
defects  in  those  laws.  And  when  the  men  of  all  other 
professions  and  employments  conform,  as  closely  as 
soldiers  of  the  United  States  do,  to  established  •  law 
and  accepted  principles  of  morality,  justice,  and  honor, 
there  will  be  fewer  wars  and  fairer  dealing  among  men 
in  both  peace  and  war. 


APPENDIX  A. 

The  Court  of  Claims  in  the  case  of  Major  John  B.  Collins  v. 
the  United  States  (Reports,  Vol.  XIV.)  held  that  Congress 
may  "  authorize  the  President  or  the  head  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment to  appoint  an  army  officer,  because  the  officer  to  be 
appointed  is  inferior  to  the  one  thus  vested  with  the  appointing 
power.  The  word  inferior  is  not  here  used  in  a  sense  of  petty 
or  unimportant ;  but  means  subordinate  or  inferior  to  those 
officers  in  whom  respectively  the  power  of  appointment  may  be 
vested — the  President,  the  courts  of  law,  and  the  heads  of 
departments/'  .  .  .  "  Whenever,  therefore,  Congress  thinks 
proper  to  vest  in  the  President  alone,  in  a  court  of  law,  or  in 
the  head  of  a  department,  the  appointment  of  any  of  their 
respective  subordinate  officers,  other  than  those  named  in  the 
clause  under  consideration,  or  whose  appointment  is  otherwise 
provided  for  by  the  Constitution,  it  must  be  held  that  such 
officers  are  inferior  officers  in  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution, 
whose  appointment  in  that  manner,  Congress  has  the  power'  to 
authorize/' 

The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  (in  the  case  of  the 
United  States  v.  Germaine,  99  U.  S.,  503)  has  rendered  a  deci- 
sion in  accord  with  the  foregoing  views  of  the  Court  of  Claims. 
Whether  officers  of  the  Army  are  "inferior  officers/'  whose 
appointments  may  be  vested  ly  law  in  the  President  alone,  or 
in  the  Secretary  of  War,  is  one  question,  while  the  right  of 
Congress  under  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  which  say 
that  Congress  shall  have  power  to  "raise  and  support  armies," 
and  make  rules  for  their  government  and  regulation,  is  another 
question. 

On  the  25th  of  April,  1822,  the  Senate  of  the  United  States 
adopted  the  following  Report  from  its  military  committee:  "In 
the  8th  Section  of  the  1st  Article  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  it  is  provided  that  Congress  shall  have  power  '  to 
make  rules  for  the  government  and  regulation  of  the  land  and 

521 


522  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

naval  forces/  In  virtue  of  this  power  Congress  have  directed, 
both  with  land  and  naval  service,  that  promotion  shall  be 
according  to  seniority.  This  principle  has  heretofore  been  held 
sacred.  .  .  .  The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  pro- 
vides that  '  Congress  shall  have  power  to  make  rules  for  the 
government  and  regulation  of  the  land  and  naval-  forces. 
Under  this  article  of  the  Constitution,  it  is  competent  for 
Congress  to  make  suoh  rules  and  regulations  for  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Army  and  Navy  as  they  may  think  will  pro- 
mote the  Service.  This  power  has  been  exercised  from  the 
foundation  of  our  Government  in  relation  to  the  Army  and 
Navy.  Congress  have  fixed  the  rule  in  promotions  and  appoint- 
ments. Every  promotion  is  a  new  appointment."  (See  Am. 
State  Papers,  Military  Affairs,  Vol.  II.,  pp.  406-7.)  . 

Attorney- General  Brewster  said  in  an  opinion  in  the  Fitz- 
John  Porter  case:  "  I  am  aware  that  the  power  of  Congress  over 
military  and  naval  appointments  has  been  put  upon  grounds 
not  applicable  to  civil  appointments."  These  " grounds"  must 
be  the  constitutional  power  of  Congress  to  raise  and  support 
armies  and  make  rules  for  their  government  and  regulation. 
There  can  be  no  other  grounds  for  the  difference. 

The  Attorney-General  of  the  United  States  (14  Opin.  164) 
says:  "  It  may  be  regarded  as  definitely  settled  by  the  practice 
of  the  Government,  that  the  regulation  and  government  of  the 
Army  include,  as  being  properly  within  their  scope,  the  regula^ 
tion  of  the  appointment  and  promotion  of  officers  therein. 
And  as  the  Constitution  expressly  confers  upon  Congress 
authority  to  make  rules  for  the  government  and  regulation  of 
the  Army,  it  follows  that  that  body  may,  by  virtue  of  this 
authority,  impose  such  restrictions  and  limitations  upon  the 
appointing  power  as  it  may  deem  proper  in  regard  to  making 
promotions  or  appointments  to  fill  any  and  all  vacancies  of 
whatever  kind  occurring  in  the  Army,  provided,  of  course,  that 
the  restrictions  and  limitations  be  not  inconsistent  or  incom- 
patible with  the  exercise  of  the  appointing  power  by  the  depart- 
ment of  the  Government  to  which  that  power  constitutionally 
belongs." 

AS  it  is  conceded  that,  ~by  virtue  of  the  authority  to  make 


APPENDIX.  523 

rules  for  the  government  and  regulation  of  the  Army,  Congress 
may,  in  the  matter  of  Army  appointments,  impose  upon  the 
appointing  power  all  the  restrictions  and  limitations  that  Con- 
gress deem  proper,  and  as  the  power  to  make  Army  appoint- 
ments "constitutionally  belongs  "  to  the  appointing  power  only 
so  far  as  Congress  does  not  restrict  and  limit  it,  there  can  be  no' 
force  so  far  as  Army  appointments  are  concerned  in  the  At- 
torney-GeneraFs  proviso  that  the  rights  of  the  appointing  power 
shall  not  be  interfered  with.  ; 

In  the  opinion  already  cited,  Attorney-General  Brewster  said 
concerning  the  foregoing  extract  from  his  predecessor  :  "  Con- 
ceding all  that  is  here  claimed  for  Congress  under  the  provision 
of  the  Constitution  adverted  to,  it  does  not  follow  that  the 
right  to  regulate  appointments  to  offices  in  the  Army  can  be 
carried,  to  the  designation  of  particular  individuals  to  fill  such 
offices,  without  imposing  an  unconstitutional  restriction  upon 
the  appointing  power/'  In  this  as  in  the  preceding  extract,  the 
concession  and  the  denial  are  inconsistent.  As  the  right  is 
conceded  to  impose  in  Army  appointments  all  the  restrictions 
and.  limitations  Congress  deem  proper,  there  cannot  be  a  proviso 
that  the  unrestricted  and  unlimited  right  be  restricted  and 
limited  so  that  particular  individuals  are  not  designated  for 
office.  In  both  opinions  the  concession  concedes  the  whole 
case.  The  right  of  Congress  to  regulate  promotions  has  been 
exercised  without  protest  from  the  foundation  of  the  Gov- 
ernment. Yet  every  promotion  is  an  appointment,  and 
regulating  promotion  is,  at  best,  limiting  the  President  to 
the  designation  of  one  of  a  class,  and  is  often,  in  fact, 
the  designation  of  a  particular  individual.  This  iinporttan 
and  conceded  right  of  Congress  is  founded  in  their  consti- 
tutional power  to  raise  and  support  armies,  and  make  rules  for 
the  government  and  regulation  of  the  land  and  naval  forces; 
and  is  entirely  independent  of  the  question,  whether  officers  of 
the  Army  are  "  inferior  officers  "  in  the  meaning  of  the  term  as 
used  in  that  clause  of  the  Constitution  which  says  that  "  Con- 
gress may  by  law  vest  the  appointment  of  such  inferior  officers  as 
they  think  proper  in  the  President  alone,  in  the  courts  of  law,  or 
in  the  heads,  of  departments."  The  statutes  contain  many  exam- 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

pies  of  the  exercise  of  the  right  by  Congress  to  regulate  appoint- 
ments and  some  even  to  designate  individuals.  A  law,  approved 
June  17,  1874,  required  "that  an  additional  Major  be  added  to 
the  Second  Regiment  of  artillery,  to  be  filled  by  the  nomination 
and  appointment  of  Captain  James  M.  Robertson  of  said  regi- 
ment." The  President  approved  the  act,  and  executed  the  law, 
which  designated  a  particular  individual  for  the  office.  Acts  of 
like  bearing  upon  the  question  under  consideration,  though  not 
all  so  pointed,  were  passed  as  follows: 

March  1, 1873,  in  case  of  Ashton,  of  the  Navy;  March  2,  1874, 
in  case  of  Kilburn,  of  the  Navy;  June  16,  1874,  in  case  of  the 
Inspector-General  of  the  Army;  June  18,  1874,  in  case  of  Book, 
of  the  Navy;  June  22,  1874,  in  case  of  Plunkett,  of  the  Navy; 
June  23,  1874,  in  case  of  Preble,  of  the  Navy;  June  23,  1874, 
in  case  of  Payne,  of  the  Army;  January  30,  1875,  in  case  of 
Wykoff,  of  the  Navy;  March  3,  1875,  in  case  of  Beaumont,  of 
the  Navy;  March  3,  1875,  in  case  of  McLean,  of  the  Army; 
March  3,  1875,  in  case  of  Chamberlin,  of  the  Army;  June  21, 
1876,  in  case  of  Sinclair,  of  the  Army;  June  24,  1876,  in  case 
of  Olmstead,  of  the  Army;  June  26,  1876,  in  case  of  Emory,  of 
the  Army;  July  25,  1876,  in  case  of  Preston,  of  the  Army; 
March  3,  1877,  in  case  of  a  Signal  Sergeant  to  be  a  Lieutenant 
in  the  Army:  March  3,  1877,  in  case  of  Spencer,  Freudenberg 
and  Maley,  of  the  Army;  March  15,  1878,  in  case  of  Hammond, 
of  the  Army;  April  8,  1878,  in  case  of  Darling,  of  the  Army; 
April  23,  1878,  in  case  of  Armes,  of  the  Army;  June  19,  1878, 
in  cases  of  Walker  and  Mullen,  of  the  Army;  March  3,  1879, 
in  cases  of  Hunt  and  Collins,  of  the  Army;  February  19,  1879, 
in  case  of  Wyse,  of  the  Army;  and  March  3,  1879,  in  case  of 
Stanhope,  of  the  Army,  in  which  case  the  authorization  to 
appoint  the  individual  was  accompanied  "  with  directions  to 
the  Secretary  of  War  to  place  him  upon  the  retired  list."  An 
act  noteworthy  in  its  relation  to  the  power  of  Congress  to 
designate  particular  individuals  for  office,  was  that  in  case  of 
Major  Granville  O.  Haller,  7th  U.  S.  Infantry,  who  was  dis- 
missed in  July,  1863.  An  act,  approved  March  3,  1879,  required 
"the  Secretary  of  War  to  order  a  military  court-martial  or  court 
of  inquiry,  to  inquire  into  the  matter"  of  Haller's  dismissal; 


APPENDIX.  525 

"said  court  to  be  fully  empowered  to  confirm  or  annul  the 
action  of  the  War  Department  by  which  said  Haller  was  sum- 
marily dismissed;  and  the  finding  to  have  the  effect  of  restoring 
said  Haller  to  his  rank,  with  the  promotion  to  which  he  would  be 
entitled,  if  it  be  found  that  he  was  wrongfully  dismissed." 
Under  this  act,  Haller,  who  left  the  Army  a  Major  in  18G3, 
came  back  to  it  a  Colonel  in  1879. 


APPENDIX  B. 

SEC.  1.  That  when  any  number  of  officers  of  the  United 
States  Army,  not  less  than  two  hundred  and  fifty,  shall  signify 
to  the  Secretary  of  War  their  desire  to  unite  for  mutual  sur- 
vivorship annuity  protection,  and  shall  be  deemed  eligible 
thereto  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  to  make,  through  the  Pay  Department  of  the 
Army,  equitable  deductions,  determined  as  provided  in  section 
2  of  this  act,  from  the  monthly  pay  of  said  officers,  and  to  de- 
posit the  same  to  the  credit  of  the  Treasurer  of  the  United 
States,  to  be  passed  into  the  general  balances  of  the  United 
States  Treasury,  and  be  known  as  the  Army  Mutual  Survivor- 
ship Annuity  Fund. 

SEC.  2.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to 
adopt,  as  soon  after  the  passage  of  this  act  as  practicable,  a  set 
of  Survivorship  Annuity  Tables,  based  upon  suitable  Life 
Tables,  and  six  per  cent,  interest  to  regulate  the  deductions  to 
be  made  from  the  monthly  pay  of  such  officers  of  the  Army  as 
may  be  accepted  by  the  Secretary  of  War  under  this  act,  to 
secure  to  each  one  of  said  officers  the  survivorship  annuity 
which  he  may  elect  to  purchase  for  a  nominee  to  be  designated 
by  him. 

SEC.  3.     It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  have 


526 


MILITARY  MISCELLANIEB. 


such  examinations  made  of  officers  applying  for  purchase  of 
annuities  under  this  act,  as  he  may  deem  necessary  ;  to  issue 
such  certificates  of  purchase,  and  to  prescribe  such  rules  and 
forms,  not  inconsistent  with  this  act,  as  may  be  needful  to 
govern  the  applications  of  officers  for  said  annuities,  and  to 
secure  prompt  and  proper  responses  to  said  applications. 

SEC.  4.  The  purchase  of  a  survivorship  annuity  under  this 
act  shall  take  effect  from  the  date  that  the  application  therefor 
shall  receive  the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  the 
annuity  shall  be  due  to  the  nominee  from  the  date  of  the  death 
of  the  purchaser. 

SEC.  5.  Nothing  in  this  act  shall  be  construed  as  limiting 
the  number  of  annuities  which  may  be  purchased  by  the  same 
person  ;  and  in  case  any  purchaser  of  an  annuity  under  this  act 
shall  elect  to  terminate  the  monthly  deductions  from  his  pay, 
required  by  this  'act  on  account  of  such  purchase,  he  shall  be 
entitled  to  receive,  in  lieu  of  a  certificate  for  a  full  annuity,  a' 
paid  up  certificate  for  an  annuity  in  equitable  proportion  to  the 
amount  of  deductions  which  shall  have  been  made  from  his 
pay  on  account  of  said  purchase,  the  payment  of  which  annuity 
to  his  nominee  shall  commence  at  the  death  of  said  purchaser. 

SEC,  6.  Estimates  for  so  much  of  the  Army  Mutual  Sur- 
vivorship-Annuity  Fund  as  may  from  time  to  time  be  required 
to  pay  annuities  falling  due  under  the  provisions  of  this  act, 
shall  be  made  and  transmitted  to  Congress  in  the  same  manner 
as  estimates  for  pay  of  the  Army. 

SEC.  7.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Secretary  of  War -to  have 
the  annuities  falling  due  under  this  act,  paid  by  the  Pay  De- 
partment of  the  Army  in  the  same  manner  that  officers  of  the 
Army  are  paid;  and  all  laws  and  regulations  fixing  the  accoun- 
tability for  public  fund^  shall  apply  to  the  moneys  of  the  Army 
Mutual  Survivorship  Annuity  Fund. 

SEC.  8.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  to  sub- 
mit to  Congress,  annually  a  full  statement  of  the  Army  Mutual 
Survivorship  Annuity  Fund,  and  he  is  hereby  authorized  to 
adopt  such  rules  and  forms  as  may  from  time  to  time  be  found 


APPENDIX.  527 

necessary  to  carry  out  the  purposes  of  this  act;  Provided,  that 
no  compensation,  pay  or  fee  shall  be  allowed  to  any  officer  for 
services  rendered  under  this  act. 


Lieut.  Col.  J.  B.  Fry,  Asst.  Adjt.-GenL,  U.  8.  A. 

DEAR  SIR:  I  have  carefully  examined  the  project  of  a  law  for 
the  creation  of  an  Army  Survivorship  Annuity  Company,  sent 
to  me  with  your  note  of  the  1st  instant.  I  can  only  judge, 
without  hesitation,  of  the  object  of  the  law,  which  I  deem  of 
the  highest  importance  to  the  Army.  Whether  the  terms  as 
you  have  stated  them,  be  the  best  to  secure  the  object,  I  cannot 
say,  though  they  commend  themselves  very  strongly  to  my 
judgment.  Such  a  society  has  long  been  needed,  and  the  won- 
der is  that,  in  view  of  all  the  circumstances,  it  has  never  been 
created.  It  is,  in  my  judgment,  the  only  means  of  affording 
adequate  protection  to  the  dependent  widows  and  orphans  of 
deceased  Army  officers,  free  from  all  charge  against  the  Govern- 
ment. 

The  necessary  funds  will  be  easily  provided  by  the  officers 
themselves,  by  a  voluntary  reduction  of  their  receipts  from  the 
Army  Paymaster.  The  amount  of  this  reduction  will  be  re- 
tained by  the  Treasury,  and  be  available  for  the  current  expen- 
ses of  the  Government,  and  Congress  will  not,  I  am  sure,  in 
view  of  the  humane  object,  refuse  to  allow  an  interest  upon  this 
money  equal  to  that  paid  upon  the  most  favored  bonds  of  the 
United  States.  Should  your  project  become  law,  it  will  give 
me  great  pleasure  to  aid  the  company  forward  by  having  pre- 
pared a  suitable  set  of  Annuity  Tables  for  its  use.  Not  only  this, 
but  it  will  afford  me  great  pleasure  to  aid  in  any  other  way  in 
my  power. 

Very  truly  yours, 

WM.  H.  C.  BARTLETT. 
MUTUAL  LIFE  INSURANCE  Co.,  March  3,  1874. 


528  MILITARY  MISCELLANIES. 

General  J.  B.  Fry,  N.  Y. 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL:  I  have  read  with  great  care  and  inter- 
est the  proposed  bill  for  the  formation  of  an  Army  Mutual 
Survivorship  Annuity  Society,  with  remarks  accompanying  it. 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  plan  proposed  will  meet,  in  the  best 
possible  manner,  the  wants  of  the  officers  of  the  Army.  It  is 
simple  and  practicable.  The  expense  of  management  will  be 
so  small,  that  the  annuities  purchased  will  be  obtained  for 
the  smallest  possible  premiums — a  great  benefit  to  the  offi- 
cer— while  at  the  same  time,  the  premiums  may  be  so  arranged 
as  to  give  to  the  Government  all  the  profits  which,  with  the 
same  expenses,  could  be  made  by  a  well-managed  private  com- 
pany. 

The  arrangement  in  section  5,  of  the  revised  copy  sent  me 
yesterday,  of  giving  to  a  purchaser  desiring  to  cease  making 
payments,  a  paid  up  policy  for  an  equitable  annuity,  removes 
the  only  objection  that  had  occurred  to  me  on  the  first  draft  of 
the  bill. 

I  am  very  truly  yours, 

A.  E.  CHURCH. 

WEST  POINT,  N.  Y.,  March  13,  1874. 


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